The economic reference of 1957 in the USSR was a reform of the management of the national economy, carried out in 1957–65 . Characterized by the replacement of the centralized sectoral management system, which has been used since the mid-1930s [1] , with a decentralized, territorially distributed system, which in Soviet literature has been called the "territorial management system" [2] . Associated with the name of the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and (since 1958) Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. S. Khrushchev .
The reform consisted in dividing the territory of the USSR into the so-called “ economic administrative districts ” [3] with the creation within the regions, territories and republics of the USSR of a network of territorial economic councils to which enterprises that were previously subordinate to industrial and agro-industrial ministries were transferred. According to the initiators of the reform, the decentralization of the production management system would increase its growth, improve product quality, optimize the allocation of resources, reduce the cost of equipment repairs, and improve the organization of logistics [2] . However, a short period of decentralization in the early years of the reform aimed at breaking the rigidly centralized sectoral management system established in the mid-1930s led to the destruction of the unified technical policy and the disintegration of economic ties in industry and agriculture. An attempt to rectify the situation through the consolidation of economic councils and the merging of administrative economic regions led to the emergence of intermediate levels of government in the person of republican and union councils of the national economy and sectoral state committees . Research, design and design organizations that were under the authority of the branch management bodies were cut off from industrial enterprises, which continued to remain subordinate to the territorial bodies. This led to a decrease in the quality of design, construction and reconstruction of enterprises, slowed down the introduction of new technologies, machinery and equipment and, consequently, led to a decrease in the quality of industrial products. Transformation of the industry management system from a sectoral to a territorial one and the evolution of the latter into a hybrid “production-territorial” system [4] failed to resolve the fundamental contradiction between the historically established system of vertical integration of production in industries and the attempt to control the sectors on a territorial basis. The problems of the Soviet economy continued to worsen, and by the mid-1960s the tendency of centralization had prevailed. Economic councils were liquidated, and the territorially distributed system of economic management through economic councils was replaced by the rigidly centralized sectoral management system familiar to the party and economic nomenclature through industry ministries and inter-sectoral state committees .
History
Initiation of reform
After the death of J. V. Stalin in 1953, the leaders of the country and the parties set a course for the development of socially oriented sectors of the economy - construction, agriculture, light industry and the production of everyday goods . However, by 1955, the policy of preferential development of the production of consumer goods was rejected in favor of the priority development of heavy industry [5] . At the XX Congress of the CPSU in 1956, a program was adopted to form a single national economic complex of the USSR. The implementation of the program was to ensure continuous technical progress, a rapid increase in labor productivity, the development of strategically important industries and, as a result, an increase in the standard of living of the Soviet people, which would bring the USSR to the first place in the world and demonstrate the advantage of a socialist economy over a capitalist one. At the end of January 1957, a note from the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, N. S. Khrushchev, on improving the management of industry and construction was sent to a wide circle of leaders of the country for discussion. The essence of the note was the proposal to abolish the departmental subordination of enterprises and give them over to the regions. Branch ministries, as unnecessary, were subject to liquidation. It was assumed that such a reorganization will significantly increase the growth of industrial production, improve the quality of products, resources will be distributed more rationally, and the problems faced by the Soviet economy will be solved more quickly. One of the reasons for the appearance of a note on the need for decentralization of management was the growing budget deficit of the USSR, and to cover foreign exchange expenditures it was necessary to sell more and more gold abroad. The ideological underlying decentralization was the aspiration of N. S. Khrushchev to create a "nation-wide state" in which the broad masses of workers are involved in all spheres of government, including production, where this course was expressed in decentralization and de-bureaucratization of the country's economy. According to Khrushchev, the existing centralization of management gave rise to "a number of abnormal phenomena", making it difficult for society to "come into communist society, having such an overly centralized economic management system" [5] .
At the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which was held in February 1957, a discussion was held on the reform of the system of economic management. N. S. Khrushchev’s proposal was supported by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan N. A. Mukhitdinov , the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR N. T. Kalchenko , the First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee F. R. Kozlov , Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee I. V. Kapitonov ; First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers M. G. Pervukhin , Minister of State Control of the USSR V. M. Molotov , Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR K. Ye. Voroshilov , First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine P. E. Shelest , Chairman of the USSR State Plan N K. Baibakov and his first deputy A.N. Kosygin [6] . However, the opinion of Khrushchev prevailed, and at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR held after the plenum of the party, a resolution was adopted unanimously to establish local councils of national economy ( economic councils , snh).
Period of decentralization (1957–1962)
Before the beginning of the reform, the management of industry and construction was carried out through sectoral ministries , in whose jurisdiction in 1957 there were more than 200 thousand enterprises. The beginning of the reform was marked by the abolition of 25 of the 37 allied and all-republican ministries of industry and construction, and the transfer of enterprises under their jurisdiction to the direct subordination of economic councils [7] . The remaining ministries retained the “planning functions of relevant industries and ensuring a high technical level in the development of production.” The same reorganization was carried out at the level of the republics of the USSR. The State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers on the long-term planning of the national economy was transformed into the State Planning Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers (USSR State Planning Committee) ; instead of the abolished State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for New Technology ( State Technical ), the State Scientific and Technical Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers was formed [8] . To implement the reform in the USSR, 105 administrative economic regions were created, 70 of which were in the RSFSR . In each such district, a national economic council functioned with its sectoral and functional departments and divisions, where economic management issues were decided in relation to a given economic administrative region depending on its specialization. In March 1958, Khrushchev, remaining the leader of the party, also assumed the post of head of the Soviet government , which, in the opinion of the country's leadership, was supposed to help advance the reform of economic management.
The decentralization of industrial management made it possible for the first time in the Soviet practice of public administration to bring management bodies as close as possible to the lower-level management objects — industrial enterprises. Thanks to this, the planning, coordination, procurement, construction, etc. processes have significantly accelerated. The possibilities of inter-sectoral cooperation within the boundaries of a single administrative economic region have expanded, creating prerequisites for the formation of integrated territorial-production systems on the territory of economic regions. At the same time, the territorial approach to industrial management has led to a breakdown in established economic and industrial relations between enterprises of the same industry, since enterprises were reformed in different administrative economic regions and subordinated to various economic councils. Also, the problems associated with the uneven regional economic development of the country. For example, the northwestern and central regions of the RSFSR had a much more developed industrial base - especially in the field of shipbuilding, instrument engineering, automotive engineering, machine tool construction, electrical engineering, electronics, construction materials, light and chemical industries [9] - and skilled personnel, including managerial than the Central Asian regions of the USSR, in whose economy agriculture prevailed. For this reason, less economically developed areas were doomed to a chronic lag in the development of their territorial production complexes.
The first stage of the reform was accompanied by propaganda actions and slogans. In January 1959, at the XXI Congress of the CPSU , the “complete and final” victory of socialism in the USSR was announced and a seven-year plan for the development of the national economy for 1959-65 was approved. The plan called for “ catching up and overtaking ” the capitalist countries and bringing the Soviet economy to the first place in the world in per capita production. At the XXII Congress of the CPSU , held in October 1961, a new, third program of the Communist Party was presented - a program for building a communist society in the USSR. In the field of economics, the program called for ten years (1961–71) to create the material and technical base of communism through the electrification of the country, integrated mechanization and mass automation of production. It was planned to increase the volume of industrial products by 6 times over 20 years, to increase labor productivity by 2 times in 10 years, and to double the level of labor productivity in the USA for 20 years.
The period of centralization (1962-1964)
Since the beginning of the 1960s, the centralization of the usual for the party and economic nomenclature in the system of economic management began to return. First, at the republican level, economic councils of the Union republics - the RSFSR, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan - were created. To coordinate their activities, in November 1962, the Council of National Economy of the USSR was created, and then the process of consolidation of local economic councils began through the merger of economic administrative regions into larger economic regions . As a result of the enlargement, the number of such areas was reduced from 105 to 43. The enlargement of the economic councils caused a chain reaction of changes in other elements of the control system. In particular, the economic planning system was reorganized, as a result of which regional councils for the coordination and planning of production activities appeared. In March 1963, the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR Council of Ministers (Supreme Economic Council of the USSR) was formed under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which was entrusted with the role of "the highest state body ... to resolve issues related to the work of industry and construction, and ensure the successful implementation of state plans" [10] . To carry out a unified technical policy, instead of abolished industrial ministries , state production committees were formed — sectoral authorities that concentrated in their jurisdiction research, design and design organizations that serve the production needs of enterprises under the control of economic councils. By the mid-1960s, contrary to the originally planned program, the trend of centralized sectoral management of the country's economy actually prevailed. At the same time, the degradation of the territorial management system as a result of the introduction of the branch management principle familiar to the Soviet economy was supported by demagogic arguments of government theorists about the birth of a new management style supposedly organically combining elements of centralization and decentralization [4] :
| There is a new stage in the interaction of production and territorial principles ... Instead of leading the industry in the whole scope of management functions by one body, a system of different bodies is formed - within the same industry. And here there is not a mechanical division of functions between different organs. We are talking about accumulation by territorial indication (for example, in the form of economic councils) of the entirety of operational management rights in the field and by functional-industry characteristic (through state committees, etc.) - strengthening centralized functions of planning, technical management, etc. designed to ensure unity and integrity in the development of individual sectors of the national economy ... As a result, the whole combination of territorial and sectoral "cuts" in the planning and management of the national economy becomes I was even more organic. |
The reforms of the economic management bodies were accompanied by the reorganization of the administrative-territorial division of the USSR and the restructuring of the activities of local party and Soviet bodies. In November 1962, the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to divide the party organs into industrial and agricultural. It was assumed that such a division would improve the party management of enterprises in the context of the territorial system of industrial management, formed by economic reform. As a result of these transformations, the number of local party and Soviet bodies doubled in each administrative region of the country - some were involved in industry, others - in agriculture; however, the intervention of the party organs in the system of economic management led to the actual replacement of the Soviet organs by the party organs.
Curtailing Reform (1964-1965)
Transformations aimed at introducing elements of sectoral coordination and centralization into a territorial control system failed to eliminate the fundamental contradiction between the vertical sectoral organization of production in the USSR, which was rooted in a rigidly centralized sectoral control system formed over decades, and an attempt at territorial, industry-wide production management, which was undertaken during the implementation of the 1957 reform. By the mid-1960s, the territorial management system became territorial and sectoral, which aggravated its incapacity. The powerlessness of economic councils to solve the economic problems of the Soviet Union became apparent. On October 14, 1964, N. S. Khrushchev , the main initiator and supporter of the reform, was removed from the leadership of the party and the government with the phrase “for health reasons” [11] . A year later, in September 1965, a plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held , at which it was stated that “management of industry on a territorial basis, somewhat expanding the possibilities of interdisciplinary specialization and cooperation of industrial production within economic regions, led to the containment of the development of industry-specific and industrial relations between enterprises located in different economic regions, alienated science from production, led to fragmentation and multistage management. ARISING industries. " Участники пленума приняли решение о необходимости возврата к управлению промышленностью по отраслевому принципу [12] . По результатам обсуждения реализации реформы на пленуме было выпущено постановление ЦК КПСС и Совета министров СССР, в котором традиционным для программных партийно-советских документов хвалебным тоном были отмечено то, что «советский народ под руководством Коммунистической партии добился больших успехов в коммунистическом строительстве» и перечислены высокие экономические результаты, достигнутые за период с 1960 по 1965 годы; кратко обозначены проблемы, с которыми столкнулась попытка реформирования системы управления промышленностью; сделано заключение о том, что «дальнейшее развитие промышленности … и повышение эффективности общественного производства требуют улучшения управления промышленностью» [2] . Спустя несколько дней Верховный совет СССР выпустил соответствующий закон, предусматривавший упразднение системы совнархозов и восстановление системы управления посредством отраслевых министерств [13] .
Причины провала реформы
Практика децентрализованного управления советской экономикой посредством совнархозов себя не оправдала по нескольким причинам.
Главной причиной было то, что, несмотря на коренную структурную реорганизацию сложившейся централизованной системы управления, реформа затрагивала не сущность, а только форму этой системы. Система управления экономикой продолжала оставаться по своей природе командно-административной (решения об объёмах производства, ценах и расходах того или иного продукта принимало либо правительство либо совнархозы, а не определялось рыночной необходимостью, то есть спросом или предложением ); при этом ответственность за экономическое развитие страны была переложена с центральных на местные органы государственной власти и управления. В условиях централизованного государственного планирования и отсутствия рыночных механизмов и стимулов, реформа быстро привела к дезинтеграции советской экономики, в основе которой лежала жесткая вертикальная организация производства, включавшая интеграцию науки, профессионального обучения, планирования, производства и распределения его продуктов. Советский партийный и государственный деятель В. В. Гришин впоследствии отмечал, что результатом реформы стало нарушение сложившихся многими десятилетиями производственных, отраслевых и межотраслевых связей; по этой причине в развитии народного хозяйства появились большие диспропорции [14] .
Другой причиной свёртывания реформы было нежелание советской номенклатуры , усматривавшей растущую угрозу в децентрализации ввиду ограниченной независимости местных властей, терять своё господствующее положение в принятии экономических решений.
Итоги реформы
Реформа 1957 года не принесла желаемых результатов и закончилась возвращением к централизованной системе управления промышленностью. Реформа также не смогла решить проблему роста расходования золотого запаса страны, которая являлась одним из факторов, повлиявших на решение высшего советского и партийного руководства СССР о проведении реформы. В период с 1953 по 1965 годы через Моснарбанк правительство СССР реализовало свыше 3 тысяч тонн золота. Если в 1953 году на покупку продовольствия за рубежом было потрачено 250—300 тонн золота [5] , то в 1963 — 64 годы , когда реформа набрала полную силу, продажа золота составила 1244 тонны. Проведенная в 1961 году денежная реформа привела к девальвации рубля. В 1962 году начались перебои со снабжением населённых пунктов промышленными товарами и продуктами питания [15] .
Повышение розничных цен на мясо , мясные продукты и сливочное масло вместе с ухудшением условий труда вызвали волну забастовок и выступлений трудящихся в Краснодаре , Риге, Киеве, Челябинске, Ленинграде, Омске, Кемерове, Донецке, Артемьевске, Краматорске [16] . Подавление забастовки рабочих в Новочеркасске в 1962 году сопровождалось применением огнестрельного оружия и закончилось арестами и уголовным преследованием забастовщиков.
Темпы роста промышленности и сельского хозяйства продолжали снижаться. Особенно острое замедление роста наблюдалось в сельском хозяйстве, где вместо запланированных 70 %, рост сельскохозяйственного производства к 1965 году составил всего 15 %. Освоение целины превратило Советский Союз в экспортёра пшеницы в середине 1950-х годов. Однако вызванное засухами, пыльными бурями, а также неграмотным использованием некоторых земель в южных регионах, ввиду их особенности, привело к катастрофическому падению урожайности целинных земель. После этого руководство СССР впервые в истории страны решилось на закупку миллионов тонн зерна за границей [17] . В 1963 году за границей было закуплено 12,1 миллионов тонн пшеницы, в 1964 году — 50 тыс. тонн риса, в 1965 — 90 тыс. тонн соевых бобов [18] , что обошлось государству в сумму более 1 миллиарда долларов США. В целом не была решена проблема нехватки и качества товаров народного потребления. В 1962 году только 5,3 % советских семей имели холодильники (для сравнения, в США — 98,3 %) [19] .
Положительным результатом реформы были внушительные по сравнению с экономически развитыми странами количественные экономические показатели. В частности, к 1965 году национальный доход СССР увеличился на 53 % по сравнению с 1958 годом, производственные фонды выросли на 91 %, производство промышленной продукции — на 84 %. Реальные доходы населения выросли на одну треть. Были введены зарплаты и пенсии колхозникам. За счёт строительства зданий из крупных панелей заводского производства, жилой фонд увеличился на 40 %. В период с 1950 по 1964 годы площадь жилья увеличилась в 2,3 раза [5] . Российский историк В. А. Красильщиков так оценил экономические достижения того периода [21] :
| Хрущевское десятилетие — один из самых важных периодов в истории России/СССР XX века с точки зрения модернизации. Никогда на протяжении XVIII–XX веков разрыв между Россией/СССР и Западом не был так мал, как в эти годы. |
Практический опыт территориального управления экономикой был использован для уточнения и развития теории формирования территориально-производственных комплексов, основы которой были заложены советским экономистом Н. Н. Колосовским . В ходе реализации реформы наглядно проявились системные недостатки советской экономики и методов планирования и управления, которые тормозили рост производительности труда в народном хозяйстве. Это стимулировало общесоюзную экономическую дискуссию в 1962—1964 годы, которая в 1965 году вылилась в Косыгинскую реформу .
See also
- Денежная реформа в СССР 1961 года
- Реформа административно-территориального деления в СССР (1962—1963)
- Экономическая реформа 1965 года в СССР
Notes
- ↑ Министерства (рус.) // 2-е изд. / Б. А. Введенский (гл. ред.). — Большая Советская Энциклопедия , 1954. — Т. 27 . — С. 529—531 .
- ↑ 1 2 3 Постановление ЦК КПСС и Совета министров СССР от 30 сентября 1965 № 728. Об улучшении управления промышленностью
- ↑ Краткая географическая энциклопедия / гл. ed. A. A. Grigoriev . М.: Советская энциклопедия , 1962. Т. 3. 580 с.
- ↑ 1 2 Тихомиров Ю. А. Производственно-территориальный принцип в организации и деятельности аппарата управления // Советское государство и право . 1964. № 1. С. 22—32.
- ↑ 1 2 3 4 Пыжиков, 2002 .
- ↑ Алексей Гвишиани: «Не надо жалеть Косыгина!» // Правда.ру
- ↑ Советы народного хозяйства — статья из Большой советской энциклопедии .
- ↑ О дальнейшем совершенствовании организации управления промышленностью и строительством: Закон от 10 мая 1957 г. // Ведомости Верховного Совета СССР , 1957 г., № 11
- ↑ USSR. Экономические районы — статья из Большой советской энциклопедии .
- ↑ Об образовании Высшего совета народного хозяйства Совета Министров СССР: Указ Верховного Совета СССР № 1020а-VI от 13 марта 1963 г. // Ведомости Верховного Совета СССР , 1963 г., № 11
- ↑ Проект решения ЦК КПСС об освобождении Хрущёва от должности . Архивировано 26 ноября 2012 года.
- ↑ Нарышкин, Б. В. Коммунистическая партия Советского Союза в революциях и решениях съездов, конференций и пленумов ЦК (1898—1986) . — Т. 10 (1961—1965). - Ed. 9. — М.: Издательство политической литературы , 1986
- ↑ Об изменении системы органов управления промышленностью и преобразовании некоторых других органов государственного управления: Закон СССР от 2 октября 1965 г. № 4041—VI // Ведомости Верховного Совета СССР , 1965 г., № 39
- ↑ Гришин В. В. Катастрофа. От Хрущёва до Горбачёва. М., 2010. С. 15.
- ↑ Старохамская К. Что случилось в Новочеркасске? Генерал, который не стрелял . Ежедневный познавательный журнал «ШколаЖизни.ру» (8.12.2007). The appeal date is June 2, 2013.
- ↑ Криворученко В. К. , Пыжиков А. В., Родионов В. А. Коллизии хрущевской «оттепели». М., 1998. С. 88-89.
- ↑ Пихоя Р. Г. Почему Хрущёв потерял власть // Восток : альманах. — окт. 2004. — № 10 (22) . Archived June 5, 2013.
- ↑ Morgan, Dan. Merchants or Grain. — Penguin Books , 1980. — С. 159—162, 171. — ISBN 0140055029 .
- ↑ Жирнов Е. Жертвы холодильной войны (недоступная ссылка) . Коммерсантъ-Деньги . № 38(644) (2007). Дата обращения 8 мая 2009. Архивировано 21 октября 2010 года.
- ↑ История России: XX век: учебник для 9 кл. / А. А. Данилов , Л. Г. Косулина . М.: Просвещение , 1995. 366 с.
- ↑ Красильщиков В. А. Вдогонку за прошедшим веком. М., 1998. С. 138.
Literature
- Osmanov, M.E. Economic Year 1957 in the USSR and the Chita Region, a brief essay-Chita, 2018-12 p. http://social.zabgu.ru/system/study_works/works
- Pyzhikov A.V. Khrushchevskaya The Thaw: 1953-1964. - Olma-Press , 2002. - 512 p. - ISBN 5-224-033356 -X.