Mutual Assistance Pact between the USSR and Estonia

Since 1938, when England and France responded with the Munich Agreement to seize the Czechoslovak Sudeten Germany, and Poland took an active part in the partition of Czechoslovakia and refused to provide the Soviet Union with a corridor for troops that could come to the aid of the occupied country, the Soviet Union proposed England and France to create anti-Hitler coalition, which would include Poland and the Baltic countries. This proposal did not receive effective support until Germany seized the Memel Territory of Germany and forced Lithuania to sign a non-aggression pact with this country in March 1939.

Since England and France did not agree to issue security guarantees to the Baltic countries and actually lost their influence on them, Germany took advantage of this, April 28, 1939 inviting Estonia and Latvia to conclude non-aggression treaties. This happened in Berlin on June 7, 1939. The documents contained a secret clause according to which Estonia and Latvia pledged to take "with the consent of Germany all the necessary military security measures in relation to Soviet Russia." According to the agreement, the Baltic countries formally remained neutral, but in fact became dependent on Germany, recognizing that "the danger of attack existed only from Soviet Russia and that the sensible implementation of their policy of neutrality requires the deployment of all defensive forces against this danger." Germany pledged to provide assistance to the Allies "to the extent that they themselves are not able to do this", which in essence was a hidden military protectorate ^[1] .

On August 23, 1939, the USSR and Germany signed the Nonaggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union (Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact) ^[2] . Germany and the USSR agreed that the sovereignty of small states caught between two great powers is subject to liquidation ^[3] . According to the secret supplementary protocol on delimiting the areas of mutual interests in Eastern Europe in the event of a “territorial and political reorganization”, it was envisaged to include Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, as well as Bessarabia in the sphere of interests of the USSR ^{[4] [5] [6 ] [6 ] ]} .

At the negotiations on a trade agreement between Vyacheslav Molotov and Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter , which began on September 13, a sharp turn took place on September 17: there was an incident with the Polish submarine Orel , which was interned in the port of Tallinn on the eve of the surrender of the Polish government, and when the surrender came true on September 17 and the Soviet Union began to deploy troops to Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, a Polish submarine was able to leave the port of Tallinn and go to England.

On September 24, 1939, Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter and his wife arrived in Moscow at the invitation of the Government of the USSR. In the evening he was received in the Kremlin by the chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Molotov . Noting that the new trade agreement was ready, he indicated that the political relations between the Soviet Union and Estonia were unsatisfactory. “The escape of the interned Polish submarine from Tallinn shows that the Estonian government either does not want or cannot maintain order in its country and thereby threatens the security of the Soviet Union,” said Molotov. - The submarine was repaired in Tallinn, supplied with fuel, 6 torpedoes were left to it and given the opportunity to leave. The Soviet Union, which has significant interests on the Baltic Sea: a large port in Leningrad, large military and merchant fleets, is not protected from such surprises in the future. It is necessary to give the Soviet Union effective guarantees to strengthen its security ... and conclude a military alliance or mutual assistance agreement, which would at the same time provide the Soviet Union with the right to have strongholds or bases for the fleet and aviation in Estonia. ”

Already on April 17, 1939, the Latvian envoy to Estonia V. Šumanis informed the Foreign Ministry that “these days in Estonia the duration of military service has been equalized and extended for all military branches to 18 months,” and “it is planned to extend the general military in Estonia or May or June service for 2 years. " However, "according to experts, the current composition of the armed forces is so small (due to the years of World War II, when the birth rate was very negligible) that it is impossible even to conduct a one-time general mobilization , due to a lack of personnel." ^[one]

Selter departed for negotiations with the president and parliament in Tallinn.

By this time, a military group was deployed on the Soviet border with Estonia and Latvia, which included 160 thousand people, 700 guns, 600 tanks and the same number of aircraft. The Estonian army totaled only 16 thousand people, 30 tanks and 125 aircraft. On September 26, 1939, the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Kliment Voroshilov , ordered that on September 29 “deliver a powerful and decisive blow to the Estonian troops” with the simultaneous advance of the 7th Army in the direction of Riga, if the Latvian army supports Estonia. On September 27, the Soviet transport ship Metalist was sunk in the Gulf of Finland, in whose death the Soviet leadership blamed Estonia ^[7] . The Estonian army completed pre-mobilization preparations by September 27 ^[8] .

The plan of invasion of Estonia was approved by Voroshilov on September 28. The Baltic Fleet was tasked with destroying the Estonian fleet and its naval bases, blocking the access of ships to the Gulf of Finland and preparing the capture of the Tallinn fortified area ^{[9] [10]} .

September 26, the requirements of the USSR were discussed at a meeting of the commissions of the Estonian parliament on foreign affairs and state defense ^[11] . In conditions when Latvia and Finland refused to support Estonia, England and France (who were at war with Germany) were not able to support it, and Germany recommended accepting the Soviet proposal, the Estonian government went to negotiations in Moscow, as a result of which September 28 a “Mutual Assistance Pact” was concluded, providing for the deployment of Soviet military bases and 25,000-strong Soviet contingents in Estonia ^{[12] [13]} . The Estonian Parliament ratified the treaty on October 4 ^[11] .

Article I stipulated the obligations of the parties to render assistance to each other, including military assistance, “in the event of a direct attack or threat of attack by any great European power with respect to the maritime borders of the Contracting Parties in the Baltic Sea or their land borders through the territory of the Republic of Latvia, as well as and the bases referred to in Article III. ” Article III provided for the deployment of Soviet naval bases and airfields in Estonia (in Hiiumaa , Saaremaa and Paldiski ). ^[14]

On September 28, a confidential protocol was also adopted to the Covenant, which provided for the USSR’s right to keep garrisons of up to 25,000 people at airfields and bases during the European War. ^[15]

On October 11, a package of agreements was signed on the deployment of Soviet military units in Estonia, as provided for in article III of the Covenant ^[16] .

Article VI envisaged the entry into force of the pact on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification (took place on October 4 ^[17] ), the validity period was set at 10 years with an automatic extension of 5 years if no party denounces the pact a year before the expiration of the term.

After the restructuring revealed the details of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (on the division of the sphere of influence between Nazi Germany and the USSR) in the Baltic republics, a movement for sovereignty and mass non-violent actions of people rose (for example, the “ Baltic Chain ” 600 km long where people held hands ) in these republics led to the fact that on November 12, 1989, the Supreme Council of the Estonian SSR annulled its declaration of July 22, 1940 on the entry of the ESSR into the USSR. On May 8, 1990, the Supreme Council of the Estonian SSR adopted a law on the restoration of the Constitution of the independent Republic of Estonia in 1938 . On August 20, 1991, Estonia reaffirmed its independence. September 17, 1991 Estonia was admitted to the UN .

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• Pact and Protocol