Great Luke Campaign

Immediately after the successful siege of Polotsk ended, Stefan Bathory began preparations for a new campaign. Expenses for the Polotsk campaign amounted to about 330 thousand zlotys, while Batory received only 212 thousand from the Sejm, and he had to cover the remaining costs from his own treasury, as well as borrow ^[1] . In this regard, before the start of a new campaign, the king needed to obtain the consent of the Sejm to collect a new tax. At the Warsaw Diet, convened on November 22, Batory received the support he needed, despite the presence of a certain number of opponents of the new campaign. The positive decision of the Sejm was due to the military successes of Batory, which caused delight in society ^[2] . However, tax collection lasted much longer than the king expected ^[3] .

The preparations were delayed also because, according to Heidenstein , the soldiers who participated in the first campaign and clearly represented all the burdens of service were reluctant to go to war again ^[4] . According to Heidenstein, Zamoysky , who was the chief adviser and assistant to the king, had a great influence on the assembled detachment at his own expense ^[4] . 1,500 soldiers were recruited from the peasants of the royal economies , which met the resistance of their holders . A group of Hungarian infantry, recruited by King Krishtof’s brother, also joined the assembled troops ^[5] . The recruitment of troops was carried out by Ivan IV, however, according to Novodvorsky, the assembled army, although large, was a poorly organized and poorly led mass ^[5] .

Before the start of the campaign, it was decided to concentrate the troops in Chashniki , which were at the crossroads of roads to Velikiye Luki and Smolensk , thereby the enemy was not able to find out the final goal of the campaign, which was hidden until the very last moment ^[6] . On June 15, Bathory left Vilna , and on July 8 arrived in Shcheduty, a village five miles from Chashnikov, where he waited for the remaining troops to arrive ^[7] . A military council was immediately held at which it was to decide where to speak: in Pskov, Smolensk or Velikiye Luki. According to Heidenstein, the option of capturing Pskov was postponed until the time when enemy fortresses were taken, which would have remained behind in the event of an immediate appearance. Some members of the council advocated a march on Smolensk, appealing to its wealth and crowding, as well as to the fact that its capture would lead to easy submission to the Seversky region . Others pointed out that the road to Smolensk runs through an area previously devastated by the forces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which may cause a lack of supplies. In addition, a trip to Smolensk will divert forces from the main goal of the war - Livonia, and also open the enemy a free path to Vilna. The capture of the Great Onions promised great benefits: despite the woodland, which would impede the movement of troops, artillery and provisions could be transported along the Dvina and Usvyache rivers . The city was at an equal distance from both Smolensk and Pskov roads, which made it possible to control both of these routes from it, blocking the possibility of free maneuver for both Lithuania and Livonia. According to Heidenstein, the king was convinced that it was necessary to perform at the Great Luke also because they were “in the atrium of the Moscow state” and possessed a strong fortress, and therefore the threat to them would force the enemy to engage in open battle, which was what Batorius sought ^[8] . Finally, the area around Velikiye Luki was fertile, which excluded possible problems with a lack of provisions ^[8] .

By the time of the second campaign, Batory succeeded in reassembling significant forces of which the overwhelming majority went on a campaign to Velikiye Luki (over 48,000 people). The remaining troops were distributed in minor directions:

• In Ukraine and in Podolia - 777 people. quart troops , 530 people Registered Cossacks and about 550 people. hired infantry as part of the fortress garrison.
• On the Russian-Lithuanian border - 1100 people. in the detachment of Philo Kmites , 1700 people. as part of serf garrisons and 2900 people. as part of the gentry gentry and Tatar detachments.
• In Livonia - up to 3000 people. as part of the fortress garrisons.

The main army led by the king included the following troops ^[9] .

Crown army
Hired cavalry

• The Polish cavalry of hiring 1576-78: 4666 hussars, 256 Cossacks, 31 rebels. A total of 4953 people.
• The Polish cavalry of hiring in 1580: 1482 hussars, 56 Cossacks, 199 reitars. A total of 1727 people.
• The Polish cavalry of the regiment of Jan Zamoysky: 918 hussars, 217 Cossacks, 113. A total of 1302 people.
• Polish cavalry of the Podolsk regiment Mikolaj Senyavsky : 202 hussars, 795 Cossacks. Only 997 people.
• Hungarian cavalry: 1356 hussar

Mercenary Infantry

• Polish infantry: 2585 people
• Selected infantry : 1407
• Hungarian infantry: 3332
• German infantry: 50 people

Private mail

• Cavalry - approx. 3,500 people
• Infantry - approx. 1,500 people

Total Crown Army: approx. 22719 people, including OK. 13845 people cavalry and approx. 8874 infantry

Lithuanian army
Mercenary Cavalry : 2150 hussars, 1100 Cossacks, Pyatigorsk, Tatars, 80 horse archers. Only 3330 people.
Mercenary infantry : 1550 Lithuanian (mainly Poles and Hungarians), 800 Cossacks. Only 2350 people.
Magnate mail : 8300 cavalry and 1700 infantry (estimates are approximate)
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - 9000 cavalry, 1000 infantry (approximate estimates)
Total Lithuanian Army: approx. 25680 people, including OK. 20,630 people cavalry and approx. 5050 people infantry.

Total Batory army: approx. 48399 people, including OK. 34,475 people cavalry and approx. 13924 people infantry

Artillery totaled more than 70 guns, of which 34 belonged to heavy guns. The army was accompanied by a fairly large number of gunners and spies under the general command of the Italian specialist Dominico Rudolfini. ^[10] .

After collecting the troops, the king went to Vitebsk, carefully inspecting the army on the way and being very pleased with it, the fortifications of Lepel and Ula were also examined. After a series of military conferences, it was decided first to take Velizh and the Sanctified as being in the rear of the army ^[11] . In addition, in the case of the capture of Velizh, navigation along the Dvina, necessary both for military needs and for the needs of trade, was freed ^[12] . Crown Chancellor Jan Zamoyski was appointed the head of the campaign to Velizh, which caused controversy between the Poles and Lithuanians, since the latter insisted that the Lithuanian hetman lead the expedition. The Polish side took the lead in the dispute, since the Lithuanian army was not yet ready for action, while Zamoysky, well informed about the plans of the king as his chief adviser, prepared for him in advance. Batory's decision to appoint Zamoysky’s commander was due to the fact that his advice during the siege of Danzig and during the Polotsk campaign convinced the king that the chancellor had outstanding military capabilities ^[12] .

According to Stryikovsky, on July 29, Zamoysky advanced with an army to Velizh, walking along the Dvina. He entrusted the command of the vanguard to his relative (husband of the sister of Sophia) Lukash Dzyalynsky , a former experienced warrior. As assistants to Dzyalynsky was appointed Nikolai Levels. Zamoysky himself commanded the main forces of the detachment, appointing Stanislav Zholkevsky , who became famous in the fight against the Tatars, as his deputy. There was a convoy in the rear guard, divided by Zamoysky into three parts, which corresponded to the division of the marching column of the main army. Thus, each part of the convoy was moving behind its detachment, which made it possible to prevent problems arising from the movement of the entire army along one path. The artillery was sent forward along the Dvina, its cover was entrusted to the Hungarian cavalry under the command of Stefan Lazar, advancing along the coast. A cover of the convoy was also organized ^[13] .

Having reached Surazh , the last city within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Zamoysky waited for artillery and convened a council, on which, according to Heidenstein, it was decided which way to go to Velizh. The first path was complicated by the fact that it passed through dense forests, through which no one had led an army since the time of Vytautas . The second road lay on the other side of the Dvina, which made it necessary to build crossings twice: at Surazh and Velizh. As a result, it was decided to follow the first road, for which people were sent forward to clear the road: cutting trees and building gateways through across swamps. On August 1, Zamoysky arrived in the village of Verkhovye, where he ordered the troops, when approaching Velizh, to shoot rifles, blow the horn and beat the drums, that is, to behave as quietly as possible ^[13] . The next day, the army arrived in the village of Studennaya, located a mile from Velizh. From here, Zamoysky ordered to prepare for a performance with a supply of provisions for one day, since the convoy remained in Stuyanny for one more day. Such a decision was intended to provide a free path from Velizh to Studenaya in case the army undermines failure and has to retreat hastily ^[14] . On August 3, while in Studyany, Zamoysky published military articles on discipline: it was forbidden to set fire to temples, kill children, the elderly and clergy ^[15] .

Early on the morning of the 3rd, when the army was ready to advance, the Cossacks captured the boyar, who was heading from Velizh to his village. After torture, he said that the city was aware of the impending attack, but did not know that it would take place today ^[15] . Thus, Zamoysky did not lose the chance of a surprise attack. Taking with him only part of the army, he headed towards the forest to Velizh. At the edge of the forest, a discussion was held on how to carry out the attack. The Hungarians advised to wait for the night, and with its advance to get to the fortress and set it on fire. Others argued that an attack should be taken immediately so as not to lose the effect of surprise. Zamoysky decided to divide the army: from the north-west, that is, from the Dvina, send infantrymen with axes, since this place was least fortified; send the other part from the side of the gate, since there was a possibility that she could easily get into the fortress with the people who were rescuing; cavalry had to prank from the opposite side of the fortress in order to divert the attention of the defenders ^[15] .

According to Forlinsky’s diary, Velizh’s quadrangular plan was located on a hill with a sloping part towards Dvina. The fortifications were wooden, consisting of three log houses with earth and stones poured between them. The walls were covered with clay, and turfed at the bottom. At the corners and in the middle were towers, in which and between which were loopholes. The northeastern wall was located above a deep ravine along which the Velizh river flowed into the Dvina River and had a gateway to raise the water level; northwest descended to the Dvina; from the south-west the fortress was protected by a deep steep ravine, and from the southeast - by a moat enclosed by a stockade ^[16] . In the fortress there were 200 children of boyars , 400 archers and about a thousand ordinary people. Artillery consisted of 14 guns, of which 8 were large, as well as 80 howitzers . Gunpowder and other supplies, including provisions, were plentiful ^[16] .

Despite the measures taken, Zamoysky did not manage to attack suddenly: as soon as the soldiers left the forest, a cannon shot was heard, informing local residents of the beginning of the attack and the need to take refuge in the fortress, which was done. The plan to lure the enemy from a fortified position with the help of cavalry also failed. Zamoysky sent to the fortress 4,500 foot soldiers who sat down at the fortress stockade and entered into a skirmish with the defenders of Velizh. The hopeless exchange of fire continued until the evening: in the Zamoysky army there were no killed or wounded, one person was killed by the defenders ^[16] . Owing to the failure, Zamoysky had to start a siege: from the north-east Hungarians settled under the command of Bornemissa, from the south-east a detachment of Trembetskiy, the south-west - Levelyazky, behind the Dvina there were Cossacks Ostromentsky ^[17] .

The next day, August 4, a convoy arrived, after which the construction of the camp began. Zamoysky sent a letter to the fortress with a proposal to surrender on the terms of a free exit and support to those who want to become citizens of Batory. The besieged proposals were not accepted, saying that they should forward it to the king and rely not on his decision. The siege was to be carried out quickly, since, according to the prisoners, a 20-thousand army was sent to the rescue of Velizh. Meanwhile, shelling of the fortress was postponed, since artillery was delivered only by the evening of the next day. Along with artillery, the thousandth detachment of the royal infantry also arrived, which immediately set about building the trenches ^[17] . In order to expedite the matter, Zamoysky donated 400 thalers to Bornemisse as a reward to someone who manages to set fire to the fortress; instead of money, a Pole promised 12 drags of land ^[17] .

From the dawn of August 6, the shelling of the fortress began. Soon, the besieged began to show signs that they wanted to start negotiations. Since the negotiations ended in nothing, after a short respite, the shelling was resumed. The defenders began negotiations again, asking for a two-hour truce, until they could agree among themselves what to do. At the end of the term, they said that they could not agree and asked to wait until tomorrow. According to Rönner, the besieged declared that they had run to the king to defend themselves for 15 days. Zamoysky, who considered that they were simply taking time, ordered the resumption of the bombing. At this time, the Hungarians with the help of red-hot cores managed to light the fortress in several places, but the defenders were able to put out the fire. The Poles set fire to one of the towers in the same way, but it only smoldered. The soldiers of V leveletskiy managed to set fire to the fortress bridge, after which 50 infantrymen began to set fire to the fortress with torches. Seeing this, the besieged declared their readiness to surrender. At about three in the morning, the Velizh governor arrived at the Zamoysky camp, confirming the surrender of the fortress ^[18] .

The next day, Zamoysky took the fortress and ordered an inventory of everything that was in it. The population of Velizh was sent on rafts down the river, where they were landed, dug in a rampart and guarded until the king arrived. The most notable Velizh boyars were sent to Surazh, where the king was at that time ^[4] . On August 8, the solemnly met Bathory arrived at the camp. He examined the trenches, and the next day and the fortresses, remaining pleased that the fortifications were not damaged and they are as good as the fortifications of Polotsk. Soon after, Bathory returned to Surazh, and Zamoysky went on behalf of the king and ordered the release of the captives. The estate was promised to those who wanted to go to service at Batory, and they themselves were escorted to Velizh. For the rest, which turned out to be the majority, a detachment of 150 Cossacks was allocated, which accompanied them for six miles to protect themselves from aggressively-minded soldiers. Since people were forced to walk, they gave their children, who could not walk so much, to the Poles ^[19] .

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• Novodvorsky V. Velikiye Luki // The Struggle for Livonia between Moscow and the Commonwealth (1570-1582). - SPb., 1904. - S. 120-199.
• Górski, Konstanty .Pierwsza wojna Rzeczypospolitej z Wielkim Księstwem Moskiewskim za Batorego // Biblioteka Warszawska. T. 4. Warszawa: Spółka Wydawnicza, 1892. P. 93–117
• Kotarski, Henryk . Wojsko polsko-litewskie podczas wojny inflanckiej 1576-1582. Sprawy organizacyjne, cz. III // Studia i Materiały do ​​Historii Wojskowości. T. 17. Cz. 2 Warszawa, 1971.P. 81-151
• Kupisz, Dariusz. Połock 1579. Warszawa: Bellona, ​​2003.184 p.
• Kupisz, Dariusz. Psków 1581-1582. Warszawa: Bellona, ​​2006.220 p.