Voronezh-Povorinsky operation

During the autumn campaign of 1918, the Don Army of Krasnov, forcing the 10th Red Army to partially withdraw in the Tsaritsyno direction, secured operational freedom to the north. Having struck the cut between the 9th and 10th Red armies, the Don horse units almost managed to break through to Kamyshin, forcing the Soviet High Command to take part of the forces from the Eastern Front to provide this direction. However, the successes of the Don army came to her at a high price, and moods began to develop in it about the futility of further struggle, which soon led to its decomposition.

In connection with the departure of the Germans from the territory of Ukraine, the entire left flank of the Don White Front was exposed. Taking advantage of this, units of the right-flanking 8th Red Army from the second half of November 1918 began to seep into the liberated territory, gradually covering the left flank of the Voronezh group of the Don Army. By December 3, they had spread to the city of Valuyki. At the same time, the 10th Army began its advance on the right flank to Ilovlya station. The whites, underestimating the importance of exposing their left flank, on the contrary weakened their forces in the Voronezh direction in order to concentrate the shock fist in the Tsaritsyno direction against the center of the 10th Red Army. As a result, two groups formed in White: the weakest - Voronezh, and the strongest - Tsaritsynskaya, turned by the rear to each other. Both groups were interconnected by a thin thread of a cavalry veil. The Voronezh group consisted of 18 to 22 thousand soldiers with 16 guns, Tsaritsynska - up to 50 thousand soldiers with 63 guns.

The main command of the Red Army decided to take advantage of the situation and deliver a decisive blow to the Don Army. The command of the Southern Front was given the task of immediately defeating the Voronezh group of the enemy by concentrating all the reserves being directed (including the shock fist — the Kozhevnikov group from the Eastern Front). Kozhevnikov’s group (20 thousand soldiers with 20 guns), deployed on the front of Valuyki – Kupyansk, was supposed to go behind the Voronezh group of whites to the Millerovo – Boguchar front; from the front the Voronezh group was to be attacked by the 8th and 9th armies. Thus, up to 50 thousand soldiers — about half of all the forces of the Southern Soviet Front — were intended to act against the Voronezh Group. The North Caucasus Front was to assist the Southern Front with the advance of the 11th Army on the front of Novocherkassk-Rostov-on-Don. In the future, it was supposed to defeat the rest of Krasnov’s forces on the right bank of the Don River, as well as those forces of General Denikin who could be there.

The drawback of the proposed plan was that the entry of the Southern Front on the right flank could lead to the concentration of the main mass of its forces in Tsaritsynsky district, where the network of rocky railways was poorly developed, and the existing ones were in poor condition. As a result, further regrouping of troops would have been greatly hindered, and the Donets Basin, which was extremely important for the Soviet government politically and economically, would have been left unattended. To avoid this, the Commander-in-Chief Wacetis in a special instruction indicated that the main operational area should be the direction to Millerovo, which should draw the bulk of the red forces to the Donetsk basin.

In connection with the exposure after the Germans left the western border of the Don region, Krasnov needed to cover a new 600-kilometer front. Having no free forces for this, as well as in the conditions of the beginning decomposition of the Don Army (in late December, whole Don units began to leave the front, some villages established Soviet power), Ataman Krasnov was forced to seek help from the Volunteer Army.

Meanwhile, following the instructions received, the command of the Soviet Southern Front set the following tasks for its units: by the end of the day, Kozhevnikov's group was to go to the Kantemirovka-Mitrofanovka front; The 8th army was supposed to conduct an offensive on both banks of the Don; The 9th Army was heading for the Khoper River section between Novokhopyorsk and Uryupinskaya, putting up a barrier against the Tsaritsyn group of the enemy at Budarino; The 10th army, defending the Tsaritsyn district, at the same time was to develop an offensive in the Kamyshin direction in order to free the flank of the 9th army.

On January 8, the right flank of the 8th Army was already on the Black Kalitva River, and on January 10, after a short battle, Kozhevnikov’s group took control of Starobelsk. However, Krasnov at the same time inflicted a short blow at the junction of the 8th and 9th armies in the Voronezh direction, dropping their inner flanks from Abramovka stations (where the Inza division located on the left flank of the 8th army suffered a major defeat) and Povorino. But the 9th Army managed to restore the situation and again take Povorino, and by January 15 - Novokhopyorsk. Only on January 21, the 9th army took possession of Uryupinsky.

Fearing coverage from the flanks, units of the Don Army were already forced to begin withdrawing from the Abramovka-Kolen section on January 17. Since this made Kozhevnikov’s group’s efforts unnecessary, with a directive dated January 18, the commander of the Southern Front sent her along the Markovka – Taly line, with one division to Lugansk, for deeper coverage of the Voronezh group. The 9th Army was to rebuild its front to the southeast and head along the Povorino-Tsaritsyn railway; most of the forces of the 8th Army also had to operate on the left bank of the Don.

From that moment, the Voronezh group ceased to provide serious resistance, the collapse of the front began. Entire Cossack regiments surrendered or arbitrarily went home. On January 21, the command of the Southern Front considered it necessary to proceed to the second task - the defeat of the Tsaritsyno group

As a result of the operation, the Don Army of Ataman Krasnov was completely defeated; on February 1, the command of the Southern Front ordered the pursuit of its remains. The operation ended on February 8–9, when units of the 9th and 10th armies came into contact with each other in the vicinity of the Archeda station.

However, the movement of the armies of the Southern Front in convergent directions to Tsaritsyn led to the weakening of the group in the Donbass, where on January 25 a fresh division of the Volunteer Army landed in Mariupol, which launched an attack on Lugansk on January 27-28. As a result, battles broke out for the Donetsk basin .

• N. E. Kakurin, I. I. Vatsetis “Civil war. 1918-1921 ”- SPb: LLC Polygon Publishing House, 2002. ISBN 5-89173-150-9
• A. I. Egorov “The defeat of Denikin, 1919” // “Civil war in Russia: The defeat of Denikin” - Moscow: OOO AST Publishing House, 2003. ISBN 5-17-015247-7