Big Hole Battle

Chief Mirror

After the Battle of Clearwater , the non-Persian leaders decided to make a long march to leave General Oliver Howard's soldiers. They left Idaho for Montana through the Lolo Pass. After a short shootout at Fort Fizzle on July 28, they entered the Bitterut Valley and moved south. It is assumed that Chief Joseph transferred command to Chief Mirror. He convinced the white inhabitants of the valley that the non-Persians would pass through the valley without any violence. And so it happened. ^[1] Indians bought food from whites or exchanged it.

Mirror assured the Indians that General Howard was far behind, and the inhabitants of Montana are not going to fight them. Therefore, they moved slowly, without serious military preparations, without sending out scouts and without arranging pickets at the camps. They passed the Biterrut Plain, crossed the mountain range and camped in the Big Hole Lowland. There were only 750 people in the tribe, of which 200 were warriors.

Meanwhile, Colonel John Gibbon received a telegram from Oliver Howard asking him to intercept the Indians. Gibbon left Fort Shaw with a detachment of 161 men with one howitzer. Following in the footsteps of a no-Perse, he recruited 45 volunteers in the Bitterrut Valley. On August 8, Gibbon discovered an Indian camp at Big Hole. At night, he sent his squad to the camp, leaving a 12-pound howitzer and a convoy behind, guarded by 20 people. He ordered not to start negotiations and not to take prisoners, ^{[2] [3]} for he came to destroy the non-Persian.

Gibbon approached the Indians camp from the northwest. Now the camp, consisting of 89 tipi, was located behind the swamped Big Hole River. Going out to the river at dawn, the people of Gibbon met an old Indian and killed him. The soldiers crossed the river and opened fire on the Indian tipi. Almost all Indians were sleeping at this time. They were taken by surprise and fled in different directions. Gibbon's men indiscriminately shot at men, women, and children — although some women were armed and shot back. However, at the very beginning of the shootout, James Bradley, the commander of the left wing, was killed. Left without a command, his people did not continue the attack, and left the northern part of the camp, allowing the non-Perse to pack up and organize.

Gibbon stopped his people so as not to disperse his strength and ordered the tipi to be burned. It was not so simple, and the Indians managed to regroup. The soldiers heard the voices of the leaders of the White Bird and the Mirror , convening people. A small part of the Indians, who managed to escape from the camp with weapons, took secretive positions and opened sniper return fire. The bullet hit the horse of Gibbon and in the leg of the colonel himself. A few more soldiers were killed.

Already 20 minutes after the assault on the camp, Gibbon realized that he was in an unfavorable position in a difficult position and ordered to retreat back across the river, to the forest, to which it was 300 or 400 meters. On the outskirts of the forest, soldiers dug rifle cells and erected fortifications of stones and logs. At this moment, a howitzer appeared somewhat south of their position. She managed to make two or three shots at the Indians, but she had no serious cover, and the people of Gibbon were too far away. The Indians almost immediately opened fire on the servants of the guns and killed or wounded most of the time. The survivors threw the gun, having to rivet it.

Gibbon was afraid that the Indians seriously outnumbered him and might circumvent his position, but the battle turned into a sniper duel between the 60 Indians commanded by Allocott and the Gibbon soldiers. Meanwhile, the Indians gathered their weapons and ammunition thrown by the soldiers in the camp. In one place, the Indians stopped firing and tried using fire to force the soldiers to retreat, but the wind suddenly changed and they had to retreat. On that day, the Indians continued the shootout, while the women gathered the camp and the horses and went south, 18 miles to Lake Creek, where they stood up a fortified camp.

Gibbon faced serious problems at night. His people were completely without food and water, with a large number of wounded. They managed to get some water to volunteers who crept through the pickets of the Indians. Some civilian volunteers considered it best to leave. Gibbon sent messengers in search of General Howard to ask him to immediately go to the rescue. The next day, August 10, 20 or 30 Indian shooters kept the soldiers in their shelters all day. At night, the Indians left, leaving Gibbon and his soldiers alone on the battlefield. Just the next morning, Gibbon's squad was discovered by Howard's vanguard (29 horsemen and 17 scouts), which walked 71 miles in a day and night.

The battle cost both sides dearly. Gibbon did not have the strength to persecute the Indians. He lost 29 people killed (23 soldiers and 6 volunteers) and 40 wounded (36 soldiers and 4 volunteers), and two of the wounded later died. Losses reached about 30% of his squad. No-Perce losses are not exactly known. Presumably, they lost 70 or 90 people, of which 33 were warriors. Chief Yellow Wolf claimed that only “12 warriors, but the best of us” died in that battle. ^[4] Wives of the leaders of Joseph and Allocott were injured.

The sudden attack of Gibbon affected the prestige of the Mirror. He assured the Indians that they were completely safe in Montana, and as a result, almost every family suffered in the battle. The mirror remained a military leader, but the general leadership began to pass to Joseph . In this battle, the Nerses suffered the first heavy losses, which reduced their combat power. They assumed that, having left Idaho , they left the war and can now live in peace. Now they have come to understand that all whites are their enemies, and the American army is ready to destroy all their people. The war continued, Howard began the pursuit of the Indians, who retreated to Yellowstone Park . On August 20, another battle took place - at Kamas Meadows .

The battlefield is preserved as the “Big Hole National Battlefield”, being part of the Ne-Perce National Historical Park.

• Beal, Merrill D. I will fight no more forever . - Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966 .-- 366 p. - ISBN 0295740094 .
• Greene, Jerome A., Josephy, Alvin M. Nez Perce Summer, 1877: The US Army and the Nee-Me-Poo Crisis . - 2000 .-- 576 p.