North Virginia Campaign

After completing the campaign on the peninsula, General Lee led the army to Richmond and took some measures to put it in order. The soldiers were given new weapons, new clothes and shoes, improved nutrition and sanitary services. Drayton and Evans brigades were transferred from Charleston to strengthen the army, and on July 22, many soldiers returned from exchange captivity. But even these measures could not bring the army to the size that it had before the Seven-Day Battle . Lee also reorganized the cavalry, forming two brigades (under the command of Wade Hampton and Fitzghu Lee ) and entrusting cavalry to Jeb Stewart ^[3] .

Meanwhile, in addition to the main federal army on the peninsula, three more new ones appeared. The divisions of McDowell, Banks and Fremont were joined in the new Virginia army , led by John Pope . Lincoln chose Pope because he was the only general who had some success in the west and was not compromised by participating in the unsuccessful battle of Shiloh , like Grant. In addition, Pope was once a friend of Lincoln and even his distant relative. Pope was called to Washington and arrived there on June 22 ^[4] .

Intelligence reported that another army appeared near Fredericksburg ^{['' i '' 1]} , and the third, under the command of Burnside , was in transport at Fort Monroe. Much depended on the position of the Burnside army: if it were annexed to McClellan's army, it would allow a renewed offensive on the peninsula, and if it were annexed to Pope, it would allow an attack on Richmond to be launched from the north. Lee did not know the enemy’s plans and waited for the development of events, while improving the fortifications of Richmond ^[3] .

Such an expectation did not suit Jackson, who believed that it was necessary to take advantage of McClellan's weakness and attack in the north. “Why are we repeating Manassas’s mistake and letting the enemy slowly recover their strength?” He asked. Lee did not support his initiative, and Jackson was about to ask the president for support as news came of the advance of the Virginia Army: on July 12, her advance detachments occupied Kalperer and were dangerously close to the . Lee immediately (July 13) sent Jackson to Gordonsville to cover this important railway junction connecting Richmond with the Shenandoah Valley ^[3] .

On July 14, Federal General Banks ordered the Cavalry Brigade to occupy Gordonsville and destroy the railway 10-15 miles east of the city. This diversion could have serious consequences, and it had every chance of success, but Hatch, instead of a quick cavalry raid, began to advance along with infantry and artillery, and as a result, when he approached Gordonsville, the city was already occupied by Jackson’s units ^{[5 ]} .

Meanwhile, General Pope arrived in the army and issued a series of orders. The first of them, dated July 14, was widely known both in the North and in the South. Pope said soldiers should think more about the offensive than about defense lines and supply lines.

I came here from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies, from the army, whose job it was to search for the enemy and smash him where he was found; whose principle was to attack, not defend ... Let's look forward, not backward. Success and glory in the offensive; rout and shame - in the rear.

Original text

- I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies, from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and to beat him to when he was found; whose policy has been to attack and not defense .... Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance; disaster and shame lurk in the rear.

- John Pope, Virginia Army Officers and Soldiers Order, July 14 ^[6]

In the South, this order was received with ridicule, and in the North with disappointment. Federal General Alpheus Williams wrote to his daughter: “These orders of his ... immediately disappointed the army. When the general boasts that he sees only the backs of enemies and does not care about escape routes and supply bases ... anyone could imagine what such a command would lead to ... Suffice it to say (between us) that so much arrogance, arrogance, ignorance and pretentiousness have never been encountered anywhere else one person. Honestly, he has no friends anywhere - from the last drummer to the general ” ^[7] . General Porter wrote that Pope’s order would make him a laughing stock. ^[8]

Pope’s subsequent orders were more serious: he ordered only the citizens loyal to the Union’s government to compensate for losses incurred by the army. Another order ordered the destruction of every house from which a shot would be fired at a federal soldier. The third ordered to arrest the entire male population in the territory occupied by the army, demand from them an oath of allegiance, and refused to send. Those who return were ordered to punish, up to the death penalty ^{[3] [9]} . Pope’s orders (No. 5, No. 7, No. 11, No. 13, signed between July 10 and 25) reflected a new course of the war: they aimed the federal army at the Confederate’s resources: civilians and their property, without distinction between combatants and non-combatants ^{[10 ]} .

These orders made an unpleasant impression on General Lee. In one letter, he called Pope “a bastard,” and in another, he condemned his nephew Lewis Marshall, who served in the federal army. “I can forgive him fighting against us,” Lee wrote, “but not his service to Pope.” Douglas Freeman wrote that, afterwards, Lee didn’t feel such hostility towards any of his opponents as Pope did ^[3] .

Meanwhile, the federal armies did not move, and Lee decided that he could, by strengthening Jackson, attack Pope, and with the remaining forces (at that time 69,732 men) to keep Richmond. To strengthen Jackson, it was decided to send Ambrose Hill's division , which was under arrest due to a conflict with Longstreet. Hill was reassigned to Jackson and sent north on July 27. Lee had 56,000 left, and the possible advance of McClellan and Burnside was a serious danger. However, John Mosby was soon released from captivity on an exchange: during his stay at Fort Monroe, he learned that the Burnside army was being transferred to northern Virginia, and reported this to Lee. This meant that it was from there that the enemy planned the main blow ^[3] .

On August 5, the federal army on the peninsula launched an unexpected attack on Malvern Hill, and on August 7 also retreated unexpectedly. Lee was surprised at this maneuver. He did not know that even on August 3, McClellan received orders to withdraw the army from the peninsula ^[11] . Not knowing yet how to act in this situation, Lee allowed Jackson to make decisions at his discretion. “Decide for yourself what is the best way to act in this situation,” he wrote to Jackson, “and report to me about the results that you will achieve” ^[3] .

The Virginia Federal Army was created on June 26, 1862 from several “counties” operating in Virginia — the very ones that participated in the Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley . These were: John Freemont Mountain District, Rappahanok County, Irwin MacDowell, Shenandoah Nathaniel Banks County, Samuel Sturgis Brigade from the Washington Military District, and Jacob Koch Division from West Virginia. The new army was divided into three corps with a total number of 51,000 people ^[12] :

• Franz Siegel's 1st building (11,500 people);
• 2nd building of Nathaniel Banks (14,500 people);
• III Corps of Irwin McDowell (18,500 people) ^{['' i '' 2]} .

Sturgis's squad made up the reserve army. The cavalry brigades of John Beardsley, John Hatch and George Bayard were assigned to the infantry corps, which ultimately negatively affected the course of the campaign. Parts of the 3rd , Vth and VIth Corps of the Potomac Army and IX Corps of Jesse Renault later joined the Virginia Army, bringing its strength to 77,000 people ^[12] .

The third corps of Samuel Heinzelman consisted of two divisions:

• Philip Kearney’s division (John Robinson, David Byrne and Orlando Poe brigades);
• Joseph Hooker Division (Brigades Kavier Grove, Nelson Taylor and Joseph Bradford Carr).

The corps arrived from the Virginian Peninsula in Alexandria on August 22, and on August 26 joined the Virginia Army near the Warrenton Crossroads ^[13] .

However, if formally Pope’s army, including reinforcements, was supposed to number 73,000 or 75,000, its real strength by August 30 was approximately 50,000, which Colonel Allen explained by the high level of desertion ^[14] .

General Lee’s North Virginia Army was consolidated into two “wings,” or “teams” (the term “corps” was not used until November 1862), numbering 55,000. The right wing was commanded by James Longstreet , the left by Thomas Jackson. Stuart's cavalry was assigned to Jackson's wing. The army was organized even easier than during the Seven-Day Battle : in that campaign, the army consisted of 11 separate divisions, which negatively affected command. After the campaign was completed, William Whiting, Theofilius Holmes, Benjamin Huger and John Magruder were transferred from the North Virginia Army to the peninsula , and the army took the following form: Jackson’s wing consisted of the “Stone Wall Division” (General Charles Winder), the Ewell Division and the Ambrose Division (the so-called " Hill Light Division "). Longstreet commanded seven divisions: his former team was divided into two parts and entrusted to Wilcox and Kemper , the Huger division went to Richard Anderson , and the Whiting division to John Hood . David Jones and Lafayette McLose remained with their divisions. Daniel Hill's division was also subordinate to Longstreet. However, the divisions of McLose and D. Hill were left to guard Richmond, so Longstre sent only five divisions to the north ^[15] .

See also : North Virginia Army in the Second Bull Run Battle

In historiography, there was no consensus on the date the campaign began. In many cases, its first phase is July 1862 (the beginning of the Virginia Army march to Gordonsville) ^{['' i '' 3]} . Sometimes the events of July and the battle of Cedar Mountain in early August are outside the scope of the campaign, and its course has been outlined since General Lee arrived in Gordonsville. In this case, losses at Cedar Mountain are not considered losses during the campaign ^{['' i '' 4]} .

Cedar Mountain

On August 6, Pope moved south to Culpeper County to occupy the Gordonsville railway junction. This was necessary to divert the Confederate army north and prevent them from pursuing McClellan's retreating army on the Virgin Peninsula. On the evening of August 7, Jackson marched north to Culpeper to defeat the enemy advance detachment under the command of Nathaniel Banks , who had come off 8 miles from the main army. Jackson had 23,000 against 8,000, an almost threefold numerical superiority ^[19] .

The next morning (August 8), Jackson changed the route of Ewell’s forward division without informing the rest of the division commanders, which caused Hill’s division to become stuck in the Orange area. As a result of this delay, the army traveled only 8 miles out of 20 that day. Schedule was disrupted, and mainly due to Jackson. It was at this point that the conflict between Jackson and Hill began, which would lead to the arrest of Hill during the Maryland campaign ^[20] .

Jackson's offensive was spotted by the adversary, and Pope ordered Samuel Crawford's brigade to be sent forward, and the rest of the Banks corps brigade to follow. He also ordered Siegel’s corps to follow Banks, but Siegel was in no hurry and even sent a request on which road he should take, although there was only one road. As a result, only the Crawford brigade and the Bayard cavalry managed to deploy on time at Cedar Mountain ^[21] .

On August 9, Jackson’s divisions reached the place where the Orange and Madison roads connect, pushed back several pickets of the federal cavalry and came into contact with the Crawford brigade. At that time, ’s federal division approached from Culpeper, in which Banks himself was. General Ewell deployed artillery and began a shootout. ^[22]

Pope’s plans assumed that Crawford would only delay the enemy and allow the entire Virginian army to concentrate in Culpeper, but concentration was disrupted, and then Pope issued an order on the morning of August 9, which Benjamin Cooling called one of the most controversial in the whole war — he ordered Jackson to be attacked and reported about the results of ^[23] .

Jackson's plan was to tie the enemy on the road with Earley's brigade, and send the other two brigades of Ewell's division to bypass the left flank of the enemy. Charles Winder's division was to attack Banks' right flank. The success of the battle depended on Ewell and Winder. But the plan soon began to crumble: Winder was wounded by a fragment and carried out of the battlefield, and his division was headed by William Tagliaferro , who did not know what instructions were issued to Winder and how the division was supposed to be used. The general offensive did not work. Banks, observing the inaction of the enemy, meanwhile, came to the conclusion that he did not dare to attack due to lack of strength, and ordered a general offensive to be launched. Generals Ogur and Geary were wounded at the very beginning of the attack, which slowed down the advance of their division, but the Crawford brigade overthrew the brigades of Thomas Garnett and Charles Ronald, and then the Earley brigade. By 6:00 p.m., the Banks advance was quite successful ^[24] .

At a critical moment, when defeat seemed inevitable, Jackson personally stopped the fleeing. At this time, Hill's division approached and attacked Banks' right flank. The federal army began to retreat, and even the arrival of the Gordon brigade and the Ricketts division could no longer help her. Jackson, in turn, could not organize the correct pursuit due to the lack of the required number of cavalry. Two brigades from Hill's division were sent forward across the Cedar-Run River, but stumbled upon Ricketts' division and moved away. Jackson's people were so exhausted by the battle that they went to bed right on the battlefield ^[25] .

Both sides considered themselves winners: both managed to stop the enemy’s advance. Jackson, however, held the battlefield. For another two days the army stood still, not daring to resume the battle. Jackson's adjutant, Charles Blackford, then wrote that the victory was decisive, but it did not give any consequences except for a certain upsurge of morale. General Pope wrote that the battle of Cedar Mountain undoubtedly represents the first victory in a series of others that will glorify the Virgin Army ^[26] .

Rappahanok Offensive

Jackson understood that he had only met the vanguard of the army, so on August 11 he retreated to Gordonsville. This meant that the feds could break through to the Virginia Central Railroad. It also meant that Jackson would not be able to beat Pope alone and return to Richmond for action against McClellan. Lee decided to take risks to strengthen Jackson and save the railway: on August 13, he sent Longstreet to northern Virginia. And on the same day, Lee learned from the deserter that McClellan’s army was leaving the peninsula. On August 14, confirmation came that at least the V building ( Porter ) was indeed leaving ^[3] .

Lee realized that something important was happening: the Potomac army was being transferred to Pope’s reinforcement. It followed that Jackson and Longstreet could be defeated, but if Lee takes advantage of his shorter communications and quickly transfers his entire army to join Jackson, then he has a chance to defeat Pope. This meant racing, and whoever wins this race will win the war. Lee left three divisions under Richmond under the general command of General Gustavus Smith , who was instructed to strengthen Richmond and hold him at all costs, if necessary. He sent the remaining divisions to the north and left for Gordonsville on August 15 ^[3] .

Douglas Freeman, in his analysis of this campaign, drew attention to how quickly Lee reacted to events. On August 13, Lee decided that Burnside was sent to reinforce Pope, although Burnside's main forces — the 12 regiments of Jesse Renault — did not leave Frederiksberg on August 12. Lee learned about Pope's departure from the peninsula 2 days after the start of the march. On August 15, when Lee departed for Gordonsville (confident in Richmond’s safety), the bulk of McClellan’s army was still on the peninsula and was preparing food for itself on the road. Lee's reaction rate is amazing, especially considering the fact that intelligence in those years did not work very well ^[3] .

On August 15, Lee arrived in Gordonsville and convened Jackson and Longstreet for military council. He studied the situation and found that Pope’s troops were deployed along the Rapidan River, and that the Rappahanok River flows in their rear. The federals' main supply line was the Orange-Alexandria railway, which crossed Rappahanok at the town of Rappahanok Station. Pope’s carelessness gave Lee a rare opportunity to attack him with superior forces, while simultaneously destroying the bridge over Rapidan with a cavalry raid to prevent reinforcements from being sent from Washington. Meanwhile, McClellan’s army was already moving to join Pope, so they had to act quickly ^[27] .

The question was where exactly to attack the Virginia Army. Longstreet proposed attacking Pope's right flag in order to have the reliable heights of the Blue Ridge Range in the rear. Lee thought it was more logical to attack the left flank to cut off Pope from Frederiksberg and reinforcements. Jackson offered to go to Rapidan on the 16th and attack on the 17th, but Longstreet did not have time by this time, and the cavalry was still not concentrated. Lee decided to go out to Rapidan on August 17 and fight on August 18. On the evening of August 15, Lee relocated headquarters from Gordonsville to the Barton-Hakesell plantation, and on the 16th to Taylor's farm at Orange Courthouse. On the afternoon of August 17, Stuart arrived there. He reported that the Fitzhugh Brigade was ordered on the 17th to go to the Racoon Ford ford, where Stuart intended to meet him, and cross the river for the raid behind enemy lines along the same ford. Since Hampton’s team was left with Richmond, Stuart had only this Fitzhugh Lee team at his disposal. To strengthen Stuart, Lee handed him the Beverly Robertson brigade, which had previously been assigned to Jackson’s division ^[27] .

At the end of the day, Stuart arrived at Verdisville, where he hoped to meet the Fitzgee Lee brigade. To his surprise, no signs of the presence of the brigade were found. Stewart sent Major Norman Fitzhugh in search of a brigade and stayed on the veranda of a private house awaiting results. Suddenly, a reconnaissance detachment of the federal cavalry appeared from the south. Stuart managed to jump on his horse and hide in the forest with all his headquarters. At the same time, he lost his hat, which was delivered to Pope as a trophy. In addition, Norman Fitzhugh fell into the hands of the federals, in which General Lee's orders for the offensive were found ^[27] .

Subsequently, it turned out that the road to Racoon Ford was guarded by the Longstreet infantry, which was allotted by order of Brigadier General Robert Thumbes . The Federal Cavalry took advantage of this and carried out a shallow reconnaissance raid, going to Verdisville on the way back. Long Street sent Thumbes under arrest. On the morning of August 18, it turned out that Fitzghu Lee did not realize the essence of the order given to him: he did not understand that he had to go to the ford on the evening of August 17 and that the timing of the offensive of the whole army depended on it. Now Lee was forced to postpone the start of the offensive to August 20. Subsequently, Long Street wrote that due to the delay of Fitzghu Lee, the Confederation missed a good chance and partly therefore lost the war ^[27] .

Pope's Retreat

While Lee was planning an offensive, his plans became known to Pope. Spies reported the enemy’s concentration, cavalry intelligence reported, and finally Pope received Lee’s orders from Stuart on August 18. He realized that Lee wanted to go around his left flank. Henry Halleck as early as August 16 suggested Pope retreat, not take risks and wait for the concentration of the army. On August 18, Pope reported to Washington that he was retreating. ^[28]

August 18, 1862, 13:00 (received 14:00)
To Major General Halleck, General-General:
The enemy received massive reinforcements and advances to Raccoon Ford from Gordonsville, Louise Courthouse and Hanover Junction. All Richmond forces are thrown in this direction to circumvent my left flank. I cannot repulse them without losing touch with Fredericksburg and Manassas . Therefore, I, following your instructions, send the wagons back so that they cross at night over Rappahanok. My whole army will depart there at night. I will stretch the line to Frederiksberg, leaning on the right flank to the railway.
If you have any other suggestions, please send them to me.

Original text

- August 18, 1862-1.30 pm (Received 2 pm)

Major General HW HALLECK, General-in-Chief:

The enemy, heavily re-enforced, is advancing on Raccoon Ford from Gordonsville, Louisa Court-House, and Hanover Junction. All the Richmond force has been thrown in this direction to turn my left. I am not able to resist it without being cut off from the direction of Fredericksburg and Manassas. I have accordingly, in compliance with your instructions, started back all my trains to pass the Rappahannock to-night. My whole command will commence to fall back to that line to-night. I shall draw down toward Fredericksburg, resting my right on the railroad.

Please advise me at once if you wish other dispositions made.

- War of the Rebellion: Serial 018 Page 0591 Chapter XXIV.

On August 18, at 11:00 p.m., the Virgin Army began retreating beyond the Rappahanok. Jesse Renault took his units to the Kelly Ford ford, and the rest of the divisions moved through Culpeper, losing a lot of time in traffic jams. By the morning of August 20, the withdrawal of the army across the river was completed. Lee learned of this offensive only at noon on August 19. Together with Longstreet, he climbed Mount Clark and from there observed the movements of the enemy rearguards. “The general,” he told Longstreet, “we did not think that the enemy would turn back so early, at the very beginning of this campaign” ^[29] .

The first battle at Rappahanok Station

Having retreated behind Rappahanok, Pope occupied the left bank of the river from Kelly Ford to Rappahanok Station. The position seemed weak to him: the river could be crossed in almost any area, and the terrain was open, leaving no other option but a battle in the open field. However, he decided to wait for reinforcements and launch a counterattack. Meanwhile, Lee already realized that he could not prevent the federal reinforcements coming from Frederiksberg , and decided to act according to the Longstreet plan - that is, to bypass the enemy’s right flank ^[30] .

Lee told Jackson to check the availability of Beverly Ford and Freeman Ford crossings. On August 21, Colonel Thomas Rosser, at the head of the 5th Virginia Cavalry Regiment with two guns, crossed the river, but fell under the blow of the federal brigade Marsen Patrick . On another section of the front, Buford's cavalry crossed Kelly Ford, but was also repulsed. Stewart's cavalry tried to cross the Rappahanok along the Freeman Ford ford, but was repulsed by parts of Robert Milroy . Lee decided to use Stuart in another way and send him the next day to raid the enemy’s rear ^[31] .

In the evening of August 21, Jackson continued to shift to the left, looking for convenient crossings. His carts stretched from Beverly Ford past Freeman Ford and Fox Ford to the town of Warenton Sulfur Springs. These convoys seemed to federal observers a seductive booty, and at about 3 p.m. General Siegel moved infantry and cavalry through the Freeman Ford crossing. Colonel and his 74th Pennsylvania regiment broke through to the right bank of the river and attacked the convoys. Schimmelfennig requested reinforcements, and two more regiments were sent to him under the command of Karl Schurz . Schurz came up at a time when the northerners were attacked by Isaac Trimble's brigade. Federal Brigadier General , who was on the battlefield, was mortally wounded, his regiments took to flight, and many died, crossing back through Rappahanok. The situation was saved only by the Dilger battery, which managed to cover the retreat ^[32] .

On August 22, Jackson was 7 miles up the river from Freeman Ford, at the former Sulfur Springs resort. The bridge on this site was destroyed, but the river is suitable for crossing, and on its left bank there were no large enemy forces. Jackson ordered the teams of Lawton and Earley to cross the river and gain a foothold on its shore. The brigades crossed the river, and at that moment a heavy downpour with a thunderstorm began. The water level in the river rose rapidly, and Jackson's brigades were cut off from the main forces. Airlie occupied the front with the front to Rappahanock Station, and Lawton with the front towards Warrenton . Now Jackson could only rely on Siegel’s slowness ^[33] .

Pope found out about these events at 9 p.m., ordered Siegel to attack the enemy, and at the same time requested instructions from Washington. It was during these hours that communications with Washington suddenly broke (as a result of Stewart's raid on Catlett Station). Southerners, in turn, did not know what to do. Jackson began to build a bridge across the Rappahanok and ordered Airlie to retreat north in the event of a serious federal attack. In order to distract the enemy, Lee ordered Longstreet to hold a demonstration at Rappahanok Station. Airlie stood on the left bank of the river on the 23rd day and only in the morning was able to retreat to the right bank along the bridge ^{[34] [35]} .

Meanwhile, reinforcements began to arrive from the Virginian Peninsula: General Heinzelman’s III Corps approached (landed in Alexandria on the 22nd) ^[13] , General Porter’s V Corps and part of the VI Corps — the brigade of General .

Stewart Raid on Catlett Station

Meanwhile, on August 22, Stuart raided the rear of the federal army, which, according to Benjamin Cooling, changed the whole nature of the campaign. In the afternoon, Stewart took 1,500 cavalrymen and two guns, crossed the Rappahanock over Waterloo Bridge four miles above Warrenton Springs, and set off for the enemy’s deep rear to destroy the railroad and collect information. This raid vaguely resembled his first raid around McClellan's army in June. Moving along good roads, he unobtrusively reached Warrenton, made a halt there, and then proceeded through Auburn Mills to Catlett Station Station. He hoped to destroy the bridge over the Cedar Creek River ^{[36] [37]} .

On the way he was overtaken by the very downpour of the evening of August 22, but one of the local blacks volunteered to be a guide and took Stuart straight to Pope's camp. Southerners dispersed a detachment of builders and small guards and seized carts, horses, mules , prisoners and thousands of dollars in army treasury (500,000 banknotes and 20,000 gold ^[38] ). The carriage of General Pope was captured, where Stuart found the general's uniform, as well as a huge number of staff documents, "as if specially collected in one place, so that it was easier for the southerners to capture them." It was also possible to damage the telegraph line and temporarily leave the Virgin Army without contact with Washington. Heavy rain prevented the bridge from being set ablaze, so already at 03:00 Stuart turned back. On the evening of August 23, he left for Rappahanok, taking 300 prisoners with him, among them quartermaster Pope and staff officer Lewis Marshall, nephew of General Lee ^{[36] [35] [37]} .

On the morning of August 24, Lee examined the captured documents and learned from them that Pope had 45,000 people and that he intended to hold the line of Rappahanok’s hand in anticipation of the approach of McClellan’s army. This army is already close: its vanguard corps (Porter corps) moves through Fredericksburg. Douglas Freeman called the receipt of this information the turning point of the campaign: all subsequent actions of General Lee were based precisely on it ^[35] .

Stuart then sent Pope a letter: “General, you have my hat with a plume. I have your best uniform. I have the honor to offer you negotiations on the exchange of prisoners. ” This letter Pope ignored ^[38] .

Raid to Manassas Station

After examining Pope’s papers, Lee decided to continue bypassing his right flank (as Longstreet had previously suggested) and prepare for serious battles. He ordered that Lafayette Mac Lowes and Daniel Hill divisions be called from under Richmond and warned the president about this, with the proviso that the latter could cancel this order if he saw fit. Then Lee moved headquarters to the village of and called Jackson there. A meeting followed, which Douglas Freeman called one of the most important in the career of General Lee. Jackson was asked to take his divisions, bypass the flank of the federal army, and destroy the railway to Washington. Apparently, Lee did not specify which section of the road should be destroyed ^[39] .

In the end, it was decided that Jackson would take all his three divisions (23,000 people ^{['' i '' 5]} ) and leave Lee the rest (32,000). This was a gross violation of the principles of strategy: the army was divided near the enemy’s army, which could be strengthened at any time. Pope could, with all his might, attack Longstreet's corps, or simply retreat and avoid the trap. Lee did this not because he underestimated Pope (who had not yet made mistakes), but because he could only have made the enemy retreat ^{['' i '' 6]} . In addition, it was assumed that such a separation would not last very long. Pope’s papers also showed that he was just waiting for McClellan and wasn’t preparing any action. Subsequently, Lee wrote that it was a risky move, but in that situation, risks could not be avoided ^{[39] [40]} .

On August 25, 1862 at 03:00, Jackson made a speech from Jeffersonton. His divisions crossed the Rappahanok along the Mills Ford ford, moved north-east through Fokier County and, having traveled 25 miles in a day, went to Salem, where they stayed for the night. Intelligence reported to Pope about Jackson's maneuvers, but he decided that Jackson was leaving for the Shenandoah Valley. Upon learning of the appearance of southerners near Salem, Pope also decided that this was a small detachment covering the flank of the column going to Shenandoah ^[42] .

On the morning of August 26, Ewell's advance division entered Salem and turned east. At 16:00, the division reached Gainesville - thus, in 32 hours, Jackson walked 50 miles and managed to break into the rear of the federal army ^[43] .

From Gainesville, Jackson sent Manford's cavalry and Ewell’s division to Bristo Station. At about 6:00 p.m., the station was seized, and the Virgin Army railway link with Washington was cut off. At the same time, Jackson found out that only a small federal detachment was guarding the Manassas station . At 21:00, Isaac Trimble volunteered to attack the station with two regiments. At Manassas station, there were 115 federal cavalrymen under the command of Captain Samuel Craig from the 105th Pennsylvania regiment. He had already heard about the events at the Bristo station, but considered it a raid by partisans. Trimble's regiments managed to stealthily approach the station, and they rushed to the attack, taking the enemy by surprise - the federal artillerymen did not even have time to direct their guns, and their two volleys passed over the attackers, after which the gunners fled, dropping six guns. The station was taken ^{[44] [45]} .

The Battle of Bull Run Bridge

A number of federal military men managed to escape from Manassas and go towards Centerville, where the 2nd New York Heavy Artillery Regiment, which served as the infantry guard, stood at the Blackburn Ford crossing. Its commander, Colonel Gustav Wagner, decided that he was dealing with partisan sabotage, and carefully went with his regiment to Manassas . At 10:00, he stumbled upon the entire division of Ambrose Hill (9,000 men and 28 guns) and quickly stepped back, not accepting the battle. At this very time, one of the brigades of the VI Corps (William Franklin) received an order to advance to Manassas and deal with those who were considered partisans or a cavalry raid. New Jersey brigade (the so-called “ ”) received an order, which emerged from Alexandria to Manassas in the morning ^[46] .

Due to damage to the railroad track, the brigade landed from a train a mile east of Bull Run Bridge. Taylor left the 4th New Jersey regiment in place, and with the other three regiments (1st, 2nd and 3rd New Jersey) moved Bull Run, turned the regiments into a battle line and moved in the direction where Wagner’s regiment shots were heard. The brigade came under the salvo of the Hill division , after which Thomas Jackson personally drove to them under the white flag and demanded surrender. Taylor refused and began to retreat to the bridge, but his retreat soon turned into an escape. During the retreat, Taylor himself and about 150 of his people died. 200 people were captured ^[47] .

Jackson called Taylor’s attack “courageous and determined, led by an officer worthy of better use.” The tragedy at Bull Run Bridge seriously affected the course of the campaign. Cooling cites the opinions of Ethan Rafuse, who believed that it was a turning point in the campaign: General McClellan at that time had to move his corps to Pope's help, but he was looking for excuses not to do this and not to help someone he did not like. The defeat of Taylor was such an excuse. John Hennessey also believes that this battle forced McClellan to refrain from hasty action. McClellan recommended that the president gather his strength to break through to Pope’s help or let Pope break through himself, and devote all his attention to strengthening the approaches to Washington ^[48] .

Battle of Cattle Run

Manassas and Bristo were captured by Jackson on the evening of August 26. On the morning of August 27, Federal General Joseph Hooker sent the 72nd New York Regiment to Bristo Station to find out what was happening there. The regiment discovered large enemy forces and retreated without getting involved in battle. was occupied by Richard Ewell's division ; Alarmed by the appearance of the New Yorkers, the general began to prepare for defense and asked Jackson for instructions in case of a serious attack by the enemy ^[49] .

Around noon, the Hooker division approached the positions of the southerners, at the forefront of which was the Joseph Carr brigade. This brigade met the Ewells of Louisiana and launched the offensive. The Nelson Taylor Brigade turned to the left, and the Kavier Grove Brigade to the right. The battle lasted about an hour. At 16:00, Ewell realized that he was in a difficult position, but he did not dare to retreat without Jackson's direct order. Soon the messenger returned from Jackson - Ewell was allowed to retreat to Manassas if the enemy forces were serious. The first team left Alexander Lawton . Forno's brigade and the 60th Georgian regiment were connected by battle, but also began to retreat, firing back. The federal units pursued them for a while, but soon stopped. ^[50]

Historians Hennessey and Cheeks call Ewell’s actions in the Battle of Cattle Run “impeccable,” and Cooling called the battle “a very skilled rearguard battle.” Ewell managed to pat the head of the federal column and hold out as long as possible. He slowed down the federal offensive against Manassas and allowed Jackson to act on schedule. The northerners lost about 300 people killed and wounded - the 73rd New York , which lost half of its composition, was especially affected. Ewell lost 250 people. ^{[50] [51]}

Federal Army Reaction

Prisoners captured at the Battle of Cattle Run told of the presence of Jackson and his divisions. At 20:00, Pope wrote to Porter that the enemy was advancing along the Manassas-Gap railway and that, apparently, he should be attacked in the morning in the Gainesville area. An hour later, Pope drew up an order that some historians consider to be the most important order of that campaign - the order of concentration at Manassas ^[52] .

Received at Bristo Station on August 27, 1862, 9:00 p.m.
Major General McDowell:
All day, starting tomorrow morning, drive to Manassas Junction with all your strength, leaning on the right flank of the Manassas Gap Railway, stretching the left flank to the east. Jackson, Ewell, and E.P. Hill are between Gainesville and Manassas Junction. We had a fierce battle with them today, we threw them back for several miles by rail. If you speak fast and early, right at sunrise on Manassas Junction, we will grab this whole horde. I ordered Renault to advance from Greenwich at the same time to Manassas Junction, and Kearney in his rear was ordered to move to Bristo Station at dawn. Act quickly and the day will be ours.

Original text

- Received at Bristoe Station August 27, 1862, 9 pm

Major-General McDOWELL:

At daylight to-morrow morning march rapidly on Manassas Junction with your whole force, resting your right on the Manassas Gap Railroad, throwing your left well to the east. Jackson, Ewell, and AP Hill are between Gainesville and Manassas Junction. We had a severe fight with them to-day, driving them back several miles along the railroad. If you will march promptly and rapidly at the earliest dawn of day upon Manassas Junction we will bag the whole crowd. I have directed Reno to march from Greenwich at the same hour upon Manassas Junction, and Kearny, who is in his rear, to march on Bristoe at daybreak. Be expeditious and the day is our own.

- War of the Rebellion: Serial 015 Page 0304 Chapter XXIV

Thus, suggesting that Jackson would remain in place, Pope decided to concentrate his army for a decisive blow. Not thinking about the possible problems of the night march or that Jackson could change his position, Pope moved his corps forward almost without preliminary reconnaissance. Federal cavalry at that time did not bring any benefit; Stuart covered Jackson’s divisions so well that the intelligence of the northerners could not get any information - at the very moment when Pope needed it most ^[52] .

Pope’s order demanded to act quickly; in practice, this was not possible. The northerners were not very familiar with the terrain, exhausted by previous marches and moved slowly. Siegel misunderstood the order, and eventually his convoy created a cork in Gainesville. Also, General Porter did not rush. Only at 10 a.m. on August 28 did the federal convoys begin the march, already getting very out of schedule ^[53] . On the same day, Porter sent a letter to General Burnside in Falmouth, where he expressed his pessimistic view of the situation: “All this talk about the capture of Jackson and everything else is all nonsense. All this huge trap was left open, so the enemy jumped out, and the stories that McDowell cut off the path to Longstreet were not based on anything. The enemy destroyed our bridges, burned wagons, etc., and forces this army to withdraw, worrying about communications and supply bases ... They say that Jackson is at Centerville - you can believe it or not. Enemies destroyed an unthinkable amount of property in Manassas - both wagons and supplies. I suspect that Longstreet, which, you know, is cut off ... will soon come to our rear through Warrenton ... ” ^[54] .

Meanwhile, Jackson decided it was time to leave Manassas in order to avoid the spread of drunkenness among the soldiers and not to fall into the trap. He understood that Pope would begin to move north along the railway line and that Pope had to be detained and tied with a battle until the approach of Longstreet divisions. It was possible to take positions on the Bull Run River, but Jackson chose to be on the flank of the retreating army so as not to fall under the blow of all its corps at the same time. It was also necessary to have a convenient way to retreat to the Bull Run Mountains in case Longstreet delayed anything. Jackson decided to occupy the Groveton Heights - a small hill near the town of Groveton, north of the Warrenton Road. From there, there was a convenient road to the Eldi Gap Gorge, which could be used to retreat ^{[55] [51]} .

At 19:00 (August 27), he began the withdrawal of his divisions to . Due to excessive secrecy, Ambrose Hill did not understand Jackson's intentions and mistakenly led his division across the Bull Run River to Centerville. Ewell went with his division there, crossed Bull Run, then returned back over the river and joined the Tagliaferro division at Groveton. Rumors of this maneuver led Pope to the conviction that the enemy was advancing on Washington. On the morning of August 28, Hill still remained on the north bank of Bull Run and was ordered to keep the river crossings to prevent the enemy from escaping Bull Run, but Hill’s people intercepted one of Pope’s letters, from which Hill knew that the enemy was concentrating on attacking Jackson , and decided that he should join Jackson - around noon he crossed Bull Run and stood on the left flank of Jackson’s divisions ^{[56] [51]} .

On the morning of August 28, General Pope was at the Heinzelman corps. The corps moved along the railroad to Manassas, ahead of them was Philip Kearney's division, followed by the battered Hooker division as a reserve. The corps went through the burnt Bristo and Manassas, did not find any signs of an enemy there, but there were reports of the appearance of the southerners in Centerville (this was Hill's division). Pope gave a new order: now the corps was ordered to move to Centerville. Kearney’s division was the first to enter Centerville, finding that there was no enemy there ^{[13] [57]} .

McDowell and Siegel's corps moved that morning from Warrenton to Gainesville. Siegel first came to Gainesville and understood the orders given to him so that he needed to stay in that position ^{['' i '' 7]} . Suddenly, his cavalry stumbled upon the southerners near Groveton and entered into a shootout. Siegel turned the corps into a battle line and was ready to advance, but at that time an order came from MacDowell demanding to immediately move to Manassas. Siegel reluctantly obeyed the order and moved along the road to Manassas. Soon he was informed that General Kearney had occupied Manassas and that the enemy was not there ^[59] .

When Reynolds’s division, following Siegel, went out to Gainesville, she also discovered the southerners a mile east of Gainesville at Brown’s farm and engaged in a shootout with them around 10:00. McDowell did not realize that his people had finally found Jackson. He decided that this was a small reconnaissance unit or rearguard, so when the southerners retreated, he told Reynolds to continue the march and follow the road to Manassas ^{[60] [61]} .

General Tagliaferro recalled that around this time, the cavalrymen of Captain George Gaiter intercepted a courier who was transporting Pope’s order to concentrate from Manassas. This document was transferred to Jackson and acted on him like an electric discharge: without asking advice from his division commanders, without expressing his opinion on this matter, he immediately decided to attack. “He turned to me,” Tagliaferro recalled, “and said:“ Take your division and attack the enemy, ”and Ewell:“ Support the attack. ” Tagliaferro sent his division to the Warrenton Road, but, arriving at the place, found that the Reynolds corps had left ^[55] .

At about 5 p.m., McDowell's divisions received orders to advance towards Centerville. “It was between three and four in the afternoon,” McDowell later recalled, “when I found out that the enemy was not in Manassas, and soon I received two notes from General Pope; in the first, he asked to deal with the state of affairs at Centerville and asked to fully state his view of the situation, since I know this area better than he does; in the second, he informed me that the enemy was on the other side of Bull Run, on the Orange Alexandria road and in Centerville, and ordered me to move with all my forces to this place. ” Rufus King's division (temporarily under the command of ) was at that time in Gainesville and began to move to Groveton, while Reynolds' division approached Manassas and began to move north along the road to Sadley Springs ^{[62] [63]} .

Longstreet March

At the turn of the Rappahanok River on the morning of August 26, it was noticed that the northerners were retreating from their positions. This could mean that the Virgin Army was heading north to defeat Jackson. Lee called Longstreet and said he intended to join the Jackson. He asked which path Longstreet considered the best - short through Warrenton or longer along which Jackson followed. Long Street spoke in favor of the second option. Promoting orders were issued right away: Richard Anderson’s division remained to cover the Warrenton Springs crossing, and Longstreet’s entire wing went to during the day, where they arrived by night ^[64] .

In the early morning, a Longstreet convoy emerged from Orleans and walked about 10 miles to the town of Salem, where it stopped for a halt. Here Lee, together with his staff officers, suddenly ran into a detachment of federal cavalry. Lee managed to escape; the feds did not attack and retreated. This event greatly bothered Lee, in which at that moment there was no cavalry for reconnaissance. The meeting with the cavalry somewhat delayed the convoy - such was the price of the decision to send the entire cavalry to help Jackson. The column resumed the march, and after two miles of the march a courier arrived from Jackson: he reported that Jackson had successfully captured and Manassas, completed the task and, moreover, the federal army has not taken any counter-steps. Lee immediately sent a report to the president and again asked for reinforcements. At that time, a courier had already been sent from the president, who would notify Lee that the reinforcements had been sent and that “trust in you overpowered the fears of the possible attack of the defenseless Richmond” ^[64] .

Torufeyr Gorge

On the morning of August 28, Longstreet divisions had 22 miles to go before joining Jackson, but lay in their path. It was not a serious obstacle, despite the fact that Longstreet in his memoirs called it a narrow canyon (narrow gorge) ^[65] . There were no feds near the gorge, and all morning the army couriers drove freely through it. The Longstreet column moved slowly and only at 15:00 reached the gorge. Lee decided to give people a break, and to cover the gorge he sent a division of David Jones . Jones went to the gorge and unexpectedly met there a federal detachment of unknown numbers. This was very bad news for General Lee: if the enemy manages to keep the gorge, then Pope’s entire army can fall on Jackson, and after Jackson’s defeat, Longstreet’s corps will be hit. ^[66]

Lee did not show signs of concern: he slowly studied the gorge from the height of a nearby hill and came to the conclusion that the obstacle was not insurmountable: he ordered Jones to continue the offensive from the front, and the divisions of Wilcox and Hood to go around forest paths. Around this time, gunshots began to be heard far in the east, and this meant that Jackson had already entered the battle with the enemy alone ^[66] .

Federal forces in the gorge were part of the body of Irwin McDowell . On August 27, Pope instructed MacDowell to block the gorge, but then ordered him to move to Centerville. By personal initiative, MacDowell left the James Ricketts brigade (5,000 men) and the Percy Wyndham cavalry regiment near the gorge. Ricketts stopped in Gainesville, and Wyndham occupied the gorge. These forces, however, were clearly not enough ^{[67] [53]} .

On August 28, Wyndham's soldiers fell trees on the road into the gorge and at 09:30 noticed the vanguard of Longstreet . Wyndham sent a messenger to Ricketts , but he moved slowly and by 14:00 reached only Haymarket, located 5 kilometers east. At this point, Longstreet's corps knocked out Wyndham from the gorge. However, the southerners did not have time to occupy the hills north and south of the gorge, and the terrain itself was convenient for defending the road to Gainesville ^[49] .

In this situation, Long Street first decided to occupy the hills on the flanks. A Georgian regiment from Anderson’s brigade attacked Chapmens Hill on the north side of the gorge and knocked out the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment, while Georgian regiments attacked the heights on the south side of the gorge and knocked out the 13th Massachusetts regiment. Then the team of Evander Low crossed the ridge north of the gorge and attacked the right flank of the enemy. At this time, General Cadmus Wilcox with three brigades crossed the ridge north through the Houpwell Gap (10:00 p.m.), did not find an adversary on his way and went to the rear of federal positions. Ricketts' position became critical, so he took the brigade to Gainesville before Wilcox managed to cut his escape route. The obstacle to the Longstreet corps disappeared, according to Freeman, "like a miracle." Lee sent a courier to Jackson with a notification of a successful outburst, and the whole army remained overnight on the battlefield ^[66] .

In the battle, only 100 people died on both sides, but it was of strategic importance. Ricketts did not understand the seriousness of the situation, arrived too late to have time to do anything, and eventually allowed the two parts of the North Virginia Army to join. MacDowell was generally right: his corps could well restrain Longstreet for a long time, but Pope did not realize the importance of the gorge and preferred to focus all his attention on Jackson's defeat ^[68] .

Second Bull Run

On the morning of August 28, Jackson’s divisions stood on the Rocky Ridge, from where they saw how parts of Rufus King’s division were moving past them along the Warrenton Road. Jackson’s divisions were securely hidden in the woods and could have gone unnoticed, but Jackson decided not to let the enemy leave the Bull Run River and decided to draw attention to himself: he advanced Ewell’s division forward to Brown’s farm, and his artillery opened fire on the federal column . At 18:00, the northerners turned into a battle line and attacked the enemy at Brown's farm. A fierce three-hour battle ensued, which ended in a draw. General Pope decided that his units were tied up by the retreating Jackson, and that McDowell’s corps cut off his way to the Bull Run Mountains, so he ordered his units to be surrounded and destroyed on August 29 ^{[69] [70]} .

On the morning of August 29, Pope faced a control problem: his divisions were scattered along an 8-mile arc, and coordinating their maneuvers over unfamiliar terrain was not easy. Porter and MacDowell were ordered to attack Jackson's right flank, but this order was not executed. Siegel’s corps attacked Jackson’s left flank, but achieved nothing. In the afternoon, Pope himself arrived on the battlefield and set up his headquarters on Buck Hill, north of the Warrenton Road. There he began to wait for the results of Porter's attack. Meanwhile, Longstreet divisions marched through Torufeyr-Gap and took up positions to the right of Jackson, joining the flanks at Brown's farm ^[71] . Now everything was ready to attack the flank of the federal army, but Longstreet feared for its own right flank, towards which Porter’s corps was aimed ^[72] .

In the afternoon, Pope again ordered Porter to attack, but the order reached him too late. At the same time, Pope launched another attack on Jackson’s position (by Kearney’s division), but this time also failed. ^[73]

Now, after the appearance of Longstreet, Pope had the time to retreat to Centerville. But he decided to fight. He was sure that Jackson was pinned into a corner, badly battered and would be finished in the morning. The apparent success of Kearney’s division blinded Pope; he believed that Porter was already in position and new units on the way, and did not realize at all that the first day had passed in scattered attacks, suffered heavy losses, and the battle was almost uncontrollably due to his fault, Pope. Pope believed that the enemy was already retreating and suffered losses nearly double that of the Virgin Army. And he decided to continue the battle further ^[74] .

On the morning of August 30, Lee concluded that attacking numerically superior enemy forces would be risky. He decided to evade the battle and continue to maneuver, about which he notified the president. But almost at this very time (11:30) General Porter was ordered to launch an attack; at 15:00 his corps began to advance on Jackson's position. This attack was repelled with great damage to the federal army, and Lee realized that the time had come for a counterattack. At 16:00, John Hood's division was sent on the offensive. This blow caught the northerners by surprise - their entire left flank was knocked over. Only by 19:00 Pope was able to organize a defense on Henry Hill, but already at 20:00 he ordered to retreat across the Bull Run River ^{[75] [76]} .

During the campaign, southerners used unusual firing ranges. Their rifles could effectively shoot at 547 meters, and the bullet retained lethal force at 822 meters, but in practice the distances were surprisingly short. John Worsham ( 21st Virginia ) mentions shooting from a distance of 91 meters, John Dooley (1st Virginia) recalled that his regiment allowed the feds to go 45-73 meters. Under Groveton, where the soldiers had some shelter in the form of a hedge, fire was fired from a distance of 64 meters ^[77] .

Around 22:00, Lee moved the headquarters to the battlefield and began to collect news about the situation of both armies. Stuart reported that one of his brigades was chasing the enemy behind Bull Run, and the second broke through to Fairfax, and requested permission to attack the enemy with cavalry and infantry, but did not receive permission. Lee wrote a brief victory notice for President Davis at this time ^[78]

That evening, the federal army retreated behind Bull Run and stood at Centerville, where the southerners' earthen fortifications remained from spring. On the same day, heavy rain began, from which the water level in the river rose and the roads got wet. On the morning of August 31, General Lee examined the area and found that the Bull Run bridge was destroyed, it was almost impossible to cross the river, and besides this, the army was very tired of the previous march, battle and famine. News came that the corps of Franklin and Sumner (VI and II) had already come to Centerville to strengthen Pope. With all this in mind, Lee rejected the idea of ​​directly pursuing an adversary. He ordered Jackson to repeat the flanking maneuver: to cross the Bull Run at Sadley Springs and go behind enemy lines at Chantilly. Longstreet's divisions were supposed to remain on the battlefield for some time and bury the dead, and then follow Jackson. Daniel Hill's division was soon to come from Richmond and change the people of Longstreet ^[78] .

When the Jackson divisions left, Lee went to make orders regarding the Longstreet divisions and at that moment accidentally injured both hands. The injury was so serious that Lee could not ride for several days and was forced to be in a medical cart. This incident further complicated his control of the final phase of the campaign ^[78] .

Chantilly

Meanwhile, on August 30, not only news of the defeat near Manassas came to Washington, but also reports of the defeat of the federal army in the battle of Richmond (in Kentucky). Commander-in-Chief Henry Halleck had to solve these two problems simultaneously. Exhausted by insomnia (a consequence of hemorrhoids ), Halleck asked McClellan for help with a note: "I am completely exhausted." McClellan replied that he would try to help, but asked to understand his difficult situation ^{[79] [80]} . At the same time, General Pope was completely at a loss and did not know what to decide on. Halleck advised him to counterattack, waiting for the corps of Franklin and Sumner to approach. Pope gathered a military council and asked the generals for their opinions: they suggested that the enemy was planning to go on the flank of the army or invade Maryland , and advised them to retreat to Washington. At 11:00 a telegram came from Halleck, in which he suggested renewing the offensive - Porter later called this decision stupid, if not criminal. Pope decided to follow this order - there is an opinion that he was afraid of being removed from office if the army was withdrawn to the capital ^{[81] [82]} .

Finally, on September 1, Pope received permission to withdraw. Halleck told him to withdraw gradually to Fairfax, Annadale, and, if necessary, to Alexandria. At this time, Jackson was already standing at Chantilly and waiting for Longstreet: Lee ordered him not to start the battle without full confidence in victory. At 11:00, the Howard Federal Brigade discovered the presence of an adversary by engaging in a skirmish with Beverly Robertson's cavalry on the Centerville-Chantilly road. ^[83]

Jackson immediately turned his units to the right to meet the enemy. At 5 p.m. parts of the Stevens federal division turned around to attack. Jesse Renault , the corps commander, was unwell, so he entrusted the attack to Stevens, although he expressed doubt about the successful outcome. Stevens' brigades launched an offensive under heavy rain and gale, they quickly lost their ranks, and their orders mixed up. Stevens personally took the banner and led his former regiment into the attack, but almost immediately received a mortal wound. Even before that, he had sent a messenger for reinforcements to the rear, but he only found the division of Philip Kearney . Kearney arrived on the battlefield and tried to clean up the Stevens division. He tried to personally determine the location of the enemy units, but fell under the volley of the 49th Georgian regiment and was also mortally wounded. At 18:15, the southerners launched a counterattack and pushed the enemy out of the field. On this battle subsided ^[84] .

The federal army lost 500 or 1,300 people, the southerners lost 500 or 800. The losses of the federals amounted to 11.5% of the forces involved, the losses of the southerners - 3.4%. The bodies of Stevens and Kearney were discovered and transported over the front line. At the cost of the death of the two divisional generals, the feds were able to stop Jackson and did not allow him to cut off the retreat to Washington. One of the participants in the battle then wrote that if Chantilla was defeated, the army would be destroyed and Washington would be taken. But the army, even disorganized, managed to retreat to Washington. General Lee was unable to do anything (due to problems with injured hands), and his hungry army was also unable to fight that night ^[85] .

Pope, the loser strategically, was actually besieged in Washington. His military career collapsed completely, and he was saved only by his proximity to President Lincoln - Pope was sent to Wisconsin, where he participated in the Dakota War of 1862 ^[86] . Pope was removed from command even without a formal order. On September 5, he sent a telegram to Halleck, in which he wrote that he had received orders from McClellan to prepare his team for the march, and asked what kind of team it was and where it was located. Parts of his army were scattered in different directions without his knowledge, and now Pope did not know the position of a single regiment. He asked if he should command and if he should obey McClellan. Halleck answered him that the Potomac and Virgin armies were uniting, and Pope should go to the Secretary of War for instructions. According to McClellan , these two telegrams are the only documents related to the disbandment of the Virginia Army ^[87] .

The North Virginia army, exhausted by the fighting, was to be, according to all the rules, sent to camps to make up for losses and restore strength. Southerners marched and fought almost continuously for ten consecutive weeks. The army lacked shoes, clothes, and food, and the defeated federal army was still twice as numerous as it was. But General Lee, according to , did not recognize the rules. He did not intend to leave behind Rapidan or the Shenandoah Valley, but it was impossible to remain in the ravaged northern Virginia. Lee seized the initiative and did not want to give it away. He had the opportunity to deliver a decisive blow to the demoralized enemy - he decided to invade Maryland (at the same time as Bragg attacked Kentucky ) to feed the army on its territory and clear Virginia of the enemy at least for the time of harvest. On September 3, he notified the president of this decision, and on September 4, without waiting for an answer, he ordered the offensive to begin ^[88] .

Losses

The North Virginia campaign cost both sides dearly, although Lee spent his resources more carefully. Pope’s army losses amounted to 16,054 people: 1,724 killed, 8,372 wounded and 5,958 prisoners (out of 75,000) ^{[1] [89]} .

The third corps in the battles of Cattle Run, Groveton and Chantilly lost 260 people killed, 1525 wounded and 453 missing, a total of 2238. The Hooker division, which before the campaign began, numbered 10,000, now, when counted at Fairfax, it numbered only 2,400 The losses were so great that the corps was temporarily withdrawn from the field army and he did not participate in the Maryland campaign ^[90] .

Southerners lost 9197 people: 1481 killed, 7627 wounded and 89 prisoners - out of all 48 500 people ^[1] .

According to Freeman’s estimates, the loss ratio was 4.5 to 7 in favor of the South, while in previous battles of the Seven Day Battle the ratio was 5 to 4 in favor of the North ^[91] . When evaluating effectiveness on the principle of “killed enemies for every 1000 involved soldiers”, it turns out that 1000 federal soldiers killed 120 enemies during the campaign, and 1000 military confederations killed 208 enemies ^[92] .

Ratings

The campaign was a real triumph for Lee and his subordinates. Military historian John Hennessey calls this campaign the most eminent career of Lee, "a happy union of strategy and tactics." Jackson’s march, when he walked 54 miles in 36 hours, was “the bravest maneuver of the war, and Jackson performed it flawlessly.” The Longstreet attack on August 30 was “timely, powerful, and swift, and the federal army was as close to defeat as ever” ^[93] .

Historian Philip Ketcher also calls this campaign the best career of General Lee. Jackson was able to restore his reputation during the campaign, although he made mistakes at Cedar Mountain and could not destroy King’s division at Groveton. General Long Street never acted better; he was still cautious, but, starting to advance, he acted decisively (although he lost 4,000 people - more than Jackson in three days of fighting). The cavalry performed well under Torufeyr-Gap and at Manassas. Finally, the artillery of under Bull Run managed to organize a massive fire, taking revenge on the northerners for their bombing at Malvern Hill ^[89] .

Lee’s tactics in the battles of the North Virginia campaign were noticeably better than in battles on the peninsula, and his strategy also improved markedly. The strategy was better because it was partly simpler, Freeman wrote, because this time there were no attempts to manage six independent units under the command of six independent generals. All responsibility for carrying out the orders of the commander in chief lay with three people: Jackson, Longstreet and Stuart. This was one of the reasons for success. The second was excellent logistics: its parts moved quickly and in a timely manner. Several delays could well lead to defeat. In turn, if the federal corps of Franklin moved faster, Pope would have been saved ^[78] .

Freeman considers the third success factor to be the fact that Lee assessed the situation more sensibly than his opponents. Lee did not know exactly when the Army of the Potomac Army would join Pope, but he very realistically suggested the timing of this event. General Pope, by contrast, did not adequately assess the enemy and his capabilities. He planned to attack Gordonsville and Charlottesville and then from the west to Richmond, but overestimated the size of the enemy’s army in this direction. Pope also did not realize the possible danger of circumventing his right flank. He later wrote that he knew everything about Jackson’s raid on Manassas, but was sure that Manassas was securely covered, which was not consistent with his correspondence. Pope later lost sight of the approach of Longstreet divisions. ^[78]

General Lee can be blamed for three miscalculations. The first was that he had to attack the enemy at the turn of the Rapidan River until August 20 - in this case there were chances to defeat Pope. However, according to Freeman, such an offensive in any case was unlikely. Freeman calls the second possible miscalculation that Lee did not force Longstreet to attack on the afternoon of August 29, but allowed to postpone the attack until August 30. If the attack on August 29 were successful, then the weather would allow the organization of the pursuit of the enemy on August 30. This statement is based on three assumptions: 1) that the attack on August 29 would be successful; 2) that the army would have had the strength to pursue August 30; and 3) that Longstreet’s arguments against the August 29 attack could be ignored. Meanwhile, Lee did not consider himself entitled to intervene in the management of divisions on the battlefield. “I mainly work to bring my troops to the right place at the right time,” Lee said later, “that's where my work ends. As soon as I send troops into battle, I surrender the fate of my army to God ” ^[78] .

The third miscalculation can be called the fact that after the battle the persecution of the defeated enemy was not immediately organized. The validity of this third charge largely depends on the second: if Lee forced Longstreet to attack on the 29th, then on the 30th prosecution was possible. However, already on the 31st it was unrealistic due to impassable dirt. Later, in 1870, talking to his nephew, who lived near the Washington forts, Lee said: “My people had no food at all,” and pointed to Fort Wade with the words: “I can’t order people to take this fort, if they haven’t eaten anything for three days. ” “When Lee looked at the rearguards of Pope’s army, leaving the horizon on the morning of September 2, he thought about his further maneuvers,” Freeman wrote, “and not about sending his ragged army to the siege of Washington” ^[78] .

International Reaction

When news of the offensive of the North Virginia Army reached Europe, mediation demands flared up with renewed vigor. French diplomats told the American ambassador in Paris that at the moment, the conquest of the South seems impossible. British Chancellor William Gladstone said that the South, obviously, cannot be won, its independence is already inevitable, and Europe is obliged to recognize this. Lord Palmerston , who had blocked the parliamentary decision two months earlier in favor of mediation, has now changed his mind. “The feds received a fierce blow,” he wrote, “and it is likely that new troubles await them. It is possible that both Washington and Baltimore will fall into the hands of the Confederates. ” If something like this happens, then England, Palmerston suggested, would need to intervene. ^[94]

The role of McClellan

One of the reasons for the defeat of Pope was the position of George McClellan , Commander-in-Chief of the Potomac Army. McClellan immediately negatively perceived the appointment of Halleck (his former subordinate) as the supreme commander, and the creation of the Virginia Army, and the appointment of Pope as its commander. John Pope McClellan had the same dislike as Robert Lee. In a private letter to his wife, he wrote: "This villain will overwhelm any business that will be entrusted to him." Pope also had a low opinion of McClellan's abilities. According to , Lee could not even dream of such antagonism among his opponents ^{[95] [96]} .

McClellan also wrote to his wife (August 21) that if Pope is defeated in Virginia, the Washington administration will have to ask him for help. McClellan was interested in defeating Pope and was in no hurry to help him; even Lincoln (according to his secretary John Hay) felt this and said that McClellan wanted Pope to be defeated. “He's a little crazy,” Lincoln decided, but suggested that McClellan’s strange behavior is understandable with envy. Philip Kearney repeatedly warned Pope that he should not rely on McClellan and the "McClellan clique" - Generals Porter and Franklin ^{[97] [98]} .

On August 27, McClellan arrived in Alexandria and, on the basis of rumors of Taylor’s defeat and battle on Cattle Run, immediately suggested that Pope’s position was hopeless. He proposed not strengthening it with Sumner and Franklin corps, but focusing primarily on strengthening Washington. On the critical day of August 28, Halleck demanded that McClellan send these two corps as soon as possible to help Pope, but McClellan was refusing to follow this order, and Halleck did not have the rigidity to insist. As a result, the two best corps of the Potomac Army never took part in the battle on August 29-30 ^{[99] [100]} .

Pope and MacDowell considered McClellan the main culprit for failure. The Washington administration was ready to agree with them. Lincoln called McClellan's behavior "unforgivable." The resignation of McClellan was seemingly inevitable, but it turned out differently. Pope was removed from command and exiled to Minnesota, MacDowell was exiled to California, and the Virginia Army was disbanded and its corps included in the Potomac Army, which was led by McClellan on September 2. “The whole army is for him,” Lincoln explained, “and we will have to play with the cards that we have” ^[101] .

Comments

References to sources

• Condon, Steven E. Stonewall Jackson and the Midcourse Correction to Second Manassas. - New York: eBookIt.com, 2013 .-- 56 p. - ISBN 1456608932 .
• Cooling, B. Franklin. Counter-thrust: From the Peninsula to the Antietam. - U of Nebraska Press, 2007 .-- 354 p. - ISBN 0803215436 .
• Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. - New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001 .-- p. - ISBN 0-684-84944-5 .
• Harsh, Joseph L. Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 1861-1862. - Kent State University Press, 1998 .-- 278 p. - ISBN 0873385802 .
• Hennessy, John J. Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas. - University of Oklahoma Press, 1993 .-- 607 p. - ISBN 0-8061-3187-X .
• Johnson, Don. Thirteen Months at Manassas / Bull Run: The Two Battles and the Confederate and Union Occupations. - McFarland, 2013 .-- 208 p. - ISBN 147660441X .
• Katcher, Philip RN The Army of Northern: Lee's army in the American Civil War. - New York: The Brown Reference Group plc, 2003 .-- 362 p. - ISBN 1-57958-331-8 .
• Langellier, John. Second Manassas 1862: Robert E. Lee's Greatest Victory. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002. ISBN 1-84176-230-X .
• Longstreet, James. From Manassas to Appomattox. - Philadelphia: JB Lippincott Company, 1896. - 690 p.
• Martin, David G. The Second Bull Run Campaign: July-August 1862 .-- Da Capo Press, 2007 .-- 300 p. - ISBN 0306816733 .
• McPherson, James M. Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam. - New York: Oxford University Press, 2002 .-- 220 p. - ISBN 0-19-513521-0 .
• McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom. - New York: Oxford University Press, 1988 .-- 944 p. - ISBN 0-19-503863-0 .
• Maxwell, Jerry H. The Perfect Lion: The Life and Death of Confederate Artillerist John Pelham. - University of Alabama Press, 1986. - 419 p. - ISBN 081731735X .
• McClellan George Brinton. McClellan's own story: the war for the Union, the soldiers who fought it, the civilians who directed it and his relations to it and to them. - CL Webster & Company, 1887. - 678 p.
• Ropes, John Codman. The Army Under Pope. - New York: Digital Scanning Inc, 2004 .-- 252 p. - ISBN 1582185301 .

• Second Manassas Campaign - article in the Virginia Encyclopedia.
• General Lee's progress report
• Report by Irwin McDowell
• Animated Campaign Map