Ballot Processing Complex

Head scanner

Backup scanner

The declared objectives of the development of KOIB were:

• Reducing the time for establishing the voting results and compiling a protocol on the voting results by precinct commissions;
• Minimization of the human factor in the calculation of votes;
• Increasing citizens' confidence in the electoral process (p. 111 ^[5] ).

KOIB consists of a storage for ballots and a receiving device made in the form of a ballot box cover, which combines the entire electronic hardware of the complex, the basis of which is a microprocessor with a scanner connected to it. To store data, the complex is equipped with ROM , there is also the ability to connect an SD memory card .

There is a manual keyboard input device necessary for setting up the complex, switching modes (test mode and voting mode) and performing a number of standard procedures. For example, data on the results of early voting are manually entered. Single line liquid crystal display designed for data output. In the voting mode, he shows the number of ballots cast, which in fact allows any voter to evaluate the turnout at his precinct at the time of his own vote. In case of a malfunction, there is also a slot for manual voting in the lid, which allows in an emergency case to use the electronic ballot box as usual.

There are two models: KOIB-2003 (currently not in operation and discontinued) and KOIB-2010. In the KOIB-2010 model, the ballot box is made of translucent materials.

Directly during voting, electronic ballot boxes work in pairs, referring to a common duplicated database. In case of failure of one of them, voting can be continued using the second. A printer can be connected to any of the complexes to print the protocol of the election commission. Through telecommunication networks, data on the voting results can be transmitted to the GAS Vybory system. Voting results at the polling station can also be entered manually by the operator into the CEO, which often happened ^[5] .

Due to the design features of the scanning device, there are restrictions on the size of ballots. Taking into account the specifics of the work of KOIB in accordance with paragraph 1 of the Decree of the CEC of Russia dated March 6, 2013 No. 165 / 1212-6 "On the Procedure for Using Voting Techniques for Counting - When Voting in Elections to State Authorities of the Russian Federation, - complexes for processing ballots and complexes for electronic voting "the device is not used in elections and referenda: at polling stations, referendum precincts, in which the number of BULLETIN not allow to carry out testing and conducting training established by the Instruction on the use of technical means of counting votes - ballots processing facilities in 2010 in the elections and referendums held in the Russian Federation, the number of ballots;

at polling stations, referendum precincts formed in places of temporary residence of voters, referendum participants (hospitals, sanatoriums, rest houses, train stations, airports, places of detention of suspects and accused and other places of temporary stay), in remote and remote areas, on ships sailing on election day and at polar stations;

at polling stations, referendum precincts, if the number of registered candidates in single-mandate and multi-mandate constituencies, as well as electoral associations entails exceeding the length of the ballot established by regulatory documents.

During the operation of KOIB-2010 on September 14, 2014, the following types of technical problems were recorded: winding a ballot paper on the shaft of the broaching mechanism, one or both scanners freezing, scanners out of sync, ballot jamming, malfunction of the keyboard, flash media, pollution and damage to the scanning rulers, incorrect recognition of marks (during testing), the return of ballots, power supply failure, the issuance of the message "ID not detected." A total of 277 technical failures were recorded. ^[five]

In the elections in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation on October 14, 2012, at 3 polling stations, the commissions recognized ballots that were classified by the COIB as invalid. The reason is the folds of paper passing through the squares for the voter marks. They were recognized by the scanner as a voter mark. The protocol from the site was drawn up only in the manual version.

Alexander Ignatov (Executive Director of the Russian Institute of Electoral Law , p. 118 ^[5] ):

... our elections are held in the old fashioned manner, as 100 years ago. ... at least two things must be ensured: the reliability of voting systems and the confidence of voters and election participants in them. ... you can trust this kind of technology if you clearly understand the principles and procedure for its operation. I would like to always be able to check the technique by counting the votes manually. Such mechanisms, by the way, are provided in the COIB: voting in it is carried out using paper ballots, which at any time can be counted in the old proven way.

Evgeny Shevchenko (representative of the Patriots of Russia party in the CEC, p. 100 ^[5] ):

... it is important to increase confidence in these technical means: in addition to electronic vote counting, manual counting can also be carried out in parallel - and the data should be compared. A similar experience was, for example, in the Chelyabinsk region in the last election. The data ... match.

Valery Rashkin (deputy from the Communist Party ^[6] ):

... Where KOIBs were used, in principle, a manual recount of votes was not made, which is prescribed by law to verify the results calculated by the machine. The decision on this is made by the CEC - this promotes confidence in the elections. ... However, now there is no such thing, moreover, on one site of a member of the election commission who demanded a recount, they beat him, causing him bodily harm (in particular, breaking his leg). ^[7] For 1 year, in the course of the trial, the injured Egorov was retrained by the judge as a witness; the court refused to review the video of the events; and the criminal and political crime was qualified as “petty hooliganism” ^[8] . What is behind the stubborn reluctance of the CEC and other commissions to carry out such a generally simple and understandable operation? We are inclined to conclude that a specific program operation has been incorporated in KOIB in advance, which changes the voting results in the right direction. The control over the KOIBs, in principle, is not carried out by anyone other than representatives of the authorities.

According to the reports of the election commissions, the KOIB tests show that the accuracy of vote counting when using them is higher than when manually counting by members of the precinct election commission ^[9] . However, this view is not shared by all. It is suggested that these devices can be used to falsify voting results . Claims are already brought against the very principle of automated vote counting as opaque, closed to public control and vulnerable to intruders. ^[10] . In order to facilitate observation of the elections and identify possible violations or software errors, the CEC regulations provide for a manual recount of votes, by decision of the CEC, even for elections to municipal LSGs, only 5% of the KOIB equipped plots are selected by lot .

In 2013, computer enthusiasts found on the government procurement website the source code of the KOIBs that processed the votes in the mayoral election of Moscow on September 8, 2013. It turned out that the possibilities for manipulating electronic ballot boxes are no less than with ordinary ones. For example, programmers found vulnerabilities in the COIB codes that make it possible to change the number of votes cast for candidates. Vulnerabilities in KOIBs were committed by the developers of the private company CROC-Incorporated CJSC , which manages software, delivers and monitors KOIBs during elections and during the inter-election period. KOIBs are stored at the company's warehouse, and KROK-incorporated employees are KOIB operators at presentations. The owner of CROC-Incorporated is Boris Bobrovnikov . In February 2009, he was included in the "first hundred" reserve of managerial personnel under the patronage of the President of the Russian Federation.

The ability of electronic ballot boxes to recognize invalid and fake ballots is being questioned. A number of such problems are recognized in the reports of election commission experts: KOIB does not always recognize too pale marks in ballots, it can take typographical defects as a mark, and it is incorrect to evaluate the authenticity of a ballot ^[1] . Third-party experts noted the inability of KOIB to distinguish a valid bulletin from its black-and-white photocopy ^[10] or not to distinguish the color of the scanner device ^[11] .

A simple way has been discovered to obtain a falsified ballot with the correct and accurate operation of KOIB and all its components - by blocking the contacts of the printer cartridge and pre-stacking the fake ballot in the paper tray. ^[12] It is believed that this method was used in elections in Khakassia .

In accordance with article 68 (paragraph 32) of Law No. 67-FZ, ballots are recalculated manually at least 3 polling stations within the same territorial commission after COIBs count the votes ^[13] . At the conference, it was reported that in the early 2000s, with the introduction of new technology, incredulous voters demanded a manual recount - and it was done ^[14]

According to CEC member Levichev , about 30 million voters will vote in the presidential election in 2018 with the help of the KOIBs (that is, more than 40% of voters). ^[15]

But during the presidential election in 2018, a recount was not carried out even once - in contrast to how it was done under Churov ^{[16] [6]}

Moreover, at Moscow PEC No. 667, a member of the electoral commission, Ivan Egorov, who demanded a recount, was beaten and broke his leg; he was taken to the Sklifosovsky Emergency Research Institute , where he lost consciousness on the operating table. ^[7] Zyuganov stated that the control over KOIBs is carried out exclusively by government representatives, and therefore the results obtained with their help are not trustworthy. ^[17]

The representative of Yabloko ( B. G. Misnik ) also said that when counting by the KOIBs and GAS Elections, the result can be programmed (as in the elections in Saratov in 2016: exactly the same result was obtained at 140 polling stations), and the federal Yabloko’s political committee did not recognize the results announced by the CEC as real election results ^[18] .

Later it turned out that in one case, in Bashkiria, a manual recount of ballots was carried out. He showed that at a real turnout, half as shown by the KOIB, significantly fewer votes were cast for the incumbent. The election commission members said that the device was tested, and then it mistakenly summed up both results. ^[nineteen]

Even a member of the CEC in his dissenting opinion noted that during the election campaign and during the election itself there were numerous violations; including:

The increase in the number of ... ballot processing complexes (KOIB) used was not accompanied by an adequate expansion of legally secured capabilities to control the functioning of the software products embedded in them. Moreover, the CEC of Russia did not use the right granted by clause 32 of article 68 of the Federal Law “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in the Referendum of Citizens of the Russian Federation” to the territories in which the control of the counting of votes directly by members of precinct election commissions (manual counting of votes) ) ^[20]

Based on the above, Kolyushin concluded that the election results announced by the CEC were obtained, inter alia, due to a violation of the principle of free elections .