Totopotomi Creek Battle

After Grant did not engage in battle at North Anna , he once again began to bypass the right flank of Lee's army. He moved southeast to the north bank of the Pamunkey River, hoping to find a convenient place to break through General Lee's screeners. On May 27, the federal cavalry occupied a bridgehead on the south bank of the river at the Hanovertown ford. When the infantry crossed to the right bank, the cavalry got involved in the battle at House Shop (May 28)

Lee's army was located in trenches beyond the Totopotomi River, and her situation was difficult. Lee had a good idea of ​​the movement of Grant's army, but he had supply problems due to the destruction of the railway, and his army was also insufficient. Lee asked General Beauregard to hand over to him 12,000 people who, without much benefit, were blocked by Federal General Butler from Bermuda-Handred. Beauregard refused, citing the danger of Butler’s army, and then Lee turned to President Davis and in the end Beauregar sent him a Hawk division - 7,000 people.

On May 29, Grant's army headed southwest. Since the cavalry was busy in other areas, Grant decided to use infantry for reconnaissance. General Winfield Hancock’s II Corps moved along the Richmond-Hanovertown Road. Going out to the river and finding that the enemy was deeply buried in the ground, Hancock’s people also began to dig trenches. Governor Warren’s V Corps extended Hancock’s front to the left. Wright’s VI Corps went northwest, and Burnside’s Corps stood at House Shop as a reserve. Sheridan's cavalry was far to the side, at Old Chech.

The North Virginia army, from left to right, consisted of General Hill’s third corps, Breckinridge’s division (which had just come from Shenandoah), Richard Anderson ’s corps, and Jubal Earley’s corps. On the 29th, only individual skirmishes took place. The battle was planned on the banks of the Totopotomi River, near the place where in 1862 the battle of Gains Mill took place .

On May 30, Grant launched a general offensive. Wright’s federal corps headed south to Hill’s corps, while Hancock’s corps crossed the river and attacked Breckinridge’s positions. Warren’s corps attacked Earley from the east. Wright's advanced units were bogged down in the swamps at Kramps Creek and delayed his advance. Hancock’s shooters recaptured several rifle cells from Breckinridge, but didn’t advance further. George Meade told Burnside to support Hancock, but he came too late. On the federal left flank, Warren's corps crossed Totopotomi and began to move west. Griffin's division was the first, followed by the divisions of Crawford and Cattler.

Lee regarded these maneuvers as another attempt to circumvent his right flank, so he ordered the Airlie Corps to attack the Vth Federal Corps with the support of Anderson Corps. Airlie decided to send the Rhodes division into a detour march through Old Chech Road.

Meanwhile, the Vth Corps was slowly moving forward and Warren began to worry about his left flank. He ordered Crawford to move south and build temporary fortifications at Old Church Road. Crawford sent forward a brigade of Colonel Martin Hardin, whose soldiers had already expired on that day, and the 13th Pennsylvania Regiment was already ready for dissolution. To the right of this regiment was a large but inexperienced regiment of Colonel Howard Kitting. At noon, the Rhodes division entered the Hardin brigade and immediately knocked it over. Hardy's entire division faltered due to the retreat, opening the flank of the entire Vth Corps.

However, the attack upset the ranks of the Rhodes division, which in this situation did not dare to advance further behind enemy lines. the remaining divisions of the Airlie corps were still in the marching formation. Anderson’s corps lingered. Warren began to deploy his corps with a south front. At 18:30, the division of Stefan Ramser (recently promoted to the division commander) inadvertently attacked the positions of the federal batteries. The attack was not well thought out and Airlie reluctantly gave her consent. Gordon’s division was still unfolding and did not have time to support the attack. The Rhodes division was also busy. As a result, the attacking brigade of Thomas Tuna immediately lay under heavy fire from his left flank. The Pegram brigade (under the commissar of Edward Willis) courageously rushed forward under crossfire and managed to move 50 yards to the enemy’s positions, but Willis was mortally wounded and the brigade retreated.

As a result, Ramser's attack was repelled with heavy losses. One of the Virginians then recalled: “Our line was erased, as if by magic. All officers — field and staff — were killed in an incredibly short amount of time. ^[1] "

Mead ordered a general attack to support Warren, but not one corps was ready for this. And yet the people of Warren were able to cope with the situation without outside help. The failure of Ramser's attack discouraged Earley and he ordered his corps to move a little to the west. He accused Anderson of not arriving on time and spoiling the whole thing, but the soldiers blamed Ramser, who ordered the attack without preliminary intelligence.

The losses of the federal army amounted to 731 people (679 were killed and wounded, 52 were captured), the losses of the South were 1,159 (811 were killed and wounded, 348 were captured). Colonel Edward Willis was killed during Ramsera's unsuccessful attack, and in the past, Thomas Jackson, staff officer. Brigadier General James Terrill also died.

Meanwhile, Lee found out that a detachment of 16,000 men under the command of William Smith was going to Grant from the east and if he lengthened Grant's left flank, there would be nothing to oppose the North Virginia Army with - there was nothing to extend his own flank with. Therefore, Lee sent the cavalry of General Fitzghu Lee to Cold Harbor to occupy the crossroads there.

On May 31, Hancock’s corps again forced Totopotomi Creek, but did not dare to attack the fortifications. Grant realized that the situation had again reached the dead end of positional warfare, and that night of the same day he began to move his army further east, to Cold Harbor. On June 1st, these maneuvers will lead to a clash known as the Battle of Cold Harbor .

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