Battle of Ghazal

Rommel launches a new offensive from El Ageila

After the success of Operation Crusader in late 1941, the 8th British Army expelled the Axis forces from Cyrenaica and forced Rommel to retreat to the fortified defensive positions he had prepared at El Ageil . However, the British offensive by more than 500 miles became unbearable for their supply line, and in January 1942 they shortened the front line, setting the task for the troops to establish communications and supply food. A further offensive to the west, directed against Tripolitania , needed preparation. Meanwhile, Rommel received reinforcements in manpower and tanks, and on January 21 sent three strong tank columns to conduct tactical reconnaissance. Finding only minor enemy forces in front of him, he quickly turned his reconnaissance operation into an offensive. He recaptured Benghazi on January 28, and Timimi on February 3 and launched an offensive on the fortified port of Tobruk on the Mediterranean coast.

8th Army Concentrates Ghazal Force

The 8th Army was able to concentrate enough of its forces between Ghazaloy and Timimi, located to the west of Tobruk, to maneuver and fight. By February 4, Rommel’s advance was stopped and the front line stabilized. The Ghazaly Line ran from Ghazaly on the coast to the old Turkish fortress Bir Hakim, 80 km south of the coast.

The Gazaly Line was a series of “defensive boxes” occupied by troops, each occupied by brigade forces, with minefields and wire fences around. The territory between these “boxes” was observed by regular patrols. The troops of "Free France" were in the south, in the Bir-Khakiim "box". The line was not equipped with troops equally: a large number of troops were on the coast, leaving the south less protected.

Both armies prepare

During early spring, both sides focused on building their supply lines and increasing tank strength, realizing that in the previous two years there were five “swing of the pendulum” through the desert, each of which ultimately failed, as the winners in each of the battles did not the tanks had enough power to consolidate and use their success.

Lessons were learned from previous “pendulum swings”: British armored divisions began to understaff Grant tanks with a 75 mm cannon, corresponding to the German Panzer IV , and reorganized their support to expedite maintenance and repair during the battle - an area where the Axis tanks had a clear superiority. Relations between infantry and artillery were also reorganized, while Allied Air Force commander Middle East Arthur Tedder introduced a new strategy to use the Desert Air Force during the battle to support troops on the ground, and not to destroy opposing air forces. The concept of a new fighter-bomber was developed, and Aviation Vice Marshal Arthur Coningham, commander of the Desert Air Force, moved with his staff to the army commander's camp to improve coordination.

Meanwhile, Rommel was building his supply lines as fast as he could. He knew that he could attack before the 8th Army was ready if he took advantage of the proximity of his fleet to create supply lines faster than Okinlek, who depended on the 23,000 km route around Cape of Good Hope . By the end of May, Rommel was ready. In front of him, on the defensive line of Ghazaly, were the 1st South African Division - near the coast, the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division (on the left) and the 1st Free France Brigade, located far to the left, near Bir Hakim. The British 1st and 7th armored divisions were waiting behind the main line as a mobile counterattack, while the 2nd South African division formed the Tobruk garrison, and the 5th Indian Infantry Division (which arrived in April to replace the 4th Yu Indian Infantry Division) was transferred to the reserve.

Rommel’s plan for Operation Venice was that his tanks would perform a flank maneuver south of the fortified Bir Hakiyim box. On the left flank of his army, the Italian 132nd Ariete Armored Division was supposed to neutralize the Bir-Hakiim’s “box”, while on the right flank the 21st Armored Division and the 15th Armored Division would advance north beyond the defensive lines 8 Army to attract attention and destroy British tanks and cut off units from the Ghazal line. On the right edge of the attacking army, the 90th Africa light infantry division of the Africa Corps was supposed to advance on El Adem, south of Tobruk, creating supply lines on the Gazaly line and potentially sending reinforcements to the Tobruk area, simulating strong armored force with dust machines (aircraft engines and propellers mounted on trucks).

Meanwhile, the second half of the Italian 20th motorized corps and the Italian 101st Trieste motorized division were to clear a passage in a minefield north of the Bir-Hakim’m box, near the Sidi-Muftah box, to create a supply route for tanks. Rommel expected that by engaging in battle with British tanks, he would capture El Adem, Ed Duda, and Sidi Rezeg by evening, as would the defending Knightsbridge box about 40 km northeast of Bir Hakeheim. Then he could take a position with his tanks the next day to launch an offensive west of the 8th Army defensive positions between Ghazal and Alem-Khamza, coordinating the attack with the Italian X and XXI corps advancing from the west.

Rommel conducts a flank attack

At 2:00 p.m. on May 26, the Italian X and XXI corps, after concentrating heavy artillery, launched a direct attack on a position in the center of the Gazala line. In order to deceive, small parts of the Africa Corps and the XX Mobile Corps were attached to the assault groups in order to create the impression that all Axis forces were participating in this attack. The deception was reinforced by additional groups of mobile units continuing to move north towards the point of attack. However, that evening, under cover of darkness, all armored and mobile groups returned to their gathering point at the southern end of the Gazala line.

On the night of May 27, Rommel personally led the Africa Army Tank Group — the African Corps, the Italian 20th Motorized Corps, and the 90th Light Infantry Division — in a brilliant but risky flanking maneuver around the southern tip of the Allied line, hoping that minefields the enemy will defend his flank and rear.

Rommel's plan was frustrated due to Bir-Hakeim. The Ariete and Trieste divisions of the 20th Motorized Corps and part of the 21st Armored Division were detained for three hours by the 3rd Indian Motorized Brigade of the 7th Armored Division, which stopped them four miles southeast of Bir Hakeim and inflicted heavy losses before making them retreat. The “box” of Bir-Hakeheim was defended by the 1st Brigade of Free France under the command of Marie-Pierre Koenig, which turned out to be a bigger problem than Rommel had expected, and the Ariete division could not gain a foothold, having suffered heavy losses from the French 75 mm guns during the battle.

Further east, the 15th German armored division collided with the English 4th armored brigade of the 7th armored division, which was ordered to go south to support the 3rd Indian and 7th motorized brigades, and inflicted heavy losses on it, but also Itself suffered significant losses from 75 mm guns on the newly arrived Grant tanks. The 4th Armored Brigade then moved towards El Adem and spent the night near Belhamed Supply Base east of El Adem.

Towards the end of the morning, the Axis armored units advanced more than 40 km to the north, but by noon their offensive strength decreased when they met with the 1st Armored Division. A heavy battle began, in which both sides suffered heavy losses and parts of the Axis were stopped.

On the right edge of the offensive Axis forces, the 90th Light Infantry Division entered the battle with the 7th Motorized Brigade at Retma and forced it to retreat east towards Bir al-Gubi. Resuming its attack on El Adem, the 90th Light Infantry Division attacked the general headquarters of the 7th Armored Division near Bir Beuld early in the morning, defeating it and capturing a number of important military men, including division commander Frank Messervi, but he pretended to be a batman and escaped. However, the inconvenience caused by this event meant that the division was deprived of effective command over the next two days.

As planned, the 90th Light Infantry Division entered the El Adem area by mid-morning and captured a number of supply bases. The Allies were in no hurry to respond, but in the afternoon a fierce battle began. The next day, however, the 4th Armored Brigade was sent to El Adem, and the 90th Light Infantry Division was driven southwest.

Tank battles continued for three days, and since Bir-Hakeim was still holding, the Africa armored army ended up in a cauldron - with Bir-Hakeheim in the south, Tobruk in the north, extensive mine belts on the original Allied front line in the west and attacked by Allied tanks from the north and east. Rommel’s position in terms of supply supplies became desperate by the evening of May 31. Having received orders to defend the German rear, the Ariete cavalry armored division at that time repulsed repeated attacks by British armored brigades on May 29 and during the first week of June.

From the German report on these events: “During the first ten days of our attack on the French, the British remained surprisingly calm. The Ariete division alone was attacked by them on June 2, but it stubbornly defended itself. After the counterattack of the 21st Armored Division, the situation became quiet again. ”

Tank Army Africa Captures Initiative in Cauldron

Trapped between vast minefields and stiff British resistance, cut off from supply lines, Rommel fell into a desperate situation. However, on the morning of May 29, vehicles with supplies supported by the Italian divisions Trieste and Ariete and under heavy fire were able to penetrate a minefield north of Bir Hakeim and brought much-needed supplies to the Axis forces trapped. On May 30, Rommel began to advance back to the west - to his original front line - to create a bridgehead on the eastern edge of the minefield and connect with parts of the Italian X corps that cleared the route through the minefields in the west. In this attack to the west, which continued over the next two days, two passages to the minefield were created leading back to its original line, giving it a direct route for supply supplies and dividing the Allied front into two halves. In the course of this attack, the British 150th Infantry Brigade of the 50th (Northumbrian) Rifle Division in the Sidi-Muftah box was destroyed.

On the night of June 1, Rommel sent the 90th Light Infantry Division and the Trieste Division south to resume attacks on Bir Hakim, from where raids were constantly organized to attack his supply lines. The next attack did not bring the expected result, and the struggle for Bir-Hakim continued for another 10 days.

Okinleck was unaware of the extent of the desperate situation of Rommel's supply lines, but was encouraged by intelligence-over-optimistic estimates of the loss of German tanks. He urged Richie to launch a counterattack along the coast to take advantage of the lack of German tanks and break through to Timimi, and then to Mesili. However, Richie was more concerned with Tobruk's defense and concentrated on sending reinforcements to the El Adem box and creating new defensive boxes in front of the new holes in the minefield.

On June 5, the 8th Army finally launched its counterattack, but the enemy had sufficient time to prepare, and in the north of the XIII Corps was unable to advance. The attack of the 7th armored and 5th Indian divisions on the eastern flank of the "boiler" began at 02:50 on June 5 and initially developed successfully, since the infantry advancing ahead ensured the capture of planned targets. However, the Axis main defensive line was located further west than expected, and therefore, when the 22nd Armored Brigade passed through it, it came under intense fire and its advance was slowed down. At dawn, an armored brigade of the 32nd Army joined the attack, moving from the north, and also came under heavy fire, losing 50 of the 70 tanks that were in it.

By the beginning of the afternoon of June 5, Rommel decided to attack in the east with Arete forces and the 21st armored divisions and in the north towards Knightsbridge, the British defensive “box”, with parts of the 15th armored division. To the east, the offensive on Bir al-Khatmat defeated the tactical headquarters of two British divisions, as well as the headquarters of the 9th and 10th Indian Infantry Brigades and other smaller units. Command and control were completely destroyed. The 22nd Armored Brigade, having lost 60 of its 156 tanks, was forced to retreat from the battlefield due to a new attack by the German 15th Division. Of the Allied attacking forces, three Indian infantry battalions, an intelligence regiment, and four artillery regiments ended up in the "cauldron". Deprived of the support of tanks, they faced an impossible task on June 6 and were scattered one after another.

Роммель продолжал удерживать инициативу, наращивая свои силы в «котле» и направляя атаки на различные опорные пункты противника. Между 6 и 8 июня он начал новые скоординированные атаки на Бир-Хакейм, но, хотя оборонительный периметр сократился, французские защитники продолжали держаться и огонь, которые вели их тяжёлые орудия, вкупе с поддержкой колонн из 7-й моторизованной бригады и 29-й Индийской пехотной бригады, продолжал наносить ущерб коммуникациям врага. Усиленные новыми боевыми группами, силы Оси начали новое наступление 9 июня, в конечном счёте пробив оборону Союзников вглубь 10 июня. В это время положение войск «Свободной Франции» стало безнадёжным, и Ричи приказал им эвакуироваться тем же вечером. Несмотря на окружение, генерал Кёниг был в состоянии найти проходы между позициями Оси, чтобы пройти через них и встретиться с транспортами 7-й моторизованной бригады около 8 км к западу. Около 2700 солдат (в том числе 200 раненых) из первоначального его гарнизона в 3600 человек ушли из Бир-Хакейма. Когда 90-я лёгкая пехотная дивизия заняла эту позицию 11 июня, они взяла в плен только 500 французов, в основном раненых, которые не смогли эвакуироваться.

Британская армия терпит тяжёлое поражение

11 июня Роммель начал наступление силами 15-й бронетанковой и 90-й лёгкой пехотной дивизий к Эль-Адему и 12 июня заставил силы 201-й Гвардейской бригады отступить из «коробки» Найтсбридж к периметру Тобрука. 29-я Индийская пехотная бригада отбила нападение на «коробку» Эль-Адем 12 июня, но 2-я и 4-я бронетанковые бригады по левую сторону были оттеснены назад на четыре мили 15-й бронетанковой дивизией и вынуждены были оставить свои повреждённые танки на поле боя. 13 июня 21-я бронетанковая дивизия, двигаясь с запада, вступила в бой с 22-й бронетанковой бригадой. Ещё раз корпус «Африка» продемонстрировал свою превосходную тактику, заключавшуюся в сочетании применения танков и противотанковых орудий как атакующего оружия. Роммель широко и быстро использовал информацию, добытую разведкой из радиопередач Союзников, направляя свои танки к тем группам войск противника, которые просили помощи. К концу дня британские танковые соединения были сокращены с 300 танков до примерно 70, и корпус «Африка» удерживал главную линию позиций, став серьёзной угрозой не только для Тобрука, но и отрезав силы XIII корпуса от линии Газалы. К концу дня 13 июня «коробка» Найтсбридж была практически окружена, и от её защиты Гвардейской бригаде пришлось отказаться позже этой же ночью. Из-за этих поражений 13 июня стало известно как «Чёрная суббота» во всей 8-й армии.

8-я армия отступает от позиций на линии Газалы

14 июня Окинлек разрешил Ричи отойти от линии Газалы. Защитники Эль-Адема и двух соседних «коробок», удерживаемые силами 1-й Южноафриканской дивизии, смогли отступить вдоль прибрежной дороги практически без потерь. Две дивизии одновременно не смогли бы воспользоваться этой дорогой, поэтому оставшиеся две бригады 50-й (Нортумбрийской) дивизии должны были найти альтернативный путь отступления. Они не могли отступать прямо на восток из-за присутствия танков Оси, но вместо этого они атаковали на юго-западе, прорвав линию итальянских дивизий X корпуса «Брешия» и «Павия», и направились на юг, в пустыню, прежде чем повернуть на восток и отправиться обратно на территории, контролируемые Союзниками.

Окинлеку было понятно, что Лондон не будет рассматривать возможность отвода войск к сильным оборонительным позициям около египетско-ливийской границы. Приказы Окинлека Ричи от 14 июня касались создания линии, проходящей на юго-восток от Акромы (к западу от Тобрука) через Эль-Адем к Бир-эль-Губи. Тем не менее, к вечеру 15 июня опорный пункт в точке 650 был захвачен, и 16 июня защитники в точке 187 был вынуждены, не имея поставок, эвакуироваться. В течение дня оборонительные «коробки» в Эль-Адеме и Сиди-Резег также были под сильной атакой со стороны корпуса «Африка». 17 июня гарнизоны из обеих были эвакуированы, и какой-либо шанс предотвращения окружения Тобрука исчез. Ричи приказал 8-й армии отойти на оборонительные позиции к Мерса-Матрух , примерно в 160 км к востоку от границы, оставляя Тобрук, чтобы удержать рубеж и угрожать линиям снабжения Оси во многом тем же самым способом, как и в 1941 году.

Падение Тобрука

Командующий XIII корпусом Готт назначил командира 2-й Южноафриканской дивизии Клоппера в качестве командира гарнизона Тобрука. В дополнение к двум бригадам Южноафриканской дивизии он также имел 201-ю Гвардейской (моторизованную), 11-ю Индийскую пехотную бригаду, 32-ю танковую бригаду и 4-ю зенитную бригаду под своим командованием. Тобрук ранее выдержал девятимесячную осаду, прежде чем был освобождён в ходе операции «Крестоносец» в декабре 1941 года, но на этот раз Королевский флот не мог гарантировать поддержку гарнизона снабжением. Союзные лидеры ожидали, что город сможет продержаться в течение двух месяцев с его запасами. Окинлек, однако, рассматривал оборону Тобрука как несущественную задачу и уже сказал Нилу Ричи, что он не намерен удерживать его любой ценой. Кроме того, было широко известно, что в феврале 1942 года верховное командование армии, флота и ВВС в Каире решило, что Тобрук не должен снова подвергаться осаде. С учётом этого и последующего акцента на создание сил на позициях Газалы для атаки (что было упреждено наступлением Оси) вполне вероятно, что оборона Тобрука не являлась первостепенной задачей.

Всего семь дней спустя, 21 июня 1942 года, при обстоятельствах, которые даже с учётом последующего формального следствия остаются неясными и противоречивыми, 35000 войск Союзников (в том числе вся 2-я Южноафриканская дивизия) капитулировали перед силами генерала Энеа Наваррини, насчитывавшими 30000 военнослужащих. Захват войсками Оси Тобрука напоминал капитуляцию 80000 войск Содружества перед тремя японскими дивизиями, последовавшей в результате падения Сингапура несколькими месяцами ранее.

Immediately after the capture of Tobruk, Rommel received the rank of Field Marshal. On the other hand, the defeat at Ghazal and the surrender of Tobruk led to Richie’s dismissal and Okinleck taking over the direct command of the 8th Army.

After the capture of Tobruk, the Panzer Army Africa launched an offensive on Egypt. Okinleck won the time by refusing to confront Rommel’s forces directly and attacking them with the help of relatively small but powerful battle groups. He decided to abandon the Mersa-Matruh position, since it had an open flank in the south of the same kind that Rommel successfully used at Gazala. Instead, he decided to retreat another 100 miles or more east, almost to El Alamein, where the steep slopes of the Qattara massif precluded the possibility of moving tanks around the southern flank of his defense.

Despite this victory, Axis losses in tanks were irreparable. The weakening of the tank divisions after the battle was a serious blow to the strength of the Africa corps. As a result, Rommel was unable to capitalize on this success. Substantial reinforcements in the form of American-made tanks provided the British with a numerical superiority in tanks throughout the North African campaign.

Rommel launched several attacks on the El Alamein line between June 30 and July 1 during the First Battle of El Alamein, but was repelled. Despite Okinleck’s success in stopping the Axis offensive in this area, Churchill lost confidence in him. Okinlek showed considerable talent for the army commander, but the subordinates he chose turned out to be weak or unlucky as military leaders. He expected Neil Ritchie to be able to command the army, while he only had command experience as a division commander; he sent the most experienced tank commander of the 8th Army, Gott, who commanded the 7th Armored Division, to command the XIII Corps, the infantry division; at the same time, he sent Frank Messervi to command the 7th Armored Division, while he had the experience of commanding only infantry and cavalry.

Rommel was aware of the seriousness of the Axis forces after the battle. He wrote in his diary of July 4: "Our own strength is worn out." On July 5, Rommel describes the situation as critical, on July 17 he says that “the enemy, having a numerical superiority, especially in the infantry, destroys one Italian unit after another. The Germans are too weak to hold on. I could cry ..! " In August, Okinleck was replaced as commander of the 8th Army by the commander of the 13th corps, Lieutenant General William Gott, and as chairman of the Middle East Command, General Sir Harold Alexander . Gott died in a plane crash en route to his new destination, and Bernard Montgomery was assigned to his place.

An attempt to land the Allied forces in Tobruk was made on the night of September 13-14, 1942 ( ). The British forces had to return Tobruk for a whole day, as a result of which they could release about 16,000 British prisoners of war. It was suggested that the Italian troops defending the city would not be particularly resistant. The British raid failed in the face of heavy fire from Italian coastal batteries, which caused the sinking of the HMS Sikh, and active resistance from the Italian Marines battalion San Marco. As the British resistance was broken and the advancing forces began to recede, the Junkers 88 Luftwaffe aircraft sank the light cruiser HMS Coventry, and the Regia Aeronautica MC 200 sank the destroyer HMS Zulu. The total losses of the British killed and wounded during the Operation Consent included 280 sailors, 300 Royal Marines and 160 soldiers killed, wounded and captured.

• The Battle of Al-Ghazal
• Fact File: Battle of Gazala // BBC Home

• S. W. Mitch, “The Greatest Victory of Rommel,” Moscow: AST, 2003.
• Mellentin F.V. Chapter VII. The battle of Al-Ghazal // Tank battles 1939-1945. : Combat use of tanks in World War II. - M.: IL, 1957.
• German experiences in desert warfare during World War II. Volume II. Selected annexes pp. 45-49