The battle of Alavo

After the unsuccessful battle for the Russians at Lappo , on July 2, 1808, General Raevsky , who commanded the central group of forces held in Finland on the Vasa - Kuopio- Serdobol front, retreated along the road to Tavastgus , first to Salmi and then to Alavo.

At the same time, the late vanguard of Jankovic di Mirievo , linking Raevsky with Barclay de Tolly's troops held in Kuopio, was drawn from Lintulaks to Sauriyarvi. In this position, Raevsky (with no more than 6,000 troops) expected a further offensive of an enemy superior in strength.

The situation favorable for a separate defeat of Raevsky was not used by the Swedish commander-in-chief Klingspor : he continued to remain inactive with Lappo , and then with Salmi, limiting himself to the guerrilla war on Raevsky's messages in order to force him to retreat. The most sensitive for the Russians was the attack on Virtues, where, at the intersection of the Satakund lakes system with the Vaz-Tavastgus road, there was a head warehouse for food and military supplies for Raevsky’s troops. For several days Raevsky was completely cut off from his rear; the population supported the partisans and it was not possible to take any real measures against them. Raevsky’s soldiers supported their existence with roots, mushrooms, half-rotten potatoes, and the like, found in devastated fields.

In such a difficult situation, Raevsky convened a military council on July 11 (Generals Demidov , Yankovich, Kazachkovsky and Colonels Erickson , Frolov , Stegman , Turchaninov and Kulnev ). The Military Council unanimously decided to retreat to Jerveskül; This decision was approved by Count Kamensky , sent by Count Buksgevden to become the head of the Raevsky corps, to which reinforcements gathered from everywhere.

Hardly captured by the partisans along the way, Kamensky, taking command, led the troops from Erveskul to the south, along the western shore of Lake Peyyane, and stopped at the height of Tammerfors. In total, Kamensky had 10,500 people with 38 guns.

On August 1, Kamensky advanced Vlastov’s vanguard to Sauriyarvi, and two side detachments (Erickson and Sabaneyev) to Ruovesi and Keuru (crossings on the Satakund lakes line). Count Kamensky’s plan was to hide quickly behind Erveskyul’s Sauriyarvi-Lintulaks hiding behind troops of Sabaneyev and Erickson and attack Klingspor at Salmi with a threat to his communications with Vazoy and Hamlekarleb. However, this bold decision was not destined to materialize.

On August 2, Kamensky stepped out of Erveskül, and Erickson, joining Sabaneyev, marched on Alavo, hoping to attract the Swedes with such an offensive. But already on August 6, on the way to Lintulax, Kamensky received a report about the defeat of the joined detachments of Erickson and Sabaneev under Alavo.

This clash happened as follows.

Earl Klingspor, having received a report on the appearance of Russian troops, both near Alavo and near Sauriyarvi, concluded that the Russians intend to act against him both from the front and bypassing the left flank; after a long military debate, a decision was made that he decided: restraining the northeastern group of Russians (that is, Vlastov), ​​strike at their other vanguard (Erickson and Sabaneev). For this, Klingspor allocated only 5,000 people and the authorities over them entrusted Adlerkreitz to his chief of staff.

On August 4, Adlerkreitz’s troops set off in two columns: Kronstedt led the right, Grippenberg led the left. Sabaneyev’s troops (who came from Kuopio to strengthen Kamensky’s corps), joining Erickson, were located in front of Alavo, trying to cover at the same time both the road to Virtoys-Tammerfors (that is, to the south) and the Theis-Keuru-Erveskylä.

On August 5, at dawn, the Swedes began to push forward the advanced units of the Russian two-thousandth detachment ( 3rd , 23rd and 26th Jaeger regiments , 5 guns and 2 squadrons) and reports began to arrive to Erickson that the enemy was attacking with considerable force on both the roads. Fearing to be pressed back to Alayarvi Lake and deprived of the opportunity to use both ways, he moved three versts in this direction to the village of Herkenen, where he occupied the gorge between the lake and the rocky height. At 14:00, the enemy took Alavo and launched an attack on the position at Herkenei.

In view of the strength of the position from the front, Adlerkreitz resorted to bypassing the forest, which threatened to cut off Erickson from the last escape route. The bickering between Erickson and Sabaneev (whose subordination to each other was not established by Kamensky) adversely affected the success of the defense of their troops. Erickson stood for the retreat; Sabaneev, on the contrary, insisted on stubbornly holding the position. Nevertheless, the movement in the forest bypass convoy forced them to retreat, but since the retreat was begun too late, the enemy managed to crush one of the Jaeger battalions with a bold bayonet onslaught; Russians here lost about one and a half hundred prisoners.

Erickson’s retreat was hindered by the terrain: the troops had to get involved in the defile between the lake and the rocky heights, and the enemy energetically pressed, chasing the retreating for 13 miles . Having received a report on the defeat of Erickson near Alavo, Kamensky decided to provide his battle line with a victorious battle and, having thrown the originally conceived maneuver, decided to turn straight from Kevesu-Alavo in order to hit the Klingspore with a wound, so that the latter could win enough space for him to move to rear. Such a movement, giving the benefits of surprise, at the same time facilitated Erickson's position. Having completed 170 miles in five days, Kamensky again occupied Alavo on July 13, having overturned the Swedish advance detachment along the way.

A further offensive led to decisive battles at Kuortane and Salmi .

Simultaneously with his departure from Jerveskul, Kamensky moved the Vlastov’s detachment along the previously planned path in order to break Klingspor’s connection with Sandels and then act first to the flank. This movement led to the battle of Karstula .

• Military Encyclopedia / Ed. V.F. Novitsky and others - St. Petersburg. : t. in I.V. Sytin, 1911-1915. - S. 222-223.
• Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky A. I. Description of the Finnish War on the dry path and at sea in 1808 and 1809. - St. Petersburg, 1841. - S. 220—222