Prince Islands Meeting

As a result of the defeat of the Central Powers in World War I, Constantinople and the Black Sea Straits were occupied by the Entente, the former allies of Russia. It was assumed that representatives of Russia invited to the meeting could get here most quickly and with the least difficulty.

By that time, in the higher political circles of the Entente countries, two points of view regarding the events in Russia dominated:

1. Both the White and national movements and their state structures, on the one hand, and Soviet power , on the other hand, have an equal right to exist and an equal right to representation as an all-Russian and / or regional power. If it is possible to coordinate the interests of these movements, it will be possible to create a single government that can represent Russia at the Paris Peace Conference , which opened on January 18, 1919.
2. There are no fundamental differences between the Bolshevik party and other socialist parties. Therefore, an agreement is possible between them, especially if negotiations are held under the auspices of the Entente powers ^[1] .

Representatives of the White Movement, who were abroad and had contacts with leaders of the Entente powers, repeatedly and persistently raised before the latter the question of the need to invite the Russian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference ^[1] .

The inspiration for the meeting was British Prime Minister Lloyd George . He belonged to a proposal made privately, according to the memoirs of Winston Churchill, January 16, 1919 ^[2] , to invite representatives of all conflicting parties to the Russian Civil War to Paris - “just as the Roman Empire invited military leaders who paid tribute to it states so that they report on their actions ” ^[1] .

On January 16, in Paris, a meeting was held between Lloyd George and the head of the Russian Political Conference, G. E. Lvov , at which the first voiced the conditions that must be met by representatives of various "parts" of Russia (that is, "state entities" that arose in the territory of the former Russian Empire) in order to so that the allies decide which of them can be invited to the conference as a representative of Russia. According to Lloyd George, in order to receive such an invitation they would have to first pass a “poll” of representatives of the Entente. According to his plan, the "survey" was to be conducted in an informal setting. If the Bolshevik government decided to boycott such an informal forum, then representatives of the anti-Bolshevik forces, as Lloyd George believed, would only win. Until such a “poll” took place, there could be no talk of any invitation from Russia to the Paris Peace Conference ^[1] .

But on January 22, at the Paris Conference, US President Woodrow Wilson made a proposal that was fundamentally different from Lloyd George’s plan. Wilson's speech, sustained in the characteristic manner of a “peacemaker”, was devoted to the “Russian question”. Based on this statement, the conference participants on the same day adopted an official communique addressed to the parties to the conflict in Russia ^[3] .

... The Allied Powers invite all organized groups that currently exercise or are trying to exercise political power or control on the part of the army anywhere in Siberia or within the borders of European Russia that existed just before the war ended (excluding Finland ), to send their representatives, no more than three from each group on the Princes' Islands in the sea of Marmara, where they will meet representatives of the Allied powers, provided that by the time it is established a truce between the invited Sided by us and all their armed forces, sent anywhere or directed against any peoples and territories outside European Russia that existed before the war, or against Finland, or against any peoples and territories whose autonomy provided for in the 14 points that formed the basis of the present peace negotiations will be withdrawn and all hostilities will cease. These representatives are invited to the most free and frank discussion with representatives of the Allied Powers in order to establish the aspirations of all groups of the Russian people and come to, if possible, any understanding and agreement through which Russia will be able to realize its own goals and at the same time establish good cooperation relations between your people and other peoples of the world.

The Allies took upon themselves the provision of travel for Russian representatives, including moving across the Black Sea , and expected them at the meeting place by February 15, 1919.

The Allies believed that the terms of the negotiations they proposed would be unacceptable to the Bolsheviks and they would necessarily refuse them. So, the British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour said: “The Bolsheviks will probably refuse to accept such conditions and thereby put themselves at a disadvantage” ^[4] .

In fact, the invitation of the Bolsheviks to the meeting caused almost the same negative reaction from other potential participants. Moreover, as researcher D.V. Lekhovich wrote, the idea of ​​holding a meeting fell prey to, among other things, disagreements within the Entente itself, for example, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not wanting to strengthen the position of Great Britain and hoping for the success of the French presence in southern Russia , sabotaged this initiative and explicitly recommended that representatives of the White Movement ignore the invitation to the meeting ^[5] .

Kolchak government reaction

On February 2, 1919, the Russian government of Admiral A.V. Kolchak sent a telegram to Paris in response to a proposal to participate in the meeting, signed by Prime Minister P.V. Vologodsky . In this telegram, the goals that could be faced with such a meeting were divided into two different components: (a) an attempt to reach an agreement between all those national parts of the Russian state that are striving for greater independence and freedom; (b) an attempt to end the armed struggle that all these units and groups are waging with the opposite, Bolshevik camp. And if, with regard to the first goal, the Kolchak government informed "of its readiness to start any event ...", then according to the second it stated that "... the struggle it started against the enemies of civilization, which impedes the establishment of domestic and international law and order, will be brought to its conclusion ”, And the Russian government considered“ holding the first Court of Nations over Bolshevism ”the only possible purpose of the meeting on the Princes' Islands.

Members of the Omsk Bloc sociopolitical association reacted in much the same way to Wilson’s proposal - in their resolution of February 5, 1919, they noted that it was impossible to sit at the negotiating table “... with those who deny all principles of law and justice, destroy religion , culture and art ... Not a single national Russian party can, without risking dishonoring itself, seek agreements with the Bolsheviks ” ^[1] .

Reaction in the White South

In the White South, the proposal provoked a mixed reaction. In Odessa , which in the winter of 1918-1919. was the socio-political center of the entire South, the proposal of the Allies, which in Odessa became known on January 26, began to compile lists of "groups and parties" that were to send their members to the meeting, and a list of delegations. The Council of the State Association of Russia intended to send three people from each of the organizations included in its composition - from the legislative chambers, zemstvos, industrial and city governments, the Russian Church Council, financial, agricultural, academic groups, and the Senate. On February 3, an additional radiogram was delivered to Odessa, explaining in more detail which parties and groups (a representation of three people remained the same) were expected on the Prince Islands. They turned out to be: associations - the Revival Union of Russia , the National Center , the Council of the State Association of Russia , the Council of Zemstvos and Cities ; parties - Russian Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks ; Georgian Mensheviks, Armenian " Dashnaktsutyun "; governments - Don , Kuban , Omsk , Ukrainian , Georgian, Armenian, Arkhangelsk , Crimean, Estonian; Army - Volunteer , Don , Siberian , North . The radiogram did not mention the Bolsheviks and all right-wing parties. On February 26, additional clarification was received from V. A. Maklakov that the representatives of really existing power structures, possessing governing bodies and armed forces, were not invited to the meeting. But when it was confirmed that the “Government of Central Russia” (the Bolsheviks) was invited to the meeting on equal terms, then enthusiasm gave way to disappointment ^[1] .

Reaction of the Provisional Government of the Northern Region

The provisional government of the Northern Region with a special statement, which was sent to all foreign diplomatic representatives in Arkhangelsk , rejected Wilson's plan. The statement said it was "impossible for moral reasons" to sit down at the negotiating table with the Bolsheviks, who also openly declared their contempt for international law and international agreements, and stated that negotiating a "truce" was humiliating for "national armies" preparing to inflict "Attacks on the enemy." The possibility of a cease-fire was recognized as harmful and dangerous by the act, and the idea of ​​holding a meeting together with the Bolsheviks was not feasible at the appointed time, but essentially unacceptable ^[1] .

Reaction of the Russian Political Conference in Paris

RPS members took the most definite and firm position at the suggestion of the American president. In a statement by the RPS dated February 16, 1919, signed by S. D. Sazonov , N. V. Tchaikovsky , V. A. Maklakov on behalf of the “United Governments of Siberia, Arkhangelsk and Southern Russia”, it was stated ^[1] :

After a three-year struggle, during which Russia kept all its obligations and borne a good part of the total burden, it was knocked out and will be able to heal its wounds only in the world. But this work of perestroika is impossible because of the civil war that the usurpers and criminals, who know neither honor nor law, preach and wage ... Desiring first to put an end to the bloody tyranny of the Bolsheviks, Russian political groups ... will be grateful to the Peace Conference for the help that it is ready render ... in the matter of national revival ... However, in no case can there be any talk of an exchange of views on this issue with the participation of the Bolsheviks; ... for they have changed, in agreement with a common enemy, the cause of Russia and the allies; for they trampled the democratic principles governing civilized countries in the mud, sowed anarchy in the country and held power only thanks to terror. No truce is possible between them and the national Russian groups; a meeting with them will not only remain without a result, but also runs the risk of inflicting irreparable moral damage on the Russian patriots, as well as on the union nations.

The reaction of the Council of People's Commissars

The People's Commissar G.V. Chicherin sent his consent to the proposal of the Allies in a note dated February 4, 1919. The essence of Wilson's proposals received a fundamentally different explanation in the interpretation of the Bolshevik government. In his note, Chicherin did not declare readiness to create a coalition government, but readiness to achieve peace in a civil war by way of concessions to foreign states, namely, recognition of the debts of the tsarist and Provisional governments, payment of interest on loans and granting concessions for coal mines and forests of Russia. The Soviet government did not declare any concessions to its opponents within Russia, but, on the contrary, emphasized that nothing should interfere with the building of socialism in Soviet Russia. Wilson's clause on the cessation of hostilities as a prerequisite for the start of negotiations also remained in Chicherin's note without comment ^[1] . Note Chicherina remained unanswered ^[6] .

Summary

As a result, all efforts to hold a meeting on the Prince Islands proved fruitless. The consent to participate in the negotiations was given by the RSFSR and Estonia ^{[1] [7]} . All white governments declared a unified position on the proposal of the Allied Powers. Owing to the failure of the idea of ​​the Conference, the position of the Allies regarding participation in Russian affairs did not change - the Allied troops remained on the territory of the former Russian Empire only in the places where they had been introduced earlier and in the framework of previous agreements ^[1] .

• Paris Peace Conference
• Yass meeting

• Tsvetkov V. Zh. White business in Russia. 1919 (the formation and evolution of the political structures of the White movement in Russia). - 1st. - Moscow: Sowing, 2009 .-- 636 p. - 250 copies. - ISBN 978-5-85824-184-3 .
• Churchill, W. Chapter IX. Unfinished task // World Crisis = The World Crisis 1918-1925. - 1st. - M .: State Military Publishing House, 1932 .-- 328 p. - 5,000 copies.