Kerensky, Alexander Fedorovich

Childhood, Education, Nurture, Origin

On the paternal side, the ancestors of Alexander Kerensky come from among the Russian provincial clergy. Since 1830, his grandfather Mikhail Ivanovich served as a priest in the village of Kerenki, Gorodishchensky district, Penza province. The name Kerensky comes from the name of this village, although Alexander Fedorovich himself connected it with the county town Kerensky of the same Penza province.

The youngest son of Mikhail Ivanovich, Fyodor, although he graduated with honors from the Penza Theological Seminary (1859), did not, like his older brothers Grigory and Alexander (after the seminary, transferred “by request” from the Penza Diocese to Simbirsk and in 1875 served in . Trinity-Kuroedovo, Karsun district), a priest. After working for six years in religious and district schools, he graduated from the Faculty of History and Philology of Kazan University (1869) and then taught Russian literature, pedagogy and Latin in various educational institutions of Kazan.

In Kazan, F. M. Kerensky married Nadezhda Adler, the daughter of the head of the topographic bureau of the Kazan military district. On her paternal side, N. Adler was a noblewoman of Russian-German descent, and on her maternal side, she was the granddaughter of a serf peasant who, even before the abolition of serfdom, managed to redeem himself and later became a wealthy Moscow merchant. The Kerensky family was considered quite wealthy, since Alexander's mother was the daughter of a wealthy merchant, from whom she received a substantial inheritance. ^[5] Rumors of Kerensky’s Jewish origin on the maternal side occasionally arose in anti-Semitic circles both in the pre-revolutionary period and during the years of the Civil War and in exile . Particularly popular was the version that “Kerensky, the son of the Austrian Jewess Adler, who was married (first marriage) to a Jew Kirbis, and before baptism bore the name Aron. Widowed, his mother married a teacher Kerensky for the second time. ” But all these rumors are not true ^[6] .

In 1877-1879, Fyodor Mikhailovich Kerensky was the director of the Vyatka men's gymnasium and, with the rank of college adviser, was appointed director of the Simbirsk men's gymnasium . The most famous pupil of Fyodor Kerensky was Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin) - the son of his boss - the director of the Simbirsk schools - Ilya Nikolayevich Ulyanov . It was Fyodor Mikhailovich Kerensky who put him the only four (in logic) in the certificate of the gold medalist in 1887 . The families of Kerensky and Ulyanov in Simbirsk were connected by friendly relations, they had much in common in lifestyle, position in society, interests, origin. Fedor Mikhailovich, after the death of Ilya Nikolaevich Ulyanov, took part in the lives of the children of the Ulyanovs. In 1887, after Alexander Ilyich Ulyanov was arrested and executed, he gave the brother of the revolutionary Vladimir Ulyanov a positive characterization for entering Kazan University ^[7] . In the same year, F. M. Kerensky received the rank of full state adviser ^[8] , which gave the right to hereditary nobility .

In Simbirsk , two sons were born in the Kerensky family - Alexander and Fedor (before them only daughters appeared in Kazan - Nadezhda, Elena, Anna). Sasha, the long-awaited son, enjoyed the exceptional love of his parents. As a child, he suffered from tuberculosis of the femur. After the operation, the boy was forced to spend six months in bed and then for a long time did not take off his metal, forged boot with a load.

In May 1889, Fyodor Mikhailovich Kerensky was appointed chief inspector of schools in the Turkestan Territory and moved to Tashkent with his family. Eight-year-old Sasha began to study at the Tashkent gymnasium, where he was a diligent and successful student. In high school, Alexander had a reputation as a well-educated young man, a skilled dancer, a capable actor. He was pleased to take part in amateur performances, with a special brilliance played the role of Khlestakov . In 1899, Alexander graduated from the Tashkent Gymnasium with a gold medal and entered the law faculty of St. Petersburg University .

Appearance and character

Alexander Kerensky was remembered as an extremely stubborn, intractable person. He was smart , he was able to clearly formulate his thoughts, but he lacked tact. Although he had an excellent education, he lacked secular manners.

Kerensky was not in good health, in 1916 his kidney was removed, which for that time was an extremely dangerous operation. However, this did not prevent him from surviving to 89 years.

Outwardly, Alexander could be called beautiful: tall, black-haired, with large, clear features. His eyes were dark - brown, Kerensky’s nose was "eagle", slightly long. He was somewhat thin, but with age he became the owner of a dense figure.

Political career

In December 1904 he became assistant to the lawyer N. A. Oppel ^[9] . He participated in the Victim Assistance Committee on January 9 (22), 1905 , created by the bar association. Since October 1905, Kerensky wrote for the revolutionary socialist newsletter The Petrel , which began to publish The Organization of Armed Rebellion. "Petrel" was one of the first victims of police repression: the circulation of the eighth (according to other sources - the ninth) number was confiscated. On December 23, a search was conducted in Kerensky’s apartment, during which leaflets of the Organization of Armed Uprising and a revolver intended for self-defense were found. As a result of the search, an arrest warrant was signed on charges of belonging to the Social Revolutionaries . Kerensky was in pre-trial detention at Kresty until April 5 ( 18 ), 1906 , and then, due to a lack of evidence, he was released and sent with his wife and one-year-old son Oleg to Tashkent . In mid-August 1906 he returned to Petersburg .

In October 1906, at the request of the lawyer ND Sokolov , Kerensky began his career as a political advocate in the trial in Reval - he defended peasants who had plundered the estates of the Ostsee barons. He participated in a number of major political processes.

From December 22, 1909 ( January 4, 1910 ) he became a sworn attorney in St. Petersburg, and before that he was an assistant to the sworn attorney ^[10] .

In 1910, he was the main defender in the process of the Turkestan organization of socialist revolutionaries accused of anti-government armed actions. The process for the Social Revolutionaries went well, the lawyer managed to prevent the death penalty.

At the beginning of 1912, Kerensky defended the participants of the Armenian party Dashnaktsutyun at a trial in St. Petersburg . In 1912 he participated in a public commission (the so-called "commission of lawyers") to investigate the execution of workers in the Lena gold mines . He supported M. Beilis , in connection with which he was prosecuted in the course of the case of 25 lawyers .

In June 1913, he was elected chairman of the IV All-Russian Congress of Trade and Industry Workers.

In 1914, in the case of 25 lawyers for insulting the Kiev Court of Justice, he was sentenced to 8 months in prison. On the cassation appeal, imprisonment was replaced by a ban on practicing law for 8 months.

He was elected as a deputy of the IV State Duma from the city of Volsk, Saratov province ; since the Socialist-Revolutionary Party decided to boycott the elections, formally left the party and joined the Trudovik faction, which he had headed since 1915 . In the Duma, he delivered critical speeches to the government and gained fame as one of the best speakers of the left factions. He was a member of the budget committee of the Duma.

In 1915 - 1917 - General Secretary of the Supreme Council of the Great East of the Peoples of Russia - the Paramason organization, the founding members of which in 1910 - 1912 left the Renaissance box of the Great East of France . The Great East of the peoples of Russia was not recognized by other Masonic great lodges as a Masonic organization, since it set political activity as a priority. In addition to Kerensky, the Supreme Council of the VVNR included such political figures as N. S. Chkheidze , A. I. Braudo , S. D. Maslovsky-Mstislavsky , N. V. Nekrasov , S. D. Urusov and others ^{[11] [12 ] ] [13]} .

I received a proposal to join the Freemasons in 1912, immediately after being elected to the IV Duma . After serious thought, I came to the conclusion that my own goals coincide with the goals of society, and I accepted this proposal. It should be emphasized that the society I joined was not an ordinary Masonic organization. First of all, it was unusual that society severed all ties with foreign organizations and allowed women into its ranks. Further, the complex ritual and the Masonic degree system were eliminated; only indispensable internal discipline was preserved, which guaranteed the high moral qualities of the members and their ability to keep a secret. No written reports were kept, no lists of members of the box were compiled. Such maintenance of secrecy did not lead to leakage of information about the goals and structure of society. Studying the circulars of the Police Department at the Hoover Institute , I did not find in them any data on the existence of our society, even in those two circulars that concern me personally.

- Kerensky A.F. Russia at a historical turn. Memoirs. M., 1993.S. 62-63. ^[14]

In June-July 1915 he traveled to a number of cities of the Volga region and the South of Russia.

In 1916, by order of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, B.V. Sturmer, in Turkestan , mobilization of 200,000 indigenous people for rear work began. Prior to this, according to the laws of the Russian Empire, the indigenous population was not subject to draft in the army. The decree on "requisition of the indigenous people" caused a riot in Turkestan and the Steppe region . To investigate the events, the State Duma created a commission led by Kerensky. Having studied the events on the spot, he blamed the incident on the tsarist government, accused the Minister of Internal Affairs of exceeding his authority, and demanded the prosecution of corrupt local officials. Such speeches created the image of Kerensky as an uncompromising accuser of vices of the tsarist regime, brought popularity among liberals, and created a reputation as one of the leaders of the Duma opposition. By 1917, he was already a fairly well-known politician who also headed the Trudovik faction in the State Duma of the fourth convocation . In his Duma speech on December 16 ( 29 ), 1916 , he actually called for the overthrow of the autocracy, after which the Empress Alexandra Fedorovna stated that “Kerensky should be hanged” (according to other sources - “Kerensky should be hanged with Guchkov ”).

Sukhanov N. N. in his fundamental work “Notes on the Revolution” reports that before the revolution, Kerensky was under the supervision of the Security Department under the nickname “Quick” because of the habit of running around the streets, jumping on a tram on the go, and jumping back. The police had to hire a cab to spy on him. The historian S. V. Utekhin , who personally knew Kerensky well, noted as an important fact that “in 1916 he had a kidney cut out and in 1917 he had severe pain almost all the time. Do you remember, probably, that he was hysterical and fainted? So he fainted from the disease, he could not stand the pain ” ^[15] .

February Revolution

Kerensky’s rise to power began already during the February Revolution, which he not only enthusiastically accepted, but from the first days he was an active participant in it. He provoked this revolution in many ways. Kerensky on February 14 ( 27 ), 1917 , stated in his speech in the Duma: “The historical task of the Russian people at the moment is the task of destroying the medieval regime immediately, at all costs ... How can legal means be used to fight those who turned the law into weapons of mockery of the people? With lawbreakers there is only one way to fight - to physically eliminate them. ”

Presiding Rodzianko interrupted Kerensky’s speech with the question of what he means. The answer immediately followed: "I mean what Brutus did during the time of Ancient Rome."

The French ambassador in Petrograd, Maurice Paleolog, in his diary of March 2 ( 15 ), 1917 , describes Kerensky as follows: “The young deputy Kerensky, who created himself as a lawyer, a reputation in political processes, turns out to be the most active and most decisive of the organizers new regime .

After midnight from February 26 to 27 ( March 12 ), 1917, the Duma session was interrupted by the decree of Nicholas II, Kerensky at the Council of Elders of the Duma on February 27 called for disobeying the tsar’s will. On the same day, he became a member of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma formed by the Council of Elders and the Military Commission, which led the actions of the revolutionary forces against the police. In February days, Kerensky repeatedly spoke to the rebel soldiers, received from them the arrested ministers of the tsarist government, and received money and secret papers confiscated from the ministries. Under the leadership of Kerensky, the protection of the Tauride Palace was replaced by detachments of rebel soldiers, sailors and workers .

At the beginning of the February Revolution, Kerensky joined the Socialist Revolutionary Party and was appointed representative of the Petrosoviet in the revolutionary Provisional Committee created in the Duma. March 3, as part of the Duma representatives, promotes the renunciation of power by Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich .

Thus, during the February Revolution, Kerensky appears simultaneously in two opposing authorities: as a comrade (deputy) chairman of the executive committee in the first composition of the Petrosoviet and in the first composition of the Provisional Government , formed on the basis of the Provisional Committee, as Minister of Justice.

Minister of Justice

March 2, took the post of Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government . In public, Kerensky appeared in a military uniform, although he himself had never served in the army. He initiated such decisions of the Provisional Government as an amnesty for political prisoners , recognition of Poland's independence, and the restoration of the Finnish constitution . By order of Kerensky, all revolutionaries were returned from exile. The second telegram sent to the post of Minister of Justice was an order to immediately release from exile the "grandmother of the Russian revolution" Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaya and, with all honors, send her to Petrograd . Under Kerensky, the destruction of the previous judicial system began. Already on March 3, the Institute of Magistrates was reorganized - courts began to be formed of three members: a judge and two assessors. On March 4, the Supreme Criminal Court , the special presence of the Governing Senate , the judicial chambers and district courts with the participation of estate representatives were abolished. He terminated the investigation into the murder of Grigory Rasputin , while the investigator - director of the Police Department A.T. Vasiliev (arrested during the February Revolution ) was transferred to the Peter and Paul Fortress , where he was interrogated by the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry until September.

Under Kerensky, judicial figures were massively removed from service without any explanation, sometimes on the basis of a telegram from a certain attorney who claimed that such and such was unacceptable by public circles ^[16] .

Minister of War and Navy

In March 1917, Kerensky again officially joined the Socialist Revolutionary Party , becoming one of the party’s most important leaders. In April 1917, Foreign Minister P.N. Milyukov assured the Allied Powers that Russia would certainly continue the war to a victorious end. This step caused a crisis in the Provisional Government . On April 24, Kerensky threatened to secede from the government and transfer the Soviets to the opposition if Miliukov was not removed from his post and a coalition government was formed, including representatives of socialist parties. On May 5 ( 18 ), 1917 , Prince Lvov was forced to fulfill this requirement and go on to create the first coalition government. Milyukov and Guchkov resigned, the socialists joined the government, and Kerensky received a portfolio of a military and naval minister.

The new Minister of War appoints to the key positions in the army little-known but close to him generals, nicknamed the " Young Turks ." Kerensky appointed his brother-in-law V.L. Baranovsky to the post of chief of the cabinet of the Minister of War, whom he promoted to colonel, and a month later, to major general. Kerensky appointed Colonels of the General Staff G. A. Yakubovich and G. N. Tumanov as assistants to the Minister of War, people not sufficiently experienced in military affairs, but active participants in the February coup. On May 22 ( June 4 ), 1917 , Kerensky appointed to the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief General A. Brusilov instead of the more conservative-minded General Alekseev M. V. On May 9, 1917, Kerensky published the “Declaration of the Rights of a Soldier”.

As Minister of War, Kerensky made great efforts to organize the offensive of the Russian army in June 1917 . Kerensky traveled around the front-line units, spoke at numerous rallies, trying to inspire the troops, after which he received the nickname of "chief negotiator." However, the army was already seriously weakened by the post-revolutionary purges of the generals and the creation of soldiers' committees ( see Democratization of the army in Russia in 1917 ). On June 18 the offensive of the Russian troops began , which, however, quickly ended in complete failure. According to some assumptions, it was this shameful defeat that served as the main reason for the overthrow of the Provisional Government .

"March" hype around Kerensky

The peak of Kerensky’s popularity begins with his appointment as Minister of War after the April crisis. Newspapers refer to Kerensky in the following expressions: “knight of the revolution”, “lion heart”, “first love of the revolution”, “people's stands”, “genius of Russian freedom”, “sun of Russian freedom”, “people's leader”, “savior of the Fatherland”, “The prophet and hero of the revolution”, “the good genius of the Russian revolution”, “the first national commander in chief”, etc. ^[17] Contemporaries describe the “March” hysteria around Kerensky’s personality in the following expressions:

The thorny path of Kerensky, but his car is twined with roses. Women throw lilies of the valley and lilac branches to him, others take these flowers from his hands and divide them among themselves like talismans and amulets. <...> He is carried in his arms. And I myself saw a young man with ecstatic eyes prayerfully reach for the sleeve of his dress, just to touch. So reach for the source of life and light! <...> Kerensky is a symbol of truth, it is a guarantee of success; Kerensky is that lighthouse, that light, to which the arms of swimmers who have fallen out of strength are drawn, and from his fire, from his words and calls they receive an influx of new and new forces for a difficult struggle.

In May 1917, Petrograd newspapers even seriously considered the establishment of the “Fund named after the Friend of Humanity A.F. Kerensky” ^[18] .

Kerensky tries to maintain the ascetic image of the “people's leader” by wearing a paramilitary jacket and a short haircut.

In his youth, Kerensky thought about the career of an opera singer, and even took acting lessons. V. D. Nabokov describes his speeches in this way: ““ I say, comrades, from the bottom of my heart ... from the bottom of my heart, and if you need to prove it ... if you don’t trust me ... I’m right before your eyes ... ready to die ... “. Carried away, he illustrated the "willingness to die" with an unexpected, desperate gesture. " Already in old age, Kerensky regrets that “if there had been television, no one could have defeated me!” Kerensky manages to “charm” even the ousted tsar: in July, Nikolai writes in his diary about Kerensky “This man is positively in place at the present moment; the more power he has, the better. ”

The failure of the first major political project of Kerensky - the June offensive of 1917 becomes the first noticeable blow to its popularity. Continuing economic problems, the failure of the surplus intelligence policy, initiated by the tsarist government in late 1916 , the ongoing collapse of the army, are discrediting Kerensky more and more.

As Minister of the Provisional Government, Kerensky moves to the Winter Palace. Over time, rumors appear in Petrograd that he was allegedly sleeping on the former bed of Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, and that Alexander Kerensky himself was ironically called “Alexander IV” (the last Russian tsar with this name was Alexander III , who died 23 years before the revolution). V.V. Mayakovsky writes about the life of the former attorney Kerensky in the palace:

The kings palace was built by Rastrelli .

Kings were born, lived, grew old.
The palace didn’t think of a swivel arrow,
I wondered what was in the bed, the queen entrusted,
some juror will be spread.
Forgetting both classes and parties,
goes on duty speech.
Bonaparte's eyes
and the colors of the protective jacket .

Chairman of the Provisional Government

On July 7 ( 20 ), 1917 , A.F. Kerensky replaced Georgy Lvov as Prime Minister , retaining the post of military and naval minister ^[19] . Kerensky tried to reach an agreement on the support of the government by the bourgeois and right-wing socialist parties. On July 12, the death penalty was restored at the front. New banknotes were issued, called " Kerenki ". On July 19, Kerensky appointed the new Supreme Commander-in-Chief - General Staff of the Infantry Lavr Georgievich Kornilov . In August, Kornilov, with the support of generals Krymov , Denikin and some others, refused to stop Kerensky (after provoking the latter with the Lvov mission) to stop troops moving to Petrograd on the orders of the Provisional Government and with the knowledge of Kerensky. As a result of the actions of agitators, Krymov’s troops in his absence (a trip to Petrograd to Kerensky) were propagandized and stopped at the approaches to Petrograd. Kornilov, Denikin and some other generals were arrested.

Kerensky and the Kornilov rebellion from the point of view of the Kornilovites

A.F. Kerensky, who actually concentrated government power in his hands, found himself in a difficult position during the Kornilov speech. He understood that only the severe measures proposed by L.G. Kornilov could save the economy from collapse, the army from anarchy, the Provisional Government could be freed from Soviet dependence and, in the end, established the internal order in the country.

But A.F. Kerensky also understood that with the establishment of a military dictatorship, he would lose all his power. He did not want to give it away voluntarily, even for the good of Russia. Personal antipathy between Minister-Chairman A.F. Kerensky and Commander-in-Chief General L.G. Kornilov joined this, they did not hesitate to express their attitude to each other. ^[20]

26 августа ( 8 сентября ) 1917 года депутат Думы В. Н. Львов передал премьер-министру обсуждавшиеся им накануне с генералом Корниловым различные пожелания в смысле усиления власти. Керенский использует эту ситуацию со вмешательством в своих целях и совершает провокацию с целью очернить Верховного Главнокомандующего в глазах общественности и устранить таким образом угрозу его личной (Керенского) власти.

«Было необходимо — говорит Керенский — доказать немедленно формальную связь между Львовым и Корниловым настолько ясно, чтобы Временное правительство было в состоянии принять решительные меры в тот же вечер… заставив Львова повторить в присутствии третьего лица весь его разговор со мной».

Для этой цели был приглашён помощник начальника милиции Булавинский , которого Керенский спрятал за занавеской в своём кабинете во время второго посещения его Львовым. Булавинский свидетельствует, что записка была прочтена Львову и последний подтвердил содержание её, а на вопрос, «каковы были причины и мотивы, которые заставили генерала Корнилова требовать, чтобы Керенский и Савинков приехали в Ставку», он не дал ответа.

Львов категорически отрицает версию Керенского. Он говорит: « Никакого ультимативного требования Корнилов мне не предъявлял. У нас была простая беседа, во время которой обсуждались разные пожелания в смысле усиления власти. Эти пожелания я и высказал Керенскому. Никакого ультимативного требования (ему) я не предъявлял и не мог предъявить, а он потребовал, чтобы я изложил свои мысли на бумаге. Я это сделал, а он меня арестовал. Я не успел даже прочесть написанную мною бумагу, как он, Керенский, вырвал её у меня и положил в карман ». ^[21]

— Деникин А. И. Очерки русской смуты

Вечером 26 августа ( 8 сентября ) 1917 года в заседании правительства Керенский квалифицировал действия Верховного главнокомандующего как мятеж. Предоставив министру-председателю чрезвычайные полномочия, Временное правительство подало в отставку. 27 августа Керенский объявил генерала Корнилова мятежником и всей стране:

27-го августа Керенский поведал стране о восстании Верховного главнокомандующего, причём сообщение министра-председателя начиналось следующей фразой: « 26 августа генерал Корнилов прислал ко мне члена Государственной Думы В. Н. Львова с требованием передачи Временным правительством всей полноты военной и гражданской власти, с тем, что им по личному усмотрению будет составлено новое правительство для управления страной».

In the future, Kerensky, the triumvirate of Savinkov , Avksentiev and Skobelev , the Petrograd Duma with A. A. Isaev and Schreider at the head and the councils began to take measures to suspend the movement of Krymov’s troops ... ^[21]

- Denikin A. I. Essays on Russian Troubles

Kerensky tried to appoint a new Supreme Commander, but both generals - Lukomsky and Klembovsky - refused, and the first of them, in response to a proposal to take the post of Supreme, openly threw Kerensky with provocation.

General Kornilov concluded that:

the government again fell under the influence of irresponsible organizations and, refusing to firmly implement (his) army recovery program, decided to eliminate (him) as the main initiator of these measures.

- From the testimony of General Kornilov subsequently to the commission of inquiry

... and decided not to submit to the post of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief not to surrender.

Offended by the lies of various government appeals that had begun to come from Petrograd, as well as their unworthy external form, General Kornilov responded with a series of ardent appeals to the army, people, Cossacks, in which he described the course of events and the provocation of the Prime Minister.

On August 28, General Kornilov refused to Kerensky in his demand to stop the movement to Petrograd sent there by decision of the Provisional Government ^[21] and with the consent of Kerensky ^[22] corps of General Krymov . This corps was sent to the capital by the Government with the goal of finally (after the suppression of the July mutiny ) ending the Bolsheviks and taking control of the situation in the capital:

On August 20, Kerensky, according to Savinkov’s report, agreed to "declare Petrograd and its environs in a state of war and the arrival of a military corps in Petrograd for the real implementation of this situation, that is, to fight the Bolsheviks."

- Savinkov B. "On the Kornilov case." ^[22]

As a result, General Kornilov, seeing the whole depth of Kerensky’s provocation against him, accusing the Supreme Commander of treason and the supposedly ultimatum demand to transfer to him "all the fullness of civil and military power" decided:

speak openly and, putting pressure on the Provisional Government, force him:

1. to exclude from their composition those ministers who, according to his (his) information, were obvious traitors to the motherland;
2. rebuild so that the country is guaranteed a strong and solid power

... using the corps of General Krymov already moving at the direction of Kerensky to Petrograd for this purpose in order to put pressure on the Government and gave General Krymov the corresponding instruction.

On August 29, Kerensky issued a Decree on dismissal from office and bringing to trial “for rebellion ” General Kornilov and his senior associates.

The method used by Kerensky with the “Lviv mission” was successfully repeated with respect to General Krymov, who shot himself immediately after his personal audience with Kerensky in Petrograd, where he went, leaving the corps in the vicinity of Luga, at the invitation of Kerensky, which was transmitted through friend of the general - Colonel Samarin, who served as assistant chief of cabinet Kerensky. The reason for the manipulation was the need for a painless withdrawal of the commander from among the troops subordinate to him - in the absence of the commander, revolutionary agitators easily propagandized the Cossacks and stopped the advance of the 3rd cavalry corps to Petrograd.

General Kornilov refused offers to leave the Headquarters and "run away." Not wanting bloodshed in response to assurances of loyalty from parts loyal to him

Say one word, and all Kornilov officers will give their lives for you without hesitation ...

the general replied:

Tell Kornilovsky regiment that I order him to be completely calm, I don’t want at least one drop of brotherly blood to be shed ^[23] .

General Alekseev , wishing to save the Kornilovites, agreed to arrest General Kornilov and his associates at Headquarters, which he did on September 1 ( 14 ), 1917 . This episode turned out to be misunderstood and subsequently on the Don had a very negative impact on the relationship between the two generals-leaders of the young Volunteer Army .

Kerensky’s victory in this confrontation became a prelude to Bolshevism , for it signified the victory of the Soviets, among which the Bolsheviks already occupied a predominant position and with whom the Kerensky government was only able to pursue a compromising policy.

So, Ambassador Buchanan in his notes noted that when on the day of the revolution, November 7 , “in the morning, the Provisional Government called the Cossacks, but the latter refused to speak alone, because they could not forgive Kerensky that after the July uprising, during which many of their comrades were killed, he prevented them from crushing the Bolsheviks, as well as the fact that he declared their beloved leader Kornilov a traitor ” ^[24] .

Kerensky and the Kornilov rebellion from Kerensky’s point of view

According to the published memoirs of Alexander Fedorovich Kerensky, the insane rebellion of General Kornilov, who opened the doors to the Bolsheviks in the Kremlin and Hindenburg in Brest-Litovsk, was the result of a history of conspiracies to the right against the Provisional Government. Alexander Fedorovich noted that the struggle was started not with these or those “excesses” of the revolution or with the “lack of will of the Kerensky government”, but with the revolution as such, with a new order of things in Russia in general ^[25] .

Events immediately preceding the rebellion

After the February Revolution, the question of the principles and foundations of the governance of Russia was entirely in the hands of the army - the millions of soldiers who were at the front and in the rear, "who were the color of the entire population and, moreover, armed" ^[26] . The corps of officers, who did not understand anything in politics, was in the hands of the "soldier mass" and had no influence on it. The soldiers and emissaries of the socialist parties influenced the soldiers, who were sent by the Soviets of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies to promote peace. The main slogan was: "Down with the war, immediately peace at all costs, and immediately take away the land from the landowner." The reason is simple: for centuries, the master has been accumulating wealth for himself as a peasant hump, and this illegally acquired property must be taken from him. An officer in the minds of soldiers became an enemy, as he demanded a continuation of the war and was a type of master in military uniform. A. A. Brusilov wrote in his memoirs ^[26] that at first the majority of officers began to adjoin the Cadet party , and the “soldier mass” suddenly became all Social Revolutionary . However, soon the "soldier mass" realized that the Social Revolutionaries, led by Kerensky, were preaching the offensive, continuing the alliance with the Entente and postponing the division of the land until the Constituent Assembly . Such intentions were absolutely not included in the calculations of the “soldier mass” and clearly contradicted its “lusts” ^[26] .

It was here that the preaching of the Bolsheviks came to the taste and understanding of the soldiers. They were not at all interested in internationalism, communism, and the like, they only learned the following principles of their future free life: immediately peace at all costs, deprivation of the entire property class, to whatever estate it belongs, of all property, destruction of the landowner and generally the master.

However, in the face of an external insidious aggressor, learning about the betrayal of the Bolsheviks and discarding the aforementioned “lusts,” the people of Russia highlighted the feelings of patriotism and love for the motherland. The First World War , as Kerensky writes in his memoirs, introduced into the practice of the warring states not only toxic gases for physical poisoning of the enemy, but also in an unheard of amount of bribery and propaganda as a means of armed struggle for the spiritual decay of the enemy rear. By the summer of 1917, an investigation by the Provisional Government established "the entire apparatus of Lenin’s relations with Germany." In the spring of 1917, Lenin and his closest associates formed an “organization” within the Bolshevik party, which, using funds received from the enemy state, organized propaganda among the population and troops aimed at disorganizing the Russian army and rear. For the same purposes, during the period from July 3 to 5, the aforementioned “organization” provoked an armed uprising in St. Petersburg against the government existing in the state ^[25] . The uprising began on July 4 with a speech by machine-gun regiment soldiers, workers of the Petrograd factories, Kronstadt sailors under the slogans of ending the war, the immediate resignation of the Provisional Government, and the transfer of power to the Soviets. On July 4, the Provisional Government was forced to introduce martial law in the city. Late in the evening of July 4, Minister of Justice Pereverzev handed over to the journalists information about the treason of Lenin, Zinoviev and other Bolsheviks. By the middle of the day on July 5, the news spread that the government had accurate data on the treason of the Bolsheviks and that Lenin was a German spy . July 6 ( 19 ), 1917, these data were published in print. The revelations made a stunning impression on the soldiers. Hesitant regiments sided with the government. On July 5, the uprising was over. The Lenin citadel itself ( Kshesinskaia Palace ) was occupied by government forces. On July 6, Kerensky approved a list of persons subject to immediate arrest. The list included Lenin, Zinoviev, Kozlovsky , Sumenson, Furstenberg (Ganetsky) , German citizen Gelfand (Parvus) , Kollontai, Ilyin (Raskolnikov), and others. A few days later, Trotsky and Lunacharsky were arrested. On July 10, Lenin, wearing a red wig and shaving his beard, fled to Finland ^{[25] [27]} .

As for the Bolsheviks themselves, even if the native air of Russia aroused a sense of honor and conscience in Lenin, Zinoviev and others, they could no longer stop on the paths of destruction. Each of their steps was controlled by representatives of Ludendorff , and the unlimited material possibilities of propaganda of the "social revolution" would have dried up at the first deviation of the Bolshevik Central Committee from the defeatist program. Thus, reconciliation, any agreement between the Bolsheviks and the forces of Russian democracy was objectively impossible. The physical struggle between them was inevitable, just as the struggle between Russia and Germany at the front was inevitable.

In his memoirs, Kerensky writes that having become convinced of the example of the Bolshevik demagogy and feeling in it the strong hand of a merciless external enemy, the new people's Russia resolutely turned to the state. After the defeat of the Bolsheviks in July, the process of establishing a new statehood in Russia went ahead with exceptional speed: the adopted laws on broad city and zemstvo self-government on the basis of universal, proportional, equal suffrage for both sexes entered into force. By early August 1917, nearly 200 cities had new democratic city councils. By mid-September, 650 cities had new city councils. At a slower pace, thanks to the conditions of village life, the Zemstvo Reform advanced towards the end. The powerful cooperative construction within the framework of the new cooperative law created a serious public support for the democratic state in the country. The authority of the government commissioners, who, according to the plan of the Military Ministry, had to play the role of a middle link in the transition of the army from the March committee state to normal unity of command, increased in the army. In difficult conditions, the Provisional Government conducted work related to the convening of the Constituent Assembly, designed to determine the state structure of Russia. The convocation of the Constituent Assembly, scheduled for September 30 because of the crisis, was postponed to November 28. It was too long to wait. The government decided to listen to public opinion, to find support for strengthening power. On August 13 ( 26 ), 1917 , the Provisional Government in Moscow convened the All-Russian State Conference - a review of the country's political forces ^[25] .

Outwardly, the meeting hall of the State Conference presented a curious picture. Just along the line of the main passage from the stage to the main entrance, the stalls and lodges of the theater were divided into equal halves: to the left - democratic Russia, peasant, workers', Soviet and socialist - Russia Labor; to the right is liberal, bourgeois, possessive Russia. Representatives of the army by the committees were represented to the left, the command staff - to the right. Just against the central aisle, the government was in the foreground. I sat in the middle, to my left the ministers "from the" labor "democracy" to the right - "from the bourgeoisie." The Provisional Government was the only knot that linked both Russia into one. Anyone who has spent the days of the State Conference at the Moscow Bolshoi Theater will never forget these days. The whole rainbow of political opinions, the whole gamut of public moods, all the tension of the internal struggle, all the power of patriotic anxiety, all the fury of social hatred, all the bitterness of accumulated insults and insults - all this was rushing to the stage, to the table of the Provisional Government. They demanded of him; he was accused; they complained to him; they wanted to help him; some wonderful word was expected from him. Each of the two Russia wanted the power to be only with her. And the power was only with the State, for we, the Provisional Government, saw on the whole what each of the parties fighting for power noticed only in the part that interests it. We have seen that both sides are equally needed by the State.

The Bolsheviks and outright monarchists did not have representatives at the meeting.

Kerensky notes that the sharpest, most intense minute of the congress was the speech of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov. For the left side of the theater, it was a symbol of the upcoming “counter-revolution”, for the right side it was a living “national hero” who was to overthrow the “weak-willed, interim government that was held captive by the Soviets” and establish “strong power” in the state.

Kerensky was convinced that Russia could safely get to the shore of salvation, but not one step away from the path that her Provisional Government had taken from the very beginning of the revolution, fulfilling the will of the vast majority of the country's population ^[25] .

Until the end of the military campaign of 1917, it was not so long. The all-union task of our front has already been completed. Lenin on the run; The Soviets receded into the background of national life. State power has gained strength. Only three months are left before the Constituent Assembly. Three months of difficult organizing work, but within the framework of a hardened state. All this was quite obvious to a more or less thoughtful and objectively-minded person. This objectivity, it seemed, could be demanded of those political and cultural leaders of Russia, in the eyes of whom the monarchy had so recently disintegrated, who, with their own hands, perceived all the ulcers of the old regime. They - old statesmen and politicians, experienced in experience, - more than anyone else, should have understood how enormous, inhuman patience it was necessary to have when building Russia in the first months after a catastrophe that the world has not seen equal, maybe since the fall of the Roman Empire. Patience, however, was not enough for them!

With the wording of Kerensky as “losing his will to rule”, on July 19 ( August 1 ), 1917 , A. A. Brusilov was removed from the post of Supreme Commander. He was replaced by General Kornilov. According to Kerensky, the figure of Kornilov was more convenient for him, as it was quite reliable, tough, manageable and little reasoning. Kerensky recalled ^[25] :

I personally even liked the passion and attack of General Kornilov. The sharpness of the expressions of us - people from the Provisional Government - it was impossible to surprise in the fourth month of the revolution; to infuriate - all the more. Indeed, on the left, the hot revolutionary horses kicked hard until they themselves entered the shafts of power. I thought: a consciousness of state responsibility will even out, politically train General Kornilov and his closest military friends.

Rebellion

On August 19, the Germans broke through the front of Oger in the Dvina. On August 20, Riga was abandoned. The front line was approaching St. Petersburg.

On August 21, the Provisional Government decided to urgently call from the front a detachment of reliable troops at the disposal of the government. This decision was dictated by military-strategic and domestic political considerations: with the “unreliability and licentiousness” of the St. Petersburg garrison, it was necessary to ensure the order for the government to move to Moscow, as well as to have at its disposal solid military force in the event of a “movement to the right,” which then is real for us and threatened ^[25] .

The choice of a detachment of military units was entrusted to the Supreme Commander. At Stavka, Kerensky seconded the manager of the War Ministry, Savinkov , demanding that General Kornilov observe two conditions:

1. General Krymov should not be at the head of the corps sent to Petersburg;
2. in the composition of the sent troops there should not be a Caucasian native (Wild) division.

Kerensky in his memoirs noted that, according to accurate data, which he possessed, General Krymov and part of the officers of the Wild Division were participants in a military conspiracy ^[25] .

On August 24, General Kornilov made a promise to Savinkov to fulfill both requirements of the Provisional Government. On August 25, Savinkov reported to Kerensky about Kornilov’s promise. However, on the same day, by a special order (hidden from the Minister of War), General Kornilov subordinated the Wild Division to General Krymov.

Initially, the idea of ​​overthrowing the Provisional Government appeared in St. Petersburg in a narrow circle of banking and financial figures ( Vyshnegradsky , Putilov ...) in April 1917. Subsequently, Kornilov himself and his closest accomplices - courageous and fighting Russian patriots, were drawn into conspiratorial work. A. F. Kerensky in his memoirs cites extracts from the letter of General Alekseev to P. N. Milyukov dated September 12 ^[25] :

The Kornilov affair was not the affair of a handful of adventurers, General Alekseev writes, it relied on the sympathy and help of broad circles of our intelligentsia. You, Pavel Nikolaevich, to a certain extent know that some circles of our society not only knew about everything, not only sympathized ideologically, but helped Kornilov as best they could ...

As Kerensky notes, the right mood for the development of a military conspiracy arose immediately after the July Bolshevik uprising, which showed:

1. the weakness of the Soviets, torn by internal struggle;
2. the instability of the anarchist-minded "revolutionary regiments" of the Petersburg garrison;
3. Opportunities for an entrepreneurial minority:

• in secret, in a Bolshevik way, prepare the seizure of strategic points in St. Petersburg (government buildings, telephones, post offices, the Soviets themselves, etc.);
• saturate the capital with faithful troops of their people;
• to prepare public opinion by agitation in “their” press;
• at a convenient time to make a quick "surgical" operation at the highest levels of power.

Shortly before the Moscow State Conference, Kerensky met with Kornilov. At the meeting, Kerensky tried to convince the general that there were no differences between him and his entourage and the Provisional Government in the goals and objectives of working in the army. Kerensky tried to explain to Kornilov that any attempt to establish a personal dictatorship in Russia would lead to disaster: the terrible fate that awaits officers.

Nevertheless, at a state meeting in Moscow in the event of a “favorable set of circumstances” it was planned to proclaim the dictatorship of General Kornilov.

During the days of the state meeting, the “Trudovik” Aladyin A.F., famous in the 1st State Duma, came from England. He brought to General Kornilov a message from the British War Secretary, Lord Milner, who “blessed” the Russian Supreme Commander-in-Chief to overthrow the allied England of the Russian Provisional Government. As Kerensky notes, this appeal extremely raised the mood of the conspiracy organizers on the right.

July 30 ( August 12 ) 1917. Kornilov transferred from the front to his disposal the 3rd cavalry (Cossack) corps , commanded by General Krymov. When transferring from the front, General Krymov was subject to appointment to the post of commander of the 11th army in Galicia . However, instead of leaving for the location of his army, General Krymov was summoned to Mogilyov, to General Kornilov’s Headquarters. From the beginning of August, he, secretly from the Provisional Government, lived in the Headquarters and carried out the special secret assignment of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - he worked out a plan for the capture of Petersburg. The combat order received on the night of August 28 by General Krasnov (at that time deputy general Krymov) from Krymov wrote: “Everything was provided for which division to occupy which parts of the city, where to have the strongest guards ...” (Archive of the Russian Revolution, vol. I. S. 117-118).

A few days before the opening of the State Conference, the conspirators mobilized public forces: the committees of all military organizations (the Council of Cossack troops, the Council of St. George cavaliers, the Central Committee of the Union of Officers, the congress of the military league, etc.) decided one by one to consider General Kornilov as irreplaceable Supreme commander in chief .

It is not hard to imagine how dizzy from this the head of a fast-moving in action, but not used to politically reflecting and weighing his thoughts general. After all, he understood every word in a soldier's way: it is said, done; promised - fulfilled.

According to Kerensky, Kornilov was least prepared for the role of politician. The main thing that was characteristic of Kornilov was "non-reflective determination." These features of the nature of Kornilov, confirms in his memoirs and Alexei Brusilov ^[28] :

I believe that this unconditionally brave man is strongly guilty of excessively shed blood of soldiers and officers. Owing to his ferocity, he was destroying a soldier to no avail, and having declared himself a dictator without any sense, he ruined many officers with his trick. But I must say that everything that he did, he did without thinking and delving into the depths of things.

Despite the enormous amount of data gathered about the plot, Kerensky “until the last minute” did not see General Kornilov among the conspirators. Kerensky was sure of Kornilov: a valiant soldier would not play hide and seek in politics and wouldn’t shoot from around the corner.

The Moscow State Conference for the supporters of the coup was very unsuccessful. The proclamation of a military dictatorship in a peaceful manner, as if under pressure from free public opinion, did not work. On the way back from Moscow to Mogilev in the carriage of the Supreme Commander, it was decided to overthrow the Provisional Government with an armed hand ^[25] .

On August 25, General Kornilov, without the knowledge of the Provisional Government, appointed General Krymov the commander of the "Special St. Petersburg Army." The wild division acted as the vanguard of the anti-government troops in the direction of St. Petersburg.

On August 26 morning General Krymov left Mogilev after the Wild Division to Luga with special instructions from General Kornilov. On August 27, at 2 hours and 40 minutes, General Kornilov sent a telegram to the Provisional Government. The telegram reported that the concentration of the corps near Petersburg would end this evening.

On August 26, at about 5 p.m., a former member of the Provisional Government, a member of the 4th State Duma V.N. Lvov, arrived at Kerensky in the Winter Palace and presented an ultimatum on behalf of General Kornilov:

1. declare a state of siege in Petersburg;
2. transfer power to him;
3. all ministers to resign immediately.

For me personally and my closest War Ministry officer, Savinkov was invited to go to Headquarters that evening (on the eve of the arrival of General Krymov’s detachment), since in the new government under General Kornilov I supposedly became the Minister of Justice, and Savinkov - military.

Late in the evening in the Winter Palace, V.N. Lvov once again confirmed the contents of General Kornilov’s ultimatum. Lvov explained each paragraph of the ultimatum to an official witness (director of the Police Department S. A. Balavinsky). Lviv did not suspect the presence of a witness in the room. Captain Kuzmin, assistant commander of the St. Petersburg Military District, arrested Lviv by order of Kerensky.

All this happened between 5 and 10 pm on August 26 ( September 8 ), 1917 . Until the moment of Lvov’s arrest, no one knew anything about the catastrophe in the Headquarters of the disaster - neither in the government, nor in the capital, nor in the country.

As Alexander Fedorovich explains, the task was to quickly, without expanding the circle of initiates, stop madness in the bud. The disclosure of the conspiracy was tantamount to a loss of confidence in the army in the army ^[25] .

At about 11 pm on August 26 ( September 8 ), 1917 , at a meeting of the Provisional Government, it was decided:

1. invite General Kornilov to surrender the supreme command to General Klembovsky , Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front and to appear in Petersburg;
2. to give Kerensky special powers to curb the coup.

The last meeting of the second coalition of the Provisional Government ended at about 1 am. Two members of the government immediately left him: the Minister of Agriculture, the leader of the Socialist Revolutionary Party V. M. Chernov and the Minister of Railways P. P. Yurenev . The meeting of the government, according to Kerensky, was "blown up" by General Kornilov. The general was asked at night: to resign and arrive in Petersburg. However, Kornilov immediately sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fronts and the Commander of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets stating that he, Kornilov, did not obey the government’s demand to resign as Supreme Commander-in-Chief and offered to support him.

On August 27 ( September 9 ), 1917 , Kerensky addressed the population of the country with a manifesto. In turn, General Kornilov published a counter-manifesto. As Kerensky notes, the lying postscript of General Kornilov in the counter-manifesto: “The telegram of the Minister-Chairperson No. 4163 in its first part is a complete lie: I didn’t send State Duma member V. Lvov to the Provisional Government, but he came to me as the Minister’s envoy- Chairman ... ”laid the foundation for the whole legend of“ my betrayal ”of General Kornilov ^[25] .

On difficult days, August 27 and 28, confusion and panic began in St. Petersburg. No one knew anything. General Krymov’s regiments moving to St. Petersburg turned into armies in the imagination of ordinary people. In Soviet circles, taken by surprise, the March moods of extreme suspicion, distrust of the authorities flared up. There was no longer unity among the Provisional Governments. On the night of August 28, delegates from the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets came to Kerensky and proposed a radical change in the entire policy of the Provisional Government: the Soviets, socialist parties, Bolsheviks and other democratic organizations united around the government had to save the country, taking power into their own hands, but without the bourgeoisie . According to the memoirs, A.F. Kerensky gave a categorically harsh answer to these proposals ^[25] :

This will never happen. Government can be overthrown with an armed hand; its individual representatives can be destroyed physically, but the Provisional Government, sworn to bring the country to the Constituent Assembly, will not back down from the path chosen for it to fight for Russia.

By the morning of August 28, the main forces of General Krymov began to approach train after train at Luga. Kerensky urgently sent Krymov an order: turn the 3rd cavalry corps to the front towards Riga. Krymov did not obey and declared that he would execute orders only of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov. In the morning of August 28, Krymov announced that in the morning of August 29, by force, “in a field camp” he would make his way to Petersburg if the railway lines were not restored ^[25] .

The whole plan of the campaign against St. Petersburg was built on a children's plan: to act against the Provisional Government, convincing the regiments that the corps was going to help the Provisional Government against the Bolsheviks. On August 28-29, combatant Cossacks discovered this deception of General Kornilov. Newspapers came from St. Petersburg to Luga, where my orders and the corresponding appeals of the Soviets were printed. In addition, a special Muslim deputation led by members of the State Duma and mullahs came to St. Petersburg from the Wild Division. The Kornilov-Krymov case was over: the selected representatives from all regiments of the 3rd cavalry corps came to the local Council premises with a statement: we won’t go against the Provisional Government, and if the authorities insist on it, we will return to the front.

By the evening of August 28, General Krymov was left without an army. As Kerensky writes in his memoirs: “Now about such a bloodless victory was telegraphed to me in Petersburg. "Guard Colonel Voronovich , chairman of the local Council, asked to take measures for the speedy arrest of General Krymov . " Kerensky signed the arrest order of General Krymov and sent Colonel General Staff Samarin to Luga in order to convince Krymov to come to Petersburg. Samarin had to explain to Krymov "all the hopelessness of further resistance and all its mortal danger to the army." On August 30, General Krymov, imperceptibly from the Cossacks of the 3rd Corps, extremely excited against him, drove to St. Petersburg by car with Colonel Samarin and his chief of staff, General Diderichs. At about noon on August 31, Kerensky’s office arrived: General Krymov with General Dietrichs and Colonel Samarin. In the office, in addition to Kerensky, there were: Assistant Secretary of War General Yakubovich and Chief Naval Prosecutor Shablovsky . Kerensky asked Krymov: "In what capacity did you end up in Luga?" He replied that as the commander of the St. Petersburg "special army", intended to act in the St. Petersburg region. The Provisional Government was not aware of the existence of such an army. General Yakubovich confirmed that there was no information about this army. Krymov explained the official purpose of finding the 3rd Corps in Luga: troops were sent to the Provisional Government at the request of the Minister of War, but were then suddenly stopped. General Krymov presented military order No. 128 of August 28, which reported on the non-existent uprising of the Bolsheviks in St. Petersburg and the order of capture by the city corps. General Krymov issued the order in accordance with the directive received from General Kornilov. As Kerensky writes: "Having handed this document over to me, General Krymov openly and honestly, having thrown all kinds of hide and seek, recognized himself as a participant in the conspiracy . " General Krymov left Kerensky’s office free. The next day he shot himself ^[25] .

The results of the rebellion The troops returned to March anarchy. Six months of the struggle to restore the combat effectiveness of the army went to dust. The officers in the eyes of the soldiers became "Kornilovites" -reactionaries. Discipline has disappeared. Kornilov’s rebellion “overshadowed” the betrayal of the Bolsheviks. In the regiments and navy, the Bolshevik organizations took revenge for the defeat after the July uprising - they seized the Committees. September 1 in Helsingfors on the battleship "Petropavlovsk" was committed lynching: four officers - Lieutenant Tizenko, midshipmen Mikhailov, Kondyba and Kandratyev were shot. At the same time as the events at Petropavlovsk, lynching occurred in Vyborg: three generals and a colonel were arrested and then drowned by soldiers on suspicion of assisting Kornilov. Across the front, soldiers began to arbitrarily arrest command personnel and kill officers. Kornilov himself in Mogilev was threatened with cruel reprisal. Hastily organized detachments of soldiers from different directions moved to the Headquarters. Kerensky understood that only General Alekseev could take command from the hands of Kornilov ^[25] .

On August 30 in the morning, taking only V.V. Vyrubov with me, I arrived in one private apartment (of a general, also a participant in the conspiracy), where General Alekseev stopped. Then he treated me with undisguised hatred. Always reserved and restrained, this time he could not stand it, lost his temper and just started yelling at me, pouring out all the resentment that had been boiling over half a year and all the bitterness for the failure of the conspiracy at Headquarters. But I needed him at all costs. Therefore, I did not stop him. Indeed, the cry lightened his soul and broke his mood. When he fell silent, I asked: "Well, now, General, do you agree?" He agreed to accept the post, but only to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, insisting that I personally replace General Kornilov. So it was done.

According to General Alekseev, the situation in the army after General Kornilov required a complete concentration of power in one hand. Extraordinary circumstances arose. Kerensky legally agreed “in the name of an early cessation of anarchy at Headquarters” to temporarily go for the merger of the post of head of the Provisional Government with the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. On September 2, General Alekseev arrested General Kornilov and his accomplices.

Such a peaceful end to the conspiracy kept the entire complex apparatus of the Main Apartment (Headquarters) intact - this not only the brain, but also the heart of the army.

According to Kerensky, restoring order in the army has become simply impossible. The army had to be dissolved and demobilized as soon as possible. On September 12, General Dukhonin was appointed Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and General Diterichs as Quartermaster General. They urgently began to develop a plan for a radical reorganization of the army with an extraordinary reduction in its composition. After the arrest of General Kornilov and his accomplices, the conspirators who remained at large set up a “defensive campaign” in print ^[25] :

Its meaning lies in the assertion that there was no conspiracy, that there was a “misunderstanding” between Kornilov and the head of the Provisional Government, that General Kornilov did not send any ultimatum, and Lvov “messed up everything”. It was even claimed that through the manager of the War Department Savinkov I was “in agreement” with General Kornilov. And then “under the pressure of the Soviets” and in his “cowardice” the general “betrayed”.

This slanderous fabrication was immediately picked up by the Bolsheviks and became in their hands that dynamite with which they literally blew up the confidence of the "soldier mass" in the authorities that had just been restored in the country. After the defeat of the Bolsheviks in July, the process of establishing a new statehood was disrupted by the insane riot of General Kornilov, and from the beginning of September, Russia rushed rapidly to reverse to chaos.

Kerensky in October 1917

Kerensky, becoming the supreme commander in chief, completely changed the structure of the interim government, creating the “Business Cabinet” - the Directory . Thus, Kerensky combined the powers of the chairman of the government and the supreme commander.

Having concentrated dictatorial powers in his hands, Kerensky made another coup d'etat - dissolved the State Duma, which, in fact, brought him to power, and announced the proclamation of Russia as a democratic republic ^[29] , without waiting for the convening of the Constituent Assembly.

To provide government support, he went on to form an advisory body - the Provisional Council of the Russian Republic (Pre-Parliament) on October 7 ( 20 ), 1917 . Assessing the situation in Petrograd on October 24 as a “state of insurrection," he demanded that the Pre-Parliament fully support the actions of the government. After the adoption by the Pre-Parliament of an evasive resolution, he left Petrograd to meet troops called up from the front to support his government.

In his own words, Kerensky was "between the hammer of the Kornilovites and the anvil of the Bolsheviks"; a popular legend ascribes to General Kornilov the promise "to hang on the first pillar of Lenin, and on the second Kerensky."

Kerensky did not organize the defense of the Provisional Government from the rebellion of the Bolsheviks , despite the fact that many drew the attention of the Minister-Chairman, including representatives of foreign embassies. Until the last moment, he invariably replied that the Provisional Government had everything under control and that the troops in Petrograd were enough to suppress the Bolshevik uprising, which he even eagerly awaited to put an end to them. And only when it was already completely late, at 2 hours and 20 minutes. On the night of October 25 ( November 7 ), 1917 , a telegram was sent to General Dukhonin at Headquarters on sending Cossack units to Petrograd. Dukhonin in response asked why they had not transmitted this telegram before, and several times called Kerensky through a direct wire, but he did not fit. Later, Kerensky tried to make excuses in exile that, allegedly, “in the last days before the Bolshevik uprising, all my orders and the headquarters of the Petersburg military district to expel troops from the Northern Front to Petrograd sabotaged locally and on the road.” The historian of the Russian revolution Melgunov, S. P. on the basis of documents proves that there were no such orders ^[30] .

However, by October 1917, there was practically no sufficient military force left that Kerensky could rely on. His actions during the Kornilov speech repelled army officers and Cossacks from him. In addition, during the struggle with Kornilov, Kerensky was forced to turn to the Bolsheviks as the most active left, thereby only bringing closer the events of November 1917. Kerensky's indecisive attempts to get rid of the most unreliable parts of the Petrograd garrison led only to the fact that they drifted "to the left" and switched to the Bolshevik side. Also, units sent to Petrograd from the front in July gradually moved to the Bolshevik side. The growing chaos was also facilitated by the dissolution of the unpopular police after the February Revolution. Replaced by her "people's police" was unable to fulfill its functions.

The version is widespread that Kerensky escaped from the Winter Palace , disguised as a nurse (another option is a maid). It has been suggested that this version was created by Bolshevik propaganda or the people. For the first time, this version was expressed by the brother of the head of the cunk school, guarding the Winter Palace in October 1917 . According to the memoirs of the journalist G. Borovik , who met with Kerensky in 1966 ^[31] , this version “burned his heart after 50 years,” and the first phrase he said at the meeting was: “Mr. Borovik, well, tell me in Moscow there are you have smart people! Well, I didn’t run from the Winter Palace in a women's dress! ”

Kerensky himself claimed that he had left Zimny ​​in his usual jacket, in his car, accompanied by the American ambassador’s car with the American flag, which was offered to him by American diplomats. Counter soldiers and Red Guards recognized him and habitually saluted.

Probably, a second after my passage, not one of them could explain to himself how it happened that he not only missed this “counter-revolutionary”, “the enemy of the people”, but also saluted him ^[32] .

Kerensky emphasizes and in certain tones distorts reality in his memoirs: in fact, his departure from the Winter Palace was of a different nature, even in trifles ^[33] . For example, David Francis , the former American ambassador to Russia at that time, in his book “Russia from the Window of the American Embassy” writes that the American car was not “offered” to Kerensky, but was captured by his adjutants. The American flag was also forcibly assigned ^[34] . The secretary of the American embassy only obeyed the inevitable and limited himself to protesting against the use of the US flag ^[33] . (There are opposite evidence ^[24] ). In general, Kerensky was worth a lot of effort to leave Petrograd, since all the stations were already controlled by the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee.

The campaign of the Krasnov-Kerensky detachment to Petrograd was not successful ^[35] . After a series of battles, the Cossacks of Krasnov on October 31 in Gatchina entered into a truce with the Soviet troops. The 3rd cavalry corps of General Krasnov did not show much desire to defend Kerensky, while the Bolsheviks developed vigorous activity in organizing the defense of Petrograd. Dybenko, who had arrived for negotiations , jokingly suggested that the Cossacks of the 3rd Corps “exchange Kerensky for Lenin”, “if you want, we’ll exchange ear to ear”. According to the memoirs of General Krasnov, the Cossacks, after negotiations, clearly began to incline to extradite Kerensky, and he fled from the Gatchina Palace, disguised as a sailor's suit ^[36] .

The agent of the British secret service "Somerville" (writer Somerset Maugham ) who was in Petrograd from August to November 1917 and gave him the following description:

The situation in Russia worsened every day ... and he removed all the ministers, as soon as he noticed in them abilities that threatened to undermine his own prestige. He made speeches. He made endless speeches. The threat of a German attack on Petrograd arose. Kerensky made speeches. Lack of food became more serious, winter was approaching, there was no fuel. Kerensky made speeches. Behind the scenes, the Bolsheviks were active, Lenin was hiding in Petrograd ... He made speeches ^[37] .

One of the leaders of the cadet party, Ivan Kutorga, in his book "Orators and the Masses" describes Kerensky in this way:

... Kerensky was the true personification of February with all his enthusiasm, impulse, good intentions, with all his doom and frequent political childish absurdity and state crime. Personally, hatred of Kerensky is explained, in my opinion, not only by his undeniably huge political mistakes, not only by the fact that Kerensky (a word that has become common in all European languages) failed to show serious resistance to Bolshevism, but, on the contrary, cleared the way for him but also by other, broader and more general reasons. ”

In the Soviet history textbooks for the comprehensive school, a reproduction of the painting by the artist Grigory Shegal “The Flight of Kerensky from Gatchina”, in which he is depicted dressing as a nurse, was given.

After the Bolsheviks seized power

On the 20th of November, Kerensky appeared in Novocherkassk to General A. M. Kaledin, but was not accepted by him ^[38] . The end of 1917 spent in wanderings in remote villages near Petrograd and Novgorod (about 40 days he lived in a dacha in Siverskaya). In early January 1918, he secretly appeared in Petrograd, wanting to speak at the Constituent Assembly , but in the Socialist Revolutionary leadership this, obviously, was considered inappropriate. Kerensky moved to Finland. On January 9 ( 22 ), 1918 , a resolution of the Council of People 's Commissars of January 4 ( 17 ), 1918 “On the confiscation of the amounts held by banks in the current accounts of A. F. Kerensky” was published: in the State Bank - 1,157,714 rubles, in the International Commercial 317 020 rub. In the decision, the Council of People's Commissars appealed to everyone, "who could give instructions regarding the source of these sums, their purpose, etc., with a request to provide comprehensive information about this" ^[39] . At the end of January 1918, Kerensky returned to Petrograd, at the beginning of May - to Moscow, where he established contact with the Union for the Renaissance of Russia . When the speech of the Czechoslovak Corps began , the Revival Union invited him to get abroad to negotiate the organization of military intervention in Soviet Russia ^[40] .

Life in exile

In June 1918, Kerensky, under the guise of a Serbian officer, accompanied by Sydney Reilly, traveled through the north of Russia outside the borders of the former Russian Empire. Arriving in London , he met with British Prime Minister Lloyd George and spoke at a Labor conference. After that, he went to Paris , where he stayed for several weeks. Kerensky tried to get support from the Entente for the Ufa directory , which was dominated by the Socialist Revolutionaries. After the coup in Omsk in November 1918, during which the directory was overthrown and the dictatorship of Kolchak established , Kerensky campaigned in London and Paris against the Omsk government. He lived in France .

In February 1920, he was arrested in Baku . He went to the Caucasus in an English ship to seek the support of the Russian population from the Russian Democratic Party, but he was arrested. ^[41]

Kerensky in Paris tried to continue active political activity. In 1922 - 1932 he edited the newspaper "Days" , delivered sharp anti-Soviet lectures, called on Western Europe to crusade against Soviet Russia.

In 1939, he married the former Australian journalist Lydia Tritton ^[42] . When Hitler occupied France in 1940, he left for the USA .

When his wife was terminally ill in 1945, he went to her in Brisbane to Australia and lived with her family until her death in February 1946, after which he returned to the United States and settled in New York , although he also spent a lot of time at Stanford University in California . There he made a significant contribution to the archive of Russian history and taught students.

Author of memoirs, historical studies and documentary publications on the history of the Russian revolution .

In 1968, Kerensky tried to obtain permission to come to the USSR ^[43] . A favorable resolution of this question depended on the fulfillment of a number of political conditions by him, and this was directly indicated in the draft document submitted by the Central Committee staff on August 13, 1968 . The document said: “... to receive his (Kerensky's) statement: on the recognition of the laws of the socialist revolution ; the correctness of the policy of the government of the USSR ; recognition of the successes of the Soviet people achieved over the 50 years of the existence of the Soviet state ” ^{[44] [45]} . According to the memoirs of a priest of the Russian Orthodox patriarchal ^{[ specify ] the} church of A.P. Belikov’s church in London , through which these negotiations began, “Kerensky acknowledged that the events that took place in October 1917 are a logical conclusion to Russia's social development. He does not regret at all that it happened exactly as it was and to what it led 50 years later ” ^[12] . For unclear reasons, Kerensky’s arrival in Moscow was unexpectedly withdrawn from discussion (probably due to the invasion of Czechoslovakia on 08.21.1968).

In December 1968, the Center for Humanitarian Research at the University of Texas at Austin (USA) purchased the Kerensky archive with the consent of the owner from his son Oleg and personal secretary E. I. Ivanova, according to them, "to receive funds for treatment and care of patient A F. Kerensky. " The archive was estimated at 100 thousand dollars with a payment of 20 thousand dollars per year for five years ^[46] .

Kerensky fell seriously ill. Deciding not to be a burden to anyone, he refused to eat. Doctors at a New York clinic injected a nutrient solution through a dropper, Kerensky pulled out a needle from a vein. This struggle lasted two and a half months. In a sense, Kerensky’s death can be considered suicide ^[47] . Died June 11, 1970 at the New York hospital St. Luke's for arteriosclerosis ^[48] , after a fall involving fractures of the elbow, femoral neck, and shoulder dislocation ^[48] . Local Russian and Serbian Orthodox churches refused to funeral him, believing that the fall of the monarchy in Russia was the culprit ^[49] . The body was transported to London, where his son lived, and buried in Putney Vale Cemetery cemetery , which does not belong to any denomination.

•    Sister Elena Fedorovna Kerenskaya (1878 - 1938), a native of Kazan, a non-partisan surgeon at the Shuvalovo-Ozerkovsky dispensary, lived in Leningrad, st. Zhelyabova, d. 5, apt. 64. Arrested in 1922. Arrested a second time on March 5, 1935. On March 9, 1935, she was convicted by a special meeting of the NKVD of the USSR as a “socially dangerous element” for 5 years of exile. She served a term in Orenburg, a surgeon at the City Health Department. A special meeting at the NKVD of the USSR on May 16, 1935 allowed residence in the construction area of ​​Rybinsk-Uglich. Arrested on June 5, 1937. On February 2, 1938, she was sentenced to death by a visiting session of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court in Orenburg. Shot the same day in Orenburg.
•    The first wife (since 1904) is Olga L. Kerenskaya (in her childhood - Baranovskaya, 1884 - 1975), the daughter of a Russian general ^[50] .
•    Vladimir L. Baranovsky (1882-1931, brother of Olga Lvovna) - major general, worked at the military departments of Moscow universities. Repressed. He died in the camp .
•    Sons Oleg Alexandrovich and Gleb Alexandrovich Kerensky. Oleg Alexandrovich (1905 - 1984), bridge engineer. Under his leadership, many bridges were designed in the UK and other countries of the world, with his participation - the famous Harbor Bridge in Sydney and the suspension bridge over the Bosphorus Strait in Istanbul. For outstanding services, O. A. Kerensky was awarded the title of Commander of the British Empire . Since the mid-1980s, every two years at the British Institute of Structural Engineering, international scientific conferences have been held - the Kerensky Readings. Gleb Aleksandrovich (1907-1990) also worked as a civil engineer, but he did not achieve such grandiose successes as his elder brother.
•   grandson - Oleg Olegovich Kerensky (1930-1993) - writer, publicist, ballet and theater critic, author of The World of Ballet (1970), Anna Pavlova (1973), New British Drama (1977). He was a close friend of Rudolf Nuriev . In 1981, he starred as a grandfather in the American film " Reds ."
•   The second wife (since 1939) - Lydia (Teresa-Nell) Tritton (1899-1946). She worked as a Paris correspondent for a number of Australian publications. Helped A.F. Kerensky to publish the journalistic journal "New Russia" in France. Died of a serious cancer. Buried in Australia.

Kerensky was a socialist, but apparently loyal to the Orthodox Church. A. Kartashev , who was involved in religious politics under the Provisional Government, in November 1915 brought Kerensky to a meeting of the Petrograd religious and philosophical society , where Kerensky spoke about the need to reform the church, as “equality, freedom and fraternity ... not only Christian thinkers preach but socialist thinkers ” ^[51] .

The activities of Kerensky devoted to many scientific studies. So, in particular, well-known historians V.V. Shelokhaev and S.V. Tyutukin wrote about Kerensky, who revealed many aspects of the minister’s activities in the book “Kerensky. Pages of Political Biography” ^[52] .

• The famous haircut "beaver" Kerensky recommended to wear his young wife. "Beaver" he remained faithful to old age.
• When he first visited the Ministry of Justice in March 1917, Kerensky made a symbolic gesture - he offered his hand to the doorman. This act of his gave rise to many disapproving comments.
• 36-year-old Kerensky became the youngest non-hereditary ruler of Russia in the XX century. He also became the longest-living ruler of Russia (89 years); only Soviet statesman Vasily Vasilyevich Kuznetsov lived longer than Kerensky for 75 days (February 13 ( 26 ), 1901 - June 5, 1990), who served three times during 1982-1985 as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and was thus the nominal head Soviet state ^[53] .
• Kerensky’s money ^[54] and the political concept of Kerenshchina were named “in honor” of Kerensky, which, according to the Soviet explanatory dictionary of the Russian language, published in 1935 , meant “the politics of the petty-bourgeois revolutionary government, covering up its agreement with the big bourgeoisie with loud phrases” ^[55] .
• In May 1917, Kerensky, as Minister of War, visited the front and received from the soldiers and officers a 4th-degree cross engraved “From the 8th Zaamursky burial. infantry. regiment ”, but handed it to General A. A. Brusilov, because he did not fight at the front. Another cross (on a red ribbon; 2nd degree) Kerensky received from St. George cavaliers - delegates of the 3rd Caucasian Army Corps ; moreover, the cross was a stranger; it was donated to the defense fund by soldiers of D. A. Vinogradov. Both crosses are preserved. At the end of May 1917, delegates of the Siberian Rifle Regiments presented Kerensky with the 1st degree Cross of St. George ^[56] .

• Francis Chapin ( The Fall of the Romanoffs , USA, 1917)
• Henry Hull ( Rasputin, the Black Monk , Rasputin, the Black Monk , USA, 1917)
• H. L. Swisher ( The Legion of Death , The USA, 1918)
• Nikolai Popov ( October , 1927)
• Alexander Kovalevsky (" Lenin in October ", 1937)
• Vladimir Khomich (“ Baltic Glory ”, 1957)
• Yaroslav Gelyas ( Pravda , 1957)
• Sergey Kurilov (“ In the Days of the October Revolution ”, 1958)
• Nikita Podgorny ( "Aurora Volley" , 1965; " Syndicate-2 ", 1981)
• Mikhail Volkov (“ The Kotsyubinsky Family ”, 1970; “ The Collapse of the Empire ”, 1970)
• John Mackineri (" Nicholas and Alexandra " Nicholas and Alexandra , USA, 1971)
• Per Goldschmidt (“Lenin, Your Gift” Lenin, din gavtyv , Denmark, 1972)
• Jim Norton (“The Fall of the Eagles,” episode 12 “The Secret War” Fall of Eagles , episode 12 The Secret War , UK, 1974)
• Igor Dmitriev (“ Going through the agony ”, 1977)
• Oleg Kerensky ( Reds , USA, 1981)
• Bogdan Stupka (" Red Bells. Movie 2. I saw the birth of a new world ", 1983)
• Nikolay Kochegarov ( The White Horse , 1993)
• Mikhail Efremov (" Romanovs. Crowned Family ", 2000)
• Dmitry Scherbina (“ Star of the Empire ”, 2007)
• Victor Verzhbitsky ( Admiral , 2008)
• Alexey Shemes (" Mustafa Shokai ", 2008)
• Sergey Ugryumov (" Grigory R. ", 2014)
• Marat Basharov (The Battalion , 2015)
• Denis Sinyavsky ( Trotsky , 2017)
• Sergey Kunitsky ( Wings of the Empire , 2017)

• 1914 - 1915 - Zagorodny, 23 ^[57] .
• 1916 - 1917 - apartment building (Tverskaya street, 29) ^[58] .

• The Kornilov case. - M., 1918. - 194 p.
• Prelude to Bolshevism (1919)
• From far away a collection of articles. Russian book publishing Povolotsky
• Disaster (1927)
• The Doom of Freedom (1934)
• Kerensky A.F. Russia at a historic turn. Memoirs. . - M .: Republic, 1993 .-- 384 p.
• Kerensky A.F. Russian revolution. 1917. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2005.384 s.
• Kerensky A.F. The tragedy of the Romanov dynasty. M .: Tsentrpoligraf, 2005.207 p.
• History of Russia (1942-1944; Irkutsk, 1996)
• "Dictatorship over the Russian people," gas. The Day, 1930.

• Vladimirovich E.A.F. Kerensky - People's Minister . - Odessa: Book publishing house "The Power of the People" by M. I. Rudman, 1917. - 32 p.
• Boris Kolonitsky . "Comrade Kerensky": the anti-monarchist revolution and the formation of the cult of the "leader of the people" (March - June 1917). - M .: New Literary Review, 2017 .-- 520 p. - ISBN 978-5-4448-0638-8 .

• A.F. Kerensky Museum in London
• Alexander Kerensky - Heinrich Borovik talks about his interview with Kerensky // from the “Our Everything” series, Ekho Moskvy radio station
• Kerensky in 1917 - newsreels.
• A. F. Kerensky - biography
• Konstantin Mikhailovich Oberuchev. “In the days of the revolution. Commander of the district forces. ”
• Online version of the article by T. V. Kotyukova “Kerensky in Turkestan: the history of the everyday life of one family (myths and reality)” on the website of Ferghana.ru
• Interview Kerensky. Radio Canada 1964