Open individualism

Daniel Kolak begins the book “ I Am You: The Metaphysical Foundations for Global Ethics ” with the following words:

The central thesis of the book “I Am You” - that we are all one and the same person - may seem to many readers to be obviously false or even absurd. How can you be me, and Hitler, and Gandhi, and Jesus, and Buddha, and Greta Garbo, and all other people in the past, present and future? In this book, I explain how this is possible. In addition, I show that this is the best explanation of who we are for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that it provides a metaphysical basis for global ethics. Original text The central thesis of I Am You - that we are all the same person - is apt to strike many readers as obviously false or even absurd. How could you be me and Hitler and Gandhi and Jesus and Buddha and Greta Garbo and everybody else in the past, present and future? In this book I explain how this is possible. Moreover, I show that this is the best explanation of who we are for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it provides the metaphysical foundations for global ethics.

The fact that Hitler and Gandhi are one person can also be expressed as follows: Hitler’s life experience E1 at time T1 and Gandhi’s life experience E2 at time T2 belongs to the same subject in the same way as the same subject belongs to Hitler’s life experience E1 at time T1 and Hitler’s life experience E3 at time T3.

The Austrian theoretical physicist, Nobel laureate in physics Erwin Schrödinger as follows sets forth the basic idea of ​​open individualism: ^[3]

Philosopher Daniel Kolak identifies three views on the identity of a person: closed individualism, empty individualism and open individualism.

Closed individualism is the usual and most common view. In accordance with closed individualism, there are many numerically different personalities about whom the following assumptions can be made:

1. The assumption of a single continuous individual : a person is a single continuous individual in time.
2. Assumption of survival and identity : a person survives only as long as there is an individual who is identical to that person.
3. The assumption of internal properties : the identity of a person depends only on the properties of that person.
4. The assumption of individualization and separation of personalities : there are certain boundaries that separate one person from another.

Erwin Schrödinger describes the causes of closed individualism in the following words: ^[4]

Empty individualism is a view that denies at least the 2nd assumption (usually also the 1st and / or 3rd assumptions), but retains the 4th assumption of closed individualism. According to empty individualism, a person can survive without identity. Identity is not what matters for the survival of the individual, but other relationships (for example, physiological or psychological continuity, cause-effect relationship, etc.) are important. Famous representatives of empty individualism: Buddha , David Hume , Daniel Dennett , Robert Nozick , Derek Parfit , Sidney Shoemaker , Peter Anger .

In particular, Daniel Dennett, a representative of empty individualism, believes that there is no single governing body (subject) in the mind and all his work is a system of spontaneously self-organizing processes. Dennett considers one of the main philosophical myths, rooted in philosophy since the time of Descartes, the provision on the existence of "I" ^[5]

At the same time, the philosopher Derek Parfit came close to understanding open individualism, but did not develop his view: ^[6]

Open individualism denies the 4th assumption, but retains all other assumptions of closed individualism.

In the course of philosophical analysis, Kolak comes to the following conclusions:

1. Closed individualism is a logically contradictory view.
2. The argument against open individualism is not a good argument.
3. Our usual perception of ourselves is consistent with both empty individualism and open individualism (but not with closed individualism).
4. Open individualism preserves our deep intuitions.
5. Open individualism is more logically consistent than empty individualism.

The following is information from Daniel Kolak’s book, “I Am You: Metaphysical Foundations for Global Ethics”:

How can open individualism be true if it has so many obvious statements that preclude its possibility? The following is an initial list of some types of boundaries, each of which is an obvious “exclusionist” of open individualism, each “real” border described by a “neutral” (relatively closed against open individualism) language:

1. The border established by the fact of an exclusive connection (FES) . The obvious ability to control immediately certain boundaries directly in the experience with which the subject is connected, but not connected to others.

FES play a central role in our concept of ourselves as separately existing individuals.

To call the body sitting at the table in the room my body means to say that I can move parts of this body (arms, legs, etc.) without the need for any additional actions. When I put my hands on my chest and say: “This is me” and then point at you or a chair and say: “This is not me,” I mean that I can directly control these borders and I can’t control those.

Obviously, FES separates me from my liver, my blood, cell replacement, DNA division, etc. This simple observation already indicates that FES alone is not enough to draw boundaries between individuals.

However, there is a stronger argument. FES also takes place in a dream, but we do not believe that such a border separates me from not me. All I see in a dream is me. Consequently, FES is not a sufficient condition for the existence of other personalities.

2. The border established by the identification of other entities (IDS) . Some objects from which I am separated by FES (for example, you) are obviously themselves objects (for example, me) are individualized and identified as (other) subjects, exclusively connected.

Perhaps FES + IDS is the boundary for the separation of one person from another? After all, some objects separated from me by FES are perceived by me as subjects, as conscious beings.

No, again FES + IDS is not such a sufficient condition, because in a dream FES separates characters from me that I perceive as conscious. I can even imagine (although this is not necessary for open individualism) that other characters in the dream are conscious. However, it is obvious that they are me.

3. Physiological boundary : each person consists of numerically different physical material.

Perhaps two people are different personalities due to the fact that they are composed of numerically different matter (substantial physiological boundary). The atoms that make up one person are qualitatively identical to the atoms that make up another person, but they are still different atoms. But such an assertion is refuted by ordinary life, since in a few years the cellular and atomic composition of the human body changes completely. For example, “I am 29 years old” and “I am 5 years old” are composed entirely of other atoms, but we are one person.

A proponent of closed individualism may argue that a substantial physiological boundary is the boundary only between simultaneously existing physiologies. In fact, such a statement returns us to the already considered boundary of the FES. However, other arguments can be made. For example, you can imagine a journey back in time (the impossibility of such a journey has not been proved). In this case, for example, “I am 29 years old” and “I am 5 years old” exist simultaneously and consist of different atoms.

You can abandon the substantial boundary and replace it with the boundary of the continuity of the body. “I am 5 years old” and “I am 29 years old” are one person, as my body has changed continuously and gradually. But the criterion of continuity of the body can be easily relaxed to the criterion of continuity of the brain. If I transplant the heart, liver, kidneys of another person (this is clearly not a continuous change), then I will continue to exist. Intuition tells me that if my brain is transplanted into the skull of another person, then I will not die, but simply I will have a different body.

Consider the boundary of brain continuity. It is a fact that a person is able to survive the death or removal of one of the cerebral hemispheres. ^[7] Let us turn to the following thought experiment. We transplant one hemisphere of the brain into the body of another person (living, but with a dead brain). In this case, the continuity of the brain takes place in relation to two people. But one can imagine that both of these people are one person, that is, the same "I" will find itself, then in one, then in another body.

4. Spatial boundary : I, apparently, is located at any moment in only one spatial place.

5. Psychological border : people are distinguished by individuality, personality traits and memories, that is, human beings differ in their psychology.

6. The boundary of the stream of consciousness : at any moment in time, each concrete, simultaneously coexisting conscious person has a qualitatively different “stream of consciousness”.

Consider the thought experiment “Physics Exam”. Suppose I belong to that small number of people who have equally well developed right and left hemispheres of the brain. Therefore, I can write with both my left and right hands. The scientists provided me with a device that allows me to block the communication and transmission of information between the hemispheres of my brain, and also allows me to stop such blocking. The device turns on and off by pressing a button. I am sitting in front of a task in a physics exam and I see 2 possible ways of computing to solve this problem. I decide that the left hand will solve the problem in the 1st way, and the right hand in the 2nd way, and I turn on the device. In the “right-handed” stream of consciousness (that is, I control the movements of the right hand, but not the left), I recall that I have to solve the problem in the 2nd way, and begin to make calculations. I note that my left hand also writes something, but I don’t feel this hand and I don’t know what exactly it writes. I can only see what my left hand is writing in the same way as I can see what my neighbor is writing at the other table.

My “left-handed” stream of consciousness has the same experience.

Suppose the 2nd method of solving the problem turned out to be unsuccessful, and the 1st method was successful. In this case, the “left-handed” stream of consciousness feels pleasure from a successfully solved problem, and the “right-handed” stream of consciousness is upset.

Next, I turn off the device, and suddenly remember that I performed the calculations immediately in 2 ways. But were there two personalities, two "I" present during the exam? Such a position would look extremely strange and it can be argued that during the exam there was only one person, only one “I”, but with a divided consciousness.

Daniel Colac shows that the above boundaries, as well as some other boundaries, are not sufficient conditions for the existence of many personalities. These boundaries are not closed interpersonal boundaries , they are open borders within the same person .

Consider the dream as an illustration of the possibility of open individualism. Let you have a dream in which you (the "central" character) are talking with a "different" character. The “other” character looks conscious, and you perceive him as a conscious subject. Предположим, что он действительно сознателен (в данном случае не важно, действительно ли это так; это только предположение, хотя в поддержку такой позиции есть эмпирические свидетельства). Можно ли в этом случае поверить в то, что оба персонажа — это одна и та же личность, один и тот же «сновидец»? Очевидно, что это не только возможно, а это лучшее объяснение.

Утверждать, что существует только один субъект, — это утверждать, что реальная жизнь похожа на указанную выше иллюстрацию-сновидение. Можно предположить, что в примере со сновидением в существование одного субъекта легко поверить из-за того, что «сновидец» находится в прямом контакте с любым и каждым элементом сновидения, включая и двух сознательных персонажей, через нейрофизиологические связи. Однако такое возражение легко опровергнуть.

First of all, even a little thought reveals to us that it is quite easy to understand how neurophysiological elements are in direct physical contact with each other (through electrochemical connections, synapses, etc.), but still there is a problem in understanding how neurophysiology is located in direct physical contact with phenomenology - how the states of the brain are in direct physical contact with the states of the mind and vice versa. “The problem of the point of contact” is not only the problem of open individualism, this problem is unresolved and arises in any other view of personality identity.

Below are other illustrations viewed by proponents of open individualism. :

• A time travel in which you meet yourself at a different age.
• A disorder of a multiple personality (in this case, the word “personality” is used in the meaning of an independent psychological complex ( Eng. “Personality” ), and not of a personality as a subject ( Eng. “ Person ” )), in which you are all personalities (various psychological complexes) one man.
• Reincarnation or palingenesis back in time. Proponents of reincarnation may suggest that after death, reincarnation occurs not only in people of the future, but also in people of the past, and two incarnations of the same person can exist simultaneously.

Scientific concepts about copying and “transferring” consciousness and related problems were examined in detail by Stanislav Lem in the Sum of Technology ^[8] , his conclusions are directly opposite to the idea of ​​open individualism that appeared later.

• Indian religions
• World soul
• Paramatma
• Solipsism

• Monograph by Daniel Kolak "I Am You: The Metaphysical Foundations for Global Ethics"
• Daniel Kolak Doctoral dissertation "I Am You: A Philosophical Explanation of the Possibility That We Are All the Same Person"
• Article by Daniel Kolak “Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity” ( Abstract )
• Gordon Cornwall's article “Kolak: I Am You”

• The Third Hypothesis Website - The Third Hypothesis
• Schrödinger E. “My Worldview”
• Kaminsky A. Introduction to the physics of consciousness
• Kaminsky A.V. Physics of Personal Identity
• Kotlyarenko V. S. “Why and how to go to the concept of the phenomenon of eternal life”