Znamenskaya operation

At the first stage of the Nizhnedneprovsk strategic operation - the Pyatikhatsky operation - the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front broke through the German defenses at the junction of the German 1st Tank Army (Commander-in-Chief Cavalry General Ebergard von Mackensen ) and the 8th Army (Commander-General of the Infantry Otto Veler ) of Army Group “ South ” (commander of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein ) and advanced to Krivoy Rog almost 100 kilometers from the Dnieper . The German command managed to localize this breakthrough and stop the Soviet offensive at Krivoi Rog, but the wedge that threatened the enemy remained. The Supreme Command headquarters urged the front commander, General of the Army I. S. Konev, to resume the attack on Krivoy Rog and at the same time expand the bridgehead occupied in the direction of Znamenka - Kirovograd , capturing both of these cities. Here the Soviet troops had to attack in the general direction to the north-west, almost parallel to the Dnieper.

The 7th Guards Army (Commander General M.S. Shumilov ), the 57th Army (Commander General N.A. Hagen ), the 37th Army (Commander M.N. Sharokhin ), part of the forces The 53rd Army (commander I. M. Managarov ) and the 5th Guards Tank Army (commander Colonel-General of Tank Forces P. A. Rotmistrov ). The main forces of the 53rd Army and the 5th Guards Army (commander General A.S. Zhadov ) were on the Znamensky sector. Approximately 100 kilometers north-west in the Cherkasy region, the 52nd Army (commanded by Lieutenant-General KA Koroteev ), which captured on November 13 a small bridgehead in the Cherkassy region. From Kremenchug to Cherkasy along the eastern bank of the Dnieper , the 4th Guards Army (Commander, Lieutenant-General I.V. Galanin ) defended. Since the front-line armies had been carrying out heavy offensive battles for 4 months and had a significant shortage of personnel and armaments, I. S. Konev made a bold decision: assessing that after the start of a new offensive, the German command would not be able to force the Dnieper, an army from a defensive position on the eastern bank of the Dnieper and transfer it to the western bank, placing it in the direction of the main attack in the Znamensky direction.

By the beginning of November 1943, the 8th German Army and part of the forces of the 1st German Tank Army defended in front of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, a total of 14 infantry, 6 tank, one mechanized division and 6 combat groups formed from the remnants of previously defeated infantry and tank divisions. The 3rd, 47th Panzer and 11th Army Corps of the 8th Army (8 infantry, 1st tank divisions) operated on the Znamensky direction from these forces.

November 20, 1943, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front launched an offensive. Since they had repeatedly tried to achieve success in the Dnipropetrovsk and Krivoy Rog directions before, the enemy expected our blow there and put up stubborn resistance. The fighting took a protracted nature and brought great losses with a slight advance (8 - 10 kilometers). At the same time, the strike in the direction of Znamenka and the introduction of a relatively well-equipped fresh army into the battle turned out to be unexpected for the German command. Under these conditions, Konev suggested that the main efforts be concentrated in the direction of Alexandria and Znamenka, defeating the enemy grouping in the area of ​​Alexandria, Znamenka, Chigirin and advancing on Kirovograd . In order to achieve decisive success, on his order, the 5th Guards Tank Army (2 tank and 2 mechanized corps) was withdrawn from the battle in the Krivoi Rog direction and transferred by a forced march (almost 100 kilometers in two days) to the standard direction.

The resumption of the offensive was scheduled for November 12 , but postponed due to the bad weather and began on November 14 . It immediately became apparent that the German command was also able to use the breathing space and strengthened its defenses in the standard direction. Although every day the enemy was able to push for several kilometers, it was not possible to achieve a breakthrough of his front. For this reason, Konev postponed the entry into battle of the tank army and made it only on 23 November . But the army, seriously weakened in previous battles, also failed to achieve a decisive break. Strong daily counter-attacks of the enemy did not cease.

November 25 marked the success of the actions of the 5th Guards Tank Army - it managed to make significant progress, bypassing Znamenka from the west. One tank brigade broke through the front line and went into a deep raid (40 kilometers) through the German rear. Connecting with significant partisan forces operating in local forests, she paralyzed the roads leading from Znamenka to the west. There were defeated several columns of German troops. Then the tankers with the landing of partisans on armor captured an important enemy stronghold in one of the villages along the paths of the enemy’s reserves and kept him until December 1 , when the advancing Soviet troops approached him. These actions contributed to the weakening of the enemy defenses.

From December 3 to December 6, the Soviet troops of the 7th Guards Army conducted heavy assault battles for the liberation of the city of Alexandria , on December 5, two tank corps broke through to the southern outskirts of Znamenka . The battle for this industrial city with a large railway junction lasted from December 6 to December 9 and was of an extremely stubborn nature. Many quarters and industrial facilities changed hands several times. Every day, the enemy took up to 10 counterattacks . With the approach of infantry units, the 53rd Army and the 4th Guards Army joined the battle for Znamenka, and a partisan formation under the command of I. D. Dibrova was attacked from the rear (5 detachments of a total of 3,000 men). Only by the evening of December 9, Znamenka was completely liberated. In the battles for the city were destroyed up to 1,500 Nazis and 23 German tanks . The Soviet command attached great importance to the taking of this most important communications hub in Right-Bank Ukraine . In honor of her release, an artillery salute was given in Moscow , and immediately 18 units and formations received the honorary title “Znamensky”.

After the capture of Znamenka, Soviet troops continued to develop the offensive on the Kirovograd area and by December 12 reached the distant approaches to it, engulfing a powerful grouping defending the city from three sides. But there a powerful defensive line was already prepared and it became obvious that it would not be possible to break through without serious preparation. Having led up to three tank divisions into battle in this direction, the German command managed to stop the Soviet offensive. On the approaches to Kirovograd from December 16 to December 23, fierce battles of immense tension were fought, in which both sides suffered heavy losses.

At the same time, the Soviet command tried to use the fact that the Germans had transferred a large number of their troops from under Krivoy Rog to Znamenka and once again tried to seize this city with the use of a long roundabout maneuver. But this time from 10 to 19 December, the Germans stopped the Soviet offensive.

On the Dnieper direction, the Soviet troops acted more successfully. Having advanced almost 50 kilometers, on December 12 , the troops of the 4th Guards Army liberated the town of Chigirin , and on the following days they completely cleared the enemy from the entire west bank of the Dnieper in the front line. On the extreme right flank of the front, the 52nd Army stormed the city of Cherkassy , from November 13 to December 14 , stopped in a powerful defensive node, and then united with the 4th Guards Army.

In the course of the Znamenskaya operation, the troops of the left flank of the 2nd Ukrainian Front advanced over 100 kilometers to the north-west and significantly extended in this direction the protrusion into the depth of the positions of Army Group South . The Soviet bridgehead south of Kremenchug was turned into the second strategic bridgehead on the Dnieper (after Kiev), favorable conditions were created for the rapid liberation of Right-Bank Ukraine. The fierce resistance of the German troops did not allow the Soviet troops to fully realize the plans of the Znamenskaya and the Pyatikhat operations preceding it. However, it was precisely in these difficult battles that the troops of Army Group South had suffered heavy losses, which caused its defeat in the Dnieper-Carpathian operation in the first months of 1944 .

The losses of the Soviet troops were also very high. The exact losses of the Soviet troops in the Znamenskaya operation are unknown, but according to G.F. Krivosheev, from October 1 to December 20 the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front lost 303,617 people, of which 77,400 people were irretrievable, 226,217 people lost sanitary losses. Since during this period the front was led only by the following hostilities: the struggle to expand the Dnieper bridgeheads, the Pyatikhat operation and the Znamenskaya operation — the losses in each of these operations, including in Znamenskaya, constitute a very significant part of this figure (supposedly about 100 thousands of people).

• http://pretich2005.narod.ru/map-war/war-vov/krivorog-d.htm Konev I.S. Notes of the front commander. M.: Military Publishing House, 1991. - p. 67: map of Pyatikhatskaya and Znamenskaya operations).
• Russian archive. Great Patriotic War, 1943. Volume 5 (3). - M: "TERRA", 1999. - Documents 371, 372, 375, 397, 401.
• Manstein, E. Lost victories.
• Memories of the liberation of Kirovohrad region (materials, articles, stories) Publication of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Kirovograd Regional Committee of the CP (B) U. 1945 (Publication on the website of the Regional Kirovograd Universal Scientific Library named after Chizhevsky.).
• The liberation of cities.
• Collection of military historical materials of the Great Patriotic War. Issue 12. - M .: Military Publishing, 1953 .
• Roads wins. (Fighting path of the 5th Guards Tank Army.) - Moscow: Voenizdat, 1969. - 352 pp. - 30,000 copies. / Before the title author: P. Ya. Egorov, I. V. Krivoborsky, I. K. Ivlev, A. I. Rogalevich .