Tula offensive operation

In October – December 1941, for 43 days, the key strategic defense center of the city of Tula was in a semi-environment, was subjected to artillery and mortar shelling, Luftwaffe air raids and tank attacks. However, the front line on the southern approaches to Moscow was stabilized. The retention of the city of Tula ensured the stability of the left flank of the Western Front, pulling out all the forces of the 4th Wehrmacht field army and foiling plans to bypass Moscow from the east with the 2nd Panzer Army. During the second general offensive of the German troops November 18 - December 5, despite some successes, they also failed to make a breakthrough to Moscow in a southerly direction and fulfill the tasks assigned to them.

On December 5, 1941, the German 2nd Panzer Army , scattered along the front for 350 km, received an order to go on the defensive. Having exhausted their offensive capabilities, units of the 2nd Panzer Army began to withdraw from the ledge, dangerous for it, formed north-east of Tula, to the Tula-Uzlovaya railway line, the Don River ^[1] .

After the activity of German troops in the Tula direction subsided on December 6, the Soviet troops, having received reinforcement, launched a counterattack. The purpose of the operation was to defeat the strike force of the German troops operating in the Tula direction and to eliminate the threat of bypassing Moscow from the south.

The offensive of the 10th army of F. I. Golikov began on the night of December 7 with a joint attack by the military units of the 328th Infantry Division (Colonel P. A. Eremin ) and the 330th Infantry Division in the direction of Mikhailov , which was after a night battle to freed in the morning. This success was a signal to the beginning of the counterattack of the 50th Army of I.V. Boldin .

According to the magazine of military operations, the 328th Infantry Division liberated the city. However, it so happened that the horse signalman sent to the division headquarters with a report on the capture of the city did not find the division headquarters, and the report returned. At this time, the 330th division on the radio reported to the army headquarters about the capture of the city, supposedly only by its units. This subsequently affected the accuracy of coverage of events outside the city of Mikhailov ^{[2] [3]}

During December 8-10, the forces of the 10th Army advanced more than 70 kilometers with battle. They began to approach the Don . By the end of the 10th, the 50th Army advanced south to a depth of 4-16 km. The 50th Army was weakened by previous defensive battles, in addition, the tightly knocked down formations of the shock group of the 24th German motorized corps offered fierce resistance. Therefore, units of the army were unable to take possession of the areas designated by it in a timely manner and cut off the escape routes for units of the 2nd Guderian Tank Army , which were retreating from the Venev - Mikhailov area .

On December 9, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps of P. A. Belov, together with the 9th Tank Brigade, liberated Venev, and by December 10, his advanced units were on the outskirts of Stalinogorsk (now Novomoskovsk ). Despite the relatively high rate of advance of the forces of the 10th Army (10-12 kilometers per day), it was clearly insufficient to surround the Wehrmacht group, retreating from the Venev and Tula regions. This was explained by several factors, for example, insufficient attention to bypassing and reaching German strongholds. So, the 328th Infantry Division tried to recapture the village of Gremyachey from the Germans on December 9 (24 km southwest of Mikhailov). And only in the evening did Soviet forces go around the enemy stronghold from north and south, after which the Germans' resistance was broken. The front command repeatedly pointed out this flaw to Commander F. I. Golikov. On December 10-11, units of the 10th Army got stuck in the battles for Epifan and Stalinogorsk, where the Germans offered fierce resistance.

At the same time, it should be noted such an objective factor as the lack of mobile units in the 10th army. The army did not have powerful cavalry, tank and motorized to successfully conduct operations on the environment. The 10th army had 57th and 75th cavalry divisions, but they were few in number and were used mainly as flank cover at the junction with the neighbor on the left. And parts of the 1st Guards Corps went on the offensive from their defensive orders. There was no opportunity to transfer formations of the cavalry corps to form a mobile group in the 10th Army. The cavalry corps had to overcome the stubborn resistance of the Guderian army, which was withdrawing from Venev. Therefore, parts of P. A. Belov traveled 100-120 km during the operation (that is, the average pace is only 8-10 km per day, which is very small for cavalrymen). Of course, the ideal solution would be to change the cavalry corps of Belov to rifle divisions, and to introduce parts of the corps into the breakthrough of the 10th army on the Mikhailov-Stalinogorsk line.

By December 14, the forces of the left wing of the 49th Army, Lieutenant General I.G. Zakharkin , also joined the counteroffensive. Before the offensive, the 49th Army received four fresh rifle brigades (19th, 26th, 30th and 34th). In addition to new formations, the 133rd Infantry Division from the 1st Shock Army was transferred to Zakharkin’s army . For 3 days of the battle, units of the 49th Army traveled 10–20 km, liberating the city of Aleksin and were able to seize bridgeheads on the left bank of the Oka River, north of Tarusa and at Aleksin.

The 50th army of Boldin was slowest than anyone else, since the German command did everything to keep the Shchekino area behind and thereby prevented Soviet troops from accessing the Tula- Orel highway and saving their troops from possible encirclement. Only on December 17 were units of the 50th Army able to recapture Shchekino. But the Germans by this time were already able to withdraw their formations from the area northeast of Shchekin, Uzlovaya , Lomovki to the southwest. For ten days of the operation, the Fifth Army advanced 25-30 kilometers, thus, the rate of its advance was no more than 2.5-3 kilometers per day.

As a result of the left flank of the Western Front of the Tula offensive operation, the Red Army eliminated the threat of encircling Moscow from the south. German troops were forced to retreat 130 kilometers to the west. In addition, the Tula offensive operation is interesting in that it was carried out without an operational pause . Soviet troops went on a general offensive after a difficult defensive battle and in the same direction. This gave the offensive some features: the Belarussian cavalry corps was used not as a shock fist to develop success, but as a link between the 10th and 50th armies, the corps had its own offensive zone. Despite the fact that parts of the German 2nd Panzer Army managed to break out of the "bag" formed east of Tula, they had to throw a lot of equipment. The Tula operation created opportunities for the further development of the offensive in this direction, towards Kaluga and Sukhinichi . Therefore, the Tula direction in the end became one of the most promising for the Soviet supreme command.

As a result of hostilities and the implementation of the policy of total war, German troops inflicted great social and economic damage on the Tula region: 19 164 collective farm yards were burned in 25 districts of the region, 316 villages were completely burned and destroyed, the cities of Epifan , Venev , Bogoroditsk and Chern were almost completely destroyed , 299 schools were destroyed and burned in 27 districts of the region ^[4] . Mass executions and extermination of the local population in various ways took place.

• The battle of Tula. Collection of documents and materials, 4th edition, Tula, 1969
• Klimov I. D. Heroic defense of Tula. (The defensive operation of the troops of the 50th Army, October — December 1941). M .: 1961
• Brezhnev L.I. An outstanding feat of the defenders of Tula. M., 1977
• The history of the second world war. 1939-1945. T. 4.M., 1975, p. 101, 107-108
• The defeat of Nazi troops near Moscow, M., 1964;
• Nuriev D. 3. The failure of the operation "Typhoon". Ed. 2nd. M., 1972, p. 121-143
• Elkin A.A. 50 days of courage. Tula, 1976
• Malygin A.N. Working Tula fights. M., 1974

Memoirs

• They defended Tula. Memoirs and Essays, 2nd Edition, Tula, 1965
• From Cheboksary to Koenigsberg: Episodes of the military route of the 324th Verkhnedneprov. Krasnoznam. Infantry Division / N.V. Radaev, P.S. Moglov, 140 p., Cheboksary Chuvash. Prince publishing house, 1988
• Guderian G. Impact on Tula and Moscow // Memoirs of a soldier . - M .: Military ed. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1954.

• Act of the Commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences on Nazi crimes in Yasnaya Polyana. December 27, 1941. TsGAOOR USSR, f. 7021, op. 47, d.371, l. 15-18.
• Report of the Tula city executive committee to the regional executive committee on the damage caused by the fascist invaders to the city economy and institutions of Tula. Not earlier than January 1, 1942. TOPA, f. 3039, op. 1, d. 7, l. 108-118.
• From the report of the Tula regional commission on accounting for the damage caused by the Nazi invaders to collective farms, state, cooperative and public enterprises, institutions and organizations of the Tula region, to the emergency state commission on the identification and investigation of the crimes of the Nazi invaders. 1944. TsGAOOR USSR, f. 7021, op. 47, d.375, l. 1 - 21.
• Decree on awarding the city of Tula the title City of Hero. December 3, 1966.

• Stopped near Tula. Soyuzkinoservice. Directors: Vadim Tsalikov, Vadim Gladyshev. 2002.
• Tula border.
• In the Tula direction. 1941.

• According to the materials of the Soviet military encyclopedia in the 8th volume, v. 8.
• Tula offensive operation on the site serpukhov.su
• Fighting of tank units on the left flank of the Western Front (unopened) (inaccessible link) . Date of treatment August 23, 2011. Archived March 17, 2012.