Chernihiv-Poltava strategic offensive operation

(See also Battle of Kursk § Offensive from the top of the Kursk ledge )

According to the directives of the Supreme High Command Headquarters , received during the Battle of Kursk , the Red Army forces had to launch an offensive at the front from Velikiye Luki to the Sea of ​​Azov . The central , Voronezh , Stepnoy , Southwestern and Southern fronts had the task of defeating the main enemy forces on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, liberating the Left-Bank Ukraine and the Donbass , going to the Dnieper , forcing it and seizing bridgeheads on the right bank of the river, creating conditions for liberation Right-bank Ukraine . The South-Western and Southern Fronts began to fulfill the tasks assigned to them on August 13 , starting the Donbass operation (some researchers also consider it an integral part of the Battle of the Dnieper, official history considers it an independent strategic operation). The remaining three fronts were to fulfill their tasks at the front from Cherkasy to Poltava . The unified plan of the operation consisted of delivering several powerful strikes simultaneously by forces of three fronts at the same time with the aim of dissecting the German defense and preventing the enemy from securing along the borders of the Desna and Dnieper rivers .

The preparation of the Soviet troops for the offensive took place in difficult conditions, in the shortest possible time after a month and a half of continuous battles in the Kursk. The troops broke away at a great distance from their supply bases, having spent most of their materiel. The railway network was just being restored, the supply was carried out mainly by vehicles, which was not enough. The strength was the high morale of Soviet soldiers who felt a taste for victories. It was also possible, on the whole, to secretly regroup the troops, which made the power of the Soviet offensive unexpected for the German command.

After the defeat near Kursk, the Wehrmacht ’s High Command decided to go over to the defense on the entire Eastern Front and to hold on to the occupied lines firmly. At the same time, new defensive lines along large rivers were hastily prepared, the Dnieper was given special importance. According to the German command, the Dnieper was to become an insurmountable barrier for the Red Army, in German propaganda it was referred to as the impregnable "East Wall" . However, the German army began to equip this line with a great delay.

USSR

Central Front (commander of the Army General K.K. Rokossovsky ):

• 65th Army (Lieutenant General P.I. Batov )
• 2nd Panzer Army (Lieutenant General A. G. Rodin )
• 60th Army (Lieutenant General I. D. Chernyakhovsky )
• 13th Army (Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov )
• 61st Army (from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters on September 6, Lieutenant General P. A. Belov )
• 48th Army (Commander Lieutenant General P.L. Romanenko )
• 70th Army (September 1 was withdrawn to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Major General V. M. Sharapov )
• 9th tank corps
• 16th Air Army (Lieutenant General of Aviation S. I. Rudenko )

There were 579,600 people.

Voronezh Front (Commander-in- Chief of the Army N.F. Vatutin ):

• 38th Army (Lieutenant General N.E. Chibisov )
• 40th Army (Lieutenant General K. S. Moskalenko )
• 3rd Guards Tank Army (Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko )
• 5th Guards Army (until September 6, General A. S. Zhadov )
• 47th Army (General F.F. Zhmachenko )
• 27th Army (General S. G. Trofimenko )
• 52nd Army (General K.A. Koroteev )
• 4th Guards Army (Lieutenant General A. I. Zygin , from September 27, Lieutenant General I. V. Galanin )
• 6th Guards Army (General I. M. Chistyakov )
• 1st Panzer Army (from September 9 in the reserve of the Supreme High Command, Lieutenant General of Tank Troops M.E. Katukov )
• 4th Guards Tank Corps
• 1st Guards Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General V.K. Baranov )
• 2nd Air Army (Lieutenant General of Aviation S. A. Krasovsky )

There were 665,500 people.

Steppe Front (commander of the army general I. S. Konev ):

• 37th Army (September 6 from the Headquarters reserve, General M.N. Sharokhin )
• 5th Guards Army (received September 6 from the Voronezh Front, General A. S. Zhadov )
• 7th Guards Army (General M.S. Shumilov )
• 46th Army (received September 6 from the Southwestern Front, General V.V. Glagolev )
• 53rd Army (General I.M. Managarov )
• 69th Army (General V.D. Kryuchenkin )
• 5th Air Army (lieutenant general of aviation S.K. Goryunov )

It counted 336,200 people.

In total, the three fronts included 1,581,300 people, 30,300 guns and mortars , 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns , 690 rocket launchers , 1,450 aircraft . The actions of the Soviet fronts were coordinated by the representative of the General Headquarters, Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov .

Germany

• Army Group Center (commander Field Marshal Gunter Hans von Kluge ):
• 2nd Field Army (Commander of the Infantry General Walter Weiss )
• part of the forces of the 2nd Air Fleet (Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen )
• Army Group “South” (Field Marshal Erich von Manstein ):
• 4th Panzer Army ( Colonel General Gotthard Heinrici )
• 1st Panzer Army (cavalry general Eberhard von Mackensen )
• 8th Field Army (Infantry General Otto Veler )
• 6th Field Army (Colonel General Karl-Adolf Hollidt )
• 4th Air Fleet (Colonel General Otto Dessloch )

In total, they included 38 divisions, of which 8 were tank and 2 motorized. They had 700,000 soldiers and officers, 7,200 guns and mortars, 1,200 tanks and assault guns, and over 900 aircraft.

The general superiority of forces was on the side of the Red Army . Soviet troops exceeded the enemy by 2.1 times in personnel, by 1.4 times in aircraft, by 4 times in guns and mortars, and forces were equal in tanks.

During the battle, both sides continuously increased their strength. So, the Soviet side brought into battle a mechanized corps, 2 cavalry corps, 14 divisions and 5 brigades, the German side - 27 divisions, including 5 armored and 1 motorized.

On August 26, the troops of the Central Front went on the offensive (known as the Chernihiv-Pripyat operation ), striking the main blow with the forces of the 65th Army in the Novgorod-North direction, with the further task of breaking through to Konotop , Nezhin , Kiev . The enemy put up stubborn resistance, taking 12 counterattacks on the first day of the offensive. The advance of the Soviet troops was slow. On August 27, the 2nd Panzer Army was introduced into the battle, which was able to liberate the city of Sevsk , but was stopped at the next line of defense. By August 31, the advance was 20 - 25 kilometers; attempts to develop success here did not yield results.

On the other hand, in the direction of the auxiliary strike of the Central Front, the troops of the 60th Army quickly broke through the enemy’s defenses and advanced to a depth of 60 kilometers by the end of August 31, expanding the breakthrough to 100 kilometers along the front. The front of the German troops turned out to be divided, the army entered the operational space, on August 30 it liberated the city of Glukhov , on August 31 - the city of Rylsk . KK Rokossovsky, who immediately flew to the breakthrough site, immediately began to regroup the main forces of his front into the success zone, where he sent the 13th Army , the 2nd Tank Army, the 9th Panzer Corps, the 4th Artillery Corps and the main aviation forces. After these forces entered the battle at the breakthrough site, the enemy front of the 2nd Field Army completely collapsed. Rokossovsky’s armies were advancing at an unprecedented pace - 30-50 kilometers per day. On September 3, they immediately crossed the Seim river and captured Konotop .

The Wehrmacht command introduced an additional two tank and three infantry divisions , separate units and large aviation forces into the battle against the Central Front . However, the simultaneous and unprepared introduction of these forces into battle did not give the expected effect - the Soviet troops smashed them in parts, using deep detours and flanking attacks.

The Voronezh Front , which carried out the Sumy-Pryluk operation , was not so effective, advanced 30 kilometers by August 31 and occupied the city of Sumy on September 2 . However, the left flank of the opposing German troops was deeply embraced by the forces of the Central Front and, fearing the Soviet troops would return to their rear, the German command began a hasty withdrawal of its troops.

The pace of advance of the troops of the Steppe Front was even slower, only on September 4, after fierce fighting, they captured the city of Merefa - an important road junction on the way to the Dnieper .

On September 6, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command set new tasks for all three fronts. The Voronezh Front received orders to advance on Kiev and was reinforced by the 3rd Guards Tank Army from the Headquarters reserve. The central front was redirected from the Kiev direction to Gomel , having received a combined arms army and cavalry corps. The steppe front was aiming at Poltava and Kremenchug; three armies were handed over to him at once.

The Soviet offensive continued. By September 7, the Central Front advanced 180 kilometers to the south-west, went on a wide front to the Desna and immediately crossed it. The Voronezh Front concentrated on its right wing an attack force consisting of a tank and two combined arms armies, three tank and cavalry corps. However, this relocation reduced the already not too high rates of advance of the front. The gap between the Voronezh and Central Fronts continued to widen. The steppe front fought stubborn battles on the outskirts of Poltava , which the enemy turned into a powerful defensive area. However, north and south of Poltava, the army of the front far went around the flanks of the Poltava group and sought to the Dnieper. The Soviet command also made every effort to forestall German troops in accessing the Dnieper. The headquarters ordered all the commanders of the fronts to form mobile units in each army, collect all available tanks and vehicles for them, and quickly leave for the Dnieper, bypassing the fortified areas and settlements. The German command came to the conclusion that it was impossible to keep the onslaught of the Soviet troops on the approaches to the Dnieper and on September 15 ordered its troops to urgently leave the battle, under the guise of strong rearguards, quickly move to the Dnieper and occupy the East Wall fortifications to prevent the Soviet forces from crossing the Dnieper. In the same place, another 12 divisions, deployed from the reserve, from Europe and from the Army Group Army Center , quickly defended their defenses. Subsequent events in historical literature are often referred to as "running to the Dnieper."

The first to win was the “Run to the Dnieper” Central Front . From September 7 to September 15, his troops swiftly marched over 200 kilometers in continuous battles and liberated the city of Nizhyn on September 15, and Novgorod-Seversky on September 16. The enemy’s attempt to stop the troops of the front along the Desna River was thwarted. In the following days, Rokossovsky’s army marched another 100 kilometers with battle. On September 21, the 13th Army liberated Chernihiv - the most important support unit of German troops 40 kilometers from the Dnieper. By September 10, the south-right wing of the Voronezh Front had broken the stubborn resistance of the enemy near the city of Romny , on September 13, the Sula River was boosted and the city of Lokhvitsa was liberated. On the left flank of Voronezh and on the Steppe Front, the German command at the cost of heavy losses restrained the onslaught of the Soviet troops, but even there all the defensive capabilities of the enemy were exhausted. An important role in disrupting the German defense was played by the Soviet partisans , who began in September 1943 the large-scale operation "Concert" to disrupt enemy communications.

On September 21, the frontal units of the left wing of the Central Front ( 13th Army ) north of Kiev , near the mouth of Pripyat , were the first to enter the Dnieper. Since by this time on the western bank of the Dnieper there were scattered remnants of German units, the front commander ordered the river to be crossed on the move, without personnel crossing facilities and reinforcements, with a small amount of ammunition. Pulling all of this and the approach of the main forces took time, during which the enemy could manage to organize a strong defense. Therefore, the only right decision under such conditions was to force the Dnieper on the move. A little later, on September 25, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued a similar order, demanding with the withdrawal of armies to the Dnieper "to immediately force it on a wide front in order to disperse the attention and strength of the enemy." On September 22, the troops of the Central Front captured the first Dnieper bridgehead 25 kilometers along the front and from 2 to 10 kilometers in depth, and the next day they crossed the Dnieper and Pripyat rivers and captured the bridgehead on the Pripyat south of Chernobyl . The beginning of the crossing of the Dnieper was laid. For this victory, several thousand soldiers of the 13th Army were awarded orders, and over 200 soldiers and officers, as well as the commander of the army , N.P. Pukhov, were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union .

On September 19, the commander of the Voronezh Front, N. F. Vatutin, received evidence that the enemy’s resistance in the offensive zone of his front had sharply weakened. He urgently created a mobile front group consisting of the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps , which on September 20 went on the offensive from the Romny area in the direction of Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky , moving in a strip of up to 70 kilometers. Vanguard detached from the main forces to 40 kilometers. Having traveled 75 kilometers a day, on the night of September 22, the troops of the front mobile group reached the Dnieper in the areas of Rzhishchev and Veliky Bukrin and, on the same night, with the help of partisans crossed the Dnieper in the Bukrin bend. On the same day, reached the Dnieper in the region of Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky, the advanced detachment of the 40th army. In the area of ​​Veliky Bukrin, extremely stubborn and extremely fierce battles ensued at the Bukrin bridgehead . At the end of September, the 38th Army occupied the Lyutezhsky bridgehead north of Kiev.

By September 20, the troops of the Steppe Front fought another 70 to 120 kilometers east of the Dnieper. Only on September 23, Poltava was stormed. After that, the “run to the Dnieper” in the Kremenchug and Dneprodzerzhinsk directions also began in the front line. On September 25, the first units of the front reached the banks of the Dnieper and that night captured the first bridgehead northwest of Verkhnedneprovsk . From September 28 to September 30, the forces of the 5th Guards and 53rd Armies eliminated the enemy’s previously fortified Kremenchug bridgehead, the troops of the front went all the way to the Dnieper.

With the widespread withdrawal of Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the Dnieper and forcing it on the move with all three fronts, the Chernihiv-Poltava operation is considered to be completed on September 30. On this day, according to the directive of the Stavka, all three fronts began to solve the problem of retaining occupied bridgeheads with the cancellation of previously obtained offensive plans. In total, by September 30, Soviet troops had captured 21 bridgeheads: 7 on the Central Front, 9 on the Voronezh Front and 5 on the Steppe Front. Fierce battles began on captured bridgeheads, which lasted all of October.

Despite all the difficulties and quite numerous shortcomings, the Chernihiv-Poltava operation was the most ambitious offensive operation of the Red Army after the Soviet offensive near Stalingrad . Three Soviet fronts in a strip of more than 700 kilometers advanced west from 250 to 300 kilometers in just a month of fighting. The pace of offensive in places was up to 30 kilometers per day. Important economic areas with tens of millions of people were freed. The German command underestimated the power of the Red Army and the increased level of skill of the Soviet military leaders, being not ready for a decisive deep blow of three Soviet fronts on the Dnieper at once.

A characteristic feature of the battles for bridgeheads is the forcing of the Dnieper on improvised means due to the lag and acute shortage of personnel crossing facilities. Lack of aviation support was felt everywhere - Soviet aviation did not have time to relocate to new airfields in a timely manner. "Run to the Dnieper" was generally won by the enemy due to the higher mobility of the German troops and the acute shortage of tanks in the Red Army - all Soviet tank armies after the Battle of Kursk were reorganized due to heavy losses, with great difficulty the Headquarters was able to enter only one 3- South Guards Tank Army, and the one with a significant understatement of tanks and vehicles. Of the three fronts, only the Central Front of Rokossovsky was able to fulfill the task of dissecting the opposing German troops, the Voronezh and Stepnoy fronts attacked mainly due to frontal pushing of the enemy. During the withdrawal of their troops, the German command steadily carried out barbaric tactics of “scorched earth” , which also negatively affected the pace of the advance of the Soviet troops. Hijacking and extermination of the civilian population were widespread.

The next stage of the battle for the Dnieper began - the struggle for the retention and expansion of occupied bridgeheads. A large number of bridgeheads did not allow the German command to concentrate its forces on their destruction. But their small area and the crossing of the Dnieper without means of reinforcement and tanks forced the Soviet troops to engage in long bloody battles to hold and expand the bridgeheads. An attempt by Stavka to assist the Voronezh Front in the struggle for bridgeheads with an airborne assault on September 24 during the Dnieper airborne operation ended in failure and heavy losses of the paratroopers. The rate plan before the winter to liberate the Right-Bank Ukraine was frustrated. The success in crossing the Dnieper was nevertheless achieved to a greater extent thanks to the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers than to the tactical interaction of the combat arms and their use on the battlefield.

The victory was achieved at a high price: the irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 102 957 people, sanitary - 324 995 people (total - 427 952 people), as well as 916 guns and mortars, 1140 tanks, 269 aircraft. German casualties amounted to about 321,000 people killed, wounded and captured.

• Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War, 1943. Volume 5 (3). - M: "TERRA", 1999. - Documents 303, 311, 312, 320, 322, 331, 332, 334, annex - documents 37, 38.
• Gurkin V.V. Liberation of Left-Bank Ukraine: Chernihiv-Poltava Strategic Offensive Operation (August 26 - September 30, 1943) // Military History Journal. - 2002. - No. 1. - S.12-17.
• Shein D.V. Tanks is Rybalko. The combat path of the 3rd Guards Tank Army. - M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2007
• Konev I. S. Notes of the front commander. The chapter "Battle for the Dnieper."
• Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier's duty. The chapter "Cast for the Dnieper."

• Chernihiv-Poltava operation on the BDSA.ru website