Luxembourg Crisis

The city of Luxembourg possessed the most impressive fortifications in Europe, the plan of which was developed by the famous engineer Vauban ; Because of these fortifications, it was called the “Gibraltar of the North”. In 1815, the Congress of Vienna decided that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg would be in personal union with the Kingdom of the Netherlands . Having made a concession to Prussia, the Congress also decided that Luxembourg would join the German Alliance , and several thousand Prussian soldiers would be placed there. The Belgian revolution divided Luxembourg into Belgian and Dutch parts, and there was a threat to Dutch domination even in the rest of the Netherlands. In order to counterbalance the Belgian and French influences, Wilhelm I decided to join Luxembourg in the German Customs Union .

Since the summer of 1866, King Willem III believed that it was in his interest to get rid of Luxembourg in favor of any great power that would guarantee him unlimited ownership of Limburg, where in 1870 coal reserves were explored, but the government distributed concessions to foreign firms on his prey. ^[1] According to historian LM Schneerson, possession of Luxembourg, firstly, did not have economic benefits for the Dutch king (although in 1850 small but economically profitable deposits of iron ore were discovered in Luxembourg, other deposits of which in the Netherlands no), secondly, it was fraught with foreign policy complications, and thirdly, the duchy was strongly "French". Prussia and France laid claim to this small territory. And Great Britain saw in its attempts of annexation a threat to Belgium . ^[2]

To this we must add the fact that Willem III was a very wasteful monarch, who constantly needed money. According to G. E. Afanasyev , his mistress Mrs. Myzar pushed for the sale of Luxembourg to Willem III, whom the king promised a million in gift. ^[3]

Initially, Willem III had a plan for the transfer of Luxembourg to his brother Henry. This transaction would cease to be a personal union between the duchy and the Netherlands. But apparently, wanting to receive monetary compensation, Willem III was not against selling it to France.

The peculiarity of the Napoleon III Bonapartist regime was the need for its constant legitimation through foreign policy successes. However, both the internal and external situation was extremely unfavorable for France at that time.

First, in 1866, it entered a period of economic crisis, which gradually became more widespread. ^[4] Secondly, the Second Empire was confronted with almost complete international isolation caused by the not entirely thought out policy of Napoleon III. The French emperor in Europe was looked upon as an upstart, and he, trying to prove his greatness, tried to take part in almost everything related to relations between other European countries, often committing rather awkward acts.

So, as a result, relations with Russia deteriorated due to attempts to use the Polish question , aggravated by the 1863 uprising, as a tool of pressure on the tsarist government.

On the basis of the colonial policy, serious friction arose with Great Britain. In London, they didn’t hide their sympathy for the Bismarck government - strong Germany saw a counterweight to France; moreover, the British royal family was German in origin and tried to keep in touch with the Hohenzollern house, seeing this as a pledge of peace on the continent. A military expedition to Mexico with the aim of creating a puppet empire there, under the control of France, caused keen discontent with the United States . The stay of the French garrison in Rome in order to protect the authority of the Pope generated disapproving comments throughout Europe.

Napoleon needed to blot out the impressions of the recent failures as soon as possible by any means, both military triumph and diplomatic success.

The situation in Europe on the eve of the Luxembourg crisis was tense. Firstly, by this time the conflict between Prussia and Austria about the further unification of Germany became the most acute. Both countries claimed to become centers around which German states would rally. At the same time, unification processes also took place in Italy . The tangle of controversy that has accumulated between these participants in international politics eventually resulted in a war that lasted from June 17 to July 26, 1866 and had important consequences for the development of the conflict over Luxembourg.

During this confrontation, Prussia was supported by Italy, and the Austrian emperor Franz-Joseph I turned to France for help. ^[5] Franz-Joseph told Napoleon III that he was ready to hand over to him the Venetian region (at that time controlled by Austria) on condition of her transfer to Italy, as well as his intervention in order to get this country out of the world, and from Prussia an armistice . Thus, another power was involved in this conflict. For France, it was a chance to improve their affairs in the international arena, either militarily or diplomatically. The emperor chose the second.

The result of the war of 1866 shocked Europe: Prussia defeated the allies of Austria in Bavaria and defeated the Austrian army of Benedek at the Battle of Sadovaya . Of course, the diplomatic intervention of France somewhat reduced the fruits of the Prussian victory. Prussia had to stop its troops before Vienna itself, retreat from Saxony, limit itself to uniting only the lands lying north of the river Main, agreeing with the official exclusion of the southern German states from its zone of influence. ^[6]

However, according to a number of historians, France and Napoleon III personally missed the opportunity to regain their former glory. After all, even before the start of the Austro-Prussian War, Napoleon’s empire reckoned that both sides would be exhausted in this clash so that France would be able to return to the borders of 1814, “that would give new strength to the Bonapartist regime, ” ^[7] or at least succeeds in transferring to France the Saar basin, the Palatinate with the strategic fortress of Speyer and the Rhineland of Hesse-Darmstadt with the fortress of Mainz.

Napoleon could imitate ostentatious activity, sending several regiments to Venice or to the western borders of Italy, thereby forcing Italy to lay down their arms, and immediately occupy the Rhineland (at the time it was easiest) than to force Prussia to reckon with itself. However, the entourage of Napoleon III (above all, Prince Napoleon and the Marquis de Lavalette ) proved to him that the state of the army and finances would not allow the emperor to realize this scenario. In part, they were right. The previous foreign policy led to the extreme dispersal of the supply resources of the French army between three points: Rome, Mexico and Algeria . Napoleon hesitated for a very long time, time was lost.

Bismarck seemed to assess Napoleon’s chances for military success much higher, realizing that France at that moment could pose a real threat to Prussia. Therefore, Bismarck, wanting to divert the attention of France from participating in the preparation of a peace treaty between Austria and Prussia and gain time to sign it, began to divert her attention to the negotiations.

Even before the war of 1866, on October 4, 1865, at the negotiations in Biarritz, Napoleon III presented Prussia with claims to the Rhineland in exchange for neutrality, but was refused. And in the summer of 1866, Bismarck, taking advantage of Napoleon III's wounded pride because of internal and external failures, supported his illusions about the expansion of France and offered "Belgium and even added Luxembourg to it." ^[8] This was the beginning of the Luxembourg crisis.

On August 10, 1866, the French Ambassador to Prussia, V. Benedetti, arrived in Paris to present Bismarck’s proposals to Napoleon. Napoleon gladly approved them and instructed Benedetti to transfer two contracts to the Chancellor: according to the first, Prussia allows France to acquire Luxembourg in the near future; on the second (more distant in time) provision was made for the conclusion of a union between the two powers. His conditions were that France would take possession of Belgium, and Prussia would spread its hegemony to the River Main.

For Prussia, the terms of the proposed treaty promised a lot. However, the position of Bismarck lay in a different plane. First, as he said later, "Prussia should never be obliged to France for its future position in Germany." ^{[9] The} national unification of Germany was to take place in the eyes of the Germans and foreign powers only by the forces of the Germans themselves, and Bismarck did not spare the forces to support this important national myth.

Secondly, Bismarck was well informed about the position of England, which would never have allowed the occupation of Belgium by another power; and the position of Russia, whose ruling circles sympathized more with Prussia than Austria. The actual implementation of the terms of this treaty would lead Prussia to an undesirable complication of relations with both powers.

Luxembourg (while together with Belgium) was only a lure to draw France into a scandalous dirty deal, to embroil it with England and secure the favorable position of the latter in case of war. In the event of publicity, such a game could seriously ruin the Anglo-Prussian relations. After learning of Berlin’s attempts to "give up" Belgium, London could openly and with impunity stand on the side of Austria and the small German principalities. “But in every diplomatic maneuver to entice a partner there is a danger of getting into a delicate situation yourself. The task is not to leave any visible traces of their own initiative. ” ^[ten]

Therefore, Bismarck did not write down his proposals anywhere in writing, but having received the answer of Napoleon, he only expressed a desire to make the treaty secret and make minor changes. So the chancellor has achieved that "the combination turned out to be written in writing precisely by the French hand." ^[11] While the French verified each letter in a defensive-offensive alliance with Prussia, Bismarck concluded the Prague Peace with Austria without hindrance ( August 23, 1866 ): the German Union controlled by Austria was dissolved, and the North German alliance formed in its place, in which the leading role played Prussia.

After the signing of this treaty, Bismarck "sharply" changed his position in the negotiations regarding the alliance with France. He appealed to the fact that obtaining the consent of the Prussian King William I would be very difficult. Feeling precisely the problems of the Second Empire and the importance of the union treaty with Prussia for it, Bismarck said that he could not conclude it until Paris made a public approval of Prussia and a statement on the satisfaction of its interests. This would mean recognition of all paragraphs of the Prague Treaty. Napoleon III agreed to this and tried to continue negotiations on an alliance, but Bismarck, who skillfully mastered the art of drawing them out, declined from them.

At the end of 1866, Napoleon abandoned plans for Belgium, hoping in the near future to annex Luxembourg. For this, he needed the approval of Prussia. Diplomatic advances of the French side, which began in late January 1867 , Bismarck unexpectedly accepted favorably.

By virtue of the agreements concluded between August 18 and October 21, 1866 , Prussia formed, together with 21 states, a temporary association, which automatically ceased to exist on August 18, 1867 if the North German Union was not created before that time. In the interests of Bismarck was to sign the constitution worked out by him as soon as possible. It actually provided the Prussian king with hereditary and almost absolute power over the union. Not being able to put pressure on all participants in any way, Bismarck decided to use the Luxembourg question to create in society a fear of the possible invasion of France.

On February 24, 1867, the constituent Reichstag convened to consider the constitution. In order to make him more compliant, Bismarck decided to cause among his participants a sense of impending danger and bitterness against France. Therefore, he reaffirmed that he found the proposal of V. Benedetti on Luxembourg quite legitimate. “He therefore advised to continue and negotiate faster with the Dutch king. But an agreement must be concluded without formally bringing this matter to the attention of the Prussian king, for the latter, if necessary, would have to intervene in this matter inevitably to take into account the sensitivity of the German nation, which regards Luxembourg as German land and will not easily agree to abandon it. Before the accomplished fact, the king will no doubt bow down; it will not be difficult to impose a ready-made solution on him. ” ^[12]

In essence, Bismarck wanted Napoleon III to compromise himself with demarches and negotiations, which Germany would later consider dangerous for themselves and worthy of blame, especially since they were secret. This was not only to become the basis for rallying the German nation against a common enemy, but also to provoke France into an armed conflict.

In the first half of March 1867, the Prussia press, informed from mysterious sources about the intentions of Napoleon III, began to turn public opinion against the French emperor. Napoleon III should act faster. The immediate conclusion of a treaty with Willem III would have put Prussia and Bismarck in a dead end. However, Napoleon again lost time in disputes about the price of the transaction.

March 14, 1867 at a meeting of the Legislative Corps L.-A. Thiers criticized the policy of France, which led to Prussia becoming the head of Northern Germany, and demanded that the government declare that it would not allow the Berlin office to achieve new benefits and subordination of its policy to the South German states.

Bismarck’s reaction followed on March 19–20 : Prussia’s secret treaties with Bavaria and Baden on military alliance were signed as early as August 1866. The French public was shocked by the consciousness of a fait accompli — Bismarck drove Paris by the nose with attractive vague promises that were easily and he naturally refused, and he learned at the same time all possible diplomatic successes, while skillfully creating the most convenient public opinion, having the opportunity to freely implement the desired actions. France received nothing but the reputation of an aggressor aspiring to expansion, and the German public was indignant about the French military threat.

Willem III decided that France and Prussia were about to quarrel, and immediately suspended the negotiations. Despite the beliefs of the French side to keep them secret, he sent an official request to the Prussian king to find out his opinion on the sale of Luxembourg. He answered in obscure terms, and Bismarck again began to hurry Napoleon. The French emperor promised Willem III the required 10 million francs. In exchange, the king of the Netherlands was asked to conclude a defensive alliance that guaranteed the Netherlands Limburg in the event of the sale of France to Luxembourg. The treaty was drafted, and on March 31 the French government spread news across Europe about its supposedly achieved major diplomatic success.

On April 1, Bismarck and the head of the national liberal party R. Bennigsen staged a small performance in the Reichstag. On behalf of Germany, Bennigsen asked how fair the rumors were about the transfer of Luxembourg to France, and recalling the words of the Prussian king that "without his consent no village would be taken away from Germany," demanded intervention ^[13] . The Chancellor, in extremely friendly terms for France, stated that in order to resolve the controversial issue, the Prussian government would reckon with the powers that had signed the old treatises, with the members of the North German Union and public opinion represented by the Reichstag. These words caused a new confusion in The Hague.

On April 3, Prussia representative Count Perponher notified Willem III of his government’s absolute veto over the sale of Luxembourg.

On April 5, the Berlin Cabinet also announced a decisive renunciation of its interest in Limburg. This automatically removed one of the main reasons for selling Luxembourg.

Simultaneously with these events, Napoleon turned to Austria with a proposal of an alliance against Prussia in exchange for Silesia or the South German states, but was refused. In turn, Austrian Foreign Minister Count von Beist proposed to transfer Luxembourg to neutral Belgium, for which France would receive part of Belgian territory. The Belgian king Leopold II spoke out against this, which made the Austrian proposal unrealistic.

The war that was about to break out as a result of these events, however, did not materialize. Different historians give different reasons. A. Debidour believes that France was not ready for it (the economic crisis and the unfulfilled military reform). In addition, in 1867 the World Industrial Exhibition opened in Paris with a big pomp - a manifestation of peace and reconciliation. The beginning of the war at this time would further damage the prestige of the empire. ^[14]

L. M. Schneerson, in turn, points to the insufficient readiness of Prussia, who had not yet recovered from the war with Austria. Moreover, while Prussia felt particularly insecure at sea, feeling the superiority of the French. ^[15]

F. A. Rotstein adds another reason to this: in spite of Bismarck’s best efforts to build up the image of the enemy in France, the southern states did not find any enthusiasm for the war at such a pitiful reason as the Luxembourg question. ^[sixteen]

All historians agree that the leading world powers came out against the war at this stage of the Franco-Prussian conflict. England feared that as a result of such a clash France would win, which would lead to the inevitable annexation by it of Belgium. Russia, seeing that Austria does not bind itself to any union and can, therefore, at any time turn to the East, was not interested in the war in the West either.

Thanks to these conditions it became possible to convene an international conference. It opened in London and worked for 4 days (May 7 - 11, 1867). It included Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Prussia and Russia. France, in order to somehow maintain prestige after the next fiasco, demanded the withdrawal of German troops from the territory of Luxembourg. After discussion, the London Treaty was signed. He proclaimed the neutralization of Luxembourg, the preservation of its membership in the German Customs Union, the collective guarantee of neutrality of the duchy by all conference participants, the collapse of the fortress (Prussia’s counterclaim), the evacuation of the Luxembourg garrison by Prussian troops following the ratification of the treaty.

For Prussian politics, the Luxembourg crisis helped speed up the assertion of the constitution of the North German Union and strengthen military ties between Prussia and the South German states. He demonstrated that the war of 1866 did not eliminate Austria to the end as a factor of German policy. The Austrian influence in the South German states still left an imprint on their policies and was quite significant in the Prussian plans. It had to be overcome soon.

For France, from a foreign policy point of view, the crisis contributed to undermining international prestige and revealing a significant degree of its isolation. The Luxembourg crisis has demonstrated a low degree of its readiness for war. Coupled with the economic crisis, it also caused even greater public opinion censure of Napoleon III’s policy and formed the basis of the imminent explosion.

German public opinion also reacted with extreme irritation to the outcome of the crisis - the Treaty of London, considering it humiliating for the Germanic fatherland and demanding revenge.

Thus, the Luxembourg question, which became in Bismarck’s hands an instrument for engaging France in international isolation, formed the basis of the reasons for the armed clash that broke out between France and Prussia in 1870.

1. G. Afanasyev. Napoleon III. Foreign policy: public lectures delivered in favor of the Odessa Slavic Charitable Society / G. E. Afanasyev. - Odessa: V. Kirchner Printing House, 1885. - 62 p.
2. Debidur A. The diplomatic history of Europe: from the Vienna Congress to the Berlin Congress: (1914-1878): in 2 volumes. T. 2. Revolution / A. Debidur. - M.: State. ed-in in. lit-ry, 1947. - 544 p.
3. Rotshtein F. A. Two Prussian Wars: Austro-Prussian (1866) and Franco-Prussian (1870–1871), Prague (1866), Versailles and Frankfurt (1871) Peace Treaties / F.A. Rothstein. - M. - L.: Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. - 1945. - 183 p.
4. Chubinsky V. V. Bismarck: Political Biography / V. V. Chubinsky. - M.: “Thought”, 1988. - 415 p.
5. L. Schneerson. On the threshold of the Franco-Prussian war: the Franco-German conflict over Luxembourg in 1867 / L.M. Schneerson. - Minsk: Publishing House of BSU. V. I. Lenin, 1969. - 120 p.