Polesie offensive operation

In early March 1944, the Red Army resumed the offensive on Right-Bank Ukraine against the forces of Army Group South . In order to prevent the Center Army Group from providing assistance to its southern neighbor, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to strike in the direction of Kovel and Brest ^[2] in the joint between the Army Groups Center and the South . The operation was facilitated by the success achieved by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Rivne-Lutsk offensive operation . Since the Kovel direction was considered independent, it was decided to form a separate front here. By the directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters of February 17, 1944, three new combined-arms and one air armies were included in the new front, dubbed the “2nd Belorussian”.

On March 4, the following task was set for the new front ^[3] :

1. Prepare an offensive operation of the front, having the direction of the main attack on Kovel. The immediate task to master the border Lyubeshov, Kamen-Kashirsky, Kovel. In the future, attack with the task of capturing Brest and reach the river. West Bug on the site Brest, Gorodlo (the last point exclusively). At the same time, the right wing of the front enter the line p. Pripyat and take Turov, David-Gorodok, Rubel, Stolin.
2. The offensive to begin 12-15.3, not expecting the full concentration of all front troops

On March 6, the Military Council of the Front submitted to the Headquarters a plan of operation, which provided for the main attack by the forces of the 47th Army by double bypassing Kovel from the north and south. The 70th army was supposed to advance in the direction of Kamen-Kashirsky , cut the highway Brest - Kovel , and thereby prevent an enemy attack from the direction of Kobrin , Brest . The 61st Army was tasked with clearing the enemy from the southern bank of the Pripyat River . The next day, the plan was approved by the Bet.

USSR

2nd Belorussian Front (commander, Colonel General P. Kurochkin , chief of staff, Lieutenant General Kolpakchi V. Ya. ) Consisting of:

• 47th Army (Lieutenant General V. Polenov )
• 70th Army (Lieutenant General Nikolaev I.F. , from March 28, Major General A. Ryzhov )
• 61st Army (Lieutenant General Belov P.A. )
• 6th Air Army (Lieutenant General of Aviation Polynin F.P. )

Total: 25 divisions ^[4] , 181 aircraft. ^[five]

Germany

2nd Field Army (General of Infantry V. Weiss ) from Army Group Center

• 7th Infantry Division
• Hashge group
• group "Agricola"

Part of the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (Colonel General E. Raus ) from Army Group South

• 213th Security Division
• SS Tank Division "Viking"
• SS group under the command of Bill
• Gouf group

In the immediate rear were the 1st, 9th, 12th, 19th and 23rd Hungarian divisions.

In the first half of March, in preparation for the upcoming operation, Soviet troops seized bridgeheads on the western bank of the Stohod River and conducted private battles to improve their positions. The extremely tight deadlines allocated for preparing the strike, the spring thaw, and the underdeveloped road network did not allow the 2nd Belorussian Front to fully concentrate the troops. By the beginning of the operation, only 13 were deployed from 25 divisions. ^[4] By March 18, 18 IL-2 , 14 Yak-9 , 5 Pe-2 and 85 Po-2 had relocated from the 6th Air Army. ^[5] In fact, the group of forces outlined for the operation was able to concentrate only toward its completion: by the beginning of the operation, there were 149,400 fighters, 3,039 guns, 120 tanks, 122 aircraft; by the end of the operation, despite the losses incurred, the front forces totaled 197,400 people, 4,142 guns, 191 tanks, 181 aircraft ^[6] .

However, the buildup of troops did not help - the new units came up at the same time and entered the fray also disengaged.

On March 15, the troops of the 47th and 70th armies went on the offensive with the available forces. The next day, the 61st Army struck. Despite the extreme difficulties during the offensive in a wooded and marshy area in the conditions of spring thaw, by March 18, the forces of the 47th Army managed to advance 30-40 kilometers and surround Kovel. The 70th army by March 20 overcame 60 kilometers. Well aware of the danger posed by the Soviet group going to the flank and rear of Army Group Center, the German command began to take retaliatory measures. One tank, seven infantry divisions were transferred to the threatened direction. In addition, on March 28, to improve the command and control of troops in the Kovel region, part of the forces of the 4th Panzer Army were transferred to the 2nd Field Army, and the demarcation line between the Army Groups "South" and "Center" was moved south.

The commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front made two significant mistakes - he delayed the assault on Kovel, believing his garrison was in a panic, and did not create a strong external front of the encirclement.

Having transferred additional forces to the Kovel direction, the German command began to launch counterattacks from March 23 with the aim of releasing the encircled garrison of Kovel. As a result of ten days of fierce fighting and at the cost of heavy losses, the German troops managed to break through the encirclement and push back the formations of the 47th and 70th armies. At the direction of the Headquarters Headquarters, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, K. K. Rokossovsky , arrived, expressing the opinion that the further development of the operation was inexpedient. By April 5, the front line had stabilized at the turn east of the cities of Kovel and Ratno.

On the right wing of the front, the troops of the 61st Army in 10 days of battles managed to advance 4-8 kilometers and clear the enemy from the southern coast of Pripyat east of Stolin .

At the end of the operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front was abolished, and its troops were transferred to the 1st Belorussian Front.

USSR

During the battle, the 2nd Belorussian Front lost 11,132 people, of which 2,761 irretrievably. ^[1] . The losses of the German side, the Soviet command estimated at 10,000 killed and captured, up to 100 guns and mortars, 50 tanks, 36 aircraft ^[6] .

As a result of the operation, only the immediate task of the offensive was actually solved, namely the exit to the line of Lyubeshov , Kamen-Kashirsky , Kovel . The enemy managed to keep almost all large settlements in the frontline zone in their hands.

The main reasons for the incomplete success: the extremely short preparation time, not necessitated by the need to take into account the difficulties in concentrating the troops allocated for the operation due to poor communications, the lack of dedicated divisions (on average 40%), the unsuccessful decision of the front commander (there was a strike group was created, each army broke through the German front independently on a very wide strip, weak reconnaissance of the enemy, there was insufficient efficiency in command and control, during the operation the commander I sought to fulfill the initial plan of the operation without taking into account the changing situation).

Nevertheless, by pulling significant German forces from other sectors of the front (up to 8 divisions), the 2nd Belorussian Front contributed to the successful offensive in other directions, in particular the attack of the 1st Ukrainian Front on Chernivtsi.

• Operation Kovel Knot
• Min Alexander Pavlovich

• Polesie offensive operation on the site "Combat operations of the Red Army in the Second World War"
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• Polynin F.P. Combat routes. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1972.

• Kalashnik M.K. Test by fire. - M .: Thought, 1985 .-- 412 p.

• Klokov V.I. Kovelsky knot. - K .: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1981. - 238 p.

• Fedorov A.F. Last winter. - M .: Soviet writer, 1981. - 368 p.