Kalinkovich-Mozyr operation

In the winter campaign of 1943-1944 , the Soviet command set goals to defeat German troops in the eastern regions of the Byelorussian SSR and liberate Minsk . The battles in November-December 1943 (the Gomel-Rechitsa operation , the Vitebsk operation of 1943 ) showed that without a decisive strengthening of the group of Soviet troops in this direction these tasks cannot be solved. Therefore, new plans were brought to more realistic goals. In particular, on January 2, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command set the task for the Belorussian Front (Commander-in- Chief of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky ): to break up the enemy’s group in the Mozyr region, create a bridgehead for the offensive in the direction of Bobruisk – Minsk , and partly advance along the Pripyat River on Luninets ^[2] , to achieve the maximum possible advance to cover the Bobruisk enemy grouping.

The operation involved the 61st Army (commander, Lieutenant General P. A. Belov ), the 65th army (commander, Lieutenant General P. I. Batov ), a significant part of the forces of the 16th Air Army (commander, Colonel General S. . I. Rudenko ). For the operation, Rokossovsky decisively strengthened the units of both armies at the expense of other front forces - in the 65th army there were 10 rifle divisions and the 1st guards tank corps (126 tanks and self-propelled guns ), in the 65th army - 6 rifle divisions and a tank brigade. The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps and the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps were transferred to operational commander of the 61st Army. Also, there was concentrated almost all the front artillery — the breakthrough artillery corps , two breakthrough artillery divisions and one mortar division, two separate artillery brigades. The number of Soviet troops was 232,600 people. Partisans of the Gomel, Polessky and Minsk partisan formations were also involved in the operation.

The 2nd German army (commander of the infantry general Walter Weiss ) from the Army Group "Center" (commander of Field Marshal Ernst Bush ) opposed the Soviet troops. After the defeat in the Smolensk operation, German troops from October 1943 created a defense using numerous rivers and swamps. In this direction, 9 infantry and 2 tank divisions, 3 assault gun divisions , and a cavalry regiment occupied the defense. Behind the rear were several Hungarian divisions, which were used to fight the partisans, who were also thrown into battle during the battle.

On January 8, 1944, Soviet troops launched an offensive. At the initial stage, the fighting took on a stubborn character and in the early days of the operation, Soviet troops hardly pushed through German defense. Entering the battle of the tank corps did not give the desired result. However, after the breakthrough of the front line of defense, Rokossovsky brought two cavalry corps into battle south of Mozyr - the 2nd and 7th guards cavalry corps . Belarusian partisans led them through forest roads from the Yelsk region to the rear of the Mozyr and Kalinkovichi enemy groups. The cavalrymen paralyzed the German rear, cut off the Mozyr- Petrikov road, and deprived the defending German units of supplies. The German command was forced to begin the withdrawal of its troops.

Having launched a decisive attack at this moment, both advancing Soviet armies achieved significant success. The 61st Army cut the Kalinkovichi - Zhlobin railroad and highway, liberated Domanovichi and bypassed the enemy group from the north. The 65th Army advancing southward also advanced rapidly. On January 11, Rokossovsky changed the direction of the attacks of the cavalry and tank corps in order to disorient the enemy. In many ways he succeeded. On the afternoon of January 14, the main strongholds of the enemy defense and transport hubs — the cities of Kalinkovichi and Mozyr — were taken by storm with the assistance of the partisans. Continuing the offensive, the troops of the 65th Army liberated the city of Ozarichi on January 20 , and the city of Lelchitsy on January 23 of the 61st Army and partisans.

With the release of Soviet troops on the Ipa , Pripyat and Ptich rivers , the Soviet offensive was stopped. By that time, the enemy had transferred up to 2 infantry divisions, 3 assault gun battalions, 7 security battalions to the offensive area. As a result of the Kalinkovichi-Mozyr operation, Soviet troops advanced 30–40 kilometers in the forest and marshy terrain, and up to 60 kilometers in some directions. The enemy’s Bobruisk group was swept from the south, which later facilitated its rout in the course of the Belarusian strategic operation . According to German General K. Tippelskirch , in mid-January 1944 the 2nd German Army was threatened with complete encirclement and only at the cost of tremendous efforts the German command managed to get it out of attack. The German units suffered heavy damage (for example, according to Soviet estimates, only in the battles for Mozyr, their losses were up to 1,500 killed, and soldiers of the 65th Army killed up to 10,000 German soldiers and officers during the operation). The losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 12,350 people irrevocable and 43,808 people sanitary ^[3] .

The actions of the troops of the Belorussian Front favorably differed from the actions of the neighboring Western and 2nd Baltic Fronts, which this winter, with heavy losses, advanced slightly ahead of Vitebsk . A close role in the success of the offensive was played by the close connection of the front command with the partisan detachments and their competent use. Twenty-one military units received the honorary titles of the Kalinkovichi, another 18 - Mozyrsky.

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• The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 In 12 vols. Volume 04. Liberation of the USSR. 1944 year. - M.: Kuchkovo field, 2012 .-- 864 p., 22 l. ill., ill. ISBN 978-5-9950-0286-4 . - S.130-135.
• The history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. (in 6 volumes). - M .: Military Publishing House, 1960-1965. Volume 4
• Lomonosov D. B. Kalinkovich-Mozyr operation (December 1943-January 1944). // "Military historical archive." - 2001. - No. 6. - P.57-69.