Zhizdrinskaya operation

In February 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to conduct a series of offensive operations on the central sector of the Soviet-German front in order to build on the success achieved in the southern strategic direction and prevent the transfer of German forces there from the central sector of the front. These operations were the Maloarkhangelsk operation , the Sevsk operation , the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation and the Old Russian operation . One of such operations was an operation in the area of ​​the city of Zhizdra, Kaluga Region . On February 6, 1943, the corresponding directive of the Supreme Commander was signed; on February 9, Colonel-General I.S. Konev , commander of the troops of the Western Front , assigned the commander of the 16th Army, Lieutenant-General I.Kh. Baghramyan, the task of preparing the offensive. The army was to advance in an 18-kilometer strip from the Zaprudnoye - Vysokoye area (southwest of the city of Sukhinichi ) in the direction of Zhizdra , and then to the Bryansk region and, together with the troops of the Bryansk Front, encircle and capture Bryansk .

The army had six rifle divisions , one rifle brigade, for the development of success, the 9th tank corps and four tank brigades arrived in its lane (were not included in the army). Initially, the drawback of the operation plan was the performance of deep offensive missions by the forces of one army, that is, in an isolated area with unsecured flanks (only north of it was to be supported by the neighboring 10th army of Major General V.S. Popov by forces of one division). Also unrealistic was the deadline for preparing the operation - February 10 , at the request of the army commander, it was extended. The army was significantly strengthened, but the transfer of a large number of troops was poorly organized by the front command and was opened by the enemy.

The command of the opposing 9th German army (commander Colonel General Walter Model ) of Army Group Center (commander General Field Marshal Hans Gunter von Kluge ) hastily strengthened their forces in the Zhizdra area with two infantry divisions, and also transferred anti-tank artillery and up to 100 tanks and assault guns . The already quite powerful defense line was further strengthened.

February 22, 1943, Soviet troops went on the offensive. The enemy put up stubborn resistance, while continuously counterattacking wherever Soviet troops achieved success. Hitler aviation was active. By February 24, only German forces were squeezed out of the main defensive line. However, the rear defensive line following it was already completely occupied by German troops, who had been prepared for battle.

On February 26, stubborn battles began on it. Soviet troops managed to capture a number of villages, turned into fortified defense strongholds, and by February 28, wedged in places in this defense zone up to 5-6 kilometers. Essentially, it was almost broken through. However, the army command by that time had already brought into battle all of its rifle divisions, and therefore there was no longer any money to turn the wedge into a breakthrough. Front Commander I. S. Konev considered the success achieved insignificant and refused to enter the 9th Panzer Corps. The German command introduced its 5th Panzer Division and two infantry divisions withdrawn from the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge into battle there. With these measures he managed to stop the Soviet offensive. The offensive of the 16th Army was suspended for putting troops in order. Its structure was replenished to 11 divisions, three infantry brigades and a separate ski regiment.

On March 7, the 16th Army resumed the offensive. The army commander received the right to independently control the actions of tank brigades and on the first day he brought into battle all four tank brigades (110 tanks in total). During the day of the battle the breakthrough of the rear defensive line was completed, the army advanced 5 kilometers, freeing five villages. Conditions were created for the fulfillment of the immediate task - the liberation of Zhizdra . However, by that time the Stavka’s decision had already been received to transfer the 9th Panzer Corps to another front and there was nothing to develop success. The German command hastily took measures to localize the breakthrough and introduced 3 more infantry divisions into battle. The Soviet offensive was again stopped.

After an operational pause, a third attack attempt was made on March 19, 1943 . The fighting was again marked by extreme bitterness. According to the Soviet side, from March 19 to 23 in the Zhizdra region, German losses amounted to 140 tanks, 72 guns, 203 machine guns, 137 mortars and 8 thousand soldiers and officers killed ^[1] . But the Soviet offensive was repelled, the enemy managed to recapture two of his strong points lost in February. At the end of March, it became completely clear that in the central direction the enemy as a whole managed to repulse the Soviet offensive: all Soviet offensives were stopped. The new front commander ordered the transfer to defense.

As a result of a long and bloody operation, Soviet troops achieved advancement of only 10-13 kilometers. The territory of Vysoksky, Pyrensky and Shirokovsky village councils of the Duminichsky district was liberated from fascists (now it is the Kaluga region).

The tasks of the offensive operation were not completed. The reasons for the failure were errors at all levels, from the strategic (the actions of various Soviet fronts scattered over time on local and significantly distant from each other sectors) to the front (the time was missed for launching an attack tank group, the actions of the 16th Army were not supported by the actions of other armies) and the army (poor intelligence work, poor air support for troops, lack of interaction between artillery, tanks and infantry).

Stalin positively assessed the actions of the army commander I. Kh. Bagramyan in this operation (the army itself received the guards title on April 16, 1943 and became known as the 11th guards army ), blaming the front commander for the failure. On February 27, I. S. Konev was removed from office with the wording “as if he could not cope with the command of the front forces” and was recalled to Moscow ( after which he headed at that time the less important strategic point in the Northwest Front ); VD Sokolovsky was appointed commander of the Western Front .

In Soviet historical science, a number of positive outcomes of the operation are indicated, which seem very controversial: the actions of troops in other directions were facilitated (in fact, in none of the operations of the central sector of the front did the Soviet troops achieve victory), the enemy suffered significant losses (losses of the Soviet troops were significantly large).

Losses to parties in this operation are unknown. On the Soviet side, they were very significant, especially given the extremely modest results of the offensive. So, in almost a month-long battles at one of the main battle centers - near the village of Kretovaya Gora - 1955 Soviet soldiers were killed and buried, at the village of Oslinsky - 2032 soldiers, in the mass grave of the village of Vysokoye in the Duminichi district - more than 5 thousand Red Army soldiers. Also, those killed in the battles of the Zhizdrinskaya operation are buried in the mass grave of the village of Buda .

German losses were also significant. In the report of the Sovinformburo of May 29, 1943, the testimonies of the captured corporal 3 company 309 infantry regiment 208 of the German infantry division Wilhelm Burmeister were published:

“In the March battles near Zhizdra, our division was defeated and bloodless. Only about 200 people remained in the 309 regiment, and 337 and 338 regiments numbered 70-90 soldiers each. ”

“I must admit that already at that time I saw that the reason for the army’s failure to fulfill the assigned task was reduced not only to our omissions. Almost all offensive operations in the western direction in the spring of 1943 bore the imprint of haste, haste. Then all of us still had freshly achieved brilliant victories of the Red Army near Stalingrad, which laid the foundation for the mass expulsion of the fascist invaders from Soviet soil. In that situation, it seemed to many that the morale of the enemy was broken and if you didn’t let him come to his senses, continuously strike at more and more new directions, he would soon be finally crushed. Unfortunately, even some fronts commanders had such an erroneous conviction and a persistent desire to achieve successes soon, similar to the Stalingrad triumph ^[2] .

• Baghramyan I.Kh. So we went to Victory. - M .: Military Publishing, 1977. Chapter 3: "On the Western Front."
• Lopatin S.V. Living memory. - Notes of the war veteran. - Sverdlovsk: Sred.-Ural. Prince Publishing House, 1988. Chapter “The Right Shoulder,” “Winter 1942/1943.”
• Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 Collection of documents. Under the general editorship of V.A. Zolotarev. M.: Publ. Center "Terra". T. 5 (3). 1999. - Page 72.
• Ivashkin I.Z. On the life direction. - Zhizdra, 2000. - Chapter 1: "Fights at the borders of distant and close."