Maryland campaign

The year 1862 at the Eastern Theater began as a whole successfully for the federal army. The Potomac Army of George McClellan landed on the Virginian Peninsula and walked several miles to Richmond. General Johnston was unable to stop her and was himself wounded in the battle of Seven Pines . However, on June 1, 1862, General Lee took command of the army of the South. He immediately launched a counterattack and during the Seven-Day Battle forced McClellan to retreat. Following these, Lee threw his army north and defeated General John Pope's Virginia Army during the North Virginia campaign . The ensuing Maryland campaign was thus an integral part of the summer offensive of the South Army, consisting of three campaigns ^[6] .

After the battle of Chantilly, unsuccessful for the North , General Pope led the army into the fortifications of Washington, thus liberating the territory of Northern Virginia. Lee did not attack the forts of Washington, as he was sorely lacking in ammunition and provisions. He decided to withdraw the army to the Loudons Valley, where the army was easier to feed and from where it could continue to pose a threat to Washington. September 3, the southerners recaptured Winchester and the army received a certain amount of ammunition and medicine. However, this could not be enough. From the Loudon Valley, it was possible to control the Shenandoah Valley and, if the opportunity presented itself, enter Maryland , as Jackson had suggested a few weeks ago. Both federal armies ( Virginia and Potomac) are demoralized by defeats, and their replenishment has not yet been organized, as it should, and are not ready for battle. Lee’s army was inferior to the enemy numerically, but there was hope that a successful offensive in Kentucky would allow some force to be transferred from there east (160-161).

Potomac Army August-September 1862

When the Peninsular Campaign came to an end, the federal government became disillusioned with the abilities of Supreme Commander-in-Chief George McClellan , so he was removed from this post (remaining commander of the Potomac Army), and Henry Halleck , who arrived in Washington on July 22, was appointed in his place. Halleck decided that the army’s arrival on the peninsula did not make sense, and on August 3 ordered McClellan to return the army to Washington and join John Pope in the Virginia Army in Northern Virginia. McClellan protested, but Halleck insisted and in a private letter promised to leave McClellan at the head of the combined army. McClellan arrived in Alexandria on August 26, his army followed, but her units were immediately removed from his command upon arrival, and in the end he was left with only a group of orderlies and engineers. At the same time, Secretary of War Stanton and his supporters in the cabinet were preparing a resolution prohibiting Maclellan from taking command of any federal army. The future leader of the army was John Pope, who was just reporting on the victories at Manassas ^[7] .

On September 1, news came that Pope was defeated and was retreating to Washington. Halleck summoned McClellan and verbally ordered him to take command of the forts of Washington and all garrisons, but severely limited his authority to this area, categorically forbidding him to take command of the field army. On the night of September 2, more and more alarming news came about the situation in the army, so in the morning, between 7 and 8 hours, President Lincoln, accompanied by Halleck, came to McClellan, told him that the situation was critical, that the Virgin Army was in complete disarray and was running, and suggested he take command of the army and restore order. McClellan agreed and his appointment was made out by order on behalf of Halleck ^{['' i '' 2]} : “Major General McClellan takes command of the Washington fortifications and all parts for the defense of the capital” ^[9] .

Members of the cabinet learned of this decision from Stanton, and then Lincoln personally confirmed his words. Everyone was surprised, most of the members of Lincoln’s cabinet were categorically against this decision. State Treasurer Salmon Chase believed that returning the army to McClellan was like voluntarily surrendering to the enemy Washington. Lincoln said that it was his personal decision and he alone was responsible for it in front of the country. In a critical situation, something urgently needs to be done, but McClellan knows the area well and there is no better organizer in the country than he. If any member of the cabinet can find a person who is able to better and faster restore the combat readiness of the army, then he, Lincoln, promised to immediately appoint him to this post. He said that McClellan is a loser who will never be ready for battle, and will never be ready, but he was well suited for a defensive war. There was a long discussion during which cabinet members basically agreed with the president’s decision ^[10] .

McClellan immediately, after talking with the president, took action: he contacted Pope and repeated to him Halleck's order to retreat to Washington, while specifying which corps should take which road. The letter was delivered by Lieutenant John Wilson, who found Pope at Fairfax. He was unpleasantly surprised by this news. He did not understand how McClellan, whom he considered guilty of defeating the army near Manassas, could be at the head of the army. He asked Halleck for an explanation, suggested that Halleck himself lead the army, but achieved nothing. Meanwhile, in the afternoon, McClellan arrived in Upton Hill and met there the corps of MacDowell, MacDowell and Pope himself. He instructed Pope on the best location of the army and returned to Washington by night ^[11] .

By that time, units of the Potomac Army of 40,000 stood in front of the fortifications of Washington. Directly in the fortifications stood 30,000 garrison and reserve. Pope’s Virginia Army numbered another 40,000, which together gave McClellan 110,000 as of September 2. But this army also received reinforcements, and as of September 7 it numbered more than 140,000 people: 73,000 garrisons and 74,000 field army. On September 3, McClellan learned that the North Virginia Army had retreated from the Washington front and was apparently preparing to cross the Potomac and enter Maryland. On the same day, he ordered the II and XII corps to go to the north side of the Potomac River and go to Tenallitown, and the IX corps to go to Washington. Pleasanton's cavalry division was sent to Pulsville to monitor the fords across the Potomac and, if possible, prevent the enemy from crossing the river. When McClellan reported on these movements to Halleck, he asked which general was placed at the head of these corps. McClellan replied that he had not given such an order and would himself lead the field army in the event of an enemy invasion. Halleck reminded him that McClellan’s powers only apply to troops within the fortifications and that he does not have the right to command a field army ^[12] .

Federal Army

On September 12, the Potomac Army of McClellan was merged with the corps of the disbanded Virginia Army . The III Corps suffered too much in previous battles and was left in Washington, the IV Corps remained on the Virginian Peninsula, and the XI Corps stood in Virginia, covering the approaches to Washington. As a result, at McClellan's disposal there were 6 corps with a total number of about 84,000.

• Joseph Hooker I Corps , consisting of 3 divisions: Rufus King, James Ricketts and George Mead .
• Edwin Sumner II Corps , consisting of divisions of Israel Richardson , John Sedgwick , William French .
• Fitzjon Porter’s V Corps, consisting of the divisions of George Morell , George Sykes and Andrew Humphries .
• VI Corps of William Franklin , consisting of divisions of Henry Slocam , William Smith , Darius Couch .
• The 9th Corps of Ambrose Burnside , consisting of the divisions of Orlando Wilcox , Samuel Sturgis , Isaac Rodman and Jacob Cox ("Ditch Division")
• XII corps of Joseph Mansfield , consisting of divisions of Alpheus Williams and George Green .
• Cavalry Division of Alfred Pleasanton : Brigades of Whiting, Farnsworth, Rush, MacRynolds and Davis

Confederate Army

By the start of the campaign , General Lee’s North Virginia Army consisted of two large infantry corps and several separate divisions. Confederation laws did not allow the formation of corps and the appointment of lieutenant generals; therefore, Lee informally united several divisions under the general command of major generals. In early September, the army was as follows ^[13] :

• The 1st Corps, under the command of Major General James Longstreet, consisted of divisions of Lafayette Mac Lowes , Richard Anderson and David Jones
• The 2nd Corps, under the command of Major General Jackson “The Stone Wall” , consisted of divisions of Alexander Lawton (who replaced Richard Ewell), Ambrose Hill , John Jones and Daniel Hill .
• The John Walker Division, which stood under Richmond and joined the army on September 8th ^[14] .
• John Hood's division and Nathan Evans' brigade, which operated independently.
• Jeb Stewart's Cavalry Division: Hampton, Manford, and Fitzhugh Lee Brigades.
• William Pendleton Artillery Reserve. (In the second corps, artillery was given to each division, while in the first corps, artillery was given to the corps itself.)

See also North Virginia Army at Entity

On September 2, General Lee issued an order to launch the offensive on the morning of September 3. On that morning, Jackson’s divisions were the first to start the march, pass through Vienne to the Alexandria-Lisberg road, go to Drainsville and camped out of town, in the town of Suga-Land-Run. The next day, Jackson entered Leesburg and camped two miles from the city, in Big Spring. Longstreet divisions followed two roads: the Anderson and Jones divisions went through Drainsville, and the MacLouse division went through Gum Spring, and connected with the others in Leesburg. Hood's division and the Evans brigade operated independently; they left Chantilly after Longstreet and arrived at Leesburg by the night of September 4th. In addition to these divisions, Daniel Hill’s division went to Lysberg from Richmond ^[15] .

At the end of the first day of the march, Lee set up his camp near Drainsville and wrote his first letter to the president here. He wrote that the enemy was retreating to Alexandria and Washington, and it seems unreasonable to pursue him. Lee did not want to storm the forts of Washington, and did not have siege funds. He wrote that he was going to disturb the suburbs of Washington, and send the main army to the Loudons Valley and from there enter Maryland. He wrote that he was aware of the risk of this enterprise, but success seemed to him probable ^[16] .

On the evening of September 4, Lee posted his headquarters in Leesburg, from where he wrote a second letter to the president, in which he repeated that he was planning to enter Maryland and Pennsylvania, if the president had no objections to this. There, at Leesburg, Lee found out that the federal team of Julius White had left the city of Winchester, so he ordered the city to be occupied and made it the main supply base for his army. On September 5, Lee wrote a third letter to the president. He repeated that he was ready to enter Maryland, and recommended that everything sent from Richmond be delivered via Culpeper and Warrenton to Winchester. He also said that he planned to get food and fodder in Maryland, but the ammunition would need to be sent from Richmond ^[17] .

The army march on Leesburg was accompanied by distracting attacks in the direction of Washington. This task was entrusted to the cavalry division of Jeb Stewart . Already on September 2, the Fitzgee Lee cavalry brigade occupied Fairfax, where Wade Hampton's brigade, which had just arrived from Richmond, joined her. Hampton attacked the federal Flint Hill squad, forced him to retreat, then caught up and fired from two guns commanded by John Pelham . The shootout stopped at sunset. Manford's 2nd Virginian Cavalry Regiment was at the forefront of the army that day, the first to enter Leesburg and drive out the captain Mines cavalry company from there ^[18] .

On September 3, the Fitzhugh Li Brigade held a demonstration in the direction of Alexandria, and Hampton moved to Drainsville and camped there. There, a Robertson team joined him. These maneuvers, however, did not impress Henry Halleck , who warned McClellan on September 3 that Southerners could cross the Potomac and invade Maryland. Alfred Pleasanton , who commanded the cavalry near Washington, was also sure that these cavalry sabotage was just a distraction ^[19] .

On the morning of September 4, Robertson’s cavalrymen attacked Pleasanton’s pickets near Levinsville, threw them away, and an artillery fire was fired before dark. At sunset, Robertson retreated to Leesburg, where Stuart's entire cavalry was already drawn. At this stage, the cavalry covered the rear of the army, which was already crossing the Potomac ^[20] .

Jackson and Hill Conflict

On the night of September 4, Jackson ordered the start times for each division. In the morning, he noticed that Ambrose Hill’s division had not started the march at the indicated time, and Gregg’s brigade wasn’t even ready for the march. Jackson personally ordered Gregg to start the march, with some tension between the generals. In the afternoon, Jackson noticed that Hill with headquarters follows in the head of the column and no one controls the march of the division, he also noticed that many privates are behind their units, and Hill does nothing to prevent this. When the time came for a halt, the division did not stop. Then Jackson personally ordered the advance brigade ( Edward Thomas ) to stop. Upon learning that Jackson had given this order to his division, Hill personally appeared to Jackson, unfastened the officer saber and handed it to Jackson with the words that if Jackson commands his division, then his services are unnecessary. Jackson replied: “You can consider yourself under arrest for neglect of duties,” and ordered General Branch to take command of the division. According to Douglas Freeman , Jackson sacrificed his only experienced division commander to his ideal of discipline. Subsequently, he argued that "under Hill's successor, General Branch, my orders are executed much better." As a result of this arrest at the beginning of the campaign, all three Jackson divisions were under the command of brigadier generals without a military education ^[21] .

Crossing the Potomac

The first division to set foot on Maryland was the Daniel Hill Division. On August 21, she left Richmond, headed north, and on September 2 joined the North Virginia army at Chantilly. On the morning of September 3, she proceeded through Drainsville to Leesburg, and the next morning, the George Anderson brigade went out to the Potomac River at the crossing to damage the Baltimore Ohio railway and distract attention from the downstream crossings. On the opposite bank of the Potomac River was the 87th Ohio Regiment of Colonel Bunning, who was transferred from Harpers Ferry to guard the crossings. At the same time, two Hill brigades approached the Chicks Ford crossing, which was guarded by 30 people of the 1st Potomac Brigade under the command of Lieutenant Burke. Hill easily dropped pickets, destroyed canal locks, but could not damage the due to the lack of subversive means. Jackson told him to head to the place where the Baltimore-Ohio railway crosses the Monokashi River over the bridge, but Hill did not find a way to perform this maneuver and stayed with Cheeks Ford until September 6 ^[22] .

Jackson left Leesburg on the morning of September 5, went to the White Ford crossing and began the crossing shortly before noon. The water in the Potomac was low and the crossing passed without problems, although it took a lot of time. Newspapers wrote that when the front lines reached the middle of the river, Jackson took off his hat and the regiment’s orchestra played “ ,” although some witnesses deny the historicity of this scene. Historians and memoirists have noted great enthusiasm in the troops crossing the Potomac. They had already won several victories, they believed in themselves and their commanders, and the weather was fine that day, and the sight of the crossing columns of infantry and convoys was inspiring ^[23] .

Stuart's cavalry crossed the Potomac on September 5 at the same time as Jackson and went to Pulsville, where she met 100 federal cavalrymen of the 1st Massachusetts cavalry regiment (captain Samuel Chamberlain). Chamberlain led his regiment along Pulsville's main street and was already attacked by the Fitzgee Lee cavalry outside the city. The feds immediately turned back, but Pulsville residents blocked the street with various objects, which resulted in the capture of 30 federal military officers and Chamberlain himself. The feds lost 8 or 9 people wounded, and southerners 3 killed and 4 wounded. Fitzhugh Lee wrote that the joy of the residents of Pulsville filled the heart of every southerner with determination and enthusiasm ^[24] .

On September 6, captive cavalrymen were conditionally released, and the teams of Lee and Hampton went north: Lee took over the New Market, and Hampton took over Hyatstown and stationed pickets in Damascus and Clarksburg. At this time, the Robertson brigade, whose command was taken that day by Colonel Manford ^{['' i '' 3]} , stood on the right flank of the pickets at Shag-Loaf Mountain, placing the chain of pickets up to Pulsville. A chain of pickets formed that covered the direction to Washington and Baltimore. Stuart held this line until September 11th ^[24] .

When Jackson began crossing the Potomac, he hoped to reach Frederick by night and capture the railway bridge over Monokashi (which he ordered the Hill divisions to join in), but the crossing took too much time, so by night his divisions only reached Buxtistown. From there he ordered the cavalry of Captain Randolph to scout the area to the east and establish contact with Stewart's pickets. He also ordered his people to prepare for two days the only available food - unripe grain. He resumed the march on the morning of September 6, and at noon arrived at the Fredericksburg fork in the Baltimore-Ohio railway. He placed Ewell’s division to cover the direction from the fork in Baltimore, and Ambrose Hill's division to cover the direction of Washington. He marked his former division on the field of Best's farm, closer to Frederick. General Ewell captured the railway bridge that guarded the 14th New Jersey Regiment. Daniel Hill’s division soon joined Jackson and stood beside him on Best’s field. ^[26]

Longstreet divisions crossed the Potomac River on the morning of September 6th at the Whites-Ford crossing, passed Bakistown and the Frederiksberg fork, and on September 7th came to Frederick. Under Longstreet was General Lee. The Hood division and the Evans brigade followed, and the John Walker division all these days went north from Richmond and came to Leesburg on the evening of September 6. On the morning of September 7, she crossed the Potomac across the Chicks Ford crossing, where she caught up with Anderson’s crew, who had already stopped the Point of Rocks demonstrations. Together they came to night in Buxtistown and only on September 8 reached Frederick ^[14] .

The next day, Lee ordered Walker to go back to the mouth of the Monokashi River and destroy the granite that could not damage Hill. Walker came to the aqueduct, discovered federal pickets there, and threw them back with the forces of the 24th and 25th North Carolina regiments. At the same time, Captain Duffy from the 24th was mortally wounded. Walker tried to lay explosives and undermine the bridge, but it was made of granite, and so reliably that Walker could not find vulnerabilities in it. Having spent the whole day, he stopped trying and on September 10 retreated from the bridge ^[27] .

Southerners in Frederick

Southerners were surprised by the cold welcome that Frederik residents had. Private of the 17th Virgin Regiment from the Camper Brigade recalled:

On the 10th, the Seventeenth Regiment passed along Frederick's long avenue and we were very disappointed with the cold welcome. This was not what we were waiting for. The streets were really full of townspeople, as well as balconies and porches, but among them there was absolutely no enthusiasm, no greetings, no waving handkerchiefs and flags - only deathly silence - and some houses were deafly closed, as if after some kind of disaster. Friendly people met, of course, but it seemed that they were afraid to express their feelings - they only smiled slightly ^[28] .

Lee appealed to the People of Maryland, but it did not provoke any response from the state. 55,000 people were reinforced by units from Richmond: the divisions of Daniel Hill , McLose and the two John Walker brigades, in total there were more than 9,000 lost in the battles of Bull Run and Chantilly.

With the invasion of Maryland , the Confederate army immediately faced many challenges. The size of the army was constantly declining. 55,000 people came out of Chantilly, but after 10 days 45,000 remained. ^[29] Some units refused to cross the Potomac, because it was at variance with their idea that they were conducting a purely defensive war against aggression from the north. Many went out of action, suffering from diarrhea, or because they broke their legs in the blood on the roads ^[30] . Lee ordered stricter treatment of fugitives and deserters, who, according to him, “abandon their comrades in a moment of danger” and are “an unhealthy element of the army” ^[31] .

Entering Maryland, the southerners almost did not receive support from the local population. Robert Lee was disappointed with the position of the state, which he was counting on. Maryland was a slave state, but generally supported supporters of the Union rather than secessionists. In addition, many supporters of the South went to Virginia at the very beginning of the war. Only a few joined Lee's army.

In Maryland, panic spread much faster than in Pennsylvania, which so far has not been directly threatened. The city of Baltimore unanimously opposed Lee, although Lee considered him a hotbed of secession and was confident in his support. When they learned in Baltimore that the southerners had crossed the Potomac, unrest immediately began: people rushed into the streets waiting for news. In anticipation of the siege, people snapped food and other goods. The panic also spread to Philadelphia , which was located 240 kilometers from Hagerstown and which so far was not in danger.

Offensive of the Potomac Army

The first Massachusetts Cavalry Regiment was the first unit of the Potomac Army that advanced north from Washington. He originally stood in South Carolina and was transferred to Alexandria, where he arrived on September 2. The regiment was immediately ordered to go to patrol the Potomac coast, but on that day in Alexandria there was such a mess that none of the officers could be found, and the order had to be repeated three times on September 3. Only in the morning of September 4, the regiment left Alexandria and arrived in Tenalitown. The next morning, Pleasanton arrived with two cavalry regiments. 1st Massachusetts was sent to Pulsville, where he was defeated by cavalrymen Fitzghu Lee. On the same day, several more regiments were thrown into reconnaissance, but in all directions they came across Stewart's pickets. All the data obtained indicated that Lee had crossed the Potomac and was preparing to attack Washington: Jackson's divisions from Frederick and Longstreet divisions through Pulsville. As a result, on September 6, Pleasanton opened a picket chain: he placed the 3rd Indian and 8th Illinois regiments in Darnstown, the 1st New York in Middlebrook, and the 1st regular in Brookville, blocking the entire space from the Potomac to the Frederick-Baltimore road . Sumner's infantry corps was nearby ^[32] .

Cavalry gunfire at Pulsville took place on September 8: two federal cavalry regiments under the command of John Farnsworth approached the city, rejected Mansford pickets, began to pursue and collided with the 7th and 12th Virginia regiments, which were supported by two guns of the Cheuu battery. Farnsworth responded with the fire of two guns of the 2nd artillery regiment, then the 3rd Indian attacked the 12th Virgin regiment and threw it away, which caused the Chieu battery to be put in a dangerous position, but the 7th Virginia counterattack threw back the enemy and saved the guns. Manford retreated to Barnesville. In this battle, he lost 1 man killed and 10 wounded, and Farnsworth also 1 killed and 10 wounded, mainly from the 3rd Indian Cavalry Regiment ^[33] .

While Pleasonton probed the line of enemy pickets, McClellan restored the command structure of the army. His corps cautiously moved around Maryland at a close distance from the cavalry of Pleasanton and from each other. On September 6, the Hooker corps crossed the Potomac, passed Washington and took a position at Lisborough. Franklin VI Corps also crossed the Potomac and stood in Georgetown. II and XII corps still stood in Rockville. IX Corps Renault stood in Meridian Hill. I and IX corps made up the right wing of the army under the general command of General Burnside ; II and XII corps formed the center under the general command of Sumner. The VI Corps and the Couch Division became the left wing under the general command of Franklin ^{[34] [35]} .

On September 7, McClellan completed all preparations for the defense of the city, leaving 73,000 men in forts and Washington under the command of Nathaniel Banks, and the remaining 74,000 people now made up the field army without a commander ^[36] . Not waiting for his leadership to nominate the Army Commander McClellan at noon on September 7, on his own initiative, without an order, he decided to head the field army, left Washington and arrived with headquarters in Rockville. He subsequently wrote that he had commanded the entire army “with a noose around his neck”; if the army was defeated, he would be accused of illegally assuming command and, according to him, would probably be executed. “I was fully aware of the risk I was taking,” wrote McClellan in his memoirs, “but I tried to follow my duty” ^[37] .

On September 8, the corps continued their offensive: the IXth moved from Lysborough to Rockville, the 2nd and XIIth from Rockville to Middlebrook, and the VIth from Rockville to Darnstown. I remained in Lysborough. The corps moved along three roads to prevent Lee from breaking through the Potomac toward Washington or bypassing the army from the north and breaking through to Baltimore. On September 9, the corps continued to advance, gradually pushing back the cavalry pickets of the enemy. McClellan reported to Washington that the enemy army numbers up to 110,000, but he, McClellan, is ready for everything and needs only additional cavalry ^[38] .

Division of the Army

General Lee hoped that after his crossing the Potomac, the federal government would withdraw troops from Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry, which would make it possible to supply the army from the Shenandoah Valley. However, this did not happen. General McClellan advised Nearby to leave Harpers Ferry and withdraw the army to the north coast of the Potomac River or up the Cumberland Valley, since Harpers Ferry was of no strategic importance. The enemy will be able to easily capture the city, but if you leave it, then it will be possible to easily return it. But Halek replied that everything was in order at Harpers Ferry, that McClellan was wrong in his assessment of the situation, and the garrison was left in place ^[39] .

When Lee arrived in Frederick, he learned that the garrison, contrary to the rules of the strategy, was still standing at Harpers Ferry. He was very and unpleasantly surprised: now he had to temporarily postpone his plans for an attack on Hagerstown and take up the capture of Harpers Ferry. Moreover, the operation against Khareprs-Ferry required the division of his army, since if he took the whole army back behind the Potomac, McClellan could prevent him from returning ^[40] . On September 9, Lee summoned Jackson to headquarters and invited him to take three divisions and go to Virginia to block the western approaches to Harpers Ferry. Two more divisions should block the city from the north and east. Jackson was keenly interested in this proposal, but Longstreet soon came to headquarters, and expressed skepticism about this plan. He considered the division of the army dangerous, and proposed to act against the Harpers Ferry the whole army at once. “In other words, the traditional strategy seemed preferable to the innovative one,” wrote Douglas Freeman ^[41] .

Historian Jeffrey Werth wrote that General Lee, making this decision, underestimated the pace of the offensive of the Potomac Army, and this was partly due to the fault of Jeb Stewart. Lee and Stewart met often in those days, but Stewart did not tell him anything about the beginning of the offensive of the federal army. As early as September 10, cavalrymen were sure that the enemy was 10 miles away. Judging by the reports of Stuart, he did not send out scouts or patrols to identify enemy positions. So far, historians have not been able to explain the reasons for his negligence ^[42]

However, the plan has been approved. Longstreet and Jackson left the headquarters, and Lee drew up an offensive on the morning of September 10, which became known as Special Order 191 . Several copies were made from the order and sent to the division commanders. The order implied a temporary transfer of D. Hill's division to the beginning of Longstreet, so Jackson hand-written the order and sent a copy to Hill ^[43] .

According to the order, Jackson was supposed to approach Harpers Ferry from the west on September 12, the John Walker division was to occupy the Loudons Heights south of the city that day, and the MacLouse Division was to occupy the Maryland Heights north of the city. As a senior in rank, Jackson had to coordinate the actions of all three groups ^[44] .

On the morning of September 10, Jackson’s divisions began the march: the first was Jackson’s former division under the provisional command of William Stark, followed by Ewell’s division under Lawton and then Hill’s division, commanded by Branch . The divisions went through Frederick, while the officers asked the locals for a map of Chambersberg so that they thought that the army was heading north. About a mile before the army was a cavalry detachment of Lieutenant Payne, who made sure that no one would forward the news of the advance of the column. In Middletown, girls with red-white-blue ribbons in their hair ran out onto the road and began waving federal flags almost in front of Jackson's very face. He smiled and told staff officers that they were unlikely to find friends in this city. Having passed Middletown, the convoy passed the Southern Mountains along the Turner Gorge and camped east of Bunsboro ^[45] .

On September 11, Jackson’s divisions crossed the Potomac at Williamsport and entered Virginia. At that time, General Ambrose Hill was at the wagon train of his division, not having copies of orders and not knowing where the army was going. When the army crossed the Potomac, he felt that a battle was approaching, and through Kid Douglas he asked Jackson to temporarily cancel his resignation and regain command of the division. When the battle was over, he was ready to return back under arrest. Jackson listened to this offer and agreed to it without comment. Branch was ordered to surrender the command to Hill and give him all the information about the army’s advance ^[46] . On September 12, Jackson's convoy entered Martinsburg, but the federal garrison had already left for Harpers Ferry. The next morning, at about 10:00, the convoy approached the Bolivarian Heights at Harpers Ferry, where the federal army defended ^[47] .

On September 10, the Maclow and Anderson divisions began their march. By evening, they camped in front of the South Mountains, and on the morning of September 11 crossed the mountains along the Brownsville Gorge, entered the Pleasant Valley and camped at Brownsville. From here, on the morning of September 12, they began to climb the Maryland Heights ^[48] .

On the same day, September 10, Longstreet and Daniel Hill divisions marched west. According to the plan, they were supposed to get up to Bunsboro, but news came that the federal detachment was moving from Pennsylvania to Hagerstown, and since there could be large food supplies in this city, Lee sent Longstreet's division to capture Hagerstown ^[49] .

On September 13, Longstreet divisions came to Hagerstown, intending to continue moving further north. In Hagerstown, the southerners were much better treated: “The citizens of Hagerstown were very different from the residents of Frederick, they not only openly expressed sympathy for the Cause of the South, but opened the doors of their hospitable houses, filled the houses with soldiers, fed the hungry, dressed naked, as far as their capabilities allowed. I saw one citizen take off his shoes from his feet, right on the street, and give them to the barefoot, limping soldier ” ^[28] .

McClellan's Offensive

On September 9, the Potomac Army continued to advance westward, and since the departure from Washington it has suffered heavy losses due to deserters. The problem was so serious that on this day McClellan issued special orders to curb desertion. On the morning of September 10, the army was ordered to enter the Parr Ridge ridge line. The corps began the march, but the offensive was suddenly stopped because McClellan decided to conduct an additional reconnaissance and make sure that the southerners were still in Frederick, and not attacking Washington or Baltimore. The cavalry was ordered to capture the height of the Shugaloaf Mountain, which was convenient as an observation post. The height was defended by two regiments of the Manford brigade: the 2nd Virginia and the 12th Virginia cavalry regiments, in total about 500 people. On the morning of September 10, the 6th Cavalry Regiment attacked Manford's positions, but was repelled. McClellan ordered the Franklin corps to help the cavalry, but for some reason this order was not executed. If the feds had captured the height that day, they would surely have seen columns of southerners going to Bunsboro and Harpers Ferry ^[50] .

Since McClellan was unable to capture Shugaloaf Mountain on the 10th, his September 11th attack was slow and cautious. Clarksburg occupied the II Corps, Ridgville occupied the IX Corps, and Farnsworth's cavalry brigade drove Manford away from Shugaloaf during the day. On the same day, it became known that the southerners had left Frederick, and McClellan ordered the rapid offensive of the I and IX corps through the New Market on Frederick to begin. On the same day, he suggested that Halleck surrender Harpers-Ferry and join his garrison in the army, but Halleck did not give consent to this ^[51] .

On the morning of September 12, the IX Corps emerged from New Market and approached the bridge over the Monokashi River, which was held by two Hampton Brigade squadrons. Cox’s division was ordered to capture the bridge. The Ohio brigade of Augustus Moore was the first to cross the bridge, but this attack seemed too indecisive to one of the officers from the corps headquarters, who expressed his displeasure with Moore. Annoyed, Moore personally went ahead of the brigade and walked to the outskirts of Frederick. This was noticed by Hampton, who ordered Maygan's squadron to attack Moore. During a short skirmish, Moore was captured. After that, Hampton retreated to Middleberg, leaving one regiment and two guns to cover the pass in the Katoktinsky mountains ^[52] .

When Hampton left Frederick, the Cox division entered the city on the other side. Having passed through it to the greetings of the townspeople, she stood on the outskirts of Frederick. At this time, the Reynolds division went to the bridge over Monokashi, the Hatch division went to the New Market, and the Ricketts division went to Ridgville. On the left flank, Farnsworth's cavalry brigade was advancing from Shugaloaf to Urban and Frederick, pushing back Manford's cavalry. On the right flank, the cavalry brigade went to Gettysburg, from where reports came from the appearance of the southerners cavalry. At 5:30 pm, McClellan informed Halleck that he intended to pursue the southerners if they were going to Pennsylvania, but if they were trying to return to Virginia, then he intended to cut off their escape routes. At 17:45, Lincoln informed him that according to him, Jackson had gone for the Potomac and that probably the entire enemy army was about to leave Maryland. He asked not to let the enemy go unscathed ^[53] .

On the morning of September 13, the federal cavalry marched west from Frederick and came under fire from the enemy on the pass of the Katoktinsky Mountains. The 3rd Indian and 8th Illinois cavalry regiments dismounted and went on to storm the position of the southerners. At this time, Jeb Stewart did not pay much attention to defense: he believed that the Harpers Ferry was already taken, or would fall at any time, so he did not consider it necessary to seriously defend the Katoktinsky mountains. On the morning of September 13, he learned that Harpers Ferry was still holding, and it was important to slow down McClellan's advance, so he ordered Hampton to return to the passes and strengthen the defense. But at 14:00 the federal artillery took an advantageous position and knocked out the enemy from the pass. Hampton retreated to Middleberg and took a position east of the town. Southerners stayed here for a while, then retreated beyond Middletown and took a position on the Katoktin Creek River. Here Colonel Baker managed to blow up a bridge over the river and retreated to the passes of the Southern Mountains. Federal cavalry pursued Baker for some time, but did not dare to storm the South Mountains ^[54] .

While the cavalry was crowding Stuart's pickets, the federal infantry was gradually advancing to the west: IX Corps approached Middletown, and II and XII Corps entered Frederick. This attack seemed too quick to Halleck and he told McClellan that he paid too little attention to the defense of Washington. It seemed to him that the enemy was luring McClellan away to the west, and he was preparing a roundabout maneuver to the capital ^[55] .

The 12th corps of General Alpheus Williams approached Frederick on the morning of September 13, but infantry columns blocked his path and he stopped the corps in the meadows outside the city. Here, a sergeant of the 27th Indian Regiment found paper in the grass, which turned out to be a copy of Special Order No. 191 . He handed it to the captain, who handed the paper to Colonel Silas Kolgrove. He went with the paper to the headquarters of the corps, where he showed it to the adjutant Samuel Pittman, who recognized the signature of Chilton , the chief of staff of General Lee. General Williams ordered the delivery of the document to McClellan immediately. Already at 12:00, McClellan reported to Washington that he had in his hands all the plans of his opponent and now he was confident of success if these plans did not change. At 15:00 a copy of the order was handed over to General Pleisonton, who was instructed to check whether the Southerners really act according to this order. McClellan doubted the truth of the order, suspecting that it was an attempt to mislead him. He ranged from about noon until six in the evening ^{[56] [57]} .

Knowing all the plans and the location of enemy units opened up two possibilities for McClellan: he could attack Maclowes' division, defeat it, and thereby release Harpers-Ferry, allowing the garrison of the city to join his army; on the other hand, two divisions of the North Virginia Army (14 out of forty brigades) and all its convoys were located north of the Potomac River near Bunsboro without the possibility of joining the main army, and McClellan could attack and destroy these divisions, destroying all the convoys. Colonel William Allan believed that the second task was much more important than the first. As a result, McClellan decided to advance on Harpers Ferry with the forces of the VI Corps, and the IX Corps sent directly to Bunsboro ^[58] . McClellan himself wrote that the attack on Bunsboro was needed only to divert the enemy's attention from the direction to Harpers Ferry. Ezra Karman wrote that the offensive plan was good and if carried out by a capable general with competent subordinates, he would undoubtedly give good results ^[59] .

General Lee's Reaction

Late in the evening of September 13, General Lee received messages from Stuart about the nomination of the Potomac Army to the South Mountains. He called Longstreet to himself, explained the situation to him and asked his opinions. Longstreet said it’s too late to return to the passes of the Southern Mountains, and it’s more logical to move to Sharpsberg to be on the flank of the Potomac Army if it goes to Harpers Ferry. But Lee did not want to risk Maclowes' division and decided to meet the enemy at the passes. “Even at this critical moment,” Long Street wrote, “the whole army was convinced that McClellan was not capable of seriously fighting.” Lee warned of the advance of Jackson's adversary and asked him to increase pressure on Harpers Ferry. Hill was ordered to make sure that the mountain passes were well protected, and Longstreet was ordered to step up to strengthen Hill in the morning. Stuart was instructed to inform Maclow about the enemy’s movements, and Lee wrote to Maclow at 10:00 PM that he should take Harpers-Ferry faster, and then retreat to Sharpsberg. On the morning of September 14, Lee relocated headquarters to Bunsboro and again wrote a letter to MacLouse, repeating the request for the capture of Harpers Ferry ^[60] .

General Daniel Hill’s division was stationed at Bunsboro to prevent the Harpers Ferry federal garrison from breaking northward and, as a secondary task, to cover the South Mountains passes. Hill concentrated on the first task, believing that the passes reliably cover Stuart. In the three days that he spent in Bunsboro, he had never visited the South Mountains. Having learned from Stuart that his cavalry had been thrown back to the South Mountains, he only sent the Colquitte brigade to help him. The Garland Brigade was pushed closer to the mountains to reinforce Colquitte, if necessary. Colkitt arrived at Turner's Gorge at sunset and in the dark saw many campfires in the distance. He told Hill that these bonfires are suspiciously many. At midnight, a warning came from General Lee. Only now did Hill learn that the South Mountains were supposed to be seriously defended, but he was completely unfamiliar with the terrain. In the morning he went to the passes. On this day for the first time he had to independently command a division on the battlefield, but he still did not realize the danger of the situation and still kept his three brigades in Bunsboro ^[61] .

Battle of the South Mountains

On the morning of September 14, Alfred Plezonton's cavalry division stood at the approaches to the passes of the Southern Mountains. In the morning, an infantry brigade of from the Cox division approached her for reinforcement. Pleasanton told Cox that the southerners' position in Turner's Gorge is very strong, so it’s wiser to get around it from the south, through Fox Gorge. Cox sent the Scammon brigade to the gorge, followed by Crook's brigade. At 09:00, the Scammon brigade met in the gorge with the Samuel Garland brigade and a skirmish ensued. The battle went from 09:00 to noon, and in the end the Garland brigade was defeated, and he died. Cox captured the gorge, but he did not know the enemy’s strength in front of his front, so he did not dare to continue the offensive, but waited for Wilcox’s division . Southerners got about two hours to save the situation ^{[62] [63]} .

Daniel Hill had nothing to repel the offensive in the Fox Gorge, but at 14:00 the infantry brigades of J. B. Anderson , Rhodes, and Ripley came to the South Mountains. Hill sent Rhodes to help Colkitt, and Anderson and Ripley sent to Fox gorge. A little later, the teams of Drayton and J. T. Anderson from the Longstreet group appeared, and they were also sent to the Fox gorge. Hill handed over all the divisions in the gorge to General Ripley and ordered the federals to be attacked and knocked out of the gorge, but Ripley could not complete the task and his teams were fragmented. Drayton's brigade joined the battle alone and was defeated. The JB Anderson brigade attacked the enemy’s battery, but was repelled with heavy losses. The rest of the brigades could not even reach the position, and Ripley himself lost contact with the brigades ^[64] .

The last in the gorge came two brigades under the command of General John Hood, from which General Lee lifted the arrest. Hood pushed the enemy to the pass, took a position north of the pass, and there the battle ceased due to darkness. During this attack on the positions of the federal army, the commander of the IX Corps, General Jesse Renault , was killed ^[65] .

The position of the southerners in the Turner Gorge was defended by the Alabama brigade of Robert Rhodes . His positions were attacked by forces of the First Corps of General Hooker : divisions of Mead , Hatch and Ricketts. The front of the federal line was longer than the front of the Rhodes brigade, and the northerners immediately began to go on its flank. Rhodes began to retreat up the slope, withdrawing his right flank, while suffering heavy losses. Only Colonel John Gordon’s regiment remained fully operational. Rhodes requested reinforcements, but, according to him, they never came ^[66] .

McClelan got a chance to defeat the enemy army in parts. However, he delayed all day on September 15 , which allowed Jackson to complete the capture of the Hapers-Ferry, and Lee's troops to concentrate near Sharpsberg. In his memoirs, McClellan partially explains the delay by the fact that the Burnside corps remained standing still (due to people's fatigue), which prevented the advance of other parts of the army ^[67] .

Battle of the Crampton Gorge

On September 12, the MacLouse brigades left camp near Brownsville. The Kershaw and Barksdale brigades went to Maryland Heights, and the remaining eight brigades were stationed in Pleasant Valley so as to block the roads from Harpers Ferry and at the same time cover the east. By the morning of September 14, Macklose had captured the Maryland Heights, and already at 14:00 opened fire on Harpers Ferry. At the same time, Paul Sems was ordered to take his brigade and Mahone's brigade to stand in front of the Brownsville Gap. On the morning of September 14, Sems discovered that another 2 to 3 kilometers north of the gorge, known as the Crampton Gorge, was found. Sems sent there an artillery battery and three regiments of the Mahone brigade, led by Colonel William Parham. ^[68] That same morning, Jeb Stewart arrived at the Crampton Gorge, who had left the Manford cavalry brigade with the infantry, and informed Maclow that this might not be enough. MacLouse ordered General Howell Cobb to go with his brigade to Brownsville and lead the gorge defense. At 2:00 p.m., Stewart assured MacLouse that the Crampton Gorge was only threatened by an enemy infantry brigade. Near the gorge, Maclose had three brigades, so he decided there was nothing to worry about ^[69] .

On the morning of September 14, Franklin's corps approached Burkittsville. It seemed to Franklin that the enemy’s position in the gorge was very strong, and he sent Henry Slokam’s division to it. Around noon, the feds knocked out the enemy from Burkitsville and approached the stone wall, where the cavalrymen of Manford and the infantrymen of Parham took up the defense. At 15:00, the Slokama division was drawn into battle with the Southerners. At 16:00, the Cobb team arrived in Brownsville, stood there for an hour, and only then went to the gorge. At this time, the position of Parham was attacked from the front and flanks, and the people of Parham began to retreat to the pass. Cobb tried to take a position on the pass, but also fell under attack from the flanks and retreated with heavy losses ^[70] .

“Well, general,” said McLouse to Stuart, “we are now trapped.” How do we get out of here? ” ^[71] . Stewart offered to repulse the gorge, but Maclose found this inappropriate, and decided to organize a defensive line to prevent the enemy from advancing south along Pleasant Valley to Harpers Ferry. MacLouse recalled the Kershaw and Barksdale brigades from Maryland Heights and built them in the valley along with the remnants of the Cobb, Mahone and Sems brigades. He also called the Wilcox Brigade. ^[72]

Franklin for some reason, he did not develop his success. At 17:20, he wrote to McClellan that he had been fighting hard for the past hour. He requested orders, but at that time he stopped his army in the gorge and returned to his headquarters near Burkittsville. On the morning of September 15, Franklin studied the new position of the MacLouse regiments and it seemed to him too strong. Twice (8:50 and 11:00) he wrote to McClellan, asking for reinforcements, and claiming that the enemy was twice as superior in numbers, although in reality it was the other way around ^[73] .

Upon learning of the federal breakthrough in the Crampton Gorge, Lee concluded that it was time to turn off the Maryland campaign and retreat to Virginia. At 20:00, he ordered MacLouse to abandon his position at Harpers Ferry and retreat behind the Potomac. He wrote that the rest of the army would also retreat through Sharpsburg to Virginia ^{[74] [75]} .

Subsequently, General Franklin was convicted of not attacking MacLouse on the morning of September 15th. He could not have saved Harpers Ferry, but at least he had a chance to beat MacLouse. Franklin himself wrote that he did not want to break away from the main army, given the fact that Jackson's divisions could come to the aid of Maclow. Historian John Ropes believed that Franklin was afraid of Jackson’s advance north from Harpers Ferry. Henry Halleck regularly warned McClellan that Jackson could cross the Potomac River near Harpers Ferry, attack his left flank and cut off the Potomac Army from Washington. Jackson did consider such a possibility, but he had a direct order to go to Sharpsberg on September 15th. General MacLouse subsequently wrote that if Jackson crossed the Potomac and took a position on the Maryland Heights and Pleasant Valley, then Lee could join him, and this position would be more advantageous than the Sharpsberg, and the battle could be taken on more favorable conditions ^[76] .

Harpers Ferry Battle

Since March 1862, a federal unit under the command of Colonel Dickson Miles was stationed in Harpers Ferry. General Wool instructed him to defend the city and adjacent sections of the Baltimore-Ohio road. Wool did not believe in Miles' ability, but he could not find another regular army officer for this position. Miles' main forces were located in Harpers Ferry, and in July Winchester had been a team of General ^[77] . In September, Mayz had almost a week to strengthen the heights near the city, but he made no effort in this direction ^[78] .

General McClellan believed that the Harpers-Ferry garrison would not be able to keep the city, and it would be better to join the main army, or at least take it to Maryland heights, where he could hold out until the army approached. This opinion was transferred to Henry Halleck , but he considered it completely erroneous and ordered to leave the garrison in place. Miles received orders to hold Harpers Ferry at all costs ^[79]

The first to approach the city was the detachment of General MacLouse. On September 12, the Kershaw and Barksdale brigades climbed the Maryland Heights and approached the enemy fortifications. On the morning of September 13th, the 7th South Carolina Regiment of Colonel David Aiken launched an assault on the fortifications from the front, and the Mississippi Barksdale brigade outflanked the position of the northerners. Colonel was wounded during this shootout. Having lost control, the northerners panicked and began to retreat to the city. By 4:00 p.m. Maryland heights were taken ^{[80] [81]} .

On September 12, Jackson's convoy entered Martinsburg, forcing the Julius White squad to withdraw to Harpers Ferry. At 10:00 a.m. September 13, Jackson's vanguard approached the Bolivarian Heights at Harpers Ferry. Jackson tried to get in touch with MacLouse and Walker, but failed. In the afternoon, shooting was heard at Maryland Heights, but there was still no response to the signals. Jackson decided to wait until morning, and at the same time sent couriers to identify the situation of MacLouse and Walker. Couriers found one and the other at night, but it was not known when MacLouse would be able to raise guns to Maryland Heights ^[82] . On the morning of September 14, General Walker was ready to open fire on the city from Loudon Heights. The battle at South Mountain had already begun at that time, and Walker heard the cannonade. Without waiting for permission, at 13:00 he began the bombing. This shelling helped E. Hill's division draw closer to enemy positions ^[83] .

At 8:15 p.m., Jackson informed General Lee that the offensive was successful and he hoped for success the next day ^[84] . This message made General Lee once again change all his plans. He canceled the retreat order for the Potomac and ordered all divisions to concentrate near Sharpsberg ^[85] .

On the morning of September 15 , as soon as it dawned, all of Jackson's guns opened fire on Harpers Ferry. The bombardment lasted about an hour, and federal guns fired back all this time, but soon their ammunition began to run out. General White wrote that when shells for long-range guns came to an end, surrender was only a matter of time, and the continuation of defense was a waste of life ^{[86] [87]} . At 08:30, Colonel Miles gathered for a council of officers and offered to surrender. While the cannonade in the South Mountains was heard, the garrison had hope for salvation, but on September 15 the cannonade subsided, and the hope of lifting the blockade faded. At the Bolivarian Heights, a white flag was hoisted. At the height of Camp Hill, the federal flag was lowered a little later, because of which the Southerners fired several shots at the volg. One of them was mortally wounded by Colonel Miles ^[88] .

Lee's Sharpsburg Retreat

The first division to start the retreat from the South Mountains was Daniel Hill. At 22:00, the Colquitte brigade was replaced by the 2nd South Carolina Regiment of the Jenkins Brigade, connected with the Rhodes brigade and, under the general command of Rhodes, left for Bunsboro, and at 01:00 on September 15th arrived in Kidisville, from where she was sent by order of Longstreet to Sharsberg . Before dawn, both teams occupied a height south of Sharpsberg and began to cook their own food. The teams of Garland, Ripley and JB Anderson followed. They crossed the Entity River at sunrise and took a position at Sharpsberg. Hill arrived with them. He deployed his brigade to the left of the Sharpsberg-Bunsboro road, returning the Rhodes and Colquitt brigades here. Three brigades stood in front of the east, two - front to the north ^[89] .

Artillery and medical carts came behind Hill's division, and they were left near the crossing of the Potomac River so that they were ready to cross at any time: Lee had not yet decided whether to give battle to Sharpsberg. Longstreet's division covered the retreat of the convoys, so the march began only at midnight and even a little later. The crews of Drayton, Kemper and Garnett started the march first, and it was difficult for them because they had already gone a long distance during the day. John Hood remained in the mountains to command the rearguard of his two brigades, the Evans and JT Anderson brigades. He left the mountains only at one in the morning and dawn found him in Kidisville. The last in the mountains was the Jenkins team, which began the march only at 04:00 ^[90] .

At 11:15 p.m., General Lee wrote to Maclowes that he intended to concentrate the army in Kidisville to cover the retreat of the Maclowes and Anderson divisions, the field of which he left the headquarters and went to Kidisville himself. Since on September 2 he received a hand injury, he still could not ride in the saddle and moved in a medical cart. He arrived in Kiedisville before dawn. There was no news from MacLouse, so he sent him a second letter. As soon as it was gone, a message came from Manford, who wrote that MacLouse would not be able to go up the Pleasant Valley to Kidisville. This meant that Macklouz would go the other way, and it would be more convenient to meet him at Sharpsberg. The Sharpsberg position was also more convenient for defense. But in order to mislead the enemy, he stayed in Kidisville until 8 a.m. “At that moment when the sun rose, General Lee was undoubtedly in great alarm,” wrote Ezra Karman, “he did not receive news from Maclowes and Jackson, he did not know anything about how they were doing, how and when they were to him will join ” ^[91] .

In Kidisville, Lee soon received a report from Jackson, written on September 14 at 8:15 p.m.: Jackson wrote that he hoped to take Harpers Ferry on the morning of the 15th. Lee went straight to Sharpsburg and set up headquarters at Cemetery Hill, where Long Street joined him at 09:30. Через полчаса подошла дивизия Джона Джонса, и Лонгстрит поместил её правее дороги на Бунсборо и правее дивизии Хилла, при этом два полка бригады Тумбса были выдвинуты к самой реке Энтитем и заняли позицию у Рорбахского моста: это было необходимо, чтобы прикрыть мост на случай, если Маклоуз будет идти от Мэрилендских высот к Шарпсбергу через Рорбахский мост ^[92] .

Днём пришло донесение о взятии Джексоном Харперс-Ферри; Лонгстрит писал, что оно пришло в полдень ^[93] .

Худ с четырьмя бригадами перешёл Энтитем после 11:00 и в 12:00 занял позицию на Семетери-Хилл. Вся его артиллерия была развёрнута так, что б прикрывать подступы к Рорбахскому мосту. Последними на позицию пришли кавалерийские полки Россера , Манфорда, и батарея Пелхама . Россер покинул горы на рассвете и не спеша (так как его не преследовали) проследовал к Кидисвиллу, подгоняя тех, кто отбился от своих частей и регулярно отправляя генералу Ли донесения о наступлении противника. За Россером шла федеральная дивизия Ричардсона, которую он вынуждал время от времени разворачиваться в боевую линию и тем замедлял её наступление. Он перешёл Энтитем в полдень и сразу разослал пикеты во всех направлениях, так как его полк оказался единственным кавалерийским подразделением на поле боя. Два кавалерийских полка Манфорда подошли с юга, перешли Энтитем по Рорбахскому мосту и развернулись для прикрытия южного направления. К середине дня все подразделения успешно отступили за Энтитем, не понеся существенных потерь, и только кавалерийская бригада Фицхью Ли понесла урон в столкновении с кавалерией Плезонтона в Бунсборо ^[94] .

Федеральная армия начала наступление на рассвете. Дивизия Ричардсона перешла Южные горы по ущелью Тёрнера и подошла к Бунсборо, где попала под огонь пикетов Фицхью Ли и батареи Пелхама. Кавалерия Плезонтона отбросила пикеты Ли, и Ричардсон прошёл через Бунсборо и Кидисвилл к высотам у реки Энтитем. В 08:00 Макклеллан приказал корпусу Бернсайда наступать параллельно Ричардсону, а в 08:45 корпусу Самнера было приказано идти следом. В 15:00 Самнер и Хукер пришли в Кедисвилл, где из-за заторов на дороге остановились до ночи. Хукер лично прибыл на позицию Ричардсона, но ему показалось, что армия противника за рекой насчитывает 30 000 человек и атаковать эту позицию сходу опасно. В это время корпус генерала Портера подошёл к ущелью Фокса, где выяснилось, что Бернсайд ещё не начал марш. Портер обогнал Бернсайда и к вечеру присоединился к дивизии Ричардсона, заняв позицию слева. Бернсайд подошёл в конце дня, встав ещё левее корпуса Портера ^[95] .

Макклеллан в полдень покинул штаб в Боливаре, перешёл горы по ущелью Фокса, посетил место гибели генерала Джессе Рено , потом приехал в ущелье Тёрнера, поговорил с ранеными и отправился в Бунсборо. Оттуда он отправил телеграмму генералу Скотту, пробыл в городе некоторое время и только в 17:00 отправился дальше. Прибыл в Кидисвилл он разместил там штаб и встретился с корпусными командирами. Он выяснил, что на позиции стоят только дивизии Ричардсона и Сайкса, а остальные части ещё на марше, а противник занимает сильную позицию и поэтому атаковать его сходу не следует ^[96] .

Военный историк в 1882 году писал, что Макклеллан знал о капитуляции Харперс-Ферри, и точно знал, что под Харперс-Ферри стоят три дивизии Джексона, а так же дивизии Андерсона и Маклоуза. Он должен был знать, что у Шарпсберга стоят всего две дивизии, и их можно уничтожить решительной атакой. Как минимум, Макклеллан мог сблизиться с противником и выявить ширину его фронта. Но Макклеллан упустил момент и тем сам не вошёл в число знаменитых генералов. Это мнение приводит Эзра Карман, хотя редактор (Томас Клеменс) обращает внимание, что Макклеллан знал стратегическую ситуацию гораздо хуже, чем Пэлфрей в его время. Генерал Ховард впоследствии писал, что армия находилась в плохом физическом и моральном состоянии после разгрома под Манассасом и падения Харперс-Ферри, и её невозможно было эффективно ввести в бой 15 сентября. Сам Макклеллан писал, что его армия наступала только для того, что б сорвать планы Ли по вторжению в Мериленд, и поскольку цель эта была достигнута, то уже не было необходимости атаковать Ли, а гораздо важнее было завершить работу по наведению порядка в армии ^[97] .

Выбор поля боя

On the morning of September 15, when Lee took up a position near Sharpsberg, he expected to wait for MacLouse there, but did not plan to accept the fight. When the news came at noon about Harpers Ferry surrender and Jackson's approach, Lee changed his plans and canceled the retreat to Virginia. General Longstreet did not agree with this decision. Two days earlier, he considered it wrong to accept the battle in the South Mountains and offered to retreat to Sharpsberg, but after the capture of Harpers Ferry, he decided that it was best to withdraw the army for the Potomac. Subsequently, he wrote that the Sharpsberg position was good only if the southerners held Harpers Ferry and could strike from behind on the rear and communications of the federal army. The moral effect of the invasion of Maryland, but he said, was lost after an unsuccessful battle in the South Mountains ^[98] .

Retreating after the Potomac Lee could guarantee himself against defeat, but on the other hand, the prestige of the army would suffer if he retreated without a fight. The invasion of Maryland was conceived, among other things, to rid Virginia of war ruin, and Lee did not want to bring the war back to Virginia. The retreat would give time to McClellan to reorganize the army, train new recruits and prepare well for the new campaign. For this reason, it was wise to attack the Potomac Army even before it recovered from the consequences of the North Virginia campaign. A retreat would also have a negative effect on South supporters in the North and international public opinion. Eza Karman wrote that Lee was pressed against the Potomac and was forced to either fight in an uncomfortable position or retreat behind the Potomac, and only a very decisive commander could accept the battle in such circumstances, but Lee was just such a decisive commander. He believed in the invincibility of his army and took into account the demoralization of the enemy army ^[99] .

Lee also knew that Jackson supported his decision. In 1866, he wrote to Jackson's widow that when he arrived on the battlefield and listened to Lee's arguments, he enthusiastically supported the plan. He also agreed that retreating the Potomac River made sense, but nevertheless believed that you should not leave Maryland without a fight ^[100] .

September 16th

The divisions of Jackson, Walker and Maclowes were ordered to follow Sharpsburg as quickly as possible, but they had to feed the people first, and this delayed them until the night of September 15-16. Laughton’s brigade performed at sunset on September 15, but the rest of the brigades and Walker's division caught up with her only at 1 a.m. on September 16. According to Walker , only at 08:00 he and Jackson crossed the Potomac and headed to General Lee's headquarters. Jackson and Walker brought 10,300 people to Sharpsburg. Another 15,600 were already in position. Together, the army totaled 25,900 people. It remained to wait for the approach of the divisions of Anderson, MacLouse and E.P. Hill , but Lee, according to Walker, was sure that they would have time to come up ^[101] .

McClellan was not going to start the fight on the morning of September 16, so he did not give any orders and did not prepare for the beginning. He wrote to Halleck that dense fog interferes with revealing enemy positions. When the fog cleared, McClellan noticed that the enemy army had slightly changed position, and under this pretext postponed the battle. He was going to attack the left flank of the North Virginia army, but did not know where this flank was and what the terrain was on this site. Pleasanton's cavalry division was on alert, but for some reason was not used for reconnaissance. Pleasanton himself wrote that the cavalry was engaged in reconnaissance but, according to Ezra Karman, if that was the case, then we do not know anything about this. At 14:00, McClellan ordered the Hooker corps (Mead, Ricketts, and Doubleday divisions) to cross Entity and attack the enemy’s left flank, although no one could tell exactly where this flank was. Only at 16:00 the corps began to advance with the Mead division at the forefront. Hooker rode in front, and McClellan with headquarters soon caught up with him. Among other things, Hooker noted that his small corps, numbering about 12,000 people, was sent across the river to attack the entire enemy army, and if it is not strengthened, "they will simply devour it" ^[102] .

Lee learned of the offensive when he was at his headquarters in the house of Jacob Grove. He immediately ordered the Hood divisions to advance to the left flank, and Jackson to deploy his forces to the left. Hood's rifle chain was the first to meet the advancing enemy and a small skirmish occurred. Losses on both sides were small. While the shooting was underway, Jackson turned four brigades on the left: Winder and Jones in the first line, and Tagliaferro and Stark in the second. However, it soon got dark and Hooker stopped the attack, without having found out the location of the enemy flank. At the same time, his nomination completely gave General Lee McClellan's ideas. Lee immediately moved Ripley's brigade closer to the left flank. At this time, Hood asked him to be replaced by hungry people, and Lee redirected him to Jackson, who agreed to send Laughton and Trimble brigades to replace him. It was 10 o’clock in the evening when the hood retreated to the rear, promising to return at the first request ^[103] .

The Battle of Entityem

At dawn on September 17, federal artillery launched a bombardment, and then Joseph Hooker led his 1st Corps on the offensive on the left flank of the enemy. On his way stood the corps of Jackson: the divisions of Jones and Lawton. Jackson did not have a reserve except two Hood brigades, and he did not erect any fortifications. There were no natural shelters in his position either. Hooker's attack was overwhelming, Freeman wrote. Southerners suffered heavy losses: Lawton, Colonel Marcellus Douglas , General Jones and General Stark were seriously injured. Never before in the battles of the North Virginia Army have so many officers gone out of order at once. The front was nearly broken when the feds counterattacked Hood brigades with a total of about 2,000. At the same time, Earley attacked the right flank of the federals, and parts of D. Hill left. Hooker's offensive was stopped, but he was replaced by the Mansfield corps. His advance was also stopped, but after him began to attack the Sumner corps. At this time, the MacLouse division came to the battlefield and was immediately thrown into battle. Sumner retreated, a lull occurred on the battlefield ^[104] .

Assuming that an attack by the center would follow, General Lee personally visited the position and explained to the troops that the center should be held at all costs. Soon an attack followed: D. Hill's positions were attacked by the left wing of Sumner's corps. The attack was easily repelled, and Anderson's division came to the rescue of Hill. But Anderson was almost immediately wounded, he was replaced by Roger Prior , who immediately lost control of the division, and it crumbled into separate units. The position was attacked by the Richardson federal division, which managed to push Hill away, but did not dare to develop success. Around 2:00 p.m., the battle in this section subsided. Franklin’s corps came to the aid of Sumner, but Sumner decided not to bring him into battle, and McClellan approved the decision ^[105] .

During the whole battle, Lee transferred brigades from the right flank to the left and as a result, by the end of the day, only D.R. Jones's division remained on the right flank, which consisted of about 2000 people. At 10:00 the offensive of the IX Corps began . The Thumbes brigade kept the enemy near the Rohrbach bridge until 15:00, and then retreated to the heights of Sharpsberg. The feds began to advance on Sharpsburg, drove the Camper and Drayton brigades, and by 16:00 the battle on this site was almost lost by the southerners. Northerners had to walk 1,200 meters to cut Lee's retreat path beyond the Potomac. At this time , E.P. Hill arrived at Lee's headquarters. His division followed: Gregg’s brigade and Archer’s brigade. These units attacked the enemy on the flank and threw them back to the river ^[106] .

The battle lasted 12 hours and Lee deployed all of his units except the Thomas brigade. All his divisions suffered heavy losses, except for Anderson's division. Lee decided to stay in position, and only in the evening of September 18 began retreating beyond the Potomac. At dawn on September 19, the last division of Ewell’s division crossed the Potomac ^[107] .

Lee's Retreat for the Potomac

General McClellan was supposed to resume the battle on September 18. On the evening of the 17th, he and General Franklin (commander of the VI Corps) visited the right flank of the army, and Franklin offered to raise artillery to the heights of Nicodemus High, to fire from there the enemy positions (Jackson's divisions) in the Westwood forest, and then launch an offensive under their cover. McClellan approved the plan, but canceled the attack at night. He decided to wait for the reinforcements to reach 14,000 (under Reynolds ) from Pennsylvania. After nightly thinking over the situation, McClellan decided that the army was greatly exhausted by the battle and previous marches, its carts were far away and it would take time to feed people, and many units suffered heavy losses; for example, only 6,729 people remained in the Hooker corps. On the morning of September 18, Burnside requested reinforcements, from which it followed that he was not ready for a decisive offensive ^[108] .

As a result, on September 18, the Potomac Army spent replenishing ammunition, distributing food, taking out the wounded and preparing for the battle. The divisions of Couch and Humphreys approached, but the Reynolds pensioners refused to go further than Hagerstown. As a result, by noon on the 18th, McClellan had at his disposal 78,000 people, of whom 35,000 had not yet been entered into battle. It was decided to resume the offensive on September 19, but on the night of the 19th Southerners went beyond the Potomac ^[109] .

Colonel Allen wrote that not one of McClellan’s decisions in the campaign was criticized as much as this cancellation of the September 18 offensive, and not one criticism was just as unfair. McClellan's decision was approved by his subordinates and was fully combined with Lee's confidence that he would repel such an attack. Only the corps of Porter and Franklin were ready for the offensive, while the North Virginia army was completely concentrated. Allen believed that McClellan made the right decision ^[110] .

General Lee gathered the generals for advice an hour or two after dark. All generals spoke in favor of a retreat before dawn: Longstreet said that his corps had shrunk to a rifle chain and barely held a position, Jackson reported heavy losses in the officers and also offered to retreat, and General Hood said that his division no longer existed. Lee thought for a while, and then said that there would be no retreat. He proposed that all deserters be returned to service and prepared for attacks by the federals, if any follow ^[111] .

As early as the afternoon of September 17, Lee suggested that Jackson counterattack the right flank of the federals, but Jackson found that the enemy’s positions were very strong and an offensive in this sector was impossible. On the morning of September 18, Lee again offered Jackson to take 50 guns and attack the enemy, but he again refused. Then Colonel sent to Jackson, who studied the position and admitted that an attack by the available forces was impossible. Stephen Lee conveyed his thoughts to General Lee, and then he recalled that at his words a shadow fell on the general's face. He was forced to agree with the opinion of his most competent gunner. On the same day, a detachment of 6,000 people from Harpers Ferry joined the army, which compensated for half the losses, but the army did not exceed 35,000 early on. Lee did not have reserves, and the feds received reinforcements, and as a result, Lee decided to retreat ^[112] .

Between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., the convoys were ordered to start a retreat beyond the Potomac. After dark, Longstreet divisions began to retreat and completed the retreat by two in the morning. Jackson's divisions followed him. The last infantry unit to leave Maryland was Gregg's brigade. Behind her, FitzHugh Lee's cavalry brigade left Maryland. On September 19, at 10:00 the whole army left for the Potomac, leaving only some seriously wounded. When the cavalry of Pleisonton learned of the withdrawal of the enemy, it began the persecution and managed to capture 167 people, capture one gun and one banner ^[113] .

The Battle of Shepardstown

On September 19, parts of General Porter’s 5th Corps crossed the Potomac at Botelers Ford and attacked the southerners' rearguard under the command of William Pendleton. 4 guns were captured. On the morning of September 20, he transferred several more troops to the other side. The division of E.P. Hill attacked the enemy at the crossing and practically destroyed the 118th Pennsylvania regiment, which lost 269 people. After this battle, the feds no longer dared to pursue the enemy.

The main consequence of the battle was that General Lee believed Pendlenton and decided that McClellan was indeed undertaking aggressive pursuit. In view of this, he canceled the repeated invasion of Maryland and ordered the army to retreat up the Shenandoah Valley. It was after Shepardstan that it was decided to complete the Maryland campaign.

After the end of the campaign, the North Virginia army retained a high fighting spirit, but was greatly reduced numerically, mainly due to deserters. On September 21, Lee wrote that the combat readiness of the army suffers greatly due to desertion, and this was one of the main reasons for his retreat behind the Potomac. On September 25, Lee wrote that retreating from Maryland, he hoped to move the Potomac back to Williamsport and launch an offensive on Hagerstown, but the state of the army forced him to abandon these plans. He was ready to advance even with small forces, but decided that it was too dangerous, and the consequences of failure could be too serious. He made efforts to return the deserters and recruit recruits, and as a result, on September 22, the army was 36,187 people, and on October 1 there were already 55,843 people. By October 20, it reached a population of 68,000. But even having restored the size of the army, Lee chose to wait for McClellan's advance. To find out something about the location of the enemy’s army, he sent Stuart cavalry to reconnaissance on October 9, which resulted in Stuart’s second raid around McClellan ^[114] .

According to Douglas Freeman, successes in the North Virginia and Maryland campaigns were achieved because the groups of divisions were commanded by Jackson and Longstreet, but they found themselves in this position only because they were senior in rank as Major General. To improve the structure of the army, Lee had long proposed legislatively introducing the rank of lieutenant general and allowing grouping of corps. The Senate of the Confederation agreed to this on September 18, and after 10 days the new law came into force and the president asked Lee for candidates for new ranks. Lee suggested Jackson and Longstreet. He wrote about Jackson that he changed his mind about him for the better during the campaign (“during this expedition”) ^[115] .

November 5, McKelan was removed from command for indecision and lack of aggressiveness. On November 7, Ambrose Burnside was appointed the new commander, who already on November 10 proposed his plan of attack. This led to the battle of Frederiksberg on December 11th.

Losses

In his report, McClellan suggested that the enemy army lost 30,000. He wrote that the federal army did not lose a single weapon and not a single banner, while seizing 13 guns and 39 banners ^[116] .

Douglas Freeman considers the withdrawal beyond the Potomac the end of the campaign and estimates the federal losses at 27,767 people, of which about half are in the Harpers-Ferry garrison ^[4] .

Ezra Pocket provides statistics on federal losses for battles ^[3] :

The same figures are given by historian Thomas Clemens in an article in the Virginia Encyclopedia ^[117] .

Lincoln Proclamation

President Abraham Lincoln recalled that in the summer of 1862 things were getting worse and worse, and finally it became clear that you had to use your last card, completely change tactics, or lose everything. He decided to go for the emancipation of slaves and personally, without notifying the Cabinet, and without consulting him, drafted a “ Proclamation on the Liberation of Slaves ”. In late July, he called members of the cabinet and read them a text. The cabinet generally approved the proclamation, but Minister Seward proposed postponing its publication and not publishing it now, after military setbacks, but later, after some obvious success. Lincoln found Seward's position correct, and postponed the publication. From time to time, he edited the text, and at that time he eagerly awaited changes during the war. Soon Pope was defeated at the second Bull Run, but two weeks later news came of the battle of Entity and Lee's retreat behind the Potomac. Lincoln decided not to miss the moment and publish the proclamation immediately. He drew up the final text of the document, read it to the Cabinet, and on September 22, 1862, a proclamation was published ^[118] .

Many historians (Stephen Sears, James MacPherson and others) considered the Lincoln proclamation a revolution, or at least a “revolutionary event” that changed the course of the war, which from a war for economic and political interests turned into a war for the abolition of slavery. In this sense, they called the Maryland Campaign and the Battle of Entity the main turning points of the entire Civil War ^[119] .

International Reaction

The successes of the South in the North Virginia campaign and the invasion of Maryland could become sufficient grounds for recognition of the Confederation and European intervention in the war, but there was no unity on this issue in Europe. Napoleon III and members of the Palmerston cabinet advocated intervention, while Prussia and Russia were opposed. Lincoln hoped that the news of Lee's retreat and the publication of the Proclamation would have an immediate effect, but this did not happen. The historian of diplomacy, Howard Jones, believed that the events of the campaign in reality only brought closer the likelihood of intervention. Many perceived the Lincoln proclamation as a weapon of racial war ^[120] .

Comments

References to sources

• Allan, William. The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862. - Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1892. - 566 p.
• Carman, Ezra A. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Volume 1, South Mountain. - Savas Beatie, 2010 .-- 576 p. - ISBN 978-1932714814 .
• Carman, Ezra A. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Ezra A. Carman's Definitive Study of the Union and Confederate Armies at Antietam. - Routledge, 2012 .-- 512 p. - ISBN 9781135912390 .
• Cooling, B. Franklin. Counter-thrust: From the Peninsula to the Antietam. - U of Nebraska Press, 2007 .-- 354 p. - ISBN 0803215436 .
• Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. - New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001 .-- p. - ISBN 0-684-84944-5 .
• Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC 5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website.
• Freeman, Douglas S. Lee's lieutenants v. II. - New York: Charles Scribners sons, 1942 .-- 772 p.
• Glatthaar, Joseph T. General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse. New York: Free Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-684-82787-2 .
• Harsh, Joseph L. Sounding the Shallows: A Confederate Companion for the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-87338-641-8 .
• Luvaas, Jay, and Harold W. Nelson, eds. Guide to the Battle of Antietam. US Army War College Guides to Civil War Battles. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987. ISBN 0-7006-0784-6 .
• McPherson, James M. Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam. - New York: Oxford University Press, 2002 .-- 220 p. - ISBN 0-19-513521-0 .
• McClellan George Brinton. McClellan's own story: the war for the Union, the soldiers who fought it, the civilians who directed it and his relations to it and to them. - CL Webster & Company, 1887. - 678 p.
• Rafuse, Ethan S. McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-253-34532-4 .
• Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. ISBN 0-306-80913-3 .
• Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. - Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. - ISBN 0-89919-172-X .
• Wert, Jefry D. Cavalryman of the Lost Cause. - New York: Simon & Shuster, 2008 .-- 496 p. - ISBN 0-7432-7819-4 .
• Wolff, Robert S. “The Antietam Campaign.” In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: WW Norton & Company, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X .

• Virginia Encyclopedia Article
• Animated Campaign Map
• map of maryland campaign
• "My Maryland" - or His?
• With Eyes on the Harpers Ferry Road
• General Lee Begins His March Towards Maryland
• General Lee's reports