Strategic Defense Initiative

The basic elements of such a system were supposed to be based in space. To defeat a large number of targets (several thousand) within several minutes, the missile defense system under the SDI program provided for the use of active weapons based on new physical principles, including radiation, electromagnetic, kinetic, microwave, and a new generation of traditional missiles -cosmos "," air-space ".

Very difficult are the problems of launching missile defense elements into support orbits , target recognition in the presence of interference, divergence of radiation energy over long distances, aiming at high-speed maneuvering targets, and many others. Such global macro-systems as missile defense, having a complex autonomous architecture and a variety of functional connections, are characterized by instability and the ability to self-excite from internal malfunctions and external disturbing factors. The possible unauthorized actuation of individual elements of the space echelon of the missile defense system (for example, bringing it to high alert) can be regarded by the other side as preparation for a strike and can provoke it to preemptive actions.

Work on the SDI program is fundamentally different from the outstanding developments of the past - such as, for example, the creation of the atomic bomb ( Manhattan Project ) or the landing of a person on the moon ( Apollo project ). When solving them, the authors of projects overcame fairly predictable problems, caused only by the laws of nature. When solving problems with a promising missile defense system, the authors will also be forced to fight with a reasonable adversary capable of developing unpredictable and effective countermeasures.

The creation of a missile defense system with space-based elements, in addition to solving a number of complex and extremely expensive scientific and technical problems, is associated with overcoming a new socio-psychological factor - the presence of powerful, all-seeing weapons in space. It is the combination of these reasons (mainly the practical impossibility of creating SDI) that led to the refusal to continue work on the creation of SDI in accordance with its original plan. At the same time, with the Republican administration of George W. Bush coming to power in the United States, these works were resumed as part of the creation of a missile defense system.

Detection and target designation

Defeat and Destruction

Missiles

Missile defense was the most “classic” solution within the framework of SDI and was the main component of the last echelon of interception. Due to the insufficient reaction time of the anti-ballistic missiles, it is difficult to use them to intercept warheads on the main part of the trajectory (since the anti-missile requires considerable time to overcome the distance separating it from the target), but deploying and maintaining the anti-missile was relatively cheap. It was believed that anti-missiles will play the role of the last echelon of SDI, finishing off those individual warheads that will be able to overcome space-based missile defense systems.

At the very beginning of the development of the SDI program, it was decided to abandon the "traditional" nuclear warheads for missile defense. High-altitude nuclear explosions impeded the operation of radars, and thus, the downing of one warhead made it difficult to defeat the others - at the same time, the development of guidance systems made it possible to achieve direct missile defense into the warhead and destroy the warhead with the energy of the oncoming kinetic collision.

In the late 1970s, Lockheed developed the HOE project ( English Homing Overlay Experiment ) - the first project of a kinetic interception system. Since the perfectly accurate kinetic hit at that level of electronic development still posed some problems, the creators of HOE tried to expand the area of ​​destruction. The HOE striking element was a folding structure resembling an umbrella frame, which, when it exceeded the atmosphere, was unfolded and moved apart due to the rotation and centrifugal action of the loads fixed at the ends of the "spokes". Thus, the area of ​​destruction increased to several meters: it was assumed that the collision energy of the warhead with the load at a total approach speed of about 12-15 km / s will completely destroy the warhead.

Four system tests were undertaken in 1983-1984. The first three were unsuccessful due to failures in the guidance system, and only the fourth one, taken on June 10, 1984, was successful when the system intercepted the training unit of the ICBM Minuteman at an altitude of about 160 km. Although the HOE concept itself was not further developed, it laid the foundation for future kinetic interception systems.

In 1985, the development of ERIS ( Exoatmospheric Reentry Interceptor Subsystem ) and HEDI ( High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor - High Altitude Atmospheric Defense Interceptor ) initiations were initiated.

The ERIS rocket was developed by Lockheed and was designed to intercept warheads in outer space at approach speeds of up to 13.4 km / s ^[3] . The rocket samples were made on the basis of the stages of the Minitman solid-fuel ICBMs, the target was guided using an infrared sensor, and the striking element was an inflatable hexagonal design, at the corners of which the loads were placed: such a system provided the same lesion area as the HOE umbrella with much less mass. In 1991, the system carried out two successful intercepts of a training target (ICBM combat unit), surrounded by inflatable simulators. Although the program was officially closed in 1995, ERIS developments were used in subsequent American systems like THAAD and Ground-Based Midcourse Defense .

HEDI, developed by McDonnel Douglas , was a small short-range interceptor missile developed on the basis of the Sprint anti-ballistic missile ^[4] . Her flight tests began in 1991. In total, three flights were completed, two of which were successful, before the program was closed.

Nuclear-pumped lasers

A promising basis for an SOI system in the initial period was seen as X-ray laser systems pumped by nuclear explosions . Such installations were based on the use of special rods located on the surface of a nuclear charge, which after detonation would turn into an ionized plasma, but retain their previous configuration for the first milliseconds, and, cooling in the first fractions of a second after the explosion, would emit a narrow beam along its axis hard x-rays.

To circumvent the Treaty on the Non-Placement of Nuclear Weapons in Space , atomic laser missiles had to be based on refitted old submarines (in the 1980s, in connection with the decommissioning of Polaris SLBMs, 41 SSBNs that were supposed to be used to deploy missile defense systems were withdrawn from the fleet ) and run outside the atmosphere in the first seconds of the attack. Initially, it was assumed that the charge - code-named "Escalibur" - would have many independent rods, independently aimed at different targets, and thus be able to hit several warheads with one blow. Later decisions involved concentrating a plurality of rods on one target in order to obtain a powerful focused beam of radiation.

Mine testing of prototypes in the 1980s yielded, on the whole, positive results, but raised a number of unforeseen problems that could not be solved quickly. As a result, the deployment of nuclear lasers as the main component of the SDI had to be abandoned, transferring the program to the category of research.

Chemical lasers

According to one proposal, the space component of the SOI was supposed to consist of a system of orbital stations armed with more traditional chemically pumped lasers . Various design solutions have been proposed, with laser installations with power from 5 to 20 megawatts. Deployed in orbit, such "battle stars" ( eng. Battlestar ) were supposed to hit missiles and reconnaissance units in the early stages of flight, immediately after leaving the atmosphere.

Unlike the warheads themselves, the thin shells of ballistic missiles are very vulnerable to laser radiation. High precision inertial navigation equipment of autonomous breeding units is also extremely vulnerable to laser attacks. It was assumed that each laser battle station would be able to produce up to 1000 laser series, with the stations that were closer to the enemy’s territory at the time of the attack were supposed to attack taking off ballistic missiles and reconnaissance units, while those further away would have detached warheads.

Experiments with the MIRACL laser ( Eng. Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser ) have demonstrated the feasibility of creating a deuterium fluoride laser capable of delivering megawatt output power in 70 seconds. In 1985, in bench tests, an improved version of the laser with an output of 2.2 megawatts destroyed a liquid ballistic missile fixed 1 km from the laser. As a result of a 12-second exposure, the walls of the rocket body lost strength and were destroyed by internal pressure. In vacuum, such results could be achieved at a much greater distance and with a shorter irradiation time (due to the absence of beam scattering by the atmosphere and the absence of environmental pressure on the rocket tanks).

The laser battle station development program continued until the closure of the SDI program.

Orbital Mirrors and Ground Lasers

In the 1980s, the idea of ​​a partially-cosmic laser system, which would include a powerful laser complex located on the Earth, and a system of orbital mirrors directing the reflected beam to warheads was considered within the framework of the SDI. The location of the main laser complex on the ground made it possible to solve a number of problems with providing energy, removing heat and protecting the system (although at the same time it led to inevitable loss of beam power during the passage of the atmosphere).

It was assumed that a complex of laser systems located on the peaks of the highest mountains of the United States, at a critical moment of the attack will be activated and direct the rays into outer space. Concentrating mirrors located in geostationary orbits were supposed to collect and focus the rays scattered by the atmosphere, and redirect them to more compact redirecting mirrors located in a low orbit - which would aim the double-reflected rays at warheads.

The advantages of the system were the simplicity (principle) of construction and deployment, as well as low vulnerability to enemy attacks - concentrating mirrors made of thin film were relatively easy to replace. In addition, the system could potentially be used against take-off ICBMs and reconnaissance units - much more vulnerable than the warheads themselves - at the initial stage of the trajectory. The big drawback was the huge - in view of the energy losses during the passage of the atmosphere and the re-reflection of the beam - the necessary power of ground-based lasers. According to estimates, almost 1,000 gigawatts of electricity were required to power a laser system capable of providing reliable destruction of several thousand ICBMs or their warheads, redistributing it in just a few seconds in case of war would require a gigantic overload of the U.S. energy system.

Neutral particle emitters

Significant attention was paid to the possibility of creating a so-called beam weapon , striking a target with a stream of particles dispersed to sublight speeds. In view of the considerable mass of particles, the damaging effect of such a weapon would be significantly higher than that of lasers similar in energy consumption; however, the flip side was the problem of focusing the particle beam.

As part of the SDI program, it was planned to create heavy orbital automatic stations armed with emitters of neutral particles. The main stake was placed on the radiation effect of high-energy particles, when they were braked in the material of enemy warheads; such exposure was supposed to disable the electronics inside the warheads. The destruction of the warheads themselves was considered possible, but requiring long-term exposure and high power. Such weapons would be effective at distances up to tens of thousands of kilometers. Several experiments were conducted with the launch of prototypes of emitters on suborbital rockets.

It was assumed that emitters of neutral particles can be used in the framework of SDI as follows:

• Discrimination of false targets - even small power beams of neutral particles that hit the target would cause electromagnetic radiation emissions, depending on the material and structure of the target. Thus, even at minimum power, emitters of neutral particles could be used to identify real warheads against the backdrop of false targets.
• The defeat of electronics - braking in the target material, neutral particles would provoke powerful ionizing radiation that can destroy electronic circuits and kill living organisms. Thus, irradiation with flows of neutral particles could destroy the target's microcircuit and hit the crews without physically destroying the target.
• Physical destruction - with sufficient power and density of a beam of neutral particles, its deceleration in the target material would lead to powerful heat generation and physical destruction of the target structure. At the same time - since heat would be released as particles ran through the target material - thin screens would be completely ineffective against such weapons. Given the high accuracy inherent in such weapons, it was possible to quickly put an enemy spacecraft out of action, destroying its key components (propulsion systems, fuel tanks, sensory and weapon systems, a control cabin).

The development of emitters of neutral particles was considered a promising direction, however, due to the significant complexity of such installations and the enormous energy consumption, their deployment within the framework of SDI was assumed no earlier than 2025.

Atomic Buckshot

As a side branch of the nuclear-pumped laser program, the possibility of using nuclear explosion energy to accelerate to extremely high velocities of material shells (buckshots) was considered within the framework of the SDI program. The Prometheus program ^[5] assumed the use of the plasma front energy generated during the detonation of the kiloton power of nuclear charges in order to accelerate tungsten fillets. It was assumed that upon detonation of a charge placed on its surface, a tungsten plate of a special shape will collapse into millions of tiny grains moving in the right direction at a speed of up to 100 km / s. Since it was believed that the collision energy was not enough for the effective destruction of the warhead, the system was supposed to be used for the effective selection of false targets (since the "shot" of the atomic shotgun covered a significant sector of the near-Earth space), the dynamics of which from the collision with the cartridges should have changed significantly.

Railguns

Electromagnetic rail accelerators capable of dispersing (due to the Lorentz force ) a conducting projectile to a speed of several kilometers per second were also considered as an effective means of hitting warheads. On opposing paths, a collision even with a relatively light projectile could lead to the complete destruction of the warhead. В плане космического базирования, рельсотроны были значительно выгоднее, чем рассматривавшиеся параллельно с ними пороховые либо легкогазовые пушки, так как не нуждались в метательном веществе.

В ходе экспериментов по программе CHECMATE (Compact High Energy Capacitor Module Advanced Technology Experiment) удалось добиться существенного прогресса в области рельсотронов, но в то же время стало ясно, что это оружие не слишком пригодно для космического развёртывания. Значительной проблемой стало большое потребление энергии и выделение тепла, отвод которого в космосе вызвал потребность в значительных по площади радиаторах. В итоге, программа рельсотронов в рамках СОИ была отменена.

Кинетические спутники-перехватчики

В ноябре 1986 года было выдвинуто предложение сделать основным компонентом СОИ миниатюрные спутники-перехватчики, поражающие цели кинетическим ударом при прямом столкновении. Тысячи таких крошечных сателлитов могли быть выведены заранее на орбиту, и в нужный момент — нацелиться на взлетающие ракеты или боеголовки и столкнуться с ними.

Проект «Бриллиантовая галька» ( англ. Briliant Pebbles ) предусматривал вывод на околоземную орбиту системы из более чем 4000 миниатюрных спутников, оснащённых самостоятельной лидарной системой наведения. Спутники должны были наводиться на поднимающиеся из атмосферы баллистические ракеты, и поражать их лобовым столкновением на встречном курсе. Удар 14-килограммового аппарата при скорости сближения порядка 10-15 км/с гарантировал полное уничтожение ракеты или боеголовки неприятеля.

Основным преимуществом системы была её практически полная неуязвимость для превентивного удара противника. Система состояла из тысяч крошечных спутников, разнесённых на десятки и сотни километров друг от друга. Принимая во внимание сложность отслеживания столь небольших объектов, противник физически не мог уничтожить за разумное время значительное их число: пополнить же потери можно было достаточно быстро. Стандартные методы ослепления и нарушения работы системы помехами также не были бы эффективны ввиду значительного количества сателлитов и отсутствия интеграции системы в иные компоненты СОИ.

Система «Бриллиантовая галька» рассматривалась как наиболее перспективная часть СОИ, так как была основана исключительно на доступных технологиях и не требовала никаких фундаментальных исследовательских программ для реализации. При этом потенциальная эффективность спутников-перехватчиков была бы весьма высока, и они могли поражать любой тип движущихся в космическом пространстве целей. Тем не менее, как и иные компоненты СОИ, «Бриллиантовая галька» не была реализована, и программа была закрыта в 1994 году. Во время войны в Персидском Заливе , ряд военных аналитиков считало, что даже частичное развёртывание «Бриллиантовой гальки» могло бы полностью нейтрализовать урон, наносимый иракскими баллистическими ракетами типа « Скад ».

USA

United Kingdom

Thorn EMI (электроника), Ferranti ( программное обеспечение ), (информационные системы), British Aerospace ( ракетно-космическая техника ), Университет Хериота-Уатта (оптическая вычислительная техника). ^[7]

• Противоракетная оборона США
• СК-1000

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