Fichte, Johann Gottlieb

Childhood and youth

The boy’s outstanding abilities drew the attention of Baron Miltits, who once was late for church service and missed a sermon. Fichte had a phenomenal memory and reproduced this sermon for the Baron word for word, which made a great impression on the latter, and he took care of the boy's further education. From 1774 to 1780 he studied at Pfort . Then Fichte listened to lectures of theology in the Jena and Leipzig universities .

Obeying the mother’s insistence, young Fichte intended to become a pastor, but the death of the patron took away from him the hope of getting the desired place. For a long time he struggled with want, giving private lessons. From 1788, he became the home teacher in Zurich , where he met Lavater and Pestalozzi , as well as Johanna Rhine ( Klopstock's niece), whom she later married.

Maturity

In 1790, Fichte studied critical philosophy for the first time: until then, he was fascinated by Spinoza and rejected free will. He was particularly struck by the ethical side of Kant's philosophy: the reconciliation of the antinomy of freedom and necessity and the associated consciousness of the possibility of morality. Ethical aspirations are for Fichte the root sources of philosophical creativity. He expresses the inseparability of the moral side of the personality from the views that it develops in words: “which philosophy you choose depends on what kind of person you are.”

In 1791, Fichte arrived in Konigsberg ; here he became acquainted with Kant, to whom he sent the manuscript "The Critique of Any Revelation Experience". Kant approved his work and found a publisher for him. The writing was published anonymously and was greeted by the public with the greatest sympathy: it was taken for the work of Kant himself on the philosophy of religion, which was expected with impatience. When the misunderstanding turned out, Fichte immediately became famous.

From 1794 to 1799, Fichte lectured at the University of Jena. In 1798, together with Forberg , he was accused of atheism (by anonymous denunciation) for the article “On the Basis of Our Belief in the Divine World Government”, which was an introduction to Forberg’s article “Development of the Concept of Religion”. Fichte stated that he did not plead guilty and, in the event of receiving a public reprimand, would retire, which he did when he did not find support from his university comrades; even Goethe found that about objects touched by Fichte, “it would be better to keep deep silence”.

In Berlin (1799), where Fichte went, both the king and the society reacted to him sympathetically. He became close with Schlegel, with Schleiermacher, and soon began to read public lectures that attracted a large audience. In 1805, he began to lecture in Erlangen. The French offensive forced him to move to Königsberg, where he briefly lectured and prepared his “Speeches to the German People”, delivered by him at the Berlin Academy in the winter of 1807–8.

Under the French occupation of Germany, Fichte addressed his speeches "To the German Nation" (1808), in which he called for the moral revival of the Germans and fell into many nationalist exaggerations.

- Z. Ya. Beletsky

In Berlin, he became a Freemason , having entered the Masonic Lodge “Pythagoras to a Flaming Star”, remained its member until death ^[2] .

In 1809, the University of Berlin was founded, where Fichte occupied the chair of philosophy.

Death

He died on January 29, 1814 in Berlin , infected with a fever from his wife who selflessly devoted herself to caring for the wounded in military hospitals. As a person, Fichte undoubtedly represents the features of a great character: unity and integrity of nature, honesty and integrity, in connection with the desire for independence and remarkable self-control - these are its main features. Their downside is some stubbornness, toughness and poverty of fantasy; Jacobi speaks of Fichte's “logical fanaticism.”

The imperative nature of Fichte's thinking sometimes even affects those external forms that he attaches to his thought - it suffices to recall at least the title of one of his articles: “Sonnenklarer Bericht, ein Versuch den Leser zum Verstehen zu zwingen” (Clear story as day, attempt to force the reader understand). Schelling and his wife composed a witty quatrain about this: “Zweifle an der Sonne Klarheit, zweifle an der Sterne Licht, Leser, nur an meiner Dahmheit nicht!” only in your stupidity and our truth, there is no doubt) Theoretical philosophy had, in the eyes of Fichte, a service purpose in relation to practical. That is why Fichte, like Socrates, does not delve into the study of natural-philosophical problems: ethical interest prevails in his soul over theoretical interest (in addition, he lacked scientific knowledge). Equally, Fichte devotes very little space to his aesthetic questions in his philosophical works - a feature resembling Plato and Spinoza. The most important works of Fichte are devoted to metaphysics, legal philosophy, ethics, philosophy of history, social pedagogy and philosophy of religion.

As a thinker, Fichte did not enjoy widespread popularity. The number of studies on Fichte is much lower than, for example, the number of studies on Schopenhauer or Herbart .

In the theory of knowledge, the value of Fichte lies in proclaiming the inseparability of subject and object from each other and in indicating that the consistent development of critical idealism should lead to critical solipsism . Representatives of this latter trend stood out from the Neo-ichtean faction of Kant's philosophy (Schubert-Soldern). In the field of practical philosophy, the relationship established by Fichte between ethics and socialism is extremely important: he was the first to understand and prove that the economic question is closely related to the ethical one. No less interesting are the social and pedagogical ideas of Fichte: they found an echo in the study of Natorp .

The metaphysics of Fichte (the work "Science” in the original edition) was influenced mainly by three factors:

• Influence of previous philosophical systems
• Psychological motives
• Social need to create a social philosophy

Influence of previous philosophical systems, mainly Kant and Spinoza

From Spinoza, Fichte borrowed the rationalistic spirit of his system. If Spinoza seeks more geometrico to deduce the entire content of his philosophy from a single concept ( God ), then Fichte in the same strictly scholastic (though not mathematical form) tends to deduce the entire content of his system from a single concept (“ I ”). But, being carried away by Spinoza’s logical monism , Fichte seeks to break with the dogmatic basis of this rationalistic system. Returning to substance as to some otherworldly, transcendental entity, as Spinoza has it, seems to him impossible after Kant's criticism.

In the system of Kant, Fichte sees the following disadvantages:

• With his critique of knowledge, Kant showed in the most obvious way that all being is certainly a conceivable, conscious being: being not conceivable, unconscious, lying outside the limits of the spirit - “the thing in itself” - is non-sens, “Unding”; Meanwhile, Kant does not discard this “thing in itself,” but asserts that things in themselves exist and affect our feelings. In this way, Kant again falls into the dogmatism against which he fought. An amendment to its system is needed, which consists in proclaiming absolute idealism, in recognizing the imaginary meaning behind the notion of “things in themselves”.
• Describing the mechanism of knowledge in Critique, Kant does not take the trouble to establish a single basic principle of knowledge, from which all the subsequent would follow with logical necessity: forms of contemplation, categories and laws of thought are described by Kant, but their internal connection and logical unity have not been proven. This deduction of all the laws of knowledge from a single basic principle (our "I") F. and undertakes in the "Science".
• Kant's philosophy suffers from an uncompromising dualism of theoretical and practical reason. The world of things in itself and the world of phenomena remain divided, the categorical imperative and idea of ​​duty are not internally connected with an idealistic world view: it is necessary to create a link between knowledge and activity. Such a link is, according to F., the idea of ​​mental effort, which forms the basis of knowledge (in the activity of attention in the process of judgment, in the "spontaneity" of the mind) and at the same time is the core and volitional activity, manifested in our determination to act according to the command of reason.

By introducing “amendments” to Kant’s system, Fichte continues to regard his system as criticism , despite the disapproval with which she was met by Kant. The interpretation of Kant's system in Fichte was also influenced by minor Kantians of the end of the 18th century: Rheingold , Maimon and Beck , as well as the skeptic Schulze (Aenesidemus), especially in the idealistic interpretation of the “things in themselves” problem.

Psychological motives

The formation of Fichtean metaphysics, in addition to previous philosophical systems, was influenced by psychological motives. He considered morality unthinkable without free will - and on the basis of dogmatic philosophy (for example, within the limits of Spinozism), the idea of ​​freedom turned out to be impracticable. Only critical idealism reconciled the antinomy of freedom and necessity.

Hence, the joy that Fichte experienced when he mastered the foundations of critical philosophy: she gave him a firm support in the moral revival that he longed for himself and for the crushed, immersed in the egoism of modern German society. In freedom, the path to the renewal of humanity, to the creation of a "new earth and new heavens"; there is no morality without freedom, and freedom is permissible only from an idealistic point of view — this is the line of reasoning that makes Fichte defend idealism with such passion.

For Fichte, Kant's idealism, which leaves at least a problematic existence for a thing in itself, does not seem to guarantee spiritual freedom. Only from the point of view of absolute idealism, which recognizes the entire material world as the creation of the spirit, is complete power over nature, complete autonomy of the spirit possible. Doubts in freedom, in the foundations of morality, a critical attitude to the idea of ​​duty, attempts to investigate its origin were psychologically impossible for such a nature as Fichte; a theoretical study of duty seems to be impossible for him, for “this would be a diabolical attempt if the concept of the devil made sense”. “Already with one name of freedom,” he says, “my heart expands, flourishes, whereas with the word" necessity "it painfully shrinks." This subjective element of Fichte’s philosophy was indicated during the life of F. Hegel , who noted “Fichte’s tendency to be horrified, to mourn and to be disgusted at the thought of the eternal laws of nature and their strict necessity.”

Social need to create a social philosophy

The nature of Fichte’s philosophy was also determined by the public need to create a social philosophy that had matured in Germany.

Kant outlined the path that philosophical thought was to take in the field of politics and law , but he did little in that direction. His “ Metaphysical Principles of the Doctrine of Law ”, published after Fichte’s legal philosophy, is one of his weakest works. Meanwhile, the need for solid leadership in the field of politics and law in the era following the Great French Revolution was very great.

Kant drew a sharp demarcation line between the laws of knowledge and the norms of morality :

• laws apply to what is; they are the immutable properties of the knowable;
• norms are prescriptions for what should be;

norms are violated - the laws are determined by the structure of the cognizing mind and therefore are inviolable.

Fichte reveals a desire to efface this dualism of natural and moral necessity : in his eyes, thinking and activity , knowledge and behavior are so closely fused in the activity of our spirit that a retreat from the norms of behavior should entail the impossibility of natural knowledge.

Kant, contrasting the logical necessity of the laws of knowledge of the moral necessity of the categorical imperative, puts knowledge in a subordinate attitude to the moral law, without denying, however, the possibility of knowledge outside of morality. Fichte goes further and allows the very possibility of knowledge only under the condition of the admission of moral norms: "Kein Wissen ohne Gewissen".

Metaphysics

The initial position of Fichte’s philosophy thus represents, as it were, the synthesis of Cartesian " Cogito " with Kant's " categorical imperative "; it contains both an indication of a self-evident truth and the basic dictates of conscience . Just as the mechanic presumes to his research the postulates “allow the existence of motion” (at least ideal), so Fichte begins with a decree: “Cogita!”.

“I” as some kind of unceasing spiritual activity, necessity at once both moral and logical , necessity both to think and act, for thinking is already activity — that is what Fichte’s beginning of philosophy: “Im Anfang war die Tat”. The unceasing activity of the spirit is something self-evident, for in the process of knowing one cannot be distracted from the "I" and its activity. All further content of cognition is a further necessary manifestation of this activity of our "I". Knowledge is not a fixed scheme of laws and forms of thought, given to our mind statically from the outside: it is always a living process that needs to be considered dynamically. The theory of knowledge is at the same time a theory of activity, for all laws and the entire content of knowledge are extracted by the activity of the spirit from its own essence. So I am; This provision contains not only an indication of the fundamental fact of consciousness, but it also contains an indication of some basic law of thought - the law of identity .

What does "I am?" This means: “I” am “I.” Whatever the random empirical content of my consciousness, I am unquestionably aware of the identity of my “I” with myself. Equally, "I am" encompasses the main category of our thought - the category of reality. I can doubt the reality of anything, only in the reality of the "I" can not be doubted, because it is the basis of reality. But the establishment of the activity of the spirit of the undoubted fact of the reality of the “I” - “the self-laying” - is possible only under the assumption that this “I” is opposed by something imagined, recognized by him, for him, the “subject” serving as the “object”. Thus, the “I” implies something opposing to it - the “non-I”. But the concepts of “I” and “non-I” are in contradiction with one another; hence, with the opposite of “I” and “not-I”, the law of contradiction is closely connected (“I am not Not-I” - “And is not not A”), as well as the category of negation, judgments rest on the latter. which we oppose the subject and the predicate. But the “not-I” opposes our “I” and limits it, just as the latter limits the “non-I”; Consequently, both parties in the process of cognition - the subject and the object - are not limitless, but mutually limit their activities: “I” opposes in the “I” to the divisible (that is, limited) “I” the divisible “non-me”.

Such are the "three fundamental points" of Fichte’s theoretical philosophy:

• thesis
• antithesis
• synthesis

representing in their sequence the dialectic process of opening up the contradiction and its “taking off” by the act of the spirit following it.

In the third position, “I” and “non-I” mutually limit each other and combine their opposite properties in their relationship; it contains the category of restriction or definition, for every definition is a synthesis of the heterogeneous. But at the same time, the law of the foundation is concluded in it, by virtue of which we bring species concepts under generic ones, uniting the particular, different in general.

But, as has already been noted, knowledge is a process: “I” does not contemplate simply “not-I”, they interact, with what “I” plays an active role (assuming “not-I”), and “not-I” - passive. At first glance, it may seem that the opposite between them is qualitative, that is, “non-me” is absolutely sui generis compared to “me”. This is the viewpoint of dogmatism , regarding the “non-I” - the external world - as something completely alien to our “me”.

The dogmatists of realism fall into the illusion here: they take the product of the creative activity of the spirit as an other-worldly reality. In fact, there is a quantitative contrast between “I” and “non-I”: objects of cognition seem to be more or less close to our self-consciousness, more or less distinctly conscious, but in the end they all belong to our “I”. The creative spirit gives rise to the “non-I”, projects it before us, is the cause of its apparent independence from consciousness - objectivity, and its activity creates that “non-me” that is stable in the changing attributes that represents the substantiality of things.

Thus, the categories of interaction , causality and substantiality follow from the relationship between subject and object.

But why are we so inclined to regard the “non-I” as something external to our consciousness that exists besides it? Why do we imagine that the inert, material substance that is the cause of our knowledge of the phenomena of the external world hides behind the sensual shell of phenomena?

Fichte does not in the least deny the coercive nature that perceptions possess, imposed on our consciousness as something external, independently of us. He explains this metaphysical illusion as follows. Spirit is unceasing activity, unlimited activity, progressus in indefinitum; he seeks, as it were, to embrace the “non-I”, to make it entirely the object of the highest consciousness, spirituality. “Not-I” is sensual material that must be embraced by the “I” and elevated to a degree of clear consciousness; but “not-I” seems to limit this incessant activity of the spirit: only an insignificant part of it penetrates the sphere of clear consciousness — the rest escapes like material that is subject to a clear study and processing of the spirit in the future. “I” is like Saturn , forever devouring its offspring “not-me” and never satisfying its hunger. My empirical consciousness is, as it were, the arena of this eternal struggle of the titan “I” with his own product - the sensual world. But only the final product of this elemental process, this eternal creative activity of the "I" penetrates into my immediate consciousness. I have to see the outside world as something not dependent on my will and on my consciousness, not because it has reality as a thing in itself, but because the process of its objectification by the creative "I" was an unconscious process, and I suddenly meet in my consciousness that springs from the subconscious depths of my spirit. The projection of the world into the outside is accomplished in my “I” by the unconscious mechanism of creative imagination. The product of this creative activity is, first of all, the material from which perceptions are woven, so to speak, namely sensations: after all, perceptions and the essence of sensations, objectified by the unconscious activity of the "I".

But this objectification of sensations itself is possible only through the medium of space and time. In contrast to Kant, who proved the ideality of objects on the basis of the ideality of space and time, Fichte proves the ideality of space and time on the basis of the ideality of objects.

Space as a continuous, homogeneous and infinitely divisible environment is represented by Fichte as a condition of the creative act of projection of sensations. Fichte, however, does not assume space as an empty container, which the creative activity of the “I” fills with objectified sensations. Space is an expression of a simple relationship of coexistence: not things are in space, but they are extended, because otherwise they could not coexist. So, the object is extended; in what relation to him is a constantly active subject? What is the contact between this activity and the phenomenon it generates? Our “I” constantly moves attention from one object to another: at every moment its “Blickpunct” is directed at something - and this moment of the present in the focus of consciousness, representing the ever-moving border between the past and the future, is a condition for our self-consciousness.

Thus, to “put in”, to realize the object of consciousness, time is needed, which is the relation of a sequence. From this it is clear that space and time are the products of the extra-spatial and timeless creative activity of the imagination. The interior of the impenetrable objects of perception and that which lies beyond the immediate sphere of perception, as well as the past tense, are unreal in the sense of existence independent of consciousness; but for consciousness they are real, as representations, naturally constructed by our imagination. The past exists for us only as a representation in the present. "The question of whether the past really exists is tantamount to the question: does a thing exist in itself." There is no empty space, the length and intensity of sensation must be synthetically related: space is generated by the expansive activity of the imagination, expressed in a continuous continuous transition from filling a given space with a feeling and filling it with a feeling b, c, d, etc. But if the process of cognition is a continuous process over time, then one asks, what creates stability, constancy in this stream of sensations? Such a conservative, stable beginning is the mind (Verstand) - that which the cognizable by us fixes, establishing concepts. The concepts established by reason are developed by the power of judgment, which is a fundamental act of spiritual activity; through him we also reach the consciousness in the mind, that is, the consciousness of consciousness or self-consciousness. Thus, we came to the starting point of the "Science of Learning", from which we set off, as if from self-evident truth. Therefore, all theoretical philosophy is a vicious circle.

In the above course of reasoning described the process of knowledge, which is characterized by our theoretical "I". But in our "I" there is a practical side. The relationship between “I” and “non-I” is opposite in both cases. From a theoretical point of view, the “I” believes itself to be limited through the “non-I”: the subject is inconceivable without the object that must be opposed by him and the object limiting it. From a practical point of view, this relationship between subject and object is changing. The “I” supposes the “non-I” defined by the “I”. The center of our "I" is the activity of the spirit - mental effort and at the same time the impulse of the will. “I” uncontrollably seeks to spiritualize, to intellectualize the “not-me” opposing him - to raise him to a higher level of consciousness, to subordinate him to the law of reason, in which lies the law of conscience. The “non-I” limits the “I”, but by this it imparts a jolt (Anstoss), a delay to the eternal tendency of the “I” to dominate. The “I” seeks to overcome this delay. It evokes craving for reflection - but it necessarily implies the realization of some object of representation - and the “I” manifests this desire for productivity. But the attempt of the “I” to embody its practical aspirations, to quench the insatiable thirst for activity, comes up against the restriction on the part of the “non-me”. Hence the dissatisfaction, the feeling of coercion; it creates a desire for self-determination. Self-determination must be in freedom, in harmony between attraction and its realization. Such harmony is achievable only by unceasing activity for the sake of activity, in which the “absolute attraction” of our “I” is expressed - a moral duty. Fichte actually differs the status of the non-I in the epistemological and ontological aspects, ignoring the idea expressed in the “Science” that the non-I exist independently of the final, empirical being, that only in the theory of knowledge does science begin to deduce all possible definitions from I not-I and what I am doing according to the real thing is consistent with the real thing.

How does Fichte understand the freedom of "I"? In our "I" should distinguish two sides:

• I am "empirical" and
• I am "absolute."

The empirical “I” is the totality of all internal (reproduced) ideas , feelings and perceptions that form for me the external world and my personality. One of the necessary moments (in the logical, but not the temporal sense of the word) of this process of objectification is the law of causality . This law, like other laws of knowledge, unlimitedly dominates the entire content of my empirical "I", over the whole world of sensory experience. In the experience of unthinkable exceptions to this law.

Like Kant , Fichte proclaims the strictest determinism in the field of experience . But our empirical "I" is connected with the absolute, super-individual - with the unconscious basis of world existence, which is "der Weltträger". Reflexion indicates the need for its existence, for the objective and coercive nature of perceptions is inexplicable without the assumption of unconscious activity of the spirit. Is this side of our “I” subject to the inexorable power of the law of causality? Obviously, it is not subject to, for the yoke of the law of causality is imposed in the process of objectification on the sensual world by the absolutely free activity of this super-individual “me”.

This is the metaphysical justification of the absolute freedom of the "I"; but it also finds support in the psychological data of internal experience. Every action of ours, every change of sensations, is predetermined by empirical conditions; but in our mind there is an element absolutely free. This is the activity of voluntary attention; we have "absolute freedom of reflection and abstraction in relation to the theory and the ability, according to our duty, to direct attention to a known object or to distract it from another object, an opportunity without which no morality is possible." In other words, attention activity is independent of neither the physiological conditions nor the mental mechanism of the representations over which it operates (a point of view reminiscent of the psychologists of James ). So, we recognize ourselves as free, and we are free by that side of our “I”, which, as it were, is addressed to the absolute, super-individual. But what do we do with this freedom?

Suppose that I stand on the point of view of solipsism , that is, I assume that the absolute "I" was embodied only in one of my empirical "I". How can I realize my freedom in the sensual world, in the spiritual desert that surrounds me? Showing power over natural visions of objects, people and animals and using them to satisfy my desires? But such freedom would be complete slavery, and therefore cruel illusion. From the point of view of solipsism, freedom is impracticable, although real, as a fact of consciousness; for all my influence on the "non-I" is determined. A free impact on the object of knowledge is possible only on the condition that, if it does not force, to force me to cause certain actions, like any sensory object, but only to induce actions. Such an incentive to action can only be such an object, which in itself is a subject, that is, a free self-determining being. And such a subject can only be outside of me, alien, but similar to me in my psychic organization “I.”

The multiplicity of free consciousness, interacting and encouraging each other to collectively overcome the inert opposition of the "not-me" - this is the only possible condition for the realization of freedom in the world. In us it is inseparably connected with the process of cognition, the need for unstoppable, unlimited activity for the sake of activity, and yet, from the point of view of solipsism, it does not find any outcome for itself. Therefore, an unmet moral need compels us to postulate a plurality of homogeneous on the organization of consciousnesses, with which we could interact through the medium of “not-me”; in this sense, "the world is a system of many individual wills."

Practically solipsism is easily refuted. It is enough to begin to treat the solipsist as “as if you acknowledge that he is telling the truth ... that he himself does not exist, or if he does, then only as inactive matter. He doesn’t like the joke: “you don’t have to do this,” he will say. Fichte reinforces his moral postulate by pointing to a psychological fact: our self-consciousness is possible only as a social product . “One of the main motivations of a person is to assume outside himself the existence of rational creatures of their own kind: man is destined to live in society; if he lives in isolation, then he is not a complete, complete person and contradicts himself. ”

Nevertheless, from a theoretical point of view, Fichte does not consider absolutely reliable conclusions by analogy from the similarity of the manifestations of mental life in me and others to the similarity of the corresponding mental states. If I find sugar sweet, then I have no objective data to make sure that it is sweet for another. Fichte, however, does not delve deeper into the study of doubts about the reality of others ’selves. For him, practical certainty here is quite sufficient: Hartmann directly attributes Fichte's theoretical solipsism, combined with practical belief in a plurality of consciousnesses - and there is no doubt that Fichte is very close to such a point of view. At this point, the idea of ​​goal, which plays such an important role in Fichte’s philosophy, comes to the fore.

The super-individual “I” should have disintegrated or, better said, embodied in a plurality of empirical “I” in order to create the possibility of the realization of debt by collective efforts, the possibility of infinite approximation of the sensual world, what it is, to what it should be. “Does it not seem,” says Fichte, “when you see the mutual tenderness connecting father and mother with children or brothers and sisters among themselves,” does it not seem then that souls, like bodies, came out of one germ, that they too the essence is nothing but the stems and branches of the same tree? ” The empirical "I" is infinitely diverse, despite the formal identity of the mental organization (uniformity of the laws of knowledge) of all people; no two personalities with the same personality. Every person is something original. The absolute “I” falls into a plurality of individuals, like a white ray, refracted by a prism, splits into the colors of the spectrum. In contrast to Nietzsche , who later taught about the "eternal cycle" of the absolute periodic recurrence of things and people, Fichte, following Leibniz, proclaims the non-repeatability of individuals. And since each individual in the mind has the idea of ​​duty - the desire for moral freedom, then due to his inherent originality he can realize this freedom only by his own peculiar way.

Hence the imperative of conscience : thoughts and actions are completed by adding: according to your purpose, to which your mind and conscience point you. Thus, the name of teleological criticism is fully applicable to Fichte’s worldview. It would be a blunder to confuse it with illusionism on the one hand, and practical solipsism on the other. Therefore, all the jokes directed at Fichte by his contemporaries and later critics:

• Hegel , who assured that the deduction of the “not-me” from the “I” resembles the deduction of money from an empty wallet,
• Heine , who expressed regret for his wife Fichte, whose reality was allegedly denied by her husband, etc.

- all these jokes go by the way. The mockery of "empty talk" of Fichte, which Schopenhauer resorts to, is caused in part, probably by the strong influence that Fichte had on Schopenhauer's worldview. According to Kuno Fischer , Schopenhauer was supposed to "cast a shadow on Fichte's" Science Instruction so that he himself would not remain in the shadow. "

The successful epithet of the theory of the catholicity of consciousness (the expression of S. N. Trubetskoy ) is quite applicable to Fichte's metaphysics. Such a concept of “conciliarity of consciousness” can least of all be called practical solipsism , since it represents its direct opposite. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that modern theoretical solipsism in the critical theory of knowledge ( Schubert-Soldern ^[3] , Vvedensky ) derives its origin from Fichthean metaphysics. Fichte opened the way to theoretical doubts about the provability of the reality of many "I" - doubts that he himself considered moral enormity, but which became the subject of psychological and philosophical research for other thinkers.

He who mixes the Fichte system with illusionism (for example, Dühring ), forgets that, while proclaiming the ideality of objects in relation to the immediate consciousness, Fichte attributes the forced and natural character of perception to the unconscious activity of the super-individual “I”, which provides us with:

• stability of perceptions and
• coincidence in the testimony of the feelings of individuals in relation to the same perception.

Consequently, illusionism is out of the question here.

Legal philosophy

Having established the fact of the plurality of free, that is, self-determining, beings, Fichte is given by the study of conditions for their joint existence. Such a condition is voluntary mutual restriction of freedom. I cannot demand from another rational being that it considers me to be the same rational being, if I myself do not regard him as a rational, that is, a free being. The mutual restriction of the activity of rational beings is the basis of law in Fichte.

Legal norms are not something arbitrarily established by man: no, the right is an immediate condition for the practical “me” of his activity to be manifested, and only by virtue of the realization of this activity does morality become possible. At this point, Fichte disagrees with Kant, for whom the legal norms were inferred from moral law.

Fichte separates the legal from the moral field. Law makes morality possible and practicable, but it is not identical with it. The moral law is the dictates of conscience, having a universal and necessary value, - compliance with legal norms is conditional, implies reciprocity, reciprocity; morality extends to intentions - the right concerns only actions, constituting, as it were, the lowest stage of development of the practical “me”, which in morality reaches the highest level.

What should be manifested in the mutual restriction of the freedom of intelligent beings? They all interact in the sensual world; their activity is aimed at processing, modifying the material that this world represents for them. But in the sensual world there are parts that are especially closely connected with the rational activities of individuals, representing the immediate sphere for the realization of volitional acts in reality: these are human bodies. Consequently, the mutual limitation of human freedom primarily consists in allowing each human body to achieve full and normal development. The human body must be adapted to perform the infinitely diverse actions that an intelligent being needs. Pointing to the fact that the body is an instrument, the embodiment of the will in the world, and not an obstacle to its activity, Fichte fundamentally destroys the dualistic idea of ​​the body as a prison of the spirit, as an obstacle to the realization of his freedom; he seeks to show that an ascetic view of the body, as something hostile to the spirit, is incompatible with moral progress.

For Fichte, the inviolability of the human body, the right of the flesh, is something sacred, and in this respect it converges with its metaphysical polarity - Spencer . But human bodies do not interact in empty space: for the realization of their aspirations, people need, in addition to their own body, some other objects; for the individual, it is important to have exceptional possession of known things, since otherwise it could not expose them to the desired changes, meeting opposition from other persons. Hence the second right - the right of ownership .

Fichte derives this right neither exclusively from occupation, nor exclusively from labor or formation, but generally from the influence of man’s free will on nature. Without this impact, there is no right. However, the realization of freedom is possible only after its recognition by others. A problematic right of ownership becomes real only when ownership is declared by me, while others have recognized it: then only ownership becomes property. Where this is not, there is inevitable war, which is an expression of powerlessness. We need a strong security of law - and it is possible only if disputes are resolved by subordinating the warring parties to the third and strongest. This subordination leads to lasting security only if it is unconditional, with an exclusive appointment to protect the rights of the contracting parties.

Thus, Fichte sees in the state a means for the realization of the law. Without going into the study of what should be the form of government, Fichte insists on the establishment of a special body to oversee the government and to convene the people in violation of the law. Such are the ephors , the mediators between the people and the government. They do not have any positive power: they can only suspend the activities of the government and convene the people for court - therefore, in their hands negative power.

Fichte deeply believed in the feasibility of his political ideals and believed that “enough people live half a century with the proposed state system — and the very ideas about crime will be erased from his memory” (see B. N. Chicherin , “History of Political Doctrines”, vol. III, 397–442).

In this understanding of the state as a means for realizing the idea of ​​justice, in the moral enthusiasm and intellectualism of Fichte’s philosophy there is much in common with Plato . Just as Plato dreamed of countering the decomposition of the Greek state life with the ideals of the “State”, so Fichte places great hopes on his political ideas and wishes to revive German society with their help.

There is one more common feature with Fichte and Plato - these are the socialist elements of his policy. Fichte developed his socialist ideas in the "Closed Trade State". Property arises in the state. Equality of citizens of the state implies the possibility of having equal participation in common goods. Everyone chooses a profession for himself, with the help of which he assumes to acquire livelihoods, and has the right to work corresponding to this profession. Citizens form three states:

• a) producers producing coarse material
• b) artisans (artists) who process it,
• c) merchants who serve as intermediaries for barter.

The state should regulate the relationship of these states. It determines the number of people for each profession, monitors the proper performance of work and determines the price of each work, so that no one is the exploiter of another. Such an internal equilibrium in the distribution of property with the existence of foreign trade can easily be broken; for its sustainability, it is necessary for private individuals to terminate trade relations with foreigners and that such relations, if necessary, should be established by the government itself.

It may seem that this view of property excludes the mutual security of citizens' freedom, which Fichte had in mind in his deduction of the state. Conscious of the possibility of such an objection, Fichte limits the activities of citizens to strictly necessary; having paid to society in his obligations, a man belongs to himself; an excess of the works of his labor constitutes his inalienable affiliation; the individual life of a person is therefore not absorbed by the leveling despotism of the state. The entire strict and harmonious state mechanism created by Fichte's imagination has the ultimate goal to provide man with leisure for spiritual self-improvement.

Leisure, freedom for the higher spheres of spiritual activity, that which was so zealously guarded by the Jews as a divine precept - this is what the legal order outlined by Fichte should lead to. In the field of criminal law, the function of the state, according to Fichte, is to ensure respect for property through coercion. The most radical means would be to exclude every member who commits an offense; but at the same time it would be impossible to ensure the right of all, and society could easily disintegrate. Consequently, it is necessary to replace the exception with retribution. But retribution for an offense must be imposed with the consent of all; otherwise, it would be the embodiment of injustice. Whoever carelessly or out of egoism has infringed upon the rights of others, he himself must lose the corresponding part of his rights so that the balance can be restored and with it justice. Of course, such retribution is not always possible in the exact sense of the word; It is especially difficult to apply this principle to crimes committed not from selfishness or carelessness, but from the love of evil. In such cases, the most rational would be the exception, but if you can not use it, you have to resort to harsh corrective measures.

There is, however, one case in which, according to Fichte, there is no place for correction: this is committing a murder with a premeditated intention. In this case, the individual is considered outside the law. Whether he will be executed for the sake of ensuring the security of the state or not is a minor issue, for the state then acts against the person outlawed, not on the basis of law, but on the basis of mere force.

Both within and outside civil society there are social unions in the form of family and international communication. Fichte insists that the wife’s free consent be recognized as the basis of marriage, and in his absence, the state may demand that the marriage be broken. Likewise, marriage can be dissolved in the case of the adultery of a wife. The state should not assume the regulation of prostitution: it should ignore it.

The relationship between individual states is determined by international law. Violation of the latter inevitably leads to war. Thus, Fichte admits war as a means to restore the violated law, but expresses hope for the possibility of the emergence in the future of an international tribunal that could force the people who violated international law to submit to its decision. Such arbitration would be a reliable guarantee of eternal peace.

History Philosophy

His views on the philosophy of history are closely connected with Fichte’s political ideals. Fichte considers it possible to establish an a priori plan for the historical development of mankind , and thereby paving the way for arbitrary constructions of the historical process , which have become so popular in the epoch of Hegel .

In this respect, one place in the correspondence of Fichte with the famous philologist Wolf is very characteristic. Fichte informs Wolf that he came to the same conclusions on the Homeric issue in a purely a priori way, as Wolf did. The famous scientist, not without malice, remarks on this occasion that history has kept us from some peoples only a name and that it would be highly desirable for some philosopher to restore this fate of ancient peoples that did not come down to us a priori.

Fichte's worldview is alien to the evolutionary view of the origin of the world and man , which Kant adhered to. Fichte declares inescapable for science and lying outside its domain such matters as the origin

• of the world
• the human race
• cultures and
• language .

In this negative attitude to the evolutionary point of view, it is reinforced by the following consideration: it is ridiculous to assume that the reasonable could arise from the unreasonable - “e nihilo nihil fit”; therefore, it is necessary to allow the existence of intelligent beings at the beginning of history. Fichte arrived at this conclusion under the influence of the interpretation that Schelling gave to the first chapters of the Book of Genesis.

In the Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters (1806), Fichte develops this view of history. Humanity in its development goes through five phases:

1. Primitive state, when normal relations were established between people by virtue of the simple instinct of the mind.
2. Then this primitive innocence, the immediacy of the human spirit, is gradually drowned out by increasing sinfulness; mind instinct stalls in people; only a select few retain it in themselves, and in their hands it turns into a coercive external authority, demanding from the rest unconditional, blind obedience.
3. Then comes the transitional era, when authority, and with it the mind is overthrown, the dominance of the mind in a new conscious form has not yet been established. This is the modern Fichte era.
4. After it, the period of the triumph of scientific knowledge (Vernunftwissenschaft) should begin, when the mind is raised from the level of instinct to the degree of a clearly conscious beginning that causes universal reverence.
5. Finally, the development of mankind will end with the development of art (Vernunftkunst) - the art of embodying the mind in all phenomena of life, in all forms of social relations. This is the apotheosis of the historical process, the onset of the kingdom of God on earth.

Fichte believes that in the gradual development of the mind, first in an unconscious form (instinct, submission to authority), then in a conscious (science, art) humanity constantly revealed the duality of its composition. Since ancient times, there was a normal people who were surrounded by lower races - cowardly and rude, savages born from the land ("scheue und rohe erdgeborene Wilde"), who lived a crudely sensual life. The whole story is a continuous interaction of the normal race with uncivilized savages and the gradual victory of civilization over barbarism .

Moral Teaching

The right, as can be seen from the above, is an intermediate step between nature and morality. The legal order is in contact with nature, being a mechanism of spiritual forces; but it also comes into contact with moral freedom, forming the path to its realization.

The moral law is the law of the realization of freedom. But he is not an empty moral injunction; the activity of overcoming the inertia of nature, its opposition to the spirit, constitutes the very essence of our “I”, without which even true knowledge is impossible; traces., there is no absolute irreconcilability between nature and freedom. “I” wants to establish in his striving for freedom a harmony between desire and achievement.

The lowest, roughest impulse to the activity of the "I" is the pursuit of happiness; but in it nature enslaves us, we are a pitiful toy of passions, surrendering to the feeling of pleasure. Freedom from this primitive attraction constitutes the first necessary step towards freedom. The complete liberation of the spirit from the inert nature of nature is impracticable; moral activity is only unceasing progressas in indefinitum in the subordination of the "not-me" to our "I". The complete absorption of the "non-I" by our "I" is an impossibility, for these concepts are correlative: morality is an asymptotic approximation to absolute freedom. Consciousness of moral duty, the voice of conscience in us is infallible: for a person who has a mind and, therefore, is aware of moral duty (the mind and the mind of duty are inseparable), the error of conscience is impossible.

F. believes that moral delusions and sins result from the fact that the mind and conscience under the influence of affects become clouded, but he is convinced that a clear and distinct sense of duty cannot be combined with its non-fulfillment. The conflict of reason and will for him, as for previous rationalists, is psychological impossibility ( Plato , Descartes ). "Video meliora proboque - deteriora sequor" is not taken into consideration. To be aware of your duty and to act in defiance of him - “this would be something truly devilish; but this is impossible".

In his essay Ascetik als Anhang zur Moral, Φichte gives psychological directions on how to free our mind and conscience from the disturbing influence of passions. The main obstacle to the fulfillment of duty is the familiar associations between well-known ideas and feelings, impulses, etc. These associations, at the moment of our determination to act in accordance with duty, often lead us in a fatal way to the opposite direction and paralyze our good intentions. In order to weaken the power of affects over the spirit, one should ponder over them as often as possible: reflexion weakens the senses, they dull and weaken under its influence. Knowledge, as Spinoza has already noted, is a way to overcome passions. Rough inclinations need to be opposed to moral feelings - contempt for violating the moral law and respect for its holiness.

Duties Fichte subdivides into conditional (general and particular) and unconditional (general and particular). The general conditional duties primarily include the duty of self-preservation, prohibiting suicide, fasting, debauchery, excessive work, uneconomic waste of spiritual forces, and commanding a hygienic lifestyle, adaptation of spiritual and physical forces to the line of activity, mental development. To private conditional duties is the duty to choose a certain purpose in life and society. The general unconditional duties include prohibitions to commit any kind of violence against one’s neighbors, to make any encroachment on another’s body as an instrument of free will (slavery, torture); the command to love others as yourself, and the ensuing prohibition to lie and deceive (as unconditional as Kant does: there is no pia fraus) and the command to spread truth and knowledge; the prohibition of all sorts of encroachments on someone else’s property and the command to deliver to others means of living by the labor that he is capable of, but not by alms, etc. This is joined by the duty to arouse in others a good example of duty and moral self-consciousness and, moreover, not only to individuals, but also to society. Unconditional private duties include family and civil duties — lower classes (workers, manufacturers, merchants) and higher (scientists, artists, educators) duties towards mutual respect, and the attitude of both classes toward the state.

In his essay On the Appointment of a Scientist, Fichte tries to emphasize the moral and social significance of science in the state. The leaders of social life should be scientists and philosophers - these "priests of truth." The duty of a scientist is a selfless, unselfish love of truth and a desire to spread it in every way, but without any damage to its dignity. Standing for the broadest democratization of science and philosophy, Fichte strongly condemns the popularity of professors and superficial public chatter, issued as the last word of philosophy and positive knowledge. His views on the high role of a scientist in public life are reminiscent of similar ideas in O. Comte.

Social Education

The famous Speech to the German People , delivered by Fichte in Berlin in the winter semester of 1807–1808 , is remarkable as a philosophical coverage of the issue of nationality and national education .

In earlier writings, Fichte takes a cosmopolitan point of view; in “Speeches” he is an ardent patriot . It cannot be said that these two points of view (universal and national) in Fichte were exclusive of one another. The social character of ethics and metaphysics did not exclude individualism in Fichte: each empirical "I" must implement moral law to some of its own distinctive way.

Socialism Fichte does not exclude complete individualism in the field of spiritual activity: after all, the entire social organization is designed precisely to provide everyone with the opportunity to best utilize his leisure for personal improvement. In the same way, love for the motherland does not contradict universal ideals. By giving each nation, as a social group that possesses only its inherent characteristics, to indulge in free spiritual creativity, Fichte calls upon German popular self-consciousness to liberate from the bonds of superficial imitation. In this regard, there is something in common between Fichte and the Russian Slavophiles of the old formation: only Fichte clearly indicated the line beyond which nationalism, from the legal and necessary condition for the original creative activity of the spirit, becomes the slogan of violence, injustice and cruelty.

Under the influence of Fichte, apparently, the views on the national question were formed by Vladimir Solovyov and A. D. Gradovsky (“The Revival of Germany and Fichte the Elder”, Collected Works, Vol. VI, p. 107). Calling on the Germans for moral rebirth, Fichte sees the only way to him in the new national education. He proposes the establishment of state institutions in which children of future generations would be brought up. In these institutions should be no class restrictions; everyone according to his abilities should be given the full opportunity to receive both lower and secondary education and higher education.

In education, the main attention should be paid not to the accumulation of knowledge, but to the development of reason and character . Therefore, the students' initiative should always be in the foreground: this applies equally to both secondary and higher education (Fichte put forward the importance of practical work at the university). In educational institutions, children of both sexes should be brought up and, moreover, jointly - a thought already outlined by Fichte Plato and Lepelletje de Saint-Fargaux during the Convent era and found successful implementation in Sweden, Finland and America in the 19th century, and then in other countries . In adolescence, one must cultivate an ability for effort; for this it is important to take care of physical education. Along with this, every child must learn a craft; manual labor has a great educational value. The atmosphere of the schools should be the fruit of the work of the students themselves; they should learn to cook their own food, sew clothes, etc. The school should be dominated by a complete community of property: “let everyone realize that he belongs to the community and must share with her the comforts and inconveniences of life” ^[4] .

Mental education must be imbued with the spirit of philosophical unity. Fichte is already thinking about the idea of ​​disseminating philosophy among the masses - a thought that subsequently took Comte and Hegel to do so. He dreams that critical idealism becomes the common property, but he is frightened by the difficulty of the task. “The theory of knowledge should cover the whole person, it can be learned only by the totality of all mental abilities; it cannot become a generally accepted philosophy, while education in most people kills one spiritual ability at the expense of another: imagination at the expense of reason, reason - at the expense of imagination, or both. ”

• “Versuch d. Kritik aller Offenbarung (1792);
• “Zurückforderung der Denkfreiheit von den Fürsten Europas, die sie bisher unterdrückten”; "Beiträge zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Puhlicums über die französische Revolution"; Beweis der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks (1793);
• "Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre oder der sogenanten Philosophie" and "Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre" (1794);
• Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre (1796);
• “System der Sittenlehre nach Principien der Wissenschaltelehre” (1798; article giving the reason for F. to be accused of atheism);
• "Appeal to the public" about the charges of atheism (1799);
• Die Bestimmung des Menschen; "Der geschlossene Handelstaat" (1800) / Closed Trade State /;
• Sonnerklare Bericht das grössere Publikum über das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie. Ein Versuch, die Leser zum Verstehen zu zwingen (1801)
• Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre (1801);
• “Grundzüge des gegenwärt. Zeitalters; Anweisung zum seligen Leben; “Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten etc.” (1806);
• Reden an die deutsche Nation (1808);
• Die Tatsachen des Bewusstseins (1810).

In Russian

• I. G. Fichte . Works in 2 volumes. - SPb .: Mithril, 1993. - 1485 p. - ISBN 5-86457-003-6 , ISBN 5-86457-004-4 .
• I. G. Fichte. Speech to the German nation. Translation from German: A. A. Ivanenko. Publishing: Science, St. Petersburg, 2009, - 352 p. - ISBN 978-5-02-026353-6
• I. G. Fichte . Closed trade country. Translation from German E.E. Essen. Ed. KPASSAND, 2010 - 162 p. - ISBN 978-5-396-00261-6
• I. G. Fichte. Clear, as the sun, the message to the general public about the true essence of modern philosophy. Attempt to force readers to understand. - Lenand, 2016. - 112 p. - (From the heritage of world philosophical thought. History of philosophy). - ISBN 978-5-9710-3281-6 .

• Lapshin I.I. Fichte, Johann-Gottlieb // Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron : in 86 tons (82 tons and 4 add.). - SPb. , 1890-1907.
• Vysheslavtsev B.P. Ethics of Fichte. The foundations of law and morality in the system of transcendental philosophy. M., 1914.
• Oizerman T. I. Philosophy of Fichte. - M .: Knowledge, 1962. - 48 p.
• Boer M. Fichte / Trans. with him. - M .: Thought, 1965. - 168 p. - ( Thinkers of the past ).
• Gaidenko P.P. Philosophy of Fichte and Modernity. - M .: Thought, 1979.
• P. Gaidenko. Paradoxes of freedom in the teachings of Fichte. - M., 1990.
• Copleston F. From Fichte to Nietzsche / Trans. from English. Art. and note. df n V.V. Vasilyeva. - M .: Republic, 2004. - 542 p. - ISBN 5-250-01875-0 . Archived December 30, 2009. Archive dated December 30, 2009 on Wayback Machine
• Fisher K. Fichte. Life, writings and teachings // History of a new philosophy. The sixth volume / Notes and afterword A. B. Rukavishnikova. - SPb. : RHGI , 2004. - 723 + XX + [1 ill.] P. - 1000 copies - ISBN 5-88812-157-6 .
• Yakovenko B.V. The Life and Philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. - SPb .: Science, 2004. - 454 p. - (Word of Being) - ISBN 5-02-026859-3
• Fichte / P. P. Gaidenko // New Philosophical Encyclopedia : in 4 t. / Before. scientific - ed. Council V.S. Stepin . - 2nd ed., Corr. and add. - M .: Thought , 2010. - 2816 p.
• Kembaev Zh. M. Political and legal views of Johann Gotlib Fichte regarding the unification of the states of Europe and the world // History of the state and law. 2011. No. 16. C. 44-48.
• Kupriyanov V. A. “The World of Beautiful Spirit”: Aesthetics in Perspective of Transcendentalism IG Fichte // STUDIA CULTURAE, 2014. - No. 20. - P. 123—132.
• Lomonosov A. G. Johann Gottlieb Fichte. - SPb .: Science, 2016. - 255 p. - ISBN 978-5-02-039611-1 .
• For a detailed list of the literature on ph. See the “History of a New Philosophy” by Iberwegue-Heinz (trans. Ya. N. Kolubovsky, pp. 279-280).
• Many essays about F., published by the centenary of his birth, are listed by Reichlin-Meldeg in 42 tons. “Zeitschr. f. Philosophie.
• Löwe, Die Philosophie F.'s (1862);
• Adamson, "F." (1881);
• Leon "La Philosophie de F." (with a detailed chronological index to the biography of F., 1902).
• “Gesch. d. neueren Phil. "Kuno Fisher (V volume).
• In the book of Lasson, F.'s attitude toward the church and the state was characterized (1863).
• About F. as a politician wrote Zeller ("Vortr. Und Abh. *", 1865),
• about his philosophy of religion - Zimmer (1878).
• The Russian work on F. (except for the aforementioned article by Gradovsky) - African Spire, “JG Fichte nach seinen Briefen” (1879).
• Everette, Fichte's Science of Knowledge (1884);
• Noack, “JG Fichte nach seinem Leben, Lehren und Wirken”;
• IB Meier, Fichte, Lassalle und der Socialismus (1878);
• Schmoller, article in "Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik" (1855, 1-62).
• On the influence of F. on Lassalle, see the article about P. B. Struve's Lassalle (collection On Various Themes, 1902).