The permanent neutrality of Switzerland arose as a result of the signing of four international legal acts: the Act of the Vienna Congress dated March 8 (20), 1815, the Annex to the Act of the Vienna Congress No. 90 dated March 8 (20), 1815, the Declaration of Powers on the Affairs of the Helvettic Union and the Act regarding recognition and guarantees of the permanent neutrality of Switzerland and the inviolability of its territory. Unlike other countries that chose this path solely under the influence of external factors (for example, as a result of defeat in the war), Switzerland’s neutrality was also formed for internal political reasons: neutrality, becoming a nation-unifying idea, contributed to the evolution of its statehood from an amorphous confederation to a centralized federal structure. .
During the years of the policy of permanent armed neutrality, the Alpine republic managed to avoid participation in two devastating world wars and strengthen its international prestige, including through the implementation of numerous mediation efforts. The principle of maintaining relations “between countries, not between governments” allowed for a dialogue with everyone, regardless of political or ideological considerations.
Switzerland represents third countries where diplomatic relations were interrupted, for example, the interests of the USSR in Iraq in 1955 , Great Britain in Argentina during the 1982 Anglo-Argentine conflict; Switzerland currently represents the interests of the United States in Cuba and Iran , the interests of Cuba in the United States, the interests of the Russian Federation in Georgia after the break in diplomatic relations between these countries in 2008 . Switzerland provides “good offices” by providing its territory for direct negotiations between the parties to the conflicts (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhaz and South Ossetian problems, the Cyprus settlement, etc.).
Of all the types of neutrality that exist in the modern world, Swiss is the most durable and consistent. Today, the Swiss Confederation is not in any military alliance, nor in the EU. In recent years, due to changes in Europe and the world, the government and public opinion is gaining momentum in favor of strengthening integration with the EU and a more flexible interpretation of the principle of neutrality.
In May 2004, the “second package” of the EU - Switzerland sectoral contracts was signed, which, together with the “first package” (entered into force on June 1, 2002), is a kind of alternative to Switzerland’s accession to the EU.
In the framework of the national referendums held in 2005, the people of Switzerland positively resolved the issue of Switzerland’s accession to the Schengen and Dublin agreements (an agreement with the EU is included in the “second package”), as well as the extension of the provisions of the Treaty on Freedom of Movement between Switzerland and the EU (included in the “first package” of sectoral contracts) for new EU members that joined the Union in 2004. At the same time, it was decided to consider the issue of Switzerland’s accession to the European Union not a “strategic goal”, as it used to be, but only a “political option”, that is, an opportunity.
In 1959, Switzerland became one of the founding countries of the EFTA , in 1972 entered the European Economic Area, in 2002 - into the United Nations .
Switzerland actively provides humanitarian assistance to the victims of conflicts, promotes the economic development of the third world countries to overcome poverty. Switzerland maintains diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation. Diplomatic relations between Switzerland and the RSFSR existed from May to November 1918, then they were only interrupted and restored with the USSR on March 18, 1946.
Switzerland's Neutrality
Switzerland’s foreign policy in accordance with the constitution of this country is built on the basis of the international legal status of permanent neutrality. Switzerland is not in any military alliance, nor in the EU.
Origins of Neutrality
The historical roots of Swiss neutrality date back to the Middle Ages , and it is difficult to associate its beginning with a certain date. On this account there are several points of view.
Many modern, including Russian authors, connect the beginning of the history of Swiss neutrality with the defeat of the Swiss troops in the battle with the French at Marignano (1515) [1] . Then, at the beginning of the 16th century, the Swiss cantons led an aggressive policy and in 1508 captured Lombardy , but in 1515 suffered a severe defeat from the French and lost power over Milan. Indeed, since then Switzerland has not waged wars of conquest, but, of course, this did not mean permanent neutrality. The Swiss neutrality as a permanent phenomenon until the conclusion after the Peace of Westphalia , which ended the Thirty Years War , is not mentioned.
Another point of view is that the principle of neutral behavior is first encountered in Swiss history not as a foreign policy, but as an internal political principle. So the Swiss historian Edgar Bonjour argues that "the concept of Swiss neutrality arose almost simultaneously with the concept of the Swiss nation" [2] . Of course, one can argue with such a categorical statement, because the Swiss cantons, during the period when feudal states were formed in Western Europe, often interfered in wars. It is known that the Swiss were mercenary troops from various feudal rulers. However, it is not uninteresting to note that already in the XIV century the German term “stillesitzen” or “stille zu sitzen” was used in the agreements of individual cantons with their neighbors, which approximately corresponds to the later concept of neutrality. Back in 1351, that is, at the very time when Zurich joined the Confederation , its borders were tried to be placed so as to stay away from the cruel strife that often occurred in Retia. In the temporary union of Bern and Zoloturn with the margrave Rudolf von Hashberg in 1399 the position was fixed, in accordance with which both cities reserved the right to “sit quietly” if their union partner was involved in the conflict. Consequently, both of these cities did not want to intervene in conflicts that did not affect their own interests [3] .
In 1411, at that time, another 7 Swiss cantons imposed on the region of Appenzell the obligation to remain neutral in the event of a conflict between the cantons themselves. Thus, the principle of neutral behavior is first encountered as an internal political principle.
After the end of the Thirty Years War, the “Free State of the Three Unions” remained a welcome ally, whether in the sense of delivering hired power or providing territory for the transit of troops. Payment for such services most often took the form of monetary compensation or promises of military and political assistance. An interesting fact is that only an alliance with France in 1614 was an alliance of all cantons. The rest of the unions and alliances concerned only some cantons, for example, the alliance of Catholic cantons with Spain and Savoy. Such a situation did not allow the Confederation to completely “go over” to any side and made it an uncomfortable partner in political and military cooperation.
In the XVI century, Switzerland was no longer able to pursue a policy of territorial expansion, characteristic of the XV century. And after the end of the Thirty Years War, Switzerland was inclined to take a position of neutrality and non-interference in major European affairs. A landmark event in this trend was the refusal of the Swiss cantons to conclude an alliance with Sweden at the zenith of power.
In an atmosphere of political tension in Europe in the 30s of the XVII century, the idea of armed neutrality first appeared in Switzerland. In 1647, the “Military Code” (“Heeresordnung”, or “Defensionale”), common to all cantons, was published. According to this “Military Code”, a single Military Council and a general mobilization organization were created, the basis of which was the military contingents of the cantons [4] .
During the Westphalian Congress, the Swiss cantons attempted to free the cities of Basel , Schaffhausen and St. Gallen from the jurisdiction of the Holy Roman Empire . Basel had a special interest here because the lands of Alsace , which were the source of wealth for both the city and the whole Confederation, were to change their owner by the results of the congress.
To resolve this issue, in February 1646 a special session of the Council decided to send an embassy to Münster and Osnabrück. The mission was led by a Basel burgomaster, Rudolf von Wettstein. During the congress, the main task of Wettstein - the release of Basel from the obligation to submit to the imperial court - was carried out. But this was not the end. With the support of the French ambassador, Count Henri de Longville of Orleans, an agreement was reached in accordance with which the city of Basel and the rest of the land of the Confederation would be withdrawn from the sphere of jurisdiction of the empire. Thus, the empire recognized the sovereignty of the Swiss cantons, legally securing the separation of Switzerland from the German Empire.
At the end of the 17th century, the Swiss cantons continued to supply soldiers to the European feudal lords. And it turned out that the Swiss mercenary soldiers served the feudal lords, who were warring with each other. It was a kind of “neutrality vice versa,” distinguished by “unawareness” entirely on anyone's side. And finally, on September 11, 1709, in the battle of the city of Malplak, there was a bloody clash between Swiss mercenaries who served in the French camp on the one hand, and in the Netherlands on the other [5] . “The servant of two masters” again fell into the center of the European conflict. This again prompted the Swiss cantons to move from a balancing policy, fraught with the collapse of the country, to a policy of complete neutrality.
Already as a neutral state, Switzerland took an active part in the process of settling the consequences of the war for the Spanish inheritance , and one of the peace treaties was concluded in the Swiss city of Baden. This was Switzerland’s first appearance on the international stage as a neutral state. Switzerland’s participation in the post-war settlement not only positioned it for the first time as a neutral force on the European continent, but also locked its accumulated domestic and foreign policy experience into a single national concept of neutrality.
Thus, the practice of Swiss foreign policy neutrality developed on the way from balancing between various centers of political power to the neutrality of the modern type, a theoretical idea which arose only during the 18th century , when Switzerland’s neutral position became so familiar that it was hardly possible to change it.
Neutrality during the world wars
On the day when the First World War began , Switzerland conducted a general mobilization, and already on August 4, 1914, the belligerent powers were not slow in informing them that they would adhere to the traditional neutral policy. "Switzerland was neutral - but the Swiss were not neutral, they actively declared their position ..." [6] . The German-Swiss supported Germany , and the “francophone” citizens supported the Entente . Conflicts between neighbors have always been a problem for the state. That and the First World War was a severe ordeal. The real information war broke out in the country. And with that, and on the other hand there were hunters to add fuel to the fire. In this sense, neutrality was an essential tool for countering the inevitable centrifugal forces.
Despite the hostilities, Switzerland, with its rather large population and developed industry, maintained trade relations with both warring parties. This did not contradict her neutral status. For trade relations with Germany, a kind of intermediary office in Zurich was created, and for trade with the Entente, the Swiss Society for Economic Control. Switzerland has pledged that the goods entering its territory will not be shipped to other countries. Overall, the war did not hurt the Swiss economy so much. Its military expenditures were negligible compared to other countries - only 1.2 billion Swiss francs .
After the end of the war in the country, the opinion quickly prevailed that in a new “democratic era”, neutral states needed to take a more active stance. Classical neutrality, as it seemed, had exhausted its full potential and no longer corresponded to new realities. It was such categories that the outstanding Swiss lawyer and diplomat Max Huber thought. He explained his understanding of “active neutrality” in a speech in Lucerne . Two fundamental ideas in which Huber was convinced — the idea of neutrality and the idea of active foreign policy engagement — could only be combined within the framework of a policy of “active neutrality”.
In 1920, Switzerland joined the League of Nations , but in special positions. Switzerland could not participate in military sanctions against the aggressor, as required by the Charter of the League. In this great merit of Max Huber. However, she was not exempt from economic sanctions. But in October 1935, when the question of economic sanctions against Italy was discussed in the League of Nations, Switzerland, under the pretext of neutrality, refused to take part in the general meeting. This was tantamount to not cooperating within the organization.
After the events of 1938, when Germany forcibly annexed Austria , Switzerland conducted a general mobilization and declared armed neutrality. All Swiss newspapers posted a government declaration that said: “On March 13, federal Austria, with which Switzerland maintained cordial good-neighborly relations, ceased to exist as an independent state. The historical event that happened before our eyes can have far-reaching consequences ... ” [7] . Further, it was emphasized that the changes on the political map will not alter Switzerland’s foreign policy. “The independence and neutrality of the Swiss Federation, on the contrary, are more necessary than ever ... The lesson that our country should learn from these events is absolutely clear: more than ever, it is necessary to continue our efforts and achieve our aspirations to the recognition of our comprehensive neutrality; any ambiguous interpretation of this concept should be eliminated ” [8] .
The Swiss people watched in alarm as events unfolded on the border of the country. In May 1940, Germany, without considering the neutrality of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, went through a skating rink in these countries. In a further period, Switzerland, with a gun in its hands, had to defend its neutrality. For the first time, it was applied in practice the position of international law, which states that a neutral state can protect the inviolability of its territory against armies, fleets and aviation. The Swiss armed forces shot down and interned a large number of foreign aircraft. Parts of the French armies were also interned. “The aviation of the warring parties repeatedly violated the Swiss borders and even bombed Swiss cities by mistake” [9] .
Schengen space
On May 19, 2004, Switzerland signed the Treaty on the Accession of Switzerland to the Schengen and Dublin Agreements.
Since December 2008, Switzerland has been part of the Schengen area , recognizes Schengen visas and issues such visas itself. By becoming a member of the Schengen area, Switzerland gains access to the SIS, the “Schengen” electronic data bank of the EU. The systematic control on the internal borders of the countries of the Schengen agreement, including on the borders of Switzerland with Germany , Italy , France , Austria , is being canceled .
Switzerland, however, has the right to exercise mobile selective control in the interior of the country. At present, Switzerland is actually in the “Schengen regime”, since it is physically impossible to control the 700,000 border crossings every day. With regard to cargo, Switzerland, not being a member of the European Customs Union, has the right to conduct their border control.
International organizations
On the territory of Switzerland for more than a century there are numerous international organizations (about 250).
To date, 22 international organizations have headquarters in Geneva , 2 in Bern , 1 each in Basel and Lausanne . In addition, fiscal agreements have been concluded with 6 quasi- intergovernmental organizations, and more than 200 nongovernmental organizations-UN advisors are based in Switzerland [10] .
In Geneva:
- European Office of the United Nations ,
- Европейская экономическая комиссия ООН ,
- Экономический и социальный совет ООН ,
- Конференция ООН по торговле и развитию ,
- Всемирная организация здравоохранения ,
- Международная организация труда ,
- Международный союз электросвязи ,
- Всемирная метеорологическая организация ,
- Inter-Parliamentary Union ,
- International Committee of the Red Cross ,
- World Council of Churches ,
- World Trade Organization ,
- World Intellectual Property Organization
- World Scout Organization ,
in Bern:
- Universal Postal Union
- Bureau of the international organization of passenger and freight rail traffic ,
- European Organization for Quality Control ,
in Basel:
- Bank of International Settlements ,
- International Society for Internal Medicine ,
in Lausanne:
- International Olympic Committee
- International Committee of Historical Sciences .
Switzerland and United Nations
The UN is one of the most influential organizations in the world. For over 50 years, Switzerland has had difficult, largely contradictory relations with it. New trends of the new century have made adjustments to the nature of these relationships.
It should be noted that at first Switzerland was considered to be the state-companion of Hitler's Germany, therefore its entry into the UN was impossible. In March 1945, the French government put forward the idea of making the UN “open to all peace-loving states,” while noting that “the duties that the UN membership imposes on a state are incompatible with the principles of neutrality.”
And for a long time, Switzerland itself has not particularly sought to join the United Nations. However, gradually the need to overcome the country's foreign policy isolation became more serious. For this reason, attempts were made to join the UN while maintaining neutral status within the organization, which, however, did not bring the expected result. The chairman of the UNGA, the Belgian foreign minister P.A. Shpaak, asked the Swiss to “not touch the neutrality issue anymore”, since this “would create a dangerous precedent that would give other countries the opportunity to demand exceptions in terms of assuming obligations arising from the UN Charter. ”
Conducting an active backstage diplomatic activity, the Federal Council did not dare to launch an extensive discussion on the issue of joining the UN. Swiss historian Tobias Kestli believes that "the Federal Council was afraid of public debate." Russian historian I. Petrov, developing his thought, comes to the conclusion that the reason for this fear lay in the unwillingness to destroy the “atmosphere of social unity” that had developed during the war years. This was even more undesirable in the midst of the cold war.
At the referendum on joining the United Nations in 1986, 75.7% of the population of Switzerland and all cantons [11] were against it.
The Swiss government intensified efforts to create the necessary conditions for joining the United Nations only when in 1989, on the European continent and in the world as a whole, certain political changes began to occur. These efforts were particularly active in the late 1990s - the beginning of the XXI century, when the 1998 Report on the Relations of Switzerland and the United Nations, the Foreign Policy Report for 2000, the Message of People’s Initiative for Switzerland’s entry into United Nations ”2000.
Speaking at the ceremony of Switzerland’s accession to the UN, K. Philliger (then the Swiss president) outlined the main priorities that Switzerland intends to be guided by the UN, emphasizing that "the goals of the United Nations Charter almost completely coincide with the main priorities of Switzerland’s foreign policy, therefore Full membership in the UN will make a significant contribution to the achievement of Swiss goals on the international arena both in a bilateral and multilateral format. ” Among the priorities were identified such problem areas as strengthening peace and security, disarmament, international law, human rights, assistance to developing countries, and an environmental dossier.
On March 3, 2002, at a referendum, 53% of the Swiss population voted for joining the UN [11] . On March 11, 2002, Switzerland became a full member of the United Nations. The 57th General Assembly of the United Nations was the first in which Switzerland participated as a full member of the United Nations. Among Swiss priorities, an important role was played by the question of improving the mechanism of “targeted sanctions”. Recognizing the need for an instrument of international pressure, such as sanctions, Switzerland, however, called for only such sanctions and an order of their application in which they, if possible, would affect only those who are really responsible for the occurrence of the crisis leading to the introduction of sanctions, without bringing harm to civilians or third countries. Among possible sanctions of this kind, Switzerland highlights the freezing of accounts, the imposition of an embargo on the supply of certain types of goods (weapons, oil, diamonds and other natural resources), restrictions on visas and the movement of private and official persons. In the opinion of Switzerland itself, its entry into the UN has given its efforts in optimizing the procedure for imposing sanctions additional weight and persuasiveness.
As a full member of the United Nations, Switzerland actively worked in the “First Committee” of the UNGA dealing with nonproliferation and arms control issues. Switzerland strongly advocated the full implementation of the “thirteen practical measures” adopted in 2000 at the Conference on the implementation of the provisions of the “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”. Switzerland encouraged countries that are not yet members of the “Nuclear Test Ban Treaty” to join this document, as well as to join the negotiations on the “Treaty on the Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Materials for Military Purposes”.
Another priority for Swiss policy within the UN is control over the arms trade. Switzerland attaches great importance to expanding the scope of the 1980 Agreement on Certain Conventional Weapons (“CWW”). The country supported the relevant UN resolution on conventional weapons and stressed the importance of the work of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, O. Ottun, on the issue of the involvement of children in armed conflicts. Switzerland advocated the universalization of the Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel mines. For its part, Switzerland is funding the work of the International Humanitarian Mine Action Center in Geneva, which is the most important partner of the United Nations in the implementation of the mine action program (UNMAS). Switzerland actively supports the creation and operation of security research programs and institutions. Thus, in collaboration with the UN secretariat, Switzerland became the creator of the “Harvard Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Program”. Switzerland actively cooperates with other academic partners, for example, with the New York International Peace Academy.
The fight against poverty is another important vector in Switzerland’s activities within the UN. Thus, during the discussion of the results of the International Conference on Financing Development Policy, held in March 2002 in Monterrey (Mexico), Switzerland called for closer and systematic cooperation of all interested countries and structures (primarily the UN, The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the WTO, private firms and non-governmental organizations) in the field of the development of the third world countries and the fight against global poverty, taking the initiative to intensify the dialogue between World Economic Forum in Davos and the UN.
Switzerland attaches great importance to the development of the mountainous regions of the planet. In December 2001, Switzerland launched an initiative in New York to celebrate the International Year of the Mountains in 2002 (which was held). In the framework of the 57th session of the UNGA, Switzerland actively acted, using the potential of the “Group on Mountain Issues,” in favor of ensuring the sustainable development of the mountain regions of the Earth.
As a result, a corresponding resolution was adopted, which was received with satisfaction by the Swiss "as a document ensuring the political visibility of the development problems of mountain regions." On the basis of this resolution, the International Day of the Mountains was established - December 11. The fight for human rights is a traditional part of Swiss foreign policy. Based on these positions, Switzerland is building its work in the UN structures.
At the 57th session of the UNGA, Switzerland actively participated in debates on issues related to the fight against drug addiction and the uncontrolled spread of narcotic drugs and their equivalent. Switzerland is a party to the 1961 Single UN Convention on Drugs, the UN Psychotropic Convention of 1971, and the Additional Protocol to the Psychotropic Convention of 1972. Switzerland is one of the main sponsors of the United Nations International Drug Control Program. In 1998—2002 Switzerland was a member of the “UN Commission on Drugs”.
Switzerland pays special attention to the role of the private sector in ensuring the sustained development of the world economy and achieving universal well-being. In particular, participating in the debates at the 57th session of the UNGA, Switzerland emphasized the importance of the thesis on "the social responsibility of entrepreneurs at both the national and international levels."
Switzerland uses the opportunities that have opened up for it as a full-fledged member of the United Nations to further promote its environmental policy. Considering the UN Environment Program as the most important “pillar of the global ecological architecture”, Switzerland has consistently advocated strengthening the role of this structure, which is “an effective tool for implementing decisions taken in the environmental sphere”.
Since the 57th session of the UNGA, Switzerland has been persistently pursuing the thesis that “there are no hierarchical relations between the goals of environmental protection and the benefits of international trade, they are equally important, they should complement each other and be equally respected”. Here, its position corresponds, in particular, to that of Norway, opposing the approaches of the United States and some developing countries, assessing environmental goals as factors that play a subordinate role in relation to the international trade.
Switzerland-EU relations
Swiss confederation until the middle of the XIX century. considered one of the poorest European countries. Its population consisted of many nations of different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds. The country did not have any significant natural resources and did not even have direct access to the sea trade routes. Confederation was shaken by frequent religious wars and power struggles.
But at the beginning of the XXI century. Switzerland has already been attributed by the World Bank to the group of the richest countries in the world (its per capita GDP was 36.2 thousand dollars). In a specially prepared study of the Swiss Oriental Institute, such a metamorphosis is mainly due to the introduction of a highly efficient social and political management system. It is based on respect for the democratic rules of political confrontation, respect for human rights and the protection of national minorities.
However, in the same years, the problem of relations between Switzerland and the European Union took on particular importance. The difficult process of discussing the conditions for the accession of this country to European integration, which has been going on for more than a decade, has begun. But as noted by the well-known Swiss public figure S. Cook, “Modern Switzerland is a rich enough country and can afford to adhere to the principles of“ selective integration ”for a long time, which allows minimizing EU pressure and ensures the preservation of its own specifics, that is, the profitability of certain sectors of the national economy. "
Switzerland has a very special approach to the very essence of the EU. Swiss analysts believe that a rigid federal structure modeled on the United States cannot be a model for the further development of the EU political system. The term "European cosmopolitan education" is often used in place of "European federalism" in Switzerland. In Switzerland, it is assumed that the construction of the EU is an endless process that does not and cannot have a “final goal”. Neither the European Union itself, nor any of its member states should form a "monopoly center of power." They play the role of nodes of a complexly structured social and political security system.
At the turn of the XX — XXI centuries in Switzerland, there was an increase in the understanding that the long-term stagnation characteristic of the country at the turn of the century, as well as the reasons for lagging behind other Western European states, lie to some extent in the Confederation’s adherence to the so-called “special way” existence next to the EU, but without direct participation in it with partial involvement in the process of European integration. This understanding prompted the leadership of the Confederation to intensify the dialogue with the European Union. Such a dialogue is especially important for Switzerland, given that the main factor behind the growth of its economy remains external demand for Swiss products (export quota is 45%), and the lion’s share of trade falls on the EU countries (60% of exports and 82% of imports).
The first agreements between Switzerland and the European Union were signed back in 1972 as part of the agreement on the entry into the European Economic Area of a number of countries that were part of EFTA. Thus, the basis was created for the implementation of four basic principles: the freedom of movement of goods, capital, services and labor. This was followed by a series of referendums that determined the nature of further relations with the EU. In December 1992, a national plebiscite was held regarding the expediency of starting negotiations on the conditions for the country's accession to the European Union. 50.4% of the population voted against, the preponderance was only 23.3 thousand votes, but behind this insignificant advantage is the fact that 16 out of 26 cantons opposed the inclusion of the country in European integration.
As a result of the disapproval of the beginning of the negotiation process, the country found itself in the least favorable trade and economic conditions compared to other European countries. In these circumstances, the government decided to change the negotiation strategy. In May 2000, a referendum was held on the advisability of concluding a bilateral agreement with the European Union on seven specific trade and economic problems. The majority of the population (67.2%) approved this step. Only two cantons opposed them (in Ticino they feared a possible increase in the influx of immigrants from Italy, and in Schwyz they always opposed any expansion of ties with neighboring countries).
According to the Swiss government, the signed agreements provide the country with almost three-quarters of all the advantages that EU member states have, but they do not force them to make concessions. It does not cause any damage to state sovereignty. All four political parties that are members of the government (the Federal Council), as well as the main financial-industrial and trade union associations supported the agreements.
The following agreements were signed on May 19, 2004: “On exemption from customs taxation of exports to the EU of Swiss processed agricultural products”, “On Switzerland’s accession to the European Environment Agency”, “On Switzerland’s accession to the European Statistical System of Accounting (“ Eurostat ”)”, ” On the accession of Switzerland to the European Mass Media Development Program ”,“ On the accession of Switzerland to the European educational program ”,“ On the release of retired EU officials from Switzerland of the taxation tax, “On the accession of Switzerland to the Schengen and Dublin agreements”, “On the taxation of interest on European capital placed in Swiss banks”, “On the accession of Switzerland to an agreement on the fight against evasion from indirect taxes (VAT, excise taxes, etc.)” . The Confederation was still able to retain the right not to provide legal assistance to EU member states in cases involving evasion of direct taxes in the framework of joining Schengen / Dublin. В 5 июня 2005 года на референдуме граждане Швейцарии высказались за вступление в Шенгенское пространство.
С 12 декабря 2008 года Швейцария официально вступила в Шенгенское безвизовое пространство. На границах страны на всех наземных пропускных пунктах отменён паспортный контроль. В аэропортах Швейцарии паспортный контроль сохранился только до 29 марта 2009 года. За это время страна подготовила свои авиационные терминалы для обслуживания внутришенгенских авиарейсов, где паспортный контроль не требуется, и отделила эти рейсы от остальных международных терминалов. Что касается вопроса о распространении свободы перемещения на 10 новых государств-членов ЕС, то было принято решение вынести его на референдум, который состоялся 25 сентября 2005 года. Принцип свободы передвижения с новыми членами ЕС поддержали 55,95 % швейцарцев, сообщило Швейцарское телеграфное агентство.
8 февраля 2009 года граждане Швейцарии одобрили на референдуме продление соглашения с Евросоюзом о свободном движении рабочей силы, дав зелёный свет и на то, чтобы это право распространилось на граждан Румынии и Болгарии. В преддверии голосования ультраправые, выступавшие против, пугали сограждан тем, что приток в страну румын и болгар чреват ростом безработицы и преступности. Однако потеря привилегий в торговле с ЕС и ухудшение отношений, которыми грозил Брюссель, показались швейцарцам страшнее.
Проведение референдума по вопросу о том, стоит ли гражданам Швейцарии по-прежнему принимать рабочих из стран Евросоюза и, в свою очередь, иметь право на работу в ЕС, понадобилось в связи со скорым истечением соглашения Берна и Брюсселя о свободном движении рабочей силы, а также вступлением в 2007 году Болгарии и Румынии в состав ЕС.
Если к гражданам 25 стран ЕС швейцарцы уже более или менее привыкли, то к перспективе наплыва в страну румын и болгар многие отнеслись неоднозначно. В преддверии воскресного референдума на этих настроениях попыталась сыграть ультраправая Народная партия, из-за отказа которой расширить действие договора на Софию и Бухарест путём голосования в парламенте этот вопрос собственно и пришлось выносить на общенациональный плебисцит.
Готовясь к нему, партия, давно известная своей жёсткой антииммиграционной платформой, распространила по всей стране постеры, изображающие трёх чёрных воронов, клюющих маленькую Швейцарию. Агитируя голосовать против, ультраправые пугали граждан тем, что приток дешёвой рабочей силы из Румынии и Болгарии (по их определению — «стран третьей Европы») оставит без рабочих мест коренных швейцарцев, а также приведёт к увеличению налогов и росту преступлений.
Сторонники продления соглашений с ЕС, в свою очередь, обращали внимание на то, что негативный исход голосования поставит под угрозу весь комплекс отношений Швейцарии с Евросоюзом. Тем более, что Брюссель не раз давал понять, что дискриминация двух новых членов ЕС недопустима и что швейцарское «нет» автоматически сведёт на нет шесть других соглашений, касающихся взаимного снятия торговых барьеров. Некоторые еврочиновники даже говорили, что в качестве ответной меры на швейцарское «нет» ЕС может приостановить действие Шенгенского соглашения с этой страной. Ввиду того, что около трети рабочих мест в Швейцарии напрямую связаны с ЕС, объём торговли с которым достигает €150 млрд ежегодно, отмена режима свободного трудоустройства создала бы огромные сложности и увеличила бы издержки швейцарских экспортёров.
Однако если впервые решение впустить в страну рабочих из ЕС принималось на фоне экономического бума и потому в 2000 году его поддержали 67 % граждан, то сейчас Швейцария, как и большинство стран мира, переживает финансовый кризис. И хотя уровень безработицы в стране составляет всего 3 %, число безработных по сравнению с докризисными временами все же выросло.
Поэтому всего за пару дней до референдума число сторонников продления соглашения с ЕС и двумя его новыми членами составляло только 50 %. Против выступали 43 %, тогда как оставшиеся по-прежнему не могли определиться. Тем не менее, около 60 % избирателей все-таки ответили на вопросы референдума утвердительно. И тем самым продемонстрировали, что угроза испортить отношения с Евросоюзом для них страшнее, чем возможный наплыв иммигрантов из Болгарии и Румынии.
Одним из проблемных аспектов отношений Швейцарии с Евросоюзом является вопрос тайны банковских вкладов швейцарских банков. В современном мире вряд ли найдётся какая-либо другая страна, кроме Швейцарии, в которой банки оказывали бы столь существенное воздействие не только на экономические, но и на общественно-политические процессы. Эта страна стала символом элитарной банковской системы и заслуженно пользуется репутацией самого надёжного финансового сейфа в мире.
Помимо высокой надёжности многих привлекает гарантированная швейцарским законом тайна банковских счетов и имён их владельцев.
Правда, в самой Швейцарии считают, что многое, связанное с этой проблемой, можно характеризовать как «популярный миф».
В действительности в банковской системе страны не существует анонимных счетов (blind eyer), их владельцы хорошо известны руководству банков. Действует также строжайшая система постоянной проверки владельцев номерных счетов.
И всё же в последнее время давление мирового сообщества и, особенно, Евросоюза на Швейцарию возрастает. Несмотря на мощное давление Евросоюза, окончательно отказываться от принципа банковской тайны Швейцария не намерена. Данный принцип, по мнению главы Швейцарского национального банка X. Майера, является легитимным методом функционирования любого финансового объединения.
Швейцария намерена в дальнейшем тщательно анализировать все возможные последствия реализации двусторонних соглашений с ЕС и его членами.
В первую тройку актуальных проблем, по которым альпийская республика не готова идти на какие-либо радикальные уступки, входят вопросы сохранения банковской тайны, независимости швейцарского франка и незыблемости принципа нейтралитета во внешней политике.
В целом, Швейцария не готова вести дела в банковской сфере по «правилам Евросоюза». Считается, что страна была вынуждена уже пойти на значительные уступки, что существенно девальвирует привлекательность её национальных банков. Такое развитие событий особенно не устраивает небольшие приватные (семейные) банки, составляющие основу финансовой системы страны.
В новое столетие Швейцария вступает в состоянии активного поиска иного имиджа и места в современном мире.
Оказавшись в географическом центре расширяющегося Евросоюза, Швейцария вынуждена вырабатывать новые принципы международного сотрудничества. Европа остаётся для Швейцарии важнейшим партнёром: экономическим, политическим, культурным.
В целом, это направление внешней политики Швейцарии в новом веке стало более прагматичным. Швейцария не является членом Евросоюза и, очевидно, ещё долго им не станет. При этом у неё есть ряд неоспоримых преимуществ перед ЕС, как-то: дипломатическая компетенция Швейцарии, её надёжность и репутация, завоёванная в сфере защиты прав человека. И Швейцария достаточно успешно научилась их использовать в новых реалиях.
Отношения Швейцарской Конфедерации и России
Отношения между Швейцарией и Россией отличаются стабильностью и демонстрируют с начала века устойчивую тенденцию к расширению сферы совместных интересов. Новый этап в этих отношениях начался с официального визита в Россию президента Швейцарии Флавио Котти в декабре 1998 года. Именно тогда были заложены основы политического сотрудничества обеих стран в сфере борьбы с международной преступностью, отмыванием «грязных» денег, торговлей наркотиками и нелегальной иммиграцией. Однако экономический кризис 1998 года в России не позволил тогда реализовать все имеющиеся для увеличения инвестиций Швейцарии в российскую экономику.
В последующие годы эти намерения неоднократно подтверждались на самом высоком уровне, а министр иностранных дел Швейцарии Йозеф Дайс ещё раз заверил в 1999 году российское руководство, что его страна готова к дальнейшему углублению взаимных отношений и ждёт от России соответствующего отклика на свои предложения.
Пока руководство РФ раздумывало над перспективами российско-швейцарских отношений, произошла страшная катастрофа, последствия которой ощущались долгие годы. 1 июля 2002 г. над Боденским озером, по вине швейцарской авиадиспетчерской компании «Скайгайд», на высоте около 11 км столкнулись грузовой самолёт компании DHL и пассажирский Ту-154 «Башкирских авиалиний», на борту которого находилось большое количество детей. «Эта трагедия, — заявил президент Швейцарии Паскаль Кушпен во время визита в Москву в июле 2003 г., — тяжёлой тучей нависла над нами, омрачая отношения между Россией и Швейцарией».
Президенты обеих стран подтвердили приверженность принципам многополярного мира, осудили все проявления международного терроризма и с удовлетворением констатировали заметные успехи в совместной борьбе с отмыванием денег. В первые годы нового столетия Швейцария вышла на 4-е место как по объёму инвестиций в российскую экономику (1,3 млрд долларов), так и по количеству работающих на территории России предприятий (более 450).
Деловые круги Швейцарии действительно проявляют огромный интерес к необъятному потребительскому рынку РФ. Однако несовершенство законодательной базы и отсутствие привычных для швейцарцев гарантий и условий предпринимательства тормозят этот процесс.
В 2004 году был проведён международный семинар, посвящённый России, организатором которого выступило швейцарское неправительственное объединение «Совет по сотрудничеству Швейцария-Россия». Спецпредставитель президента РФ по международному энергетическому сотрудничеству Игорь Юсуфов, принявший участие в этом семинаре, заявил, что «Швейцария, обладающая большими финансовыми ресурсами, может мобилизовать новейшие технологии для использования их в российском энергетическом секторе, потенциал вложений в который достигает $200 миллиардов… Такой семинар, этот формат, рамка этого формата очень важна для того, чтобы имидж России здесь позитивно продвигать и привлекать инвесторов».
Участники семинара обсудили современный образ России в Швейцарии, согласившись при этом, что швейцарские средства массовой информации пытаются отойти от стереотипов и представить более или менее объективный образ России. «Этот форум происходит в очень важное время, когда вся Европа с тревогой смотрит на Россию, и стереотипы старых времён опять выходят наружу», — отметил известный немецкий политолог Александр Рар.
По словам Рара, по сравнению с другими странами Европы «именно швейцарцы относятся к России менее эмоционально и менее стереотипно». Представитель федерального департамента иностранных дел Швейцарии Жан-Жак Дедардель также подчеркнул, выступая на семинаре, что Конфедерация заинтересована в улучшении имиджа России для развития всестороннего сотрудничества между странами. «Отношение к России окрашено эмоциями, иногда отрицательными, иногда позитивными, но эти представления базируются на клише, стереотипах», — отметил он. Всего в семинаре приняли участие около 150 человек — предприниматели, политологи, представители различных партий и федеральных ведомств Швейцарии, журналисты. По приглашению организаторов в Берн также приехал председатель Конституционного суда России Валерий Зорькин. Таким образом, несмотря на упомянутые выше проблемы, сотрудничество Россия-Швейцария продвинулось ещё на шаг вперёд.
На заседании Федерального совета по вопросам внешней политики в 2005 году отмечалось, что более тесными должны стать отношения Швейцарии с Россией, Китаем, Японией, Бразилией, Индией, балканскими странами, ЮАР.
В 2007 году был сделан ещё один значительный шаг к сближению Швейцарии и России, когда Государственный Секретариат Швейцарии по науке и технологиям включил Россию в список приоритетных стран для развития отношений. Как сообщил в Берне «Интерфаксу» представитель отдела двустороннего сотрудничества этого ведомства Маркус Гюблер, «Россия наравне с Индией, Китаем и ЮАР числится в списке стран, стратегическое сотрудничество с которыми на период 2008—2011 гг. планирует развивать Государственный секретариат Швейцарии по науке и технологиям». Он также добавил, что «за четыре года объём ресурсов, направляемых на финансирование программ двустороннего сотрудничества с упомянутыми странами, достигнет суммы в 53 млн швейцарских франков (почти 32 млн евро). Из них на российское направление будет выделено 8-10 млн швейцарских франков (4,82-6 млн евро)».
М. Гюблер отметил, что «российско-швейцарское сотрудничество в научно-технологической сфере главным образом основано на индивидуальных контактах учёных и исследователей из двух стран и, в основном, затрагивает сферы естественных наук, экологии и нанотехнологий, а также социологии и экономики». В скором времени, добавил он, «ожидается открытие Швейцарского дома в России, который послужит платформой для дальнейшего развития отношений между представителями научного сообщества из двух стран… Двустороннее сотрудничество между Швейцарией и Россией основано на принципах взаимной выгоды, устойчивом развитии, рассчитанном на длительный срок, и на финансировании проектов в равных долях».
После того, как Россия и Грузия разорвали дипломатические отношения в период конфликта вокруг Южной Осетии в августе 2008 года, возник естественный вопрос о том, какая страна сможет представлять интересы России в Грузии. 13 декабря 2008 года в Москве Сергей Лавров и его швейцарская коллега Мишлин Кальми-Ре подписали ноту о том, что интересы России в Грузии будет представлять именно Швейцария. Было объявлено об открытии в ближайшее время при посольстве Швейцарии в Тбилиси так называемой «секции интересов России». Сергей Лавров в связи с этим заявил: «Мы признательны нашим швейцарским коллегам за такую договорённость. Она, безусловно, будет отвечать интересам нормализации обстановки и, в конечном счёте, интересам поддержания контактов между российским и грузинским народами». Очевидно, что такой шаг укрепил взаимодоверительные отношения Швейцарии и России.
Следует также отметить, что швейцарские газеты нередко упоминают о необходимости поддержания хороших отношений с Россией. В частности, информационный интернет-портал «Swissinfo» в статье, посвящённой проведению первой полноформатной встречи глав внешнеполитических ведомств России и США Сергея Лаврова и Хиллари Клинтон по вопросам будущих основ российско-американских отношений, которая проводилась в Женеве, особо отмечает, что «Россия имеет дружественные отношения с Женевой. На протяжении многих лет генеральным директором ООН в Женеве является россиянин (в настоящее время — Сергей Орджоникидзе)… Женева также являлась местом проведения знаменитого саммита 1985 года между Р. Рейганом и М. Горбачёвым, который ознаменовал начало конца СССР. Не следует также забывать, что именно здесь проходили переговоры с Грузией после её военного столкновения с Россией в августе 2008 года».
Thus, it can be concluded that the relations of the Swiss Confederation and Russia are in their heyday, and this concerns both purely political issues and issues related to the economic cooperation of both countries. Of course, far from all the potential has been used by the parties, however, the outlined tendencies towards the expansion of relations make it possible to assume that there is a further intensification of the dialogue between the parties, the goal of which will be to eliminate the remaining obstacles.
In September 2009, the first ever meeting of the top leaders of the two countries was held. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev paid an official visit to Switzerland.
The relationship of Switzerland and the United States at the beginning of the XXI century
Back in 2000, Europe was in first place for Switzerland. But over time, the leadership of the FDID (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs) realized that in new conditions the country should pay increased attention to the rest of the world. For this reason, the FDID, in cooperation with other ministries, has developed appropriate strategies, in particular, in terms of intensifying relations with the United States, which is second in Europe outside the list of Switzerland’s most important trading partners.
In this regard, it should be noted that M. Calmy-Re (who began to manage the FDID in February 2003) allowed herself to make critical remarks about the US foreign policy. Thus, in October 2003, speaking in New York, she pointed out the inadmissibility of the hegemony of one superpower and the need to respect the rules of the game adopted internationally. Of course, even in Switzerland itself, many were not inclined to approve such behavior by the head of the FDID. As a result, after more than two years of being the head of the Swiss Foreign Ministry, there was a need for proofreading in the country's foreign policy. The foreign policy of "trial and error" sharply broke with the diplomatic traditions adopted in Switzerland, in the forefront of which are trust and predictability. M. Calmy-Re was also accused of “human rights” and “humanitarian” deviations in foreign policy, while such important files as Swiss and US relations were left out, while elementary considerations of real politics should have led her to maintain a good relationship with the United States.
However, it was recognized that since the inauguration of M. Calmy-Re, he managed to significantly expand the range of foreign policy topics.
Therefore, the special meeting of the Federal Council held on May 18, 2005, devoted exclusively to the foreign policy of the Confederation, can be called long overdue. M. Calmy-Re largely agreed with the criticism addressed to her. Following the meeting, it was announced that it should not be a fundamental change in foreign policy, but rather a shift in emphasis, which emphasizes the need to protect one’s own (primarily economic) interests and indicates the universality of Swiss foreign policy.
The relations in Switzerland with the United States were seriously affected by the events in Iraq (the military crisis in March-May 2003). Then Switzerland took a position that was generally shared by the overwhelming majority of the world community. Switzerland said with the help of P. Kushpena that it considers Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction unacceptable and that Iraqis deliberately deploy their troops near civilian objects, which is contrary to international law, that the USA themselves violated international law by launching the war in Iraq, but also the Hussein regime repeatedly and grossly violated human rights. However, Switzerland was unequivocally stressed that it was in favor of exhausting all peaceful means in order to force Baghdad to disarm. Only after that the question of using force as a last resort can be raised.
It should be noted that at the beginning of the century, statesmen, contrary to previous practice, began to give the go-ahead to military aircraft and cargo transit by the North Atlantic Alliance, which were sent to crisis regions (a condition of this, however, was the presence of a UN mandate). After stormy domestic political discussions, the Swiss also joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program. However, on the eve of the Iraq war, Switzerland took a tough stance on the issue of overflights of the anti-Iraqi coalition’s airplanes over its territory, without revealing unconditional support to the actions of NATO and their leader, the United States.
First, it was stated that if the United States launches an operation against Iraq without a UN Security Council sanction, Switzerland will deny Washington any flights for military purposes, which was eventually done. Secondly, if the resolution of the UN Security Council approves the force option, Switzerland will provide the United States with opportunities to fly through its territory “from case to case,” that is, weighing all the pros and cons separately each time. No general permission for overflight was provided.
At the same time, the Federal Council decided to ban S. Hussein from entering Switzerland on the basis of “grave violations of human rights and war crimes”. This step served to preserve the country's reputation as a champion of human rights. At the same time, Switzerland flatly refused to send Iraqi diplomats out of the country, as Washington had demanded of her. The Federal Council adopted a pragmatic position and did not stop military-technical cooperation with the United States, while P. Cushpen stressed that "Switzerland will take a neutral position, in particular, it will stop the supply of weapons that can be directly used in a military zone."
Evaluating the results of the war, in Bern they considered that the doctrine of preventive war successfully tested by the Americans in Iraq led to a certain militarization of world diplomacy. Having abandoned multilateral diplomacy, Washington turned to the tactics of creating coalitions with the help of economic promises and political threats, which means in many respects a return to the military-political thinking of the XIX century. The war in Iraq solved one problem, but created a lot of new ones, after which the world did not become more stable.
It should be noted that Switzerland has so far represented the interests of the United States in Cuba and Iran.
As for the banking sector, here too there were and still are serious contradictions between the Swiss and Washington positions. While Europe displays its intrinsic delicacy in relation to the “Swiss dwarfs,” the United States is persistently pursuing its goals and forcing Switzerland to make some concessions.
Thus, since January 2001, an agreement between the two countries entered into force, according to which 31% of deposit income accumulated during the year is automatically deducted from the accounts of American citizens in favor of the US treasury. In this regard, it should be mentioned that on December 10, 2007, the Swiss bank UBS, the largest in Europe in terms of assets, announced the write-off of ten billion dollars, the reason for which was precisely the mortgage crisis in the United States.
And in October 2008, the Swiss government decided to buy out a 10% stake in the bank for 3.9 billion euros due to the global financial crisis.
It was a heavy blow to Switzerland, a small alpine country known as the birthplace of private banking, private banking. The Swiss system of privat banking has always occupied a leading position in the global banking sector, which causes envy.
Not surprisingly, during the economic crisis, Switzerland has become a convenient lightning rod for financially concerned countries, which can thus relieve their dissatisfaction and divert the attention of their citizens from the flaws in their own poorly functioning tax systems. In addition, Switzerland claims to achieve an ambitious goal - to enter by 2015 the top three global financial centers along with New York and London. Against the background of such a situation, the US Department of Justice's appeal to the court in August 2008 demanding that the UBS bank in Switzerland satisfy the American Internal Revenue Service requests and disclose the names of UBS customers from America who opened anonymous bank accounts turned out to be quite out of place. The Swiss authorities had to cooperate with the American side and make significant concessions.
Swiss Migration Policy in the 20th - early 21st centuries
Speaking about the migration policy in the XX-XXI centuries, we can distinguish several of its main stages. So, in 1914-1945. Immigrants had very high adaptation requirements. Certain groups of the population (for example, “Eastern Jews”) were denied entry. During the Second World War, Switzerland refused to allow many Jews to enter, knowing that they were facing death, for which Switzerland officially apologized.
Since 1945, migration was understood only as the temporary involvement of visitors in the labor market. It was believed that the integration of migrants is not needed, since their return to their homeland is planned. Common were the judgments that migrants should be supported by those countries where they were from, as well as discussions about the dominance of foreigners. In the 1960s, noticeable tensions arose around the issue of the large number of workers from Southern European countries who came to work in Switzerland.
Despite the traditional international character of the country and the need for the participation of foreigners in its economic life, many Swiss people were hostile to migrants from southern Europe and considered them guilty of the country's internal problems, such as housing shortages. In accordance with this, the government introduced restrictions that sharply reduced the proportion of foreigners among workers.
In 1982, voters rejected a government proposal to liberalize the rules governing the stay of foreign workers and their families, and in 1987 immigration was even more restricted. The main “blow” to political immigration was the adoption in the summer of 1990 of a federal law that sharply limited the ability to settle in Switzerland for many categories of immigrants. By simplifying and speeding up the procedure for reviewing applications, the law allowed the overwhelming majority of applicants to be expelled from the country as soon as possible, for only 6% of them receive a positive response. He has forbidden immigrants awaiting their fate to be hired for the first three months in the country. This term in most cases is enough to give a refusal.
And finally, the law introduced the concept of “safe” countries, where, according to Swiss lawmakers, human rights are not violated, and, therefore, citizens of these countries cannot be granted political asylum. The number of such countries, in addition to Russia, were Turkey, as well as Yugoslavia.
Other measures were applied, in particular, strengthening border controls (the most vulnerable parts of the border were equipped with infrared video cameras), the introduction of centralized and closed check-in points, visa requirements, reduction of food and housing allowances, refusal of a petition without a preliminary hearing, forcible expulsion . In addition, the Swiss authorities retained 7% of the salaries of persons without a residence permit, to cover the costs of their expulsion, which was considered a matter of pre-decided.
To legislative measures added a number of administrative. Thanks to the standard questionnaire used by officials and lawyers of the Federal Refugee Administration and computer processing of answers, all biographies of the petitioners looked contradictory, and therefore were declared false and not relevant to the real political situation in a given country, which was considered a priori quite normal. The consequences of such measures were very rapid: the percentage of asylum seekers dropped from 94% in 1981 to less than 3% in 1992 (rising to 1993 at 20% due to the temporarily accepted 2 thousand Bosniaks).
Since 1991, the Swiss Federal Council has announced a “new immigration policy”. Based on the “three circles” principle, it places in a privileged position immigrants from the so-called “traditional zones” (the European Union and the European Free Trade Association), where “cultural, religious and social values correspond to Swiss ones”. The second round includes the USA and Canada, the third - all other countries. At the same time, the federal authorities proposed a serious review of the law on the temporary and permanent residence of foreigners. Under the pretext of fighting crime, a series of “coercive measures” was introduced.
Thus, “preventive detention” of foreigners who have not yet received a residence permit, imprisonment for 6 months of refugees, doomed to expulsion, and living under the supervision of police of foreigners “threatening public order” is provided for.
In 1994, referendum participants approved a stricter law on the stay of foreigners. Nevertheless, the contingent of foreign workers remains large - 25% of the total number of employed. At the same time, the number of foreign nationals living in Switzerland has increased to about 1.4 million.
Since 2000, the approach to immigration and integration can be characterized as “resource” (as opposed to “deficient” in previous years). It should be noted that at present Switzerland’s current immigration policy is as follows:
- Introduction of the principle of free movement and universal residence of citizens (the principle applies to EU member states or EFTA). In other words, those who find a job have the right to remain in the country.
- A strict immigration restriction policy (applied to non-EU / EFTA states). Immigration is now possible only for highly qualified personnel.
- Family reunification is the most important basis for resettlement in the country. The share of arrivals along the line of family reunification is generally over 40%.
In Switzerland, there are also political movements and parties that adhere to anti-immigrant rhetoric, which is characterized by the following statements:
- Foreigners take away our work!
- Switzerland is a Christian nation!
- Drug trafficking and violence - this is exactly what foreigners do!
- Integrating is a task for foreigners!
- Foreigners come to us only in order to enjoy the benefits of our social security system!
- Multicultural society has failed!
- The one who comes here should adapt and adapt!
- We determine for ourselves who is in our circle and who is not!
The activities of one of the most powerful far-right political forces, the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP), are especially worth noting. The radical right believes that a significant number of foreigners violate federal laws. According to representatives of the party, many of the country's drug dealers are “newcomers” from other states, and 70% of prisoners are non-indigenous Swiss.
It should be noted that the sharpness of the dispute on the migration issue, on the issue of granting freedom of movement decreased over time. Thus, on September 25, 2005, a referendum was held in Switzerland regarding the extension of the principle of freedom of movement between Switzerland and the EU to the new members of the European Union. Shortly before the Federal Council, the government of the country, recommended that the people give a positive answer to the question posed. Even K. Blocher, the leader of the Swiss People’s Party, changed the tone a bit and on September 12, in his Address to the People, Blik, the most widely read newspaper in Switzerland, stated that “we must take the risk.”
The national referendum was held, as mentioned above, on September 25, 2005. 56% of those who took part in the voting were in favor of freedom of movement. “Speaking for the further discovery of the country, the Swiss acted pragmatically,” the newspaper Der Bund wrote in editorial comments, “In the era of the global economy, Switzerland can no longer do what it wants. Anyone who wants to do business with the EU should recognize the opportunity for Europeans to work in Switzerland. ”
As practice reveals, the cooperation of Switzerland and the EU in the migration issue is beneficial for both parties and due to the need. In particular, Switzerland is experiencing the need to join the Schengen Information System and the “Dublin Convention on the State of First Asylum” to more effectively combat cross-border crime and illegal migration, as well as to relieve the asylum system. The EU is interested in increasing the effectiveness of the fight against financial irregularities and economic crimes (meaning that EU citizens are hiding income from deposits placed in Swiss banks). All of Europe, more than ever, needs a common plan for settling migration flows in accordance with the mutual interests of the individual and society. Если она сегодня не совладает с ними, то завтра эти миграционные потоки по-своему «справятся» уже с самой Европой.
Стоит отметить, что распределение иностранцев по Швейцарии очень неравномерно. Особенно высокий процент иностранцев среди детей. Проведённая в 2000 году перепись населения показала, что 25,8 % детей в возрасте до 6 лет не имели швейцарского гражданства, а в пяти крупных городах страны это число превысило 45 %. Практически каждый пятый ребёнок, родившийся в Швейцарии, имеет по крайне мере одного из родителей, который имеет иностранное гражданство. Увеличение значения высококвалифицированных иммигрантов в Швейцарии. Швейцарский закон благоприятствует образованным специалистам, и богатым, и даже создаёт стимулы для их жизни и создания ими бизнеса в Швейцарии.
На сегодняшний день существует три основных вида иммигрантов, приезжающих в Швейцарию:
- Высокообразованные, высококвалифицированные специалисты, такие, как инженеры, которые приезжают в Швейцарию исключительно для работы в качестве высококвалифицированных работников или начинают свой собственный бизнес, и богатые люди, которые приезжают жить за счёт своего богатства. Эти иммигранты благополучны по швейцарским иммиграционным законам.
- Политические беженцы, которые приезжают именно в поисках убежища. На протяжении многих лет Швейцария приветствовала сотни тысяч политических беженцев в мире из горячих точек и продолжает это делать. Тем не менее, швейцарское законодательство не позволяет людям пытаться эксплуатировать швейцарскую социальную систему.
- Низкоквалифицированные работники, особенно из Португалии, северной Испании и южной Италии, которые приезжают в страну, чтобы предложить свою работу за высокую швейцарскую зарплату. Закон жёстко ограничивает эту категорию иммигрантов, которые и так уже находятся в Швейцарии в больших количествах.
В Конфедерации главный закон, который регулирует процедуру въезда на территорию Швейцарии — это федеральный закон от 26 марта 1931 года. В начале XXI века правительство подготовило проект нового закона и он был рассмотрен 8 марта 2002 года Федеральным Советом. После чего закон был принят 16 декабря 2005 года, а последние поправки, касающиеся статей 92—95 и 127 внесены 12 декабря 2008 года. Новый проект закона, в статье, касающейся целей, регулирует въезд, пребывание иностранцев в Швейцарии, а также процедуру воссоединения семьи. Кроме этого, в законе описываются разные программы стимулирования интеграции иммигрантов в общественной и политической жизни страны. В феврале 2009 года в Тиране прошёл семинар, проведённый Федеральным ведомством по вопросам миграции в Швейцарской Конфедерации, посвящённый вопросам интеграции иммигрантов в стране. Был приведён доклад, согласно которому было подтверждено, что сосуществование швейцарского народа и жителей иммигрантов удовлетворительно. Однако:
- около 15 % иммигрантов, не успели в молодости завершить своё профессиональное образование в рамках обычной задержки;
- Почти 40 % населения по уровню благосостояния не соответствуют швейцарским гражданам;
- Около 50 % лиц, осуждённых за уголовные нарушения в Швейцарии, являются гражданами других государств;
- Лишь 20 % иммигрантов, прибывших в страну в поисках убежища, имеют прибыльную работу.
Беженцы и защита от преследования
В августе 1942 года порог для «расовой» иммиграции, в стране преследовали беженцев, прежде всего евреев, для них въезд на тот момент являлся закрытым. Информацию о политических беженцах во время Второй мировой войны можно найти в статье « Швейцария и еврейские беженцы во время национал-социализма ».
В 1956 году, сразу же после восстания и последующего вторжения советских войск в Венгрию, в Швейцарию прибыли на временное проживание около 14000 венгерских беженцев, из которых 7000 остались в дальнейшем в Швейцарии. С 1959 года беженцы из Тибета были допущены в страну.
После вторжения войск Варшавского договора в Чехословакию в 1968 году в Швейцарию бежали около 12 000 чехословацких беженцев — в основном высококвалифицированных рабочих и учёных.
В 1973 году, когда правительство Альенде было свергнуто, Совет Федерации разрешил въезд не более 200 беженцев из Чили . В этом меморандуме сопротивление предложило такой расклад событий, что власти были вынуждены оставить открытыми ворота Швейцарии для этих беженцев.
В период между 1975 и 1983 годами прибыло 8200 беженцев из Юго-Восточной Азии, убежище в Швейцарии стало предоставляться как нечто само собой разумеющееся.
Объявление военного положения в Польше в 1981 году привело к принятию около 2500 польских беженцев в Швейцарию.
С начала 1980-х годов ситуация изменилась в области предоставления убежища. Число лиц, ищущих убежище, увеличилось значительно. Что поражает — возрастающее разнообразие стран происхождения лиц, ищущих убежища. Многие из них из Шри-Ланки, Турции, Ирака и ряд африканских государств. Это также является следствием увеличения мобильности и сетей в мире. Во время войны в Боснии и Герцеговине (1992—1995), в Швейцарию переехали около 30 000 лиц, ищущих защиты, в то время как Косовский конфликт (1998/99) вызвал прибытие 53 000 человек. Причины, почему люди сегодня расстаются со своими домами и ищут убежища в Швейцарии, являются весьма разнообразными.
В Женевской Конвенции 1951 года о статусе беженцев, является основным юридическим документом в определении, кто является беженцем, их правах и правовых обязательств государств по отношению к беженцам. Протокол 1967 года удалил из Конвенции географические и временные ограничений. Согласно Секции 3 (1) из Закона о беженцах, беженцы определены как «иностранцы, которые в стране происхождения или стране прежнего места иммиграция в Швейцарию для жительства, подвергаются или имеют хорошо-обоснованные опасения быть подвергнуты серьёзному нарушению прав человека по причинам принадлежности к определённой расе, религии, национальности, членстве в специфической социальной группе или в результате политических убеждений».
Согласно Секции 3 (2) из того же Закона, под серьёзными опасениями имеется в виду угроза жизни, физической целостности человека или его свободе, а также действия, которые наносят невыносимое психологическое давление. Признанным беженцам предоставляется вид на жительство, имеющий силу в течение одного года и продлевается автоматически ежегодно (как и во всех других странах). После пяти лет проживания признанные беженцы имеют право на постоянный вид на жительство, имеющий силу в течение 10 лет и автоматически продлеваемый ежегодно так же.
Существуют беженцы по квоте, согласно Секции 56 из Закона о беженцах Федеральный Совет (наивысшая инстанция правительства Швейцарии) имеет право предоставлять убежище группам беженцев. В восьмидесятых и в начале девяностых, Федеральный Совет после консультаций с управлением верховного комиссариата ООН по делам беженцев решил, что Швейцария будет ежегодно допускать квоту в размере нескольких сотен беженцев (имеются в виду беженцы, которые бежали в страны, не осуществляющие приёма и натурализации беженцев, и подавшие заявление об убежище в Комиссариат ООН по делам беженцев — например, вьетнамские беженцы в Гонконге , Малайзии и т. д.).
Швейцария гордится своими гуманитарными традициями. Она уже давно является местом убежища для тех, кто преследуется по политическим мотивам. Согласно данным Федерального ведомства по статистике, в 2001 году 30 % населения, проживающего в Швейцарии, составляли эмигранты и их потомки. Тем не менее, во время Второй мировой войны в Швейцарию вернулись и были депортированы тысячи беженцев, большинство из которых евреи, на том основании, что расовые, нежели политические, преследования, не дают им убежище. В то время в Швейцарии использовали лозунг — «лодка полна».
Во время «холодной войны» Швейцария приняла беженцев в 1956 году из Венгрии и в 1968 году из Чехословакии . В последние годы Швейцария приняла беженцев из различных частей мира. В 2004 году Сербия и Черногория были странами с наибольшим числом заявлений, поданных гражданами о предоставлении убежища.
Notes
- ↑ Дурденевский В. Н. О нейтралитете Швейцарии. // New time. 1955. № 22. С. 29.
- ↑ Edgar B. Swiss neutrality. 1946: Basel. P.330
- ↑ Афанасьева О. В. К истории швейцарского нейтралитета. // Международная жизнь. 1956. № 1.С.79
- ↑ Петров И. А. Очерки истории Швейцарии. М.: Циркон. 2006. С.173
- ↑ Afanasyev, O. V. To the history of Swiss neutrality. // International life. 1956. No. 1.S.80.
- ↑ Petrov I. A. Essays on the history of Switzerland. M .: Zircon. 2006. p. 554.
- ↑ Neue Zürcher Zeitung. 03/22/1938
- ↑ ibid.
- ↑ Afanasyev, O. V. On the history of Swiss neutrality. // International life. 1956. No. 1.С.81
- ↑ International organizations in Switzerland (English)
- ↑ 1 2 Switzerland joins the UN