Persian Campaign of Julian the Apostate

The invasion of Roman troops under the command of Emperor Julian the Apostate to the territory of Persia was one of the links in the chain of Roman-Persian wars that began in the first half of the 3rd century. n e. (after the Sassanid dynasty came to power in Iran) and which became the continuation of the Roman-Parthian wars of the 1st-3rd centuries. n e.

From the end of the 330s (since the expiration of the 40-year Nisibis Peace Treaty concluded in 298 ) until the mid- 350s . the fighting between the Roman and Persian armies was relatively sluggish. For the most part, the Persians were the initiators of the conflicts in the border zone, and their most significant success, apart from the constant small raids on Roman territories in Upper Mesopotamia, was the capture in 348 ( 344 ?) Of the important Roman fortress - Singara . After that, the Persian army returned to its territory.

In the following years (until the end of the 350s ), Shapur II did not take any active large-scale military actions against the Roman Empire. At this time, all the king's efforts were focused on organizing the defense of the north-eastern borders of his state. Shapur, as Ammianus Marcellin writes, “was engaged in a war with neighbors and drove away wild peoples from their borders, who often attack him in his changeable mood, and sometimes, when he goes to us with a war, they help him” ^[1] . Opponents of the Persians were Chionites and Kushans .

The Roman emperor Constantius II , in turn, also did not have the opportunity to organize military operations against Persia that could provoke retaliatory actions on the part of Shapur - he was absorbed in the struggle against internal ( usurpers Magnensius and Sylvanas ) and external ( Saracens , Alemanni , Franks , Sarmatians and Quads ) enemies of the empire.

Although the difficult situation in the East did not allow Shapur II to wage a full-fledged war against Rome, the Persians, however, during the 350s . The Roman border garrisons in Mesopotamia were systematically alarmed, keeping them in constant tension. In addition to actions directed directly against Rome, Shapur organized attacks on Armenia allied to Rome. In general, the anti-Roman actions of the Persians were very successful, to a large extent facilitated by the Romans themselves: their military leaders instead of organizing the defense of the Roman borders were engaged in robbing the local population.

The situation in Roman-Persian relations worsened again in the late 350s . By this time, Shapur II triumphantly ended the war on the eastern borders of Persia, entered into a military alliance with former opponents - the Chionites - and began preparations for the invasion of Roman possessions. The fighting began in the year 359 , when Amida was captured by the army of Shapur II. In 360, the Persians captured two more Roman fortresses - Singaru and Bezabdu .

The immediate prologue to the Roman-Persian conflict of 363 was the coming to power in the Roman Empire in 361 of Emperor Julian II .

Immediately after coming to power, Julian begins active preparations for a campaign against Persia. From the military-strategic point of view, the planned expedition was, despite all its external aggressiveness, an event of a defensive nature. The invasion of Persia, conceived by Julian, was a preemptive strike designed to protect the eastern borders of the Roman Empire from devastating Persian raids for a certain (ideally as long as possible) time. Thus, the Persian expedition of Julian the Apostate was an attempt to move Rome in the eastern (Persian) direction from passive defense to active ^[2] .

An important role in Julian’s organization of the invasion of Persian territory was also played by subjective reasons, namely, the emperor’s ambition. As Ammianus Marcellinus notes, Juliana “was hungry for battle for two reasons: firstly, because he could not stand peace at all and raved about fighting signals and battles, and secondly, because ... he was eager to add the title of Parthian to his glorious military distinctions " ^[3]

In addition, Julian the Apostate’s campaign against Persia was also called upon to solve foreign economic problems: in the event of its successful completion, the empire hoped to take control of the trans-Eurasian trade routes on their front-Asian segment, the struggle for which was generally one of the factors in the confrontation between Rome and its eastern neighbors ^{[ 4]} .

Soviet historians of the mid- 20th century also put forward one of the main goals of Julian by his desire, by means of a victorious war, to reduce the intensity of the class struggle in late Roman society and strengthen its shaky position ^[5] .

In accordance with the campaign plan developed at Julian’s headquarters, by the spring of 363, units of the Roman army concentrated at various points along the eastern border, awaiting the approach of the main forces led by Julian ^[6] .

The actions of the Romans were to be supported by the Armenian army led by Tsar Arshak II , who received orders to concentrate forces on the border of Persia and wait for further instructions from Julian. To join Arshak, it was planned to send a 30,000th detachment of the Romans under the command of two commits : Procopius and Sebastian . The task of this combined group was to protect the northern section of the Roman-Persian border in order to prevent the sudden passage of the Persians through the Tigris. In addition, it provided for the possibility of active action by the Roman-Armenian army on the territory of the Persian Media , as well as (if necessary) its connection with the main forces of Julian.

The actions of the ground forces were to be supported by a large - more than 1,000 units (see below) - fleet , which, according to the developed plan, was to follow the army along the Euphrates and supply it with everything necessary, as well as provide combat support. In addition, the created river flotilla included special vessels for guiding crossings.

Stage I (from a speech from Antioch to the approach to Ctesiphon)

Julian’s army marched from Antioch on March 5, 363, and soon, joining the rest of the units, crossed the Euphrates ^[7] . On March 27, Julian was already in Kallinik (now the city of Raqqa in Syria ).

Coming out of Kallinik, Julian's army began to move south along the left bank of the Euphrates; on the way, the emperor received the embassy of local Arab leaders, who provided him with detachments to perform auxiliary functions ^{[8] [9]} . At the same time, the Roman fleet arrived, consisting of 1000 cargo and 50 military ships, as well as 50 ships adapted for crossing, or only 1,100 units ^[10] . Ammian’s information is somewhat at variance with Zosim’s data: according to him, Julian had 600 wooden and 50 warships, 500 for the construction of crossings, and many others that brought food and siege devices, ships ^[11] , all in all, more 1150 ships. An even larger figure is given by Magnus Karrsky - 1250 vessels ^[12] .

Now, accompanied by the fleet, Julian continued to move along the Euphrates, passing by the cities of Kerkusiy , Zayt and Dara . In early April, the army of the Romans crossed the Aboru River (present-day Khabur ), the left tributary of the Euphrates, after which the built bridges were burnt by order of Julian so that none of the Romans thought about returning back. Then Persian possessions began, and the troops, having adopted a military order, began to advance more carefully. The column of Romans stretched for 10 miles ^[13] , that is, almost 15 km. Ahead and from the flanks of the column was accompanied by a detachment of light cavalry of 1,500 horsemen, providing combat protection of the main forces of the Romans ^[14] . The fleet followed the river parallel to the army ^[15] .

In mid-April, the Romans met the first enemy fortress - Anafa , who stood on an island in the middle of the Euphrates ^[16] . Her garrison, yielding to the entreaties and promises of the Sassanid prince Ormizd , who was in the Roman army, agreed to voluntarily surrender. The garrison commander, a Persian named Pusey, was given the rank of tribune ; Anafa’s population was taken to Syria, and the city itself was burned ^[17] . After that, Julian's army continued to move forward, destroying everything in its path. The next Persian fortresses on the path of Julian were Tiluta and Akhayyahala . Both of them, like Anafa, were on the rocky islands in the middle of the Euphrates ^[18] , but, unlike Anafa, their defenders did not want to surrender immediately, but stated that if the Romans, moving forward, occupy the inner regions of the Persian kingdom, then they will go over to the side of the winner ^[19] . Julian, trying to avoid unnecessary losses, moved on, passing the area called Baraksmalha and the city of Diakiru .

A few days later the first skirmish occurred between the forces of Julian and the Persian-Arab detachment, as a result of which the opponents of the Romans retreated ^[20] . Soon the Romans approached the powerful Persian fortress of Pirisabore ^[21] . After several days of siege, the garrison of Pirisabora, in the hands of which remained only a citadel , decided to begin negotiations on surrender; as a result, 2500 Persians, led by the head of the garrison Mamersid ^[22] , having received guarantees of personal safety, surrendered, and Pirisabora herself was looted and then burned ^[23] . All this time, the Persians constantly troubled the Roman army with sudden attacks and shellings, often taking the Romans by surprise ^{[24] [25] [26]} ; Julian was once even forced to use decimation in order to force his warriors to be more alert and cautious in this way ^[27] .

The next significant fortified point on the way of the Roman troops was Mayozamalha ^[28] . The city was besieged, but not one of the many assaults was successful. As a result, it was decided to dig and through it penetrate into the fortress. This plan was a success, and Mayozamalha was taken. The first warriors to enter the city were awarded siege wreaths ( corona obsidionalis ) ^[29] - one of the highest military awards in the Roman army.

A participant in these events, Ammianus Marcellinus, with undisguised pride and satisfaction reports on the cruelty with which the Romans dealt with the population of the taken fortress:

“Angry winners chopped everyone up, not distinguishing between gender or age; some residents, in fear of imminent death, threatened by fire on one side and a sword on the other, mourned their end, themselves rushed down from the walls ... So a large and crowded city, taken by the powerful courage of the Romans, was turned into dust and ruins. After this glorious work, we passed along a continuous row of bridges ... ” ^{[30] [31] [32]}

Of the entire garrison during the assault on the fortress, only 80 people survived, led by their commander Nabdat; captured Persians were granted life ^[30] .

After the capture and destruction of Mayozamalha, the Roman army continued to move further south, constantly being subjected to unexpected attacks by the Persian cavalry, while suffering substantial losses ^{[31] [32] [33] [34] [35]} . Having reached Kokhi ( Seleucia ), the Romans spent two days under its walls with the aim of rest ^[36] . Then the Roman army approached the dry Channel of Trajan, dug by the emperor Trajan during his campaign against Parthia (and subsequently repaired by Septimius Severus ^{[37] [38]} , through which the fleet could not pass; therefore, water was let into the canal, and the army, having built with the help of ships, floating bridges moved towards the nearby Ctesiphon ^[39] .

Soon the Roman army was already at the gates of the Persian capital.

Stage II (from the battle of Ctesiphon to the start of the retreat)

Here - under the walls of Ctesiphon - at the end of May 363, the first major field battle between the Roman and Persian armies took place during the Persian campaign of Julian the Apostate. This is one of the few cases when Ammianus names the commanders of the Persian army - in this case, they were “the chief leaders of Suren, Pigran and Narsey” (Pigran et Surena et Narseus potissimi duces) ^[40] . The Romans, under cover of darkness, crossed the Tiger on several ships and with battle captured part of the coast, where the rest of the army landed ^[41] . The Persians did not show serious resistance to the Roman army and after a short battle hid behind the walls of Ctesiphon, literally on the heels pursued by the Romans ^[42] . The losses of the Persians were, according to Ammian, about 2500 people, the Romans - only 70 ^[43] . Zosim leads almost the same figures, with the only difference being that the losses of the Romans, according to his data, amounted not to 70, but to 75 people ^[44] . Thus, under Ctesiphon, the Romans won a significant victory, which, however, as subsequent events showed, was fruitless.

After the battle of Ctesiphon, a military council was convened, on which the question of further actions was decided: to besiege the capital of Persia or to limit itself to ruining the areas adjacent to the city and destroying scattered groups of Persians. Due to the impregnability of the fortress and intelligence reports about the approach of the main forces of the Persians, the second option was adopted ^[45] . In the area of ​​Ctesiphon, the Roman army spent several days restoring strength and replenishing food supplies by robbery ^[45] .

However, soon Julian single-handedly changed this decision and gave the order to advance further into the depths of Persia, leaving Ctesiphon behind ^{[46] [47]} . To increase the mobility of the Roman army, the emperor also ordered the destruction of the fleet so as not to distract 20,000 warriors and not be connected with the need to stay on the banks of the Tigris. As a result, the fleet accompanying the army was almost completely burned; only 12 ships survived, which were loaded onto carts and were in the wagon train to guide pontoon crossings if necessary ^[48] .

However, the Persians did everything possible to prevent the Romans from entering the interior of the state, and therefore they set fire to the steppe, grain crops and villages in the areas along which the Roman troops were supposed to pass; this was complemented by constant attacks by the Persian cavalry ^[49] . As a result, the Romans found themselves without food and fodder in the middle of a scorched country. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Roman-Armenian army, concentrated on the banks of the Tigris (see above), did not come to the aid of Julian's army.

Stage III (from the start of the retreat to the death of Julian)

Under the pressure of circumstances , another military council was convened on June 16 , at which a new decision was made: turn north and move towards the Roman province of Corduena ^[50] , towards the army under the joint command of the Armenian king Arshak II, Procopius and Sebastian. After this, the Persians, realizing that the Romans abandoned their original plans and that a turning point occurred in the war, intensified their military activity, and the losses of the Romans increased ^[51] .

A significant Persian detachment met the Romans in an area called Maranga ^[52] . Here, another major battle took place between the Romans and the Persian army led by Merena, whom Ammianus Marcellinus calls the “cavalry commander,” and the two sons of the king ( Latin cum Merene equestris magistro militiae filiisque regis duobus ) .

The battle of Maranga ended, probably, without a definite result, although, according to Ammian, the losses of the Persians were more significant ^[53] . After a three-day truce, the Roman troops continued to move in the direction of Corduena, and the Persians, loyal to their tactics, were continuously disturbed by sudden attacks and ambushes ^[54] . During one of these attacks, which occurred on June 26, the unexpected happened: Julian, hastening to help his soldiers, did not consider it necessary (or did not have time) to put on armor, and in a short skirmish one of the cavalry darts hit him on the right side ^[55] Until now, historians cannot accurately answer the question of which side the fatal dart was launched from. There are two main versions of what happened that appeared in the sources literally immediately after the death of Julian. According to the first of them, traditional, the emperor died at the hands of a Persian warrior (this point of view was expressed, for example, by Sextus Aurelius Victor ^[56] , a contemporary of Julian and one of his close associates). The version of betrayal is not so popular among historians, but it also has its own justification. It was first played by Ammianus Marcellinus ^[57] , and then by Libanius ^[58] , Socrates Scholastic ^[59] and some other late antique and early medieval authors. According to this hypothesis, Julian was the victim of a Christian warrior who was in the Roman army and took the opportunity to eliminate the hated pagan emperor. The main argument of the supporters of this version is that after the death of Julian, none of the Persians was awarded or generally marked; therefore, the murder of the emperor is the work of one of the Roman, not Persian, warriors. The message of the most informative source - the works of Ammian - can be understood in different ways. He writes that when the Persians were already on the run, Julian, who was in the midst of the crowd, "is not known where, suddenly hit ... a cavalry spear, cut through the skin on his arm, pierced his ribs and stuck in the lower part of the liver ." In this regard, the Persian point of view on the death of the emperor Julian is interesting: Muhammad at-Tabari writes that Julian was killed in his tent with an arrow fired by an “invisible hand” and falling into the emperor’s heart ^[60] . Thus, there is no reason to give priority to any other point of view. The wound to Julian was inflicted during a swift skirmish, and in the bustle of battle no one, most likely, even managed to notice who caused the mortal wound to the emperor. Therefore, it is simply impossible to give an exact answer to the question of whose hand Julian the Apostate died. As it turned out a little later, the wound was fatal; a few hours later Julian passed away in his tent ^{[61] [62]} .

Stage IV (from the proclamation of Emperor Jovian to the conclusion of a peace treaty)

The next day (June 27), the election of the new emperor took place, which was the former commander of the corps of protectors Jovian ^[63] . The Romans were in a critical situation: they were surrounded by the Persian army, deprived of the opportunity to replenish food supplies, demoralized by the death of Julian. Therefore, the only way out and hope for salvation was a further retreat in the direction of Corduena. The army of Jovian, passing through the areas of Sumera and Kharha, on July 1 reached the city of Dura ^[64] , located on the banks of the Tigris, but could not advance further, being surrounded by the Persian army led by Shapur II himself. Unable to move further north, cross the right bank of the Tigris, or replenish food supplies, the Romans found themselves in a critical situation.

Knowing the situation in which Jovian and his army found themselves, Shapur II sent ambassadors to the emperor with a proposal for negotiations. As a result, the Persians were able to impose on Joviana an extremely unprofitable peace treaty for the Romans, which had two main conditions: 1) the transfer to Persia of the five Roman regions in Upper Mesopotamia ( Arzaneni , Moksoeny , Zabditseny , Regimeny , Kordueny ^[65] ) with the fortresses located there, as well as cities Nisibisa , Singara and the Camp of the Moors and 2) the refusal of Rome to support Armenia ^[66] . The agreement was signed for 30 years and backed by noble hostages from both sides ^[67] . After this, the retreat of the starving, exhausted by continuous skirmishes with the enemy, but still preserved (albeit very expensive price) Roman army turned into a stampede ^[68] .

As a result of the extremely unsuccessful campaign of 363, the empire not only ceded to Persia a number of its territories of strategic importance, but, in fact, betrayed its most faithful eastern ally - Armenia.

Pursuant to the terms of the treaty, the Roman state was forced to cede to Persia one of the key (both militarily and economically) points of Northern Mesopotamia - Nisibis. The inhabitants of Nisibis, under pain of death, were ordered to leave the city within three days, after which he, despite the protests of the townspeople, was occupied by the Persians ^{[69] [70]} . According to at-Tabari , by the order of Shapur, 12,000 people were relocated to Nisibis from Istakhr , Isfahan and other areas of the Persian state ^[71] .

Thus, not one of the goals pursued by Julian in preparation for the Persian campaign was fully achieved. The positions of the Sasanian Iran in Asia Minor sharply increased. Nevertheless, a positive result for the 363 campaign for Rome was the signing of the next peace treaty with Persia, which provided for a long period a quiet life for the eastern provinces of the empire. In the coming decades, the territory of Armenia became the arena of the struggle between Rome and Iran for dominance in Western Asia.

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