The landing on the Warm Lake on August 16-17, 1944, or the Lane-Mexico-Canal landing operation is a tactical landing operation of a Soviet brigade of warships during the Tartu offensive operation of the Great Patriotic War .
Landing on the warm lake | |||
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Main conflict: World War II | |||
date | August 16 - 18, 1944 | ||
A place | Estonian SSR , USSR | ||
Total | victory of the Red Army | ||
Opponents | |||
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Commanders | |||
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Forces of the parties | |||
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Losses | |||
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Content
The situation at the front of Lake Peipsi
Since July 1944, Soviet troops conducted offensive operations in the Baltic against the German forces of Army Group North . In view of the stubborn resistance of the enemy, at the same time with strikes from Belarus , an attack on the Baltic was planned from the east. In order to support the 25th brigade of warships on Lake Peipsi, which prepared the offensive (commanded by Captain 2nd Rank A.F. Arzhavkin ), the Baltic Fleet and the Leningrad Front (to which the brigade promptly submitted), they were preparing a landing operation in the northern part of Lake Peipsi, on the Narva direction.
Plan of operation and its preparation
However, in early August 1944, the flotilla was suddenly transferred to the subordination of the 3rd Baltic Front ( Army Commander General I.I. Maslennikov ), who was preparing a front-line offensive operation to liberate the city of Tartu in Estonia . Therefore, the landing site was moved to the area of warm Lake . The Germans could not cover this area with sufficient forces, since the 18th German army defending there experienced an acute shortage of troops. This shortage, in turn, arose due to the fact that since June 1944, due to the disastrous development of the situation in Belarus for the Germans, a lot of German troops were sent there from this area.
The 1st and 4th Estonian border regiments defended in the landing zone area.
The Soviet command deployed the 25th Separate brigade of river ships of the Baltic Fleet on Lake Peipsi. By the beginning of the operation, it included 12 armored boats , 21 tenders , 11 patrol and mine boats, a detachment of boats armed with missiles (5 boats), 3 hydrofoils, auxiliary vessels [1] . By the beginning of July, the German command located on the lake the 4th flotilla of gunboats , other units of high-speed amphibious barges and minesweepers (up to 20 ships in total and 30 boats), the number of ships the Germans exceeded the Soviet brigade. To eliminate the threat from the enemy ships to the future landing force, the command of the Baltic Fleet allocated the 9th Attack Aviation Division (154 attack planes and fighters ), and units of the 11th Attack Aviation Division of the fleet were also involved in solving problems on the lake. During July-August 1944, Soviet naval aviation continuously attacked the main bases of the enemy’s ships, the village of Mustvee , and then the remaining marinas and lake ports on the western shore of Lake Peipsi occupied by the Germans. During the 1436 sorties, the bulk of the enemy ships were sunk by early August (6 gunboats, 4 patrol boats, over 20 other small ships and boats, and according to VM Zhumatiy: 16 self-propelled landing barges, 15 boats, 8 barges , 1 steamer, 1 tug) or received damage (including 2 gunboats, 2 patrol boats [2] ). Thus, as a result of the successful actions of the Soviet aviation, the threat of countering the German ships was eliminated.
Progress of operation
For the landing of the landing, the directive of the commander of the 3rd Baltic front of August 12 established an amphibious group (commander of the deputy commander of the front, Lieutenant-General A. A. Grechkin ) as part of the 191st rifle division and 128th rifle division , artillery regiment (705 IPTAP ), 1/320 gvmp, two mortar regiments (281 mp and 228 guv mp without 1 division), two machine-gun artillery battalions , 1 division of self-propelled artillery installations SU-76 (20 units), 159th separate motorized pontoon bridge battalion and the 5th regiment heavy ponto in, separate special parts. The ships and boats participating in the operation were transferred in advance from the main base of the brigade, Gdov, to the departure area .
The 330th Fighter Division , the 280th Mixed Aviation Division , the 386th Night Bomber Aviation Regiment were recruited for air support.
The landing operation began on the night of August 16, 1944. The landing was carried out in three echelons in the region of Lana, Mehikorm on the Estonian (western) shore of the Warm Lake (which is the strait between the Peipsi and Pskov lakes ). By 5:00 am on August 16, the first echelon of the assault (part of the 191st rifle division: one rifle regiment, two machine-gun artillery battalions, a punitive company) was landed on the western shore. The enemy discovered his approach and opened artillery and mortar fire (rather weak), quickly suppressed by Soviet artillery from the eastern shore of the lake and the artillery fire of ships. Smoke curtains were installed immediately. There was no loss of ships on landing. By 10 o'clock in the afternoon, the landing force occupied a bridgehead to a depth of 2 kilometers. In the afternoon, the German command was able to organize a series of counterattacks using tanks and armored vehicles, but they were repulsed and the bridgehead was significantly expanded. By the end of the day, the area of the beachhead was 10 kilometers along the front, up to 6 kilometers in depth.
Since the German units could not stop the onset of the assault, the German command decided to use aviation: starting at 10:00 in the morning, German planes in groups of 10-30 bombers delivered continuous strikes at Soviet ships. On the approach to the western coast, the second echelon of the assault force, carrying parts of the 546th infantry regiment of the 191st division, came under attack. Heavy losses were inflicted on the third echelon troops, as well as points of concentration of troops and their landing on ships on the eastern coast were subjected to air strikes.
Air strikes continued the next day, August 17th. As a result, the BK-323 armored boat, MK-5 mortar boat, I-27 patrol boat, four tenders were sunk in two days, [3] 4 other boats, seven out of 14 ferries, 11 boats and 12 tenders were damaged [4] . The personnel of the landing party also suffered significant damage. Despite superiority in the landing area, Soviet aviation was unable to provide air cover. Most likely, the command of the air forces of the fleet and the front simply did not expect such a significant opposition from the air and was lost. Of the 4 fighter aviation regiments of the fleet, one carried out 8 sorties on the day of August 16, the second - 16 sorties, the other two - less than 10 sorties each. On August 17, the intensity of Soviet aviation increased, several enemy bombers were shot down, but they could not be prevented from hitting the ships again. To compensate for the losses, Fleet Commander VF Tributs ordered to urgently prepare six armored boats and 20 tenders for dispatch to Gdov from the Baltic Sea . The surviving ships worked with maximum load, performing up to 20 voyages across the lake per day without rest. All local watercraft were connected to the carriage, including towed pontoons and home-made rafts.
The success of the Luftwaffe German command could not use. Although 2 infantry regiments from the 207th guard division were deployed to the landing site, 2 artillery battalions — but the forces of the landing force were increasing faster. On the bridgehead, the landed units, acting energetically and resolutely, broke down the resistance of the existing strongholds and advanced towards the main forces of the 67th Army, which successfully developed the offensive from the south along the coast of the lake. At 23:30 local time on August 17, the troops of the landing party met with fighters of the right - flank 86th Infantry Division of the 67th Army , moving in the north direction, and jointly continued the pursuit of the enemy towards Tartu. The favorable development of the operation made it possible not to bring the second echelon of the assault force, the 128th Rifle Division, which was transported to the bridgehead, into battle, but then use it in a different direction.
Operation Result
By August 18, despite the losses in the boats, parts of both rifle divisions were transported across the warm Lake. In total, by this time the flotilla ships transported 6,425 fighters, 89 guns, 81 mortars, 312 tons of ammunition, 24 vehicles, 137 horses and other cargoes across the lake. The 159th separate motorized pontoon-bridge battalion additionally ferried over 1,000 fighters, 34 tons of cargo and 65 guns and mortars.
The landing operation was an unqualified success, playing a large role in the breakthrough of the troops of the 67th army to Tartu. This success is a consequence of the correct choice of the landing site (in the least fortified place), the preliminary destruction of enemy ships and the successful offensive of the main forces of the front. The interaction of the landing forces and its artillery support was well organized, the actions of the landing group on the bridgehead were energetic, the leadership was carried out competently. However, the enemy aircraft was able to inflict so significant losses in transporting means that the rate of landing of troops on the bridgehead fell sharply. The organization of the air defense of ships and a bridgehead (with the superiority of Soviet aviation in the area) was completely unsatisfactory. In the event of an unfavorable development of events on the bridgehead, this could have consequences up to the failure of the operation.
Party Losses
According to the losses of the parties in this operation, there are only Soviet data, according to which the landing group for August 16-17 destroyed 685 and captured 157 soldiers and officers, destroyed 2 tanks, 18 guns, 16 mortars and 62 machine guns, captured 1 tank, 27 guns , 4 mortars and 29 machine guns, 3 warehouses, other military equipment.
The loss of the landing force was 187 killed and 554 wounded; in battle, the enemy destroyed 2 guns, 5 mortars, 39 machine guns [5] . Losses in the crews of the ships are not known.
Notes
- ↑ Borisov B.Yu. Fighting operations of the 25th brigade of ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the water area of Pskov-Peipsi Lake in August-September 1944./Pskov, number 41, 2014. - P.177-186.
- ↑ Zhumatiy V. I. Naval landing operations of the Armed Forces of the USSR. M., 2011. - p.129.
- ↑ Bogatyrev S.V. Loss of warships and boats of the USSR Navy during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Lvov, IPG "MARINA-POSEIDON", 1994. - Page 39.
- ↑ On the losses of the Soviet ships from the actions of German aviation in publications there are significant differences.
- ↑ Data on the losses of both sides from the document: The landing operation of the 3 Baltic Front for crossing the strait between the Chudskoye and Pskov lakes on August 15-18, 1944, was compiled by the department for studying the experience of the war of the 3rd headquarters of the Baltic Front. Published in OBD "Memory of the People".
Documents
- Airborne assault operation 3 of the Baltic Front for crossing the strait between the lakes Chudskoye, Pskovskoe August 15-18, 1944
- The log of military operations of the troops of the 3 Baltic Front in August 1944 / OBD "Memory of the People"
- Central Navy. F. 268, op. 3, d. 17, cor. 1330. Report of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet brigade on the landing operation conducted in the Lane-Mehikorm area 15-19.08.1944.
Literature and links
- Lane-Mexico-amphibious landing operation (August 15 - 19, 1944) on the website of the Russian Ministry of Defense
- NG Kuznetsov "Course to Victory". Head of the “Lake Flotilla”
- A. Zablotsky, R. Larin'tsev "Lake Peipsi, year 1944"
- The Great Patriotic War. Day after day. “Sea collection”, 1994, № 8.
- Zhumatiy V.I. Maritime amphibious operations of the Armed Forces of the USSR. M., 2011.