Philosophical zombie

"P-zombies" ( English p-zombie ) were used, first of all, as arguments against certain types of physicalism, in particular, behaviorism . According to behaviorism, mental states exist solely in terms of behavior. So, faith , desire , thinking , consciousness, and so on, are just certain types of behavior or inclination towards them. Then it turns out that a pi-zombie, which is behaviorally indistinguishable from a “normal” person, but lacks conscious experience, in accordance with the attitude of behaviorism as a creature is logically impossible. This is due to a strict dependence in the origin of consciousness on behavior. Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that appeal to intuition about the existence of a pi-zombie described in this way reinforces the argument about the falsity of behaviorism.

There are several types of "zombies." They differ in degree of similarity with "normal" human beings and are used in different thought experiments as follows.

• The behavioral zombie is behaviorally indistinguishable from humans and yet has no conscious experience.
• The “neurological zombie” ( Eng. Neurological zombie ) has, this focuses on, the human brain and in other respects is physically indistinguishable from humans; however, he has no conscious experience.
• The “ soulless zombie ” has no soul, but otherwise is completely human; this concept is used to figure out what the soul could mean.

However, the “philosophical zombie” is primarily considered in the context of arguments against physicalism (or functionalism) in general. Thus, by pi-zombie, as a rule, we mean a creature that is physically indistinguishable from a “normal” person, but lacks conscious experience.

Kripke

A good way to demonstrate the weaknesses of physicalism is to turn to some of the ideas of the American analytical philosopher Sol Kripke outlined in his work “Naming and Necessity” (1972).

Imagine God, writes Kripke, who creates the world and decides to create the entire physical universe according to the full definition (code P) exclusively in physical terms. P describes, firstly, the location and state of elementary particles everywhere in space and time and, secondly, the laws that govern their behavior. Now the question arises: having created a purely physical universe according to this specification, should God have done something else to condition the existence of human consciousness? A positive answer to this question implies that in relation to consciousness there is more than just physical facts from which it could be deduced. Such an answer means dualism. Since consciousness requires non-physical properties in the strict sense, and such properties would not exist in a purely physical world, this would be a zombie world. Physicalists, on the other hand, decided to answer the question in the negative. Then they must say that by establishing purely physical facts in accordance with P, God thus established all mental facts about the organisms whose existence is provided for by P, including facts about people's thoughts, feelings, emotions and events.

Obviously, physicalists are true to the notion that the physical world defined by P is the only true order of things, while all other true statements are alternative ways of talking about the same world. In this sense, physicalists should consider that the facts of consciousness “follow” the physical facts and that the zombie worlds are “impossible”. Therefore, proof of the existence of zombies will show that mental facts do not follow physical facts: the fact that the zombie world is possible and physicalism is wrong .

Chalmers

However, the zombie argument against physicalism was generally best used and elaborated on by David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind (1996). According to Chalmers, one can coherently (connectedly) imagine the whole world of zombies: a world that is physically indistinguishable from our world, but completely devoid of conscious experience. In such a world, the double of every creature that is conscious in our world would be a pi-zombie. The structure of Chalmers' version of the “zombie argument” can be outlined as follows:

1. If physicalism is true, then it is impossible to have a world in which all physical facts are the same as those in the real (our) world, but in which there are additional facts. This is because, according to physicalism, all facts are completely determined by physical facts; thus, any world that is physically indistinguishable from our world is completely indistinguishable from our world.
2. But there is a possible world in which all physical facts are the same as in the real world, but in which there are still additional facts. (For example, it is possible that there is a world, just like ours, in every physical respect, but everyone in it lacks certain mental states, namely, any phenomenal events or qualia. People there look and act just like people in the actual the world, but they don’t feel anything; when, for example, someone shoots successfully, the latter screams in pain, as if he really feels it, but this is not at all).
3. Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows modus tollens :${\displaystyle \frac{\mathrm{<span\; class="mwe-math-element"><span\; class="mwe-math-mathml-inline\; mwe-math-mathml-a11y"\; style="display:\; none;">P</span></span>}<span\; class="mwe-math-element"><span\; class="mwe-math-mathml-inline\; mwe-math-mathml-a11y"\; style="display:\; none;">\to </span></span>\mathrm{<span\; class="mwe-math-element"><span\; class="mwe-math-mathml-inline\; mwe-math-mathml-a11y"\; style="display:\; none;">Q</span></span>}<span\; class="mwe-math-element"><span\; class="mwe-math-mathml-inline\; mwe-math-mathml-a11y"\; style="display:\; none;">,</span></span>\mathrm{<span\; class="mwe-math-element"><span\; class="mwe-math-mathml-inline\; mwe-math-mathml-a11y"\; style="display:\; none;">\neg </span></span>}\mathrm{<span\; class="mwe-math-element"><span\; class="mwe-math-mathml-inline\; mwe-math-mathml-a11y"\; style="display:\; none;">Q</span></span>}}{\mathrm{<span\; class="mwe-math-element"><span\; class="mwe-math-mathml-inline\; mwe-math-mathml-a11y"\; style="display:\; none;">\neg </span></span>}\mathrm{<span\; class="mwe-math-element"><span\; class="mwe-math-mathml-inline\; mwe-math-mathml-a11y"\; style="display:\; none;">P</span></span>}}}$ {\ displaystyle {\ frac {P \ to Q ~, ~~ \ neg Q} {\ neg P}}}   )

The argument seems logically valid, because it resembles modus tollens in form, and therefore, if its premises are correct, then the conclusion must be correct. For example, regarding premise 2: is such a zombie world really possible? Chalmers states that “it certainly seems that a logically consistent situation is depicted; I can’t discern a contradiction in the description. ” Since such a world is conceivable, Chalmers argues that it is possible; and if such a world is possible, then physicalism is wrong. Chalmers argues solely about logical possibility, and he believes that this is all that his argument requires. He states: "Zombies are probably not possible in nature: they probably cannot exist in our world with its natural laws."

This leads to the following questions: for example, in what sense is the concept of “opportunity” used here? Some philosophers argue that the type of opportunity corresponding to this issue is not as weak as a logical opportunity. They believe that, despite the logical possibility of the zombie world (that is, there is no logical contradiction in any full description of the situation), such a weak concept is irrelevant (does not correspond) to the analysis of a metaphysical thesis like physicalism. Most philosophers agree that the corresponding concept of opportunity is a kind of metaphysical opportunity. That the demanding “zombie argument” is the only one who can say, sitting in a chair and using only the power of reason, that this whole situation with zombies is metaphysically possible. Chalmers states: "From the representability of zombies, supporters of the argument deduce their metaphysical possibility." Chalmers argues that this conclusion, from representability to metaphysical possibility, is not completely acceptable, but it is quite acceptable for phenomenal concepts such as consciousness. In fact, according to Chalmers, what is logically possible is also, in this case, possible metaphysically.

Chalmers’s argument is a special case of the “argument of conceivability” ^[1] , also known as the “requirement of metaphysical possibility” or, more generally, a special case of “considering the minimum counterfactual world” (or the minimum counterfactual scenario) ^{[2] [3]} there is considered in it a world or an object that "in everything is exactly the same as a really observable object, but differs in one single property." All such considerations have serious logical problems - problems of fundamental insolubility. ^{[3] [4] [5]}

Also, logical unsolvability is a common problem for all counterfactual scenarios (considering situations “if there were / existed A, then there would be or will be B”). Such scenarios contain false (counterfactual, not coinciding with reality) “if” and false “then”. But this means that the truth function of any counterfactual scenario is not a function of the truth of its components ^{[5] [2] [3]} . That is, it is impossible to say whether the “conceivable” scenario is true and the conclusion from it, even if it is known whether certain propositions proposed by this scenario are true. This is a common problem of considering counterfactual implication (follow-up) ^[6] . Therefore, to answer the question about the truth of a counterfactual statement, one must rely on other methods, because the truth of such a statement is determined not by the truth or falsity of its components, but by the connection in meaning between them, that is, if its consequent can be derived from the antecedent according to some law. If this cannot be done, to derive the consequent to the antecedent, it is usually necessary to attach a set of certain conditions. For example, if we consider the sentence “If this grain were sown, then an ear would grow from this grain”, then we can see that the consequent follows from the antecedent only if a certain number of necessary conditions are fulfilled (that the grain was viable, that there was enough moisture in the soil, that crop care was carried out, etc.) ^[7] . Counterfactual scenarios such as an alternative story have the same problem. For example, you can consider a world where until a certain day everything is exactly the same as in our world - but then a single event occurs differently. For example, Kennedy was not killed. Then the question is asked - what would happen? But to answer this question is quite difficult. Another example is the consideration of a world in which only one (that is, without changing other parameters associated with it) any parameter differs from the existing one in our world. The problem is that this is logically possible only if this parameter does not undergo causal effects from anything and does not exert causal effects on anything. But then consideration of such a scenario cannot provide any new information. If we consider an example with history, then to assess the truth of the alternative scenario and draw conclusions from it without additional data (except for the statement “if, ..., then ...”), it is necessary to consider all possible alternatives and interconnections, that is, it is required to consider a potentially infinite number of counterfactual worlds in order to evaluate the validity or truthfulness of the conclusion from considering one such world. But people do not have the cognitive ability to consider all potentially infinite sets of possible worlds, and they cannot compare all the counterfactual alternatives, relationships, etc. that must be built to assess the truth of an imaginary scenario and to deduce from it. ^{[2] [8] [9]} .

Looking at a minimal counterfactual world is attractive and compelling to people. ^{[2] [10] [11] [12]} However, in reality, such a world is either logically impossible - as in the case of considering an alternative physical reality corresponding in its changes to the minimally counterfactual world, or logically insoluble (it is impossible to assess its truth and the validity of the conclusions from the assumption of such) - as in the above discussion of an alternative story. ^{[2] [10] [3] [5]} The very idea of ​​a minimal counter-factual world is, according to some researchers, logically shaky and "extremely slippery" ^{[13] [14]} .

Daniel Dennett is a well-known critic of the “zombie argument”, since he believes that he is not useful in philosophical discussions, it is based on illusions and is contradictory in nature, to the extent that it relates to the concept of man. Although it should be noted that Dennett himself in his 1991 work, Explained Consciousness, spoke of the idea of ​​“zombies,” “as something well known, and even states that there is“ general agreement among philosophers “that“ zombies are or would be such people who demonstrate completely natural, accompanied by attention and speech, lively behavior, but at the same time they are actually completely unconscious, being something like automatic machines. " A physicalist could answer the zombie argument in several ways. Most of the answers deny the premise 2 (Chalmers version above), that is, they deny that the world of zombies is possible.

The unequivocal answer is that the idea of ​​qualia and the corresponding phenomenal representations of consciousness are not related concepts, and the idea of ​​a zombie is therefore contradictory. Daniel Dennett and others take this position. They argue that although subjective experience, etc., exists in some notion, they do not appear as demands of a supporter of the zombie argument; pain, for example, is not something that can be calmly separated from the mental life of a person without causing behavioral or physiological abnormalities (discrepancies). Dennett coined the term “ zimboes ” (“philosophical zombies” that have second-order beliefs or “advanced self-monitoring mechanisms”) to argue that the idea of ​​philosophical zombies is contradictory. He states: “Philosophers should hastily abandon the idea of ​​zombies, but as they continue to be in a tight embrace, this gives me an excellent opportunity to focus on the most seductive mistake in the current thinking.”

Similarly, Thomas Nagel argues that the concept of zombies is inherently contradictory: since zombies, excluding various assumptions, behave exactly like ordinary people, they will claim to be conscious. Thomas insists that any interpretation of this requirement (that is, whether it is taken to be true, false, or neither true nor false) inevitably entails either contradiction or sheer absurdity. Taking the position of physicalism, it was necessary either to believe that anyone, including himself, could be a zombie, or that no one could be a zombie - a consequence of the assertion that one's own conviction that zombies exist (or do not exist) is a product of the physical world and therefore no different from anyone else. This argument was put forward by Daniel Dennett, who claims that “Zimbo are conscious, they have qualia, they suffer pain - they are only“ wrong “(according to this sad tradition) in a way that none of them can ever detect” . While it was argued that zombies are metaphysically impossible according to the assumption of physicalism, it has also been argued that zombies are not conceivable. This argument was expressed by Daniel Dennett, who argues that "when philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably underestimate the task of concept (or fantasy) and end up imagining something that violates their own definition."

According to Dennett, there are no differences at all between humans and “philosophical zombies”. After all, the consciousness that the zombies allegedly lack, simply does not exist, and in the sense in which it exists, zombies completely possess it. That is why, if desired, all people can be called zombies.

The zombie argument is not easy to evaluate, since it reveals fundamental differences among philosophers regarding the methodology and subject of philosophy as such, as well as the nature and possibilities of conceptual analysis. Proponents of the zombie argument, such as Chalmers, believe that conceptual analysis is a central, if not the only, part of philosophy that performs important cognitive functions. However, others, such as Dennett, Paul Churchland, Willard Quine and others, have diametrically opposite ideas about the nature and field of philosophical analysis. Therefore, argumentation based on the concept of “philosophical zombie” is still actively discussed in modern philosophy of consciousness.

The theory of philosophical zombies is discussed and pondered by the main character of Victor Pelevin’s SNUFF novel Demyan-Landulf Damilola Karpov. The question of whether the artificial woman Kaya, with whom Damilola cohabits, is a philosophical zombie, more precisely “zimbo” ^[15] and does not find a final answer in the thoughts of the protagonist.

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8. Chalmers D. Consciousness and its Place in Nature, in the Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, S. Stich and F. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell, 2003
9. Chalmers D. Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 68, no. 1, 2004
10. Dennett D. Consciousness Explained, Boston, Little, Brown and Company. 1991
11. Dennett D. The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies, Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no. 4, 1995. P. 322-326.
12. Dennett D .. The Zombic Hunch: Extinction of an Intuition ?, Royal Institute of Philosophy Millennial Lecture, 1999
13. Kirk R. Zombies and Consciousness. Oxford, 2005.
14. Kripke S. Naming and Necessity, in Semantics of Natural Language, ed. by D. Davidson and G. Harman, Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1972. P. 253-355.
15. Thomas NJT Zombie Killer, in SR Hameroff, AW Kaszniak, & AC Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates (pp. 171-177),

• Kirk R. Zombies // The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Kirk, Robert Zombies // The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

• Eliminative materialism
• Illusionism