Kuban whatnot

In many sources, the authorship of this technique is attributed to fighter pilot Alexander Pokryshkin . However, in none of the published works of Alexander Ivanovich himself, he directly calls himself the author:

In this first flight, I applied everything that I endured in my thoughts and soul for many days and nights of thought. The structure of our group was not like any of those that we have used so far. It was a "whatnot" of pairs, shifted away from the sun, with the excess of one pair over another by hundreds of meters. [one]

One of the first time we used the battle formations of Dzusov aptly called the "whatnot". It was a stepped, layered in height and quite wide along the front construction of a significant group of aircraft. Each step of the “whatnot” performed its own strictly defined role. On the whole, it was a formidable battle formation for the enemy of Soviet fighters. If the enemy aircraft managed to escape from the blow of one step of the “whatnot”, they immediately fell under the murderous fire of another, then the third. [2]

From the above quotes, we can rather conclude about the birth and application of this technique as a result of some “collective creativity” of several pilots. At present, it is hardly possible to reliably establish who, in addition to directly Pokryshkin, participated in the development of this technique.

In the matter of improving and popularizing new military techniques, including the Kuban whatnot, Pokryshkin's merit is undeniable.

Now it’s hard to remember exactly when, after what battle, but once the commander Koryagin expressed the idea of ​​the expediency of separating the fighter groups in height. In this case, one group, the strike, was supposed to work on enemy bombers, the other - to tie their fighters in battle, and the third, at the very top, would be intended to cover their own, to use it at some critical moment.

So then it went into the practice of our combat work - a kind of professional specialization.

- Savitsky E. Ya. I am “Dragon”. Attack! .. - M.: Like. guard, 1988.

Pokryshkin describes the whatnot as follows ^[3] :

... the battle order "whatnot" held the first exam in this flight. The battle order of the group, with the dispersion of the pairs along the front and the height, was similar to the steps of the porch, leaving the leading pair to the side and up. Such a group construction provided a large space for finding a goal. At the same time, it was difficult for an adversary to detect a group. The opening of the pairs along the front and the height did not hinder the pilots, prevented aircraft from colliding in the air, while at the same time allowing more attention to be paid to circular search.

Now it was not necessary for each pilot to constantly monitor the rear hemisphere. Mutual search for pairs allowed detecting the enemy at a great distance and preventing attacks from the rear hemisphere.

The maneuverability of the couples and the entire group was as high as that of a single aircraft. And this is very important for the rapid execution of attacks by our fighters and the frustration of the enemy.

It was also important that the "whatnot" of the steam had to be shifted away from the sun.

The “highlight” of the reception is that this order of fighters was applicable both before the start of the battle, as it provided an effective search for an air opponent and safe maneuvering due to an open battle order, and at the beginning of an air battle with enemy fighters. One of the standard methods of getting out of attack for German fighters was a sharp climb “ hill ” in case of danger (German aircraft had significant superiority in vertical maneuverability over the Soviet) and, due to this, a separation from the pursuers. But since the first attack was carried out by the lower pair of Soviet fighters in the “whatnot”, when the energetic “slide” took off, the German fighters lost speed and when attacked by the next pair of “whatnots” were at a disadvantage. On the contrary, Soviet fighters from subsequent attacking pairs occupied a higher echelon in advance and therefore had a reserve of speed and favorable conditions for a successful attack.

In his unfinished book, published after the death of the author, Pokryshkin separately states that when using tactical techniques, it is necessary to take into account the level of training of the flight crew ^[4] :

For pilots with little combat experience, it was impossible to establish very open formations in battle order, acceptable for experienced air fighters, who, sometimes, the feeling of a “comrade’s elbow” reduced initiative, maneuverability and surprise of the strike.

The presence on airplanes of good radio communications between airplanes and airplanes with guidance stations made it possible to build more open battle formations, separating the pairs of airplanes in a group in height, since with good radio communications replacing visual communication, control is provided without aircraft evolution.

The tactical flight data of fighter aircraft influenced the formation of the battle formation.

High-speed aircraft with high vertical maneuverability made it possible to build a battle formation with a large excess of echelons of one over the other. The battle formation of the fighters depended on the flight tactical data of the aircraft with which the fighters interacted, as well as on its battle formation.

Despite the developed general concept, the technique improved as it was introduced into combat practice:

Some of the developed provisions for high-speed patrolling, building a “whatnot” and searching for the enemy did not yet fully satisfy me. It was necessary to refine the methods of patrolling and searching for the enemy at different positions of the sun relative to the front line, on the likely routes of approaching enemy aircraft. I understood that all this still had to be considered, worked out on the ground.

- ^[3]

The German Luftwaffe General Walter Schwabedissen in his historical study for the US Air Force , published in 1960, wrote ^{[5] [6]} , with reference to Major Bruno Meyer :

In 1943, at the Kuban bridgehead, Russian fighters first used a special tactical technique called the “Kuban whatnot” <in the original “Kuban escalator ”> , the essence of which was that Russian fighters were distributed over different heights of barrage over the battlefield.

This method did not bring any outstanding success, since it was very inconvenient from a tactical point of view, it required a concentration of forces in one place, while in another there was no fighter cover.

Original text

A special method of fighter operations was observed in the Kuban bridgehead in 1943. This method was designated "Kuban escalator" by the Germans; it consisted of Russian fighter units being committed in large formations at different altitudes. No outstanding success was scored by this method which had disadvantage that the simultaneous commitment of almost all fighter units resulted in the absence of fighter cover at other times. ^[6]

It should be noted that in reality the thesis of “concentration of forces in one place” is inaccurate, since only two pairs of fighters are minimally required to compose a “whatnot”. At the same time, Pokryshkin considered the departure as part of a large group (at least 8 aircraft and no more than 12) not a shortcoming, but a factor ensuring both the success of the task of covering his troops from the actions of large forces of enemy bombers and the infliction of maximum damage to the enemy.

However, there is evidence of the use of elements of whatnot by the Germans themselves, but, oddly enough, not by fighters, but by bombers. As Ivan Kozhedub writes about this in his memoirs ^[7] . Permanent follower of Pokryshkin, Grigory Golubev also wrote ^[8] :

After some time, enemy bombers came up. We noticed that their battle order was built according to the type of our Kuban “whatnot”, developed and applied by Pokryshkin. It turns out that the enemy began to adopt our tactics. Already in the course of the fighting, we were reorganizing ourselves into new methods of struggle, and applied counter-techniques.

• Borman, Alexander Vladimirovich

• Dmitry Glinka about whatnot