Encyclopedia of Philosophy

According to Hegel, the basis of everything that exists is an absolute idea . It carries out self-knowledge, and for this purpose it objectifies itself, creating nature and man. The highest level of this self-knowledge is absolute knowledge in the form of philosophy ^[3] .

The absolute idea, realizing itself in nature, appears in the form of bodily units. But they are based on childbirth , a universal , that is, a concept. Nature is created in order for man to arise from it, and with it the human spirit. Human knowledge, revealing the ideal essence of things that are their kind, reaches the stage of absolute knowledge, by which Hegel means the adequate expression of an absolute idea through scientific concepts , logical categories ^[3] .

Considering the meaning of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in the context of Hegel's philosophical doctrine, K. Topp writes that for Hegel, philosophy makes sense only as a science, and genuine philosophical science appears where knowledge rises to the level of reason and becomes fundamentally identical to its subject ^[4] .

The first part of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences - The Science of Logic - is also called the Small Logic, unlike Hegel’s earlier work The Science of Logic , which is called the Big Logic ^[5] . The content of the “Small Logic” approximately coincides with it, but the presentation of the subject in the “Small Logic” is less detailed. At the same time, it contains a section on the three relations of thought to objectivity, which is not in the Big Logic ^[2] .

Logic in Hegel’s interpretation “is the science of a pure idea, that is, of an idea in the abstract element of thinking” (§ 19) ^[3] .

Three Attitudes of Thought to Objectivity

The first relation of thought to objectivity considered by Hegel is a metaphysical relation. In accordance with it, truth is comprehended through reflection. However, there is no element of criticism in the metaphysical setting, it is dogmatic ^[6] .

The second relation is empirical. Empiricism refuses authority and seeks to cognize the world, relying on sensory perception. However, empiricism leads to skepticism : for example, Hume holds the idea that universality and necessity are not comprehended by sensory perception; he concludes that, for example, the basis for recognizing that causality is acting in the world is the habit of expecting the appearance of a similar event under similar conditions, which arose because such a coincidence of events was observed in the past. An attempt to overcome skepticism was made by Kant . The drawback of Kantian philosophy is, according to Hegel, that Kant considers the forms of cognition to be subjective ^[6] .

The third relation of thought to objectivity is the point of view of so-called direct knowledge, represented by Jacobi's philosophy. Jacobi believes that the objects of metaphysics are comprehended by intellectual intuition. Hegel’s objection to this point of view is that what directly knowledge affirms is very poor in content ^[6] .

Genesis

The first section of the “Science of Logic” is the doctrine of being. Its main categories are quality , quantity , measure ^[6] .

Being is characterized by Hegel as something immediate. The doctrine of being, however, develops by mediating some categories with others. As a result of these mediations, an entity category arises. The essence is understood as the same being, but in its deepest basis ^[6] .

Thought in Hegelian logic moves from abstract , poorly meaningful categories to increasingly meaningful ones ^[3] . The Hegelian “Science of Logic” begins with the category of being, and Hegel describes this being as something most abstract. Being is that which is expressed by the word "is" and that is common to all existing objects. From the content side, Hegel believes that it is nothing ^[6] .

Uncertain (pure) being , thus, passes into nothing . Moreover, nothing is the antithesis of being. The synthesis of thesis (being) and antithesis (nothing) is the unity of both, namely, becoming . Formation is the first concrete category of the “Science of Logic” ^[6] .

The first triad of categories of the Hegelian “Logic” aroused objections. Some Hegel's critics believed that if one could refute the construction of this triad, then this would undermine the significance of the entire dialectical construction of the “Science of Logic” ^[6] .

Trendelenburg in Logical Investigations, believing that Hegel seemed to be able to show the identity of being and nothing, believed that at the same time the difference between them was erased, which would allow them to be combined into a new, different category. If being is equal to zero, and nothing is equal to zero, then the unity of both will remain zero ^[6] .

Some supporters of Hegel objected to this thesis that being, which was discussed at the beginning of the Science of Logic, is also a pure thought of being. Thus, there is being as an object, and a thought, the subject of which is being. Since thought is different from being, it must be considered as non-being, as nothing. Since being is the subject of thought, in its content it coincides with being, is identical with it. Thus, there is both identity and a difference between thought (nothing) and object (being) ^[6] .

A formation in which two aspects are revealed - the aspect of the transition from being to nothing ( annihilation ) and the aspect of the transition from nothing to being ( occurrence ), leads to the become, which is denoted as being ( Dasein ) ^[6] .

Cash being, in contrast to pure being, is a certain being, or quality . In the future, the existing being is characterized by Hegel as something . Since something, being a quality, has certainty, it is limited and limits everything else, since it excludes it from itself. Therefore, something must be characterized as limited, finite. In this case, the border should be understood as a qualitative border (for example, as the border between what is a forest and what is a meadow). To define something, you need to relate it to another : something A can be defined, because it is not B. However, the other is also defined through some other, for example, B is not C, D, and so on. However, what is A? A is something . What is B? B also has something . Thus, the fact that A is defined through B means that something is determined through something, and therefore, something is determined through itself. So the other disappeared, only one remained. In this characteristic of one, the category for-self-being appears ^[6] .

If you seek mediation for the category for-self-being, then you can find it only in it, since there is no other. Relating negatively to oneself, pushing away from oneself, for-itself-being (one) generates a multitude . Thus, Hegel deduces many of the one. In this case, categories of repulsion and attraction arise ^[6] .

The introduction of the categories of repulsion and attraction into the group of categories of quality provoked the objection of Kuno Fisher , because, as he believed, these two categories are too specific, physical and not suitable for such an abstract level of research, which takes place at this stage ^[6] .

The basic meaning of the dialectic of quality categories is to move from quality to quantity. Quality turns into quantity . Unlike quality, quantity is a characteristic indifferent to being: being remains the same (qualitatively) whether it increases or decreases ^[6] .

The quantity category first appears as a pure, indefinite quantity. The concept of pure quantity that arose as a result of the development of the category for-self-being, as it were, picks up the moment of attraction that appears in it, which gives continuity (the moment of repulsion gives discontinuity ). Examples of net quantity, according to Hegel, are space and time. Space and time in the first place are continuous quantities. In them, however, is the possibility of discontinuity; when this opportunity is actualized, we get a certain amount ^[6] .

In the concept of quantity, the moment of extensiveness (extent) is revealed. Intensity differs from extensiveness - in that the multiplicity is removed in it, and the moment of unity is clearly manifested. The intense quantity is given immediately as a whole; such, for example, a feeling of pressure on our body. When it comes to intensity, it is already said about the degree ^[6] .

Hegel considers degree a condition for the transition of quantity into quality. The category combining quality and quantity is a measure ^[6] .

Measure is the unity of a certain quality and a certain amount. It turns out that quality depends on quantity, since the essence of a thing is not affected by quantitative changes only until they reach a certain limit. If a further quantitative change occurs and the quality is eliminated, a new measure arises in the form of a new ratio of quality and quantity. This second measure can also be violated, and a third measure appears, etc. Quality changes in this process are leaps , form a “nodal line” of measures ^[6] .

Entity

The categories of essence appear in Hegel in the form of reflecting (reflected) in each other concepts. In these categories there are, as it were, two layers - the substrate and the surface . The substrate is internal, the surface is external. The essence is a substrate, but this substrate exists insofar as it is seen (it seems) ^[6] .

If the appearance is completely identical to the essence, coincides with it, then the essence does not have what it could be reflected in. If visibility and essence are completely different, then there is the possibility of reflection (reflection), but this reflection is external, because essence and appearance are alien to each other. In that type of reflection, in which there is both unity and a difference in the moments of essence and appearance, there are categories called Hegel's definitions of reflection ^[6] .

The first among the definitions of reflection is identity, namely, a concrete identity; it arises as a result of the removal of all categories of being. A concrete identity is a unity that includes a moment of difference. An illustration of such an identity is the teachings of Ionian philosophers about essence. This entity is abiding, from which everything arises and into which everything returns. A specific identity should be understood as a process of self-discrimination and self-identification ^[6] .

Concrete identity includes distinction; the moment of difference lies in the very concept of identity, since it is defined through difference as different from it ( different with it). In turn, since a difference is a difference, it is identical to itself and, therefore, contains a moment of identity ^[6] .

Difference initially appears as diversity . Diversity, according to Hegel, means first of all that all things are identical to themselves. However, they are also distinct from each other. But if their internal nature consists in their identity for themselves, then the difference is first established only by the knowing subject who compares things. However, the comparison operation itself assumes the presence of both points in things — identities and differences ^[6] .

The difference develops in opposition (for example, in the ratio of black, gray and white, black and white are not only different, but also opposite) ^[6] .

Identity and difference are synthesized at the base ^[6] .

Hegel goes from the category of foundation to the category of existence ( Existenz ). If there are all conditions of the subject ( Sache ), it is “ implemented ” ^[6] .

As a result of all the previous development of categories, existence is not just being, but essential being . In existence, the foundation acts as the internal unity of the thing , uniting the diversity of its properties . The thing is said to have properties ^[6] .

In the development of the category of a thing, first the internal, the single is torn off from the external, properties, discovery of the thing. So the thing-in-itself appears. According to Hegel, the thing-in-itself should be revealed; the unity of a thing must be manifested in the multitude of its properties. The way in which properties should be combined as part of a thing, how it should be manifested in them, is shown by the law ^[6] .

The law acts as the essence of phenomena . However, the law does not define the whole variety of phenomena. The fall of a particular sheet is accomplished by virtue of the law of gravity, but it cannot be deduced from this law how fast the sheet will fall - it depends on the movement of air, on the shape of the sheet, etc. But if the concept of law is improved so much that the world of laws expresses the world of phenomena, then it turns out that the surface and the substrate coincide. According to Hegel, these are two worlds inside out . The world of phenomena and the world of laws have one and the same content , but the first of them turns out to be more direct, and the second more internal (indirect) ^[6] .

The world of phenomena coincided with the world of laws; this means that there is no substantial difference between them, but only formal. Therefore, it is necessary to go to a deeper category, to understand the law as a relation , to see in what relation the substrate is to the surface ^[6] .

According to Hegel, the direct relation is the relation of the whole and the part . However, in order to explain the world of phenomena, it is necessary to comprehend the internal, the single, not just as a whole, but as that which believes the external; such an attitude is expressed by force and its detection. Further, the internal is that which is found in the external, and the external is a manifestation of the internal. The concept of the internal within itself encloses the moment of the external, and the external - the moment of the internal. Their coincidence means a transition to reality ^[6] .

According to Hegel, reality is the unity of essence and phenomenon, internal and external. However, first the internal and the external in it are disconnected. The internal is an opportunity that goes into reality. If we take the internal in isolation from reality, then this will be a formal , abstract opportunity. The condition for formal opportunity is internal consistency. So, formally it is possible, Hegel writes, that the Turkish sultan becomes the pope ^[6] .

In turn, the external, divorced from the internal, is an accident . The world, which appears in the form of accidents, is the world of things that externally affect each other, but no matter how they develop from their inner capabilities ^[6] .

A formal opportunity is contrasted with a real opportunity - an opportunity rooted in reality itself. However, one real opportunity is opposed by another real opportunity. Removing obstacles to the realization of the first real opportunity eliminates the second real opportunity, and something arises with necessity , turning into reality ^[6] .

Absolute necessity arises when we understand the whole world as a system. If all the parts within this world determine each other, then the world itself, since there is nothing outside it, since it is self-determined, is an absolute necessity. If all things are the discovery of the inner necessity of the world, then the world as an absolute necessity is a substance ^[6] .

A single substance manifests itself in many accidents (things). But although the substance is found in their being, even more it is found in their removal: things disappear in it, replacing each other. But she could not have removed them if they had not previously existed. Therefore, the substance should be understood as a reason that considers itself to be in the accidents, which, in turn, are its actions ^[6] .

Hegel initially speaks of a single cause and a multitude of actions, then moves on to the ultimate causes and final actions. According to Hegel, reason and action have the same content. However, if, for example, fire is directed to wax, then the wax will melt, and if to metal, then at the same temperature the metal will not melt. For a correct understanding of the category of causality, it is necessary to go to a deeper category - the category of interaction ^[6] .

In order for a thing to be understood, it must be included in a complex context of interaction. However, the thought is not satisfied with the reference to the fact that A defines B, and B defines A. According to Hegel, the basis from which it is possible to explain the various aspects of an object in interaction is a concept. Hegel believes that it is a concept that is the essence of all things, as it were, the essence of essence. The concept is revealed as freedom, which is revealed in necessity ^[6] .

Concept

The first stage of the Hegelian doctrine of the concept - the doctrine of the subjective concept ^[6] .

According to Hegel, the concept is absolute . Moments of the concept are universal , special and singular . The universal gives rise to a special, higher concretization of the concept is singular. Moments of the concept develop in the judgment . Judgment is a manifest concept, the “primary division” of a concept ^[6] .

Hegel formulates four types of judgment. The first type is the judgments of existing being (they are correlated with the section "Science of Logic", which sets out the doctrine of being). An example of the judgment of being: the rose is red. This judgment is affirmative . The disadvantage of this type of judgment is, according to Hegel, in the inadequacy of the predicate of judgment to its subject. The concept of red (predicate) does not exhaust the entire content of the subject (subject): in addition to color, this rose has a certain shape, smell, etc. Disproportion, in addition, is that the predicate is wider than the subject: the concept of red is applicable not only to the rose , but also to many other subjects ^[6] .

You can take a negative judgment of being, for example: a rose is not red; in any case, the rose, however, must have some color. The predicate is again inadequate to the subject. Thus, the judgments of the existing being cannot achieve adequacy between the subject and the predicate ^[6] .

Hegel goes on to the next type of propositions — the propositions of reflection (these propositions are correlated with essence). Here the meaning of the predicate changes: the predicate here expresses the relation of a thing to other things (examples of such predicates: useful, harmful) ^[6] .

An example of the judgment of reflection: this plant is useful ( single judgment). However, many plants are useful, not just that. The subject should be expanded, saying, for example: some plants are useful ( private judgment). Private judgment is scientifically unsatisfactory because it remains unknown why some plants are useful and some are not. It is necessary to specify the subject in order to obtain a universal judgment; for example, instead of saying that some trains move at such and such a speed, one can say more precisely: all trains of this and that type move at such and such a speed ^[6] .

The next group of judgments is judgments of necessity (they, like the judgments of reflexion, are correlated with the essence). Example: gold is metal (ratio of species to genus). Genus is a substance of the form ^[6] .

Further on, Hegel raises the question of the extent to which the subject referred to in the judgment corresponds to the concept , and Hegel formulates the fourth type of judgments — the judgments of the concept. Hegel begins with an assertive judgment (a judgment of reality): the house is good. However, since the assertive assertion is not substantiated, it is equally possible to make the opposite judgment: the house is not good. Therefore, an assertive judgment turns into a problematic one (a judgment of possibility): perhaps this is the case, and perhaps not. In order to get away from a problematic judgment, you need to justify the judgment: a house built in this way is good ( apodictic judgment, or judgment of necessity) ^[6] .

According to Hegel, in the apodictic judgment the meaning of all judgment is clearly expressed, namely, that all judgment in a latent form is an inference . In the apodictic judgment, a new concept is placed between the subject and the predicate, which in formal logic is called the average term ^[6] .

The conclusion, according to Hegel, is a unity of concept and judgment , since in the conclusion there is both unity (which is in the concept) and the difference of moments (which is manifested in the judgment). Hegel establishes three types of syllogism (inference): present being , reflection and necessity . Pointing out the shortcomings of the first two types of inference, Hegel turns to the inference of necessity. An example of such a conclusion: this dog is an animal; all animals are organisms; therefore, a dog is an organism. However, the genus (a broader concept) must be laid in all its forms. This requirement is fulfilled in the separation ( disjunctive ) conclusion . An example of such a conclusion: a dog is either a plant, or an animal, or a person; but the dog is an animal; therefore, it is neither a plant nor a man ^[6] .

A concrete concept is an object (that is: the world is a collection of objects, the essence of which is a concept). The doctrine of the object is the second stage of the Hegelian doctrine of the concept ^[6] .

Categories of objectivity are a mechanism , chemism and teleology . In the mechanism, the concept acts as a unity, thanks to which the world of objects appears as a system. Everything in the world is determined , everything is accomplished as if because a particular thing is exposed to from the side of other things ^[6] .

A more distinct moment of unity appears in the category of chemism. Here we are talking about such elements, which by their internal nature must come into relationship. Hydrogen and oxygen, entering into a bond, form water. In the resulting product, the differences in the starting elements are quenched. According to Hegel, the disadvantage of the category of chemism is that the unity found in it does not seem to have the power to spontaneously generate differences (external intervention is necessary so that water again turns into hydrogen and oxygen ^[6] .

A deeper category is teleology. The concept in it appears as the goal ^[6] .

Initially, the goal is detected as a subjective goal, the opposite of many mechanical and chemical objects. The meaning of the goal is that it must be realized in objects. But the implementation of the goal is a means to the implementation of another goal. It turns endless progress. According to Hegel, the goal should be considered not only as being realized, but also as realized, and not only as subjective, but also as objective. At the same time, Hegel defends the point of view of immanent teleology. According to Hegel, the concept as an internal goal is an idea ^[6] .

The doctrine of the idea is the third stage of the doctrine of the concept. The idea, according to Hegel, is objectively true or true as such. An idea goes through three stages: an idea as life , an idea as knowledge , an absolute idea. In the idea of ​​life, Hegel considers: 1) life as a “living individual”, 2) “the process of life ” and 3) the “ process of kind ” ^[6] .

In Hegel's body, three points are outlined - sensitivity , irritability and reproduction : the individual receives impressions, reacts to them and constantly reproduces himself in the process of life. A living individual, however, saves his life, reproduces himself in a certain environment, in the environment, assimilating nature; in this case, the world is subject to the individual because “in itself” (especially as an organic world) represents a concept. Thus, the process of life consists in the relation of the individual as a subject to the objects surrounding him ^[6] .

The highest type of this relationship is the relation of the individual to another individual. According to Hegel, such an attitude is the highest point in the life process. And if the individuals are individuals of one genus, but of a different sex, then not only the reproduction of the individual as himself occurs, but also the production of another, that is, a third, individual. Here the contradiction inherent in life is manifested: the individual inappropriately expresses its genus . Genus abides, individuals are transient ^[6] .

Hegel gives the family the value of a creative principle. The race is a common, it abides, individuals are transient; this is the case biologically. But in cognition, the general is grasped in the mind of man ^[6] .

Hegel's section of knowledge (in the broad sense) consists of two subsections: 1) knowledge (in the narrow sense) and 2) will. In cognition (in the narrow sense), the task is to make the subjective idea appropriate to the objective idea. On the contrary, in practice the task is to make the object commensurate with the goal set by the subject (person). Hegel puts the idea as a practice of the idea above cognition in the narrow sense of the word ^[6] .

The unification of knowledge (theory) and practice is achieved, according to Hegel, in the absolute idea, which at the same time is the unity of knowledge and life. The absolute idea, according to Hegel, is the result of the entire previous path, but a result that is understandable only in connection with this done path ^{[3] [6]} .

The absolute idea passes into its other being - into nature ^[6] .

The absolute idea of ​​internal necessity assumes or, as Hegel puts it, lets go of external nature - logic passes into the philosophy of nature , consisting of three sciences: mechanics , physics and organics , of which each is divided into three parts, respectively, of a common Hegelian trichotomy. In mathematical mechanics we are talking about space , time , motion and matter ; finite mechanics, or the doctrine of gravity, considers the inertia , impact and fall of bodies , and absolute mechanics (or astronomy ) has as its subject universal gravitation , the laws of motion of celestial bodies and the solar system as a whole ^[7] .

In mechanics, the material side of nature prevails; in physics, the formative principle of natural phenomena comes to the fore. Physics deals with light , the four elements (in the sense of ancient thinkers), the " meteorological process"; considers specific gravity , sound and warmth ; magnetism and crystallization , electricity and the "chemical process" ; here, in the variability of matter and the transformation of bodies, the relative and unstable nature of natural entities and the unconditional significance of form are finally revealed, which is realized in the organic process, which is the subject of the third of the basic natural sciences - organics. Hegel attributed the mineral kingdom to the "organic" under the name of a geological organism, along with the plant and animal organism . In plant and animal organisms, the mind of nature, or the idea living in it, manifests itself in the formation of many organic species in degrees of perfection; further - in the ability of each organism to continuously reproduce the form of its parts and its whole, using external substances ( Assimilationsprocess ); then - in the ability to endlessly reproduce the genus through the series of generations in the same form ( Gattungsprocess ), and finally (in animals) - in a subjective ( mental ) unity, which makes one self-feeling and self-moving creature out of an organic body ^[7] .

But even at this highest stage of the organic world and all nature, the mind or idea does not reach its truly adequate expression. The relation of the clan to the individual (general to unit) remains external here. The genus as a whole is embodied only in the non-existence of indefinitely multiple individuals belonging to it, separate in space and time; and the individual is generic outside itself, believing it to be offspring. This failure of nature is expressed in death. Only in rational thinking does an individual being have in itself the generic, or universal. Such an inwardly meaningful individual being is the human spirit. In it, the absolute idea from its non-existence represented by nature returns to itself, enriched by the fullness of the real-concrete definitions acquired in the space process ^[7] .

As T. Posh shows, it is the second part of the Encyclopedia, that is, the Philosophy of Nature , that has been subjected to the most fierce criticism by scientists over the 200 years since its publication. Posh explains this acutely critical attitude with the supposedly exaggerated meaning that Hegel attached to a priori knowledge (based on general categories) to the detriment of empirical knowledge (based on experience). As Posh shows, in reality, Hegel clearly understood and recognized the importance of empirical facts for cognition of nature, while he considered a priori (categorical) cognition to be a necessary prerequisite, a " concept " of all natural-scientific experience ^[8] .

The philosophy of the spirit is divided into three main sections: “Subjective spirit”, “Objective spirit” and “Absolute spirit” ^[9] .

Subjective Spirit

The philosophy of spirit begins with anthropology . Hegel defines anthropology as the science of the knowing spirit in the form of the spirit , freed from its bodily shell. At this stage, the spirit, according to Hegel, is the soul, that is, the spirit, "captivated by nature." On the path of subordinating corporeality to the soul, Hegel distinguishes: 1) the level of the natural soul, or the passive unity of the soul with nature (it refers to the effect of climate on the psyche , differences in races , national characters , temperaments , differences in age and gender , as well as feelings in connection with them sensory organs ); 2) the level of the sentient soul, or the struggle of the soul against its unity with physicality (here Hegel speaks of a dream , the presence of the soul in the womb, the "genius" of a person, magnetism ( hypnosis ); insanity; habit ); 3) the stage of the real soul, the victory of the soul over physicality ^[9] .

The next section - “The Phenomenology of the Spirit” - is a brief arrangement of Hegel's great work “The Phenomenology of the Spirit”, published in 1807. In the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, the phenomenology of the spirit is divided into consciousness, self-awareness, and reason . If in anthropology the natural connections of the spirit were considered, then in phenomenology we are talking about the struggle of the spirit with extraneous objectivity ( alienated from it) ^[9] . At the stage of consciousness, a person sees himself as something opposed to the object. At the stage of self-awareness, a person cognizes himself, and the study of his personality is carried out through the personality of another. At the stage of the mind, man comprehends his identity with the substance of the world ^[10] .

Next is a section devoted to psychology , acting as the science of the forms of knowledge and will. Distinguishing theoretical and practical spirit, Hegel begins the consideration of the first with the study of sensory contemplation ( perception ), moving from it to representation and thinking. As regards the practical spirit, the goal of its development is, according to Hegel, “that special drives are subordinate to the universal - to happiness ” (§ 469). However, human happiness and a constantly free spirit are realized in society. Freedom “itself determines itself to develop ... to the extent of legal, moral and religious, as well as scientific reality” (§ 482), which occurs on the paths of not a subjective, but an objective (public) spirit ^[9] .

Objective Spirit

The section on objective spirit includes law, morality and morality ; in the subsection on morality the family , civil society, and the state are considered ^[9] .

According to Hegel, the basis of law and the state is the “national spirit” at each stage of its development, or morality, which Hegel distinguishes from morality. At the heart of the “popular spirit” lies the absolute spirit in the form of religion ^[9] .

The concept of objective spirit, summarized in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, was later thoroughly developed by Hegel in his work Philosophy of Law ^[11] . The last chapter of the section on objective spirit is devoted to world history and is a summary of Hegel's work “Philosophy of History” ^[9] .

Absolute Spirit

At the level of the absolute spirit, the spirit finally found its essence, consisting in the knowledge of the spirit itself (or “ knowledge of the absolute idea”, § 553). Absolute spirit goes through three stages - this is art , the religion of revelation and philosophy . According to Hegel, art is a sensual image ; religion is a sensual representation ; their sensual nature is their imperfection. Philosophy is a concept , and therefore it is an adequate form of the absolute spirit ^[9] .

Hegel sets out his theory of art in detail in Lectures on Aesthetics ^[9] .

According to Adolf Trendelenburg , a critic of the Hegelian logic, “in Hegel’s dialectic, almost everything is taken from experience, and if experience had taken from her what she borrowed from her, then she would have to put on a beggarly bag” ^[3] .

The Hegelian triadic method of expanding the content of logic, Karl Marx commented as follows: “... the mind distinguishes itself in itself from itself. What does it mean? Since the impersonal mind has neither the soil on which it could put itself, nor the object to which it could oppose itself, nor the subject with which it could be combined, it must involuntarily somersault, placing itself, opposing yourself to yourself and combining with yourself: position, opposition, combination. Speaking in Greek, we have: thesis, antithesis, synthesis ” ^{[3] [12]} .

Marx wrote that all nature is for Hegel “only a repetition, in a sensual, external form, of logical abstractions” ^[13] ; thus, time corresponds to the logical category of denial, attributed to itself; movement corresponds to the logical category of formation, etc. ^[3]

Highly appreciated the "Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences" A. I. Herzen . In a letter to E. F. Korsch dated July 27, 1844, he wrote: “Having leisure ... I almost completely read the first part of Hegel's Encyclopedia. Damn knows what a powerful genius. When re-reading, every time we are convinced that before I understood narrowly and poorly ” ^[14] .

Rudolph Heim in 1857 wrote:

The appearance of the Encyclopedia could not but have influenced the impression made by Logic - at first only in small circles - but which the Encyclopedia further strengthened by transferring it to large circles. No one has seen such a construction of science since the time of Aristotle . Now they began to wonder at the brave wisdom of this building, although its depth was understood only by apprehension ^[15] .

P. L. Lavrov in his work “Hegelism” (1858) wrote that the Hegelian “Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences” covered almost everything, especially the Hegelian “Logic”; but still not quite everything: “As an example of a pass,” he wrote, “one can cite probability theory, a rather remarkable science, not only in practical but also in metaphysical terms.” Lavrov believed that the concept of probability should be supplemented by the subsection “Phenomenon” of the section on the essence ^[3] .

F. Engels saw the main drawback of Hegelian natural philosophy in that, according to Hegel, nature does not develop in time ^[16] .

The Soviet philosopher- Marxist A.M.Deborin put forward the requirement to supplement the Hegelian system of dialectic categories with the categories of space and time (Hegel did not classify time and space as categories of logic, believing, following Kant, that they are the essence of the form of sensory perception, and considered them in Philosophy of nature ”) ^[3] . In addition, Deborin stated that the categories cannot pass into each other ^{[3] [17]} .

Karl Popper , evaluating Hegel’s philosophy sharply negatively and striving to warn the reader against a serious perception of Hegel’s “jargon,” quotes a fragment from Hegel’s “Philosophy of Nature”: “ § 302. Sound is a change in the specific out-of-positionness of material parts and its negation - it is only abstract or so to speak, only the ideal ideality of this specificity. But thereby this change itself is directly a denial of a material specific sustainable existence; this negation is, therefore, the real ideality of specific gravity and adhesion, that is, heat ... The heating of sounding bodies - sounding both from impact and from rubbing against each other - is a manifestation of heat arising according to the concept with sound . ” Describing what Hegel said as "gibberish," Popper believes that in the last of the sentences he cited ("the only intelligible"), Hegel exposes himself, because this sentence "means nothing but the following:" Heating sounding bodies ... is a manifestation of warmth ... together with sound "". When asked, “Did Hegel deceive himself, mesmerized by his own sublime jargon, or did he brazenly try to deceive and confuse others”, Popper inclines to the second version ^[18] .

The Soviet philosopher A. P. Ogurtsov, describing Hegel's "Philosophy of Nature" as the weakest part of his philosophical system, at the same time called in some fair the criticism of reductionism inherent in Hegelian natural philosophy ^[16] .

J.-F. Lyotard spoke of the Encyclopedia as follows:

Philosophy should restore the unity of knowledge scattered across private sciences in laboratories and pre-university teaching; she cannot do it otherwise than in a language game, connecting one and the other, as separate moments in the formation of the spirit, and therefore in narration or, more precisely, in rational metanarration. Hegel's Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (1817-1827) tried to implement this project of totalization, the beginnings of which can already be found in Fichte and Schelling in the form of the idea of ​​the System ^[19] .

In German (lifetime)

• GWF Hegel. Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. - Heidelberg: August Oßwald, 1817.
• GWF Hegel. Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. - 2nd ed. - Heidelberg: August Oßwald, 1827.
• GWF Hegel. Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. - 3rd ed. - Heidelberg: Verwaltung des Osswald'schen Verlags (CF Winter), 1830.

In German (posthumous)

• GWF Hegel. Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe / Hrsg. von Leopold von Henning. - Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1840. - Bd. 6.
• GWF Hegel. Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe / Hrsg. von Karl Ludwig Michelet. - Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1842. - Bd. 7, Abth. one.
• GWF Hegel. Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe / Hrsg. von Ludwig Boumann. - Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1845. - Bd. 7, Abth. 2. ^{[note 2]}
• GWF Hegel. Sämtliche Werke / Neu hg. von H. Glockner. - Stuttgart: Frommann, 1929. - Bd. eight.
• GWF Hegel. Sämtliche Werke / Neu hg. von H. Glockner. - Stuttgart: Frommann, 1929. - Bd. 9.
• GWF Hegel. Sämtliche Werke / Neu hg. von H. Glockner. - Stuttgart: Frommann, 1929. - Bd. 10. ^{[note 3]}

In German (historical-critical edition)

• GWF Hegel. Gesammelte Werke / Hrsg. im Auftrag der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft. - Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000. - Bd. 13. - ISBN 978-3-7873-0904-7 .
• GWF Hegel. Gesammelte Werke / Hrsg. im Auftrag der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft. - Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1992. - Bd. 19. - ISBN 978-3-7873-0614-5 .
• GWF Hegel. Gesammelte Werke / Hrsg. im Auftrag der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft. - Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1992. - Bd. 20. - ISBN 978-3-7873-0910-8 . ^{[note 4]}

In French

• GWF Hegel. Encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques. La science de la logique. - Paris: Vrin, 1970.
• GWF Hegel. Philosophie de la nature / Auguste Véra. - Paris: Ladrange, 1863. - T. 1.
• GWF Hegel. Philosophie de la nature / Auguste Véra. - Paris: Ladrange, 1863 .-- T. 2.
• GWF Hegel. Philosophie de la nature / Auguste Véra. - Paris: Ladrange, 1863 .-- T. 3.
• GWF Hegel. Philosophie de l'esprit / Auguste Véra. - Paris: Germer Baillière, 1867 .-- T. 1.
• GWF Hegel. Philosophie de l'esprit / Auguste Véra. - Paris: Germer Baillière, 1869 .-- T. 2.

In English

• The Logic of Hegel: Translated from the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences with Prolegomena. - Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1874.
• Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. - L .: Allen & Unwin, 1970.
• Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Translated from the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. - Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.

In Russian

• G.V. F. Hegel. Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in a brief essay. Part 1. Logic / Transl. V.P. Chizhova. - M. , 1861.
• G.V. F. Hegel. Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in a brief essay. Part 2. Philosophy of nature / Per. V.P. Chizhova. - M. , 1868. ^{[note 5]}
• G.V. F. Hegel. Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in a brief essay. Part 3. Philosophy of the spirit / Per. V.P. Chizhova. - M. , 1864. ^{[note 6]}
• G.V. F. Hegel. Works / Transl. B. G. Stolpner , ed. A. M. Deborina and N. Kareva. - M .: State Publishing House, 1929. - T. I.
• G.V. F. Hegel. Works / Transl. B. G. Stolpner and I. B. Rumer, ed. A.A. Maksimova . - M .: Sotsekgiz, 1934 .-- T. II.
• G.V. F. Hegel. Works / Transl. B.A. Fokhta . - M .: Gospolitizdat, 1956.- T. III. ^{[note 7]}
• G.V. F. Hegel. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. T. 1. The Science of Logic / Transl. B. G. Stolpner, rep. ed. E.P. Sitkovsky. - M .: Thought, 1974.- 452 p. - (Philos. Heritage). - 120,000 copies.
• G.V. F. Hegel. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. T. 2. Philosophy of nature / TRANS. B. G. Stolpner and I. B. Rumer, resp. ed. E.P. Sitkovsky. - M .: Thought, 1975 .-- 695 p. - (Philos. Heritage). - 120,000 copies. ^{[note 8]}
• G.V. F. Hegel. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. T. 3. The philosophy of the spirit / TRANS. B.A. Fokhta, rep. ed. E.P. Sitkovsky. - M .: Thought, 1977 .-- 471 p. - (Philos. Heritage). - 120,000 copies.

• Philosophical Propaedeutics (Hegel)
• Dialectics

In Russian

• Bykova Μ. Φ. “Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences” // New Philosophical Encyclopedia / Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences ; Nat social science fund; Pres scientific ed. Council V. S. Styopin , alternate representatives: A. A. Huseynov , G. Yu. Semigin , school. sec. A.P. Ogurtsov . - 2nd ed., Rev. and extra. - M .: Thought , 2010 .-- ISBN 978-5-244-01115-9 .
• Korotkikh V.I. "Phenomenology of the spirit" and the problem of the structure of the system of philosophy in Hegel's work. - M .: INFRA-M, 2011 .-- 383 p. - ISBN 978-5-16004921-2
• Korotkikh V.I. The Hegelian concept of reflection as a form of the dialectical-speculative method // Questions of Philosophy, 2013, No. 5. - S. 127-140. - ISSN 0042-8744
• Georgiev F. I. The opposite of the Marxist and Hegelian doctrine of consciousness (Hegel's psychological theory). - M .: Higher school, 1961. - 157, [3] p.
• Ovsyannikov Μ. Φ. Hegel's philosophy. - M. , 1959.
• Ogurtsov A. P. “Philosophy of Nature” by Hegel and its place in the history of the philosophy of science // Hegel . Encyclopedia of Philosophy. T. 2. The philosophy of nature. - M .: "Thought", 1975. - S. 595-622. - 695 p. - (Philos. Heritage). - 120,000 copies.
• Sitkovsky E. Hegel's doctrine of man // Hegel . Encyclopedia of Philosophy. T. 3. The philosophy of the spirit. - M .: "Thought", 1977. - S. 411-448. - 471 p. - (Philos. Heritage). - 120,000 copies.
• Sitkovsky E. Philosophical Encyclopedia of Hegel // Hegel . Encyclopedia of Philosophy. T. 1. The science of logic. - M .: "Thought", 1974. - S. 5-50. - 452 p. - (Philos. Heritage). - 120,000 copies.
• Fisher K. History of the New Philosophy. T. 8: Hegel, his life, writings and doctrine. Half-hour 1: per. with him. - M .; L .: Sotsekgiz, 1933 .-- 611 p.
• Fisher K. History of the New Philosophy. T. 8: Hegel, his life, writings and doctrine. By half 2. - SPb. , 1903.
• Chernyshev B.S. 5 // History of philosophy. - M. , 1943. - T. 3. - S. 224–60.
• Chernyshev B.S. On Hegel's Logic. - M. , 1941.
• "Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences" // Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary / Ch. Edition: L. F. Ilyichev, P. N. Fedoseev, S. M. Kovalev, V. G. Panov. - M .: Soviet Encyclopedia, 1983.

In English

• Posch, Thomas. Hegel and the Sciences // A Companion to Hegel. - John Wiley & Sons, 2011 .-- P. 177-202. - ISBN 9781444397154 .

In German

• Topp, Christian. Philosophie als Wissenschaft: Status und Makrologik wissenschaftlichen Philosophierens bei Hegel . - Walter de Gruyter, 1982. - 313 S. - ISBN 9783110086409 .

• Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse Text corresponds to the 3rd edition (1830).
• Trufanov S. N. Grammar of the mind or Hegel's system in an accessible presentation . - Samara: Hegel Fund, 2003. - 624 p. - 4000 copies. - ISBN 5-93279-041-5 .
• Trufanov S. N. About the mistakes made in the book “Grammar of the Mind” (neopr.) (Inaccessible link) . Date of treatment December 3, 2013. Archived July 12, 2013.