Operation Watch Chain

The purpose of the operation was to capture the strategically important city of Albertville (now Kalemie ) located on the shore of Lake Tanganyika and to free the Europeans held hostage by the rebels.

In early 1964, numerous Congolese tribes, dissatisfied with the policies of President Joseph Kasavubu and his government, began a rebellion. The rebels, led by Pierre Mulele , are quickly gaining popularity among the backward strata of the population and take over one city after another, by August 1964 having taken control of half of the country.

On August 4, the APL army of Nicholas Olenga ( fr. Nikolas Olenga ) captured the city of Stanleyville , which was declared the capital proclaimed by the rebels of the People's Republic of Congo .

In this situation, President Kasavubu called for Mois Chombe , the former separatist leader of the Katanga province, who was respected by many Congolese and supported by some Western countries, as prime minister.

Tshombe was supposed to restore order in the Congo and, with the support of the Belgians and Americans, invited numerous technical and military specialists to the country. The retired British Army major Mike Hoar (later known as Crazy Mike or Crazy Mike ) should have been in charge of the mercenaries recruited in South Africa at that time.

The main initial task assigned to Tshomba before the ANC, led by General Mobutu and the mercenaries of Hoar, was the capture of the cities of Albertville, Manono , Fizi and Uvira . A particularly alarming situation was in Albertville, where the Sim was held captive by a large number of hostages - Europeans. One of the rebel leaders, Gaston Soumialot , threatened to deal with them in a radio speech . By this time, only the first contingent of recruited military personnel, consisting of three dozen people, arrived from South Africa by this time. These were mainly Germans, Italians and South Africans. Despite the apparent insufficiency of these forces, Hoar decided to launch an attack on Albertville after Chombe assured him of the support of the government forces and Katanga’s gendarmerie.

Hoar planned to land his battle group in 4 assault boats in the city of Moba (on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, 140 kilometers south of Albertville), take a good supply of fuel and ammunition, and under cover of darkness move to Albertville. There was an airfield 10 kilometers north of the city, and Hoar wanted to capture it first. To do this, he was going to land at night on the beach closest to the airfield and, with a sudden blow, repel him from the rebels. At dawn, he was supposed to support the Congolese aviation - the Congolese air force .

After the capture of the Hoarau airfield, aircraft delivered reinforcements and ammunition for the further development of the offensive. The ANC army and the Katangan gendarmes of Lieutenant Colonels Bengal and Kakuji at that time attacked from the cities of Kapon and Niemba.

On August 23, Hoar arrived with his people in the city of Moba. From the beginning, he was haunted by failure. One of the four assault boats was out of order. One of his officers, with his squad, refused to sail on the lake because he considered this enterprise too dangerous. Hoar also had to refuse coordination of his actions with ANC and aviation due to the fact that he did not receive the necessary radio equipment on time. Flares were lost along the way.

On top of all these misfortunes, the mercenary commander received an unpleasant message from Lieutenant Colonel Bengal, who was with his battalion in the area of ​​Kapon (130 kilometers south of Albertville) with a proposal to curtail the operation, since, in his opinion, it was doomed to failure. Despite all this, the major decided not to back down. To cheer up Bengal, he sent lieutenants Latinis and Mackintosh with their people (a total of 14 people) to help him, and he, around midnight, gave a signal to start the amphibious operation “Watch - Chain”. He and 22 members of his battle group plunged into three landing boats and headed north towards Albertville.

At 4 o’clock in the morning on August 24, a detachment landed near the city of Mpala, a hundred kilometers from their main target, to rest in anticipation of the night. There Hoar met with the Belgian missionaries and found out about the radio message they received: Gaston Sumialo threatens to kill the hostages within 48 hours. The head of the mission was instructed to contact the commander of the next landing group to the north and ask him to do everything possible to save these people. With the onset of darkness, the mercenaries set off. In the early morning of August 25, they approached Cape Rutuku and came ashore about 20 km south of Albertville. Of the three boat engines, only one was in order, and there was fuel at the end. The mercenary commander had to change the operation plan on the fly. After a brief meeting, it was decided to cancel swimming on the lake, and instead move as fast as possible to Albertville along the road along the lake. A small detachment remained in place to repair the engines, and then caught up with the main group, following the water. Due to the lack of radio communications, Hoar was unable to contact ANC and report a change in his plans.

Moving on a journey and going 14 km to the north, the detachment reached the village of Malembe and settled down to rest. Suddenly, about 30 Simba rebels, armed with old rifles , spears and bows, broke into the village and attacked the mercenaries. Most of the attackers were destroyed by return fire, only a few people managed to hide in the jungle. Hoar decides to return to his boats, as he feels that it is impossible to break through to Albertville by land. The head of the village of Malembe also warned him that the road to the city was controlled by rebels.

It was decided to return to the original plan of the landing operation. By 16 o’clock the mercenaries went to the detachment left on the shore and plunged into the boats. One boat towed the other two and, on the night of August 26, the Hoar battle group approached the center of Albertville . They moored near a well-lit road running along the shore. The rebels, however, were on the alert — as soon as the first boat touched the shore, all the lights were turned off, and two automatic rifles were fired at the mercenaries. Landing was not possible. Hoar, recalling this episode, said later: “Personally, Albertville taught me a lot. I realized that the war with Simba would not be an easy walk. Among the rebels there were people who knew well what and how to do. ” The detachment had to return to its parking lot at Cape Rutuk .

Lieutenant Kirton, with three people in a single working boat, was sent south to the city of Mpala to request reinforcements, fuel, ammunition and radio equipment. All this should have been dropped from airplanes in a designated place. The lieutenant was also instructed to inform the ANC command that Hoar was going to attack the airfield at dawn on August 27. However, he was also unsuccessful - the outboard motor was soon out of order and Kirton’s detachment was forced to make their way to Mpala on foot, failing to send the major's message in time to ANC.

On the afternoon of August 26, B-26 bombers piloted by Cubans made several raids on Albertville. They fired at administrative buildings, the port and the railway station. The next day, they resumed attacks, spreading panic in the ranks of Simba, who scattered in horror through the streets of the city. Mercenaries stationed at Cape Rutuku observed the passage of bombers. They tried to attract their attention, but without result.

Around this time, Lieutenant Mackintosh and his men attempted to free the missionaries held in Albertville. They plunged into two jeeps and drove out of the city of Kapon. At night, they rushed into the city at full speed and headed for the mission but, without a detailed Albertville plan, got lost, were attacked by superior rebel forces, lost a jeep, and were forced to flee in the same car, taking the wounded with them.

Major Hoar, who was waiting for reinforcements at Cape Rutuku, heard on the radio that there were street fights in Albertville. Having lost all hope of receiving the long-awaited help, on August 28 he loaded his battle group into the two remaining boats and two pies taken from the fishermen and decided to attack the airfield, which, as he assumed, was still in the hands of the enemy. Lieutenant Bridges was sent with his unit to reconnaissance to mark the landing site near the airfield. In the dark, they mistook the small river Lubuyu for the river Lugumba, which is much closer to the airfield. This mistake played a role in the subsequent failure of the mercenaries. Bridges sent a conditional signal and the remaining squads of the battle group arrived at the place by two in the morning on August 29.

Hoar instructed Lieutenant Siegfried Müller (former Wehrmacht officer, later known as the “Congo-Müller”) and his squad to guard the landing site, and went on a north reconnaissance, but soon returned without finding an airfield.

Assuming they were north of the airfield, the mercenaries moved south. In fact, due to a mistake in navigation, they landed farther south and, thus, with each step moved away from their target. After walking about two kilometers, they turned their attention to a building in which, it seemed to them, there were too many people. The mercenaries did not even suspect that it was the headquarters of Simba and their small detachment landed in the very lair of the rebels. That night, many Simba gathered at headquarters. A sorcerer was invited there, who was supposed to perform the "Dawa" rite, which supposedly makes the soldiers invulnerable to bullets.

Divided into three groups, mercenaries from different sides approached the building. At that moment they were discovered by an alert sentinel. Congo - Muller subsequently recalled: “We were still at a distance of ten to fifteen meters, when shelling, attack, wild cries began ... The moon shines with might and main. We immediately retreated. I immediately had two dead. Both are Germans. And the lieutenant with whom I walked in front wounded with a spear in the cheek and a bullet in the shoulder. And there was one more wounded - an Italian, I tried to pull him out of the way. He wheezed, bleeding from his mouth. We carried him to the side, to the two killed, and then disappeared. ” Mike Hoar describes this episode as follows: “This time we got ashore without much adventure. We found the headquarters of the rebels, processed it properly. Many were killed, but they themselves lost two people killed and two wounded - too much loss for such a small detachment! ”

Hoar’s squad was forced to retreat to their boats and evacuate under heavy shelling. Wounded lieutenant Bridges was able to take with him. Another wounded volunteer, Regazzi, was left on the battlefield. He was not discovered by the rebels and managed to escape on his own.

Major Hoar with 8 people and lieutenants Müller and Bridges and the others separately went to Mpala, where they arrived safely after a few days.

The air raids, the invasion of two jeeps, the headquarters attack - all this caused serious concern for Simba, who suffered heavy losses. They were forced to disperse their forces and guard not only strategic facilities in the city, but also the coast.

At dawn on August 29, the rebels led the hostages to the bodies of two killed mercenaries. Simba danced around them and posed in front of the camera of the French journalist Yves-Guy Berger , the only Western reporter to get permission to shoot in Albertville. After that, the hostages were to be executed.

However, these sinister plans were not destined to come true. At ten o’clock in the morning, convoys of ANC soldiers and Katangan gendarmes lieutenant colonels Bengal and Kakuji with air support attacked the city. One convoy advanced to the railway bridge over the Lukuga River and, repelling the counterattacks of Simba, broke into the city. Another convoy attacked the area in which the headquarters and the airfield were located. For several hours, the rebel resistance was broken and their remnants retreated to the city of Bender, located north of Albertville, before they had time to execute 135 Europeans. Despite the threats of Gaston Sumialo, they remained alive, but two missionaries were killed a few days earlier.

On September 1, General Bobozo, the commander of the 4th ANC group, arrived in the city and made a review of his victorious troops. To meet with the general, Major Hoar also arrived in Albertville. His amazing raid ended in failure, but it was difficult to reproach the major and his small detachment. A few days later, Lieutenant Müller wrote in his diary: “Friday, September 4. Again in the fireplace at our main base. I drink whiskey with an American pilot. We, the heroes of Albertville, are here again! ”

The capture of Albertville was not only of great strategic importance. It had a huge impact on the rise in morale of the Congolese soldiers. They made sure that the "invulnerable" Simba can be defeated, that they, like all people, are afraid and prone to panic.

News of the fall of the city was received at Stanleyville and provoked the fury of Nicholas Oleng. He declared all Europeans in the city hostage and threatened to kill them. To save them, in November 1964, Operation Red Dragon (Dragon Rouge) was carried out.

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• Der "Kongo-Müller" und das "Kommando 52"
• Die schrecklichen
• Sonck JP L'échec de l'opération "watch chain" a Albertville
• Operation Watch Chain