Battle of Sakarya

The Sevres Peace Treaty on August 10, 1920 secured temporary control of the region of Smyrna, where 375 thousand Greeks and 325 thousand Muslims lived, over Greece ^[3] . Nominally, the region remained Turkish, with the prospect of deciding its fate after 5 years, in a referendum of the population ^[4] . The treaty was signed by the government of the sultan, but not recognized by the Kemalist movement.

After diplomatic and military victories, Greek Prime Minister E. Venizelos agreed to hold elections, confident of his victory ^[5] . Monarchist "People's Party" conducted a campaign under the slogan "we will return our guys home." Having received the support of a significant then Muslim population, the monarchists won the elections on November 30, 1920. The party of Venizelos received 308 thousand votes, the monarchists 340 thousand, of which 100 thousand were Muslims of Macedonia ^[5] . The victory of the monarchists dealt an unexpected blow to the foreign policy positions of Greece and became a fatal event for the Greek population of Asia Minor. The Allies said that if the Germanophile of King Constantine returned to Greece, they would stop financial assistance ^[3] and freeze the loans ^[6] .

The return of Constantine ( December 6 (19) ^[4] ) freed the Allies from obligations towards Greece. Winston Churchill , in his work “Aftermath” (pp. 387–388), wrote: “The return of Constantine terminated all allied ties with Greece and annulled all obligations except legal ones. With Venizelos, we made many commitments. But with Konstantin, no. Indeed, when the first surprise passed, the feeling of relief became apparent in the leadership circles. There was no more need to follow the anti-Turkish policy ” ^[4] .

Having signed peace with Kemal in October, the Italians left Attalia and their arsenal in the city, and, remaining nominally allies of Greece, began supplying weapons to the Turks ^[4] ).

February 28 / March 10, 1921 the French signed a preliminary agreement with the Kemalists, which soon allowed those forces to liberate from Cilicia: two divisions took part in the battle of Sakarya ^[4] ).

On March 3 (16), 1921, the Kemalists signed a preliminary agreement on the supply of arms from Soviet Russia ^[4] ). It should be recognized that, unlike the Franco-Italian allies, who secured their interests, concluded a separate peace, the monarchist government could not leave the war without resolving the issue with the Greek population of Asia Minor. The Kemalists continued the Young - Turkish genocide policy towards the indigenous Christian population of Asia Minor and the massacre in Aydin and Bithynia deprived the Greek leadership of any doubt about what would happen to the population of Ionia when the Greek army left the region ^[7] . ^[7] . N. Psirukis wrote that the people gave their vote to monarchists for their pacifist demagogy, but they preferred to continue the war in absolutely unfavorable conditions - as early as January 1921, Konstantin declared a forceful resolution of the issue ^[4] . However, at the London Conference in February 1921, French General Gourault said that in order to enforce peace in Asia Minor, it was necessary to have 27 divisions, but the Greeks had only 9 divisions ^[4] .

Upon the arrival of the delegations of the Sultan and Kemal, the allies who signed the Peace of Sevres, turned the confrontation of the Entente - Turkey into a confrontation of the Greeks - Turkey. As the Greek historian D. Fotiadis writes, “from the allies they were transformed into arbitrators” ^[4] . The Kemalists requested in London for a response of 25 days.

Monarchists faced a dilemma - to continue until victory or leave Smyrna in exchange for Eastern Thrace . The modern English historian D. Dakin writes that the actions of France and Italy were "the prelude of the subsequent betrayal." “Having rectified their obligations and signatures in a flagrant manner, they, among other things, outrageously ignored the question of the fate of Greek as well as Armenian Christians” ^[3] . However, British Prime Minister D. Lloyd George , who in 1919 initiated the dispatch of Greek troops to Smyrna, confined himself to the verbal support of the Greeks, telling their delegation that no one could stop them if they acted by military means.

Spring and Summer Offensive of the Greek Army

One of the first acts of monarchists was the recall to the army of monarchist officers who, due to the National split, did not take part in the First World War . These officers received new ranks for years of service and on a large scale began to replace officers of the supporters of Venizelos, who received their titles on the battlefields of the First World War and the Asia Minor Campaign . In addition to other problems caused by the personnel policy of monarchists, the recall experience in the military experience was a gap of a decade and their tactics remained back in 1913 .

The "spring offensive" of the Greek army began on March 10, 1921. In the northern sector of the front, the Third Corps of the Greek Army was stopped at Inonu , but the final outcome of the offensive was decided by the victory of the First Corps at Tumla Bunar on March 28 / April 10. However, the set military-political tasks were not solved ^[4] . To end the war and with a population of just over 4 million people, Greece required the mobilization of three more calls ^[4] .

On June 29 / July 12, the Greek army launched the “Great Summer Offensive”, defeated the Turks in the biggest battle of the war in Afyonkarahisar-Eskisehir , but the Kemalist army avoided defeat. The Turks moved 300 km to the east, to Ankara, and the Greek government again faced a dilemma: what to do next ^[4] . Venizelos wrote in those days: “I couldn’t think about the war with Turkey without the support of the allies, especially against them ... the government should end martial law and save everything that is still possible from the fruits of our policy ... Military victory ... with unconditional surrender is ruled out the more so that the enemy knows that we are in diplomatic isolation and his capital (see Constantinople ) is protected from any of our attacks by our former allies ... a continuation will lead to our exhaustion, which will force us to beg for mediation in a few months far worse conditions. ” Later, in 1923, he wrote: “the attack deep into Asia Minor was insane” ^[4] .

Waiting for the arrival of the political leadership, on July 13 (26), 1921 , a preliminary meeting of the headquarters of the expeditionary army, chaired by the commander, General A. Papoulas , was held in Kütahie , occupied by the Greek army, at which the possibility of a further offensive was considered. Headquarters officer P. Sarriyanis stated that the army should not waste time, but should continue its offensive as soon as possible in order to prevent the Turks from regrouping and organizing their defense. However, the head of the IV department (logistics), Lieutenant Colonel Spiridonos, said that the army only had ammunition for 2 days of fighting and that it could not cross the Sakarya River, dooming itself to remain without supplies ^[4] . Spiridonos continued that even if new reserves were created and the advance to the east would continue, the army did not have the means to support it.

The next day, arrived Prime Minister D. Gunaris and the king. On July 15 (28) , under the chairmanship of the “sick and silent” King Constantine, the “Grand Military Council” was held. Papulas' doubts were broken by the stubbornness of politicians. The decision to continue the offensive was political. The government did not aim to occupy new territories to the east of Sakarya, especially since these desert territories were far from the densely populated areas of the Greek population. By virtue of this, the operation was named Reid on Ankara ( Greek: Επιδρομή προς Άγκυρα ). The goal of the Reid was to force the Kemalists to peace or, throwing them further east, to destroy their supply bases and transport infrastructure and secure the borders provided for by the Sevres peace. This would enable the government to break the political stalemate, fulfill its election promises and demobilize several calls ^[4] .

Greek historians Sarandos Kargakos ^[8] and Dimitris Fotiadis ^[4] call the campaign of the Greek divisions against Ankara “the epic of the Greek army”.

On July 28 ( August 10 ), 9 Greek infantry divisions and 1 cavalry brigade returned to their initial positions for the raid on Ankara. They had to go through a waterless desert before approaching the mountains that covered Ankara, in which Kemal prepared 3 lines of defense ^[4] .

The XII Greek division was to go through the desert 130 km, V and XIII 190 km, III - 220 km, IX - 280 km. Only VII divisions, which were ordered to act independently of the expeditionary army and force Sakarya on its northern bend, had to act in more favorable climatic conditions. The passage through the desert, which Greek historians describe as unnecessary torture of Greek soldiers before the start of the battle, astonished the Turkish command, but did not introduce the element of surprise ^[4] . K. Balomenos writes that the campaign for Sakarya was a tragic mistake, which, due to the problematic plan of the campaign, turned into a crime ^[9] .

The forces of the Greek army in Asia Minor comprised 5,500 officers and 178 thousand privates, appeals of 1912-1921, consisting of 11 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry brigade. But only 9 divisions took part in the raid on Ankara - 2 divisions remained to cover the outer flanks of the rear. According to the Greek General Staff, 3,780 officers and 120,000 privates took part in the Reid. But with the deduction of a large number of support personnel, the combat composition of the expeditionary army consisted of 1,860 officers and 75,000 privates. Greek artillery had 296 guns ^[4] .

Greek aviation, which dominated the skies of Asia Minor throughout the war, provided 18 aircraft to participate in the raid. This figure is confirmed by both Greek and Turkish sources ^[4] . However, their age and technical condition were such that a British aviation officer declared that he “would not trust them with his own field cap” ^[4] .

On the other hand, the Kemalist army consisted of 16 infantry divisions and 3 separate regiments, 4 cavalry divisions, and 1 one separate brigade. However, it should be noted that the strength of each of the Turkish divisions did not exceed 5 thousand people. According to Greek sources, the Kemalist army numbered 90 thousand people, which was commensurate with the advancing Greek army, and if you take into account only the combat strength of the Greek army, then the defenders had a slight numerical superiority. Turkish artillery had 167 guns. However, military historians note that although in quantitative terms the advantage was for the Greek artillery, in reality the advantage was for the Turkish artillery, whose Austrian guns "Skoda" surpassed the Greek guns in the firing range and a half times.

The raid on Ankara began on August 1 (14) . 3 corps of the Greek army made at the same time. Behind them, behind the clock, were made mobile warehouses: 1500 carts into which oxen were harnessed, 600 heavy (3 tons) trucks and 240 light, 1600 camels with Turkish drovers as well as herds of sheep (for meat).

Before the performance of the Greek army, the I Turkish division and almost all of Kemal's cavalry remained on the left bank of the Sakarya to follow the actions of the Greeks. Finding the “incredible course” of the Greeks who were marching to the desert, Kemal ordered that his left flank be strengthened by transferring forces from the right flank and center. On August 6 (19), the Greek divisions began to cross the Sakarya, along pontoon bridges erected by engineering units ^[4] .

Crossing the “Salty Desert” was a test for the Greek divisions. Rarely encountered on their way wells were, as a rule, poisoned by the Turks. The soldiers of the 9th division did not drink a single drop of water for 2 days. The passage through the waterless and desertless desert became also a test for horses and cattle (except for camels), whose livestock somewhat diminished. Coming out of the desert, the Greek divisions approached the ridges of treeless mountains, reinforced by Kemal to a depth of 30 km. There could be no question of any suddenness, or of any surrounding or circumvention of the Turkish positions. For the occupation of Ankara, the Greek divisions were to attack 3 or more fortified lines of defense in the forehead ^[4] .

Hoping to finish the entrenched enemy, whose resistance prevented them from returning home, the Greek soldiers surpassed themselves. The forces of the attackers and the defenders were approximately equal, which did not correspond to the prevailing doctrine at that time, according to which for the success of the attackers, the balance of their forces against the defenders should have been at least 3: 1. Even more significant was the fact that the Turks defended themselves from prepared fortified positions, which were also located on the dominant mountain peaks and cliffs, where the attacker was not easy (and sometimes impossible) to climb. However, the offensive impulse of the Greek soldiers was such that after passing through a grueling march through the “Salty Desert”, I Division 10 (23) of August 1923 , without respite and without artillery preparation, immediately beat off the Turks' peak Mangal-Dag (1400m). Kemal was impressed by this unexpected Greek success. Immediately replacing the commander of the unit that defended Mangal-dag, he declared: “if we are defeated, there will be a grave of Turkey” ^[4] .

To be closer to the battlefield, Kemal moved to Inonu headquarters in the village of Alagez and ordered each officer to be shot, who retreated without a written instruction with his subordinates, adding “there is no line of retreat, everyone must die in his trench” ^[4] .

One more success followed the first Greek success, but this time after a three-day bloody battle. The 2nd Greek Division launched an attack on Tambur - Oglu, with the objective objective of occupying the heights of Turban Tepe and the “Twins of the Twins”, but at midnight was stopped by artillery and machine-gun fire in front of the Turkish positions. I Division, seeing that II was in mortal danger, on her own initiative sent her 4th regiment to help her, who managed to intervene between Turban Tepe and Gemini.

Fevzi - Pasha ordered a general attack against the I and II Greek divisions. Turban Tepe was abandoned by the Greeks under Turkish artillery fire, but the next day the 34th Greek regiment was able to re-occupy it. On August 14 (27) , on the third day of the battle, the Greek units took the “Twins” with a sudden attack. Victory at the village of Tambour Oglu, the Greeks paid 600 killed and 2500 wounded. In one of the battalions, two-thirds of the officers and a third of the rank and file were out of action ^[4] .

The main burden of the breakthrough of the Turkish line of defense and access to Ankara fell on the III Corps of the Greek Army G. Polimenakos . Polimenakos had only two divisions, III and X, since its VII division, following along the Eskisehir - Ankara railway line, regardless of the main forces of the expeditionary army, had to force Sakarya on its northern bend and take Polatla station in front of Ankara. Before the III Corps of Polimenakos, the mountain range of Sapanj was towering, which, in turn, was protected by the Sakarya tributary, the river Geuk, and swamps.

On August 11 (24) , having crossed the Geuk on a floating bridge built by Greek sappers, the corps divisions moved to the Turkish positions at Sapanji. On August 15 (28), the X Division advanced north. The Turks defended themselves and the 27th and 30th regiments beat the Turks out of the trenches with bayonets. The division’s “irrepressible attack” allowed the dominant Naked Summit to be occupied. Although the domination of the Greek aircraft over the battlefield continued, the day was also marked by the first appearance of a Turkish aircraft, as a result of which two soldiers were killed and 7 Greek soldiers were injured.

The Turks all night trying to beat off the “Naked Top”, but managed to gain a foothold in only one place at the foot of the mountain. On the same day, the headquarters of the Greek Expeditionary Army informed the corps that there was "a large shortage of ammunition" and that the headquarters "forbade artillery fire before attacking infantry." In addition to the lack of vehicles and long lines of communications, this was the result of the activities of the Turkish cavalry and the Muretep infantry division operating on the steppes and the Salt Desert, which were beyond the control of the Greek army. X the Greek division, which remained not only without shells, but for two days without receiving any food or water, was exhausted and practically did not advance further.

But Division III managed to take Gildiz Dag on August 17 (30) and saved the situation. Immediately thereafter, the Greek engineering units erected a pontoon bridge on the northern bend of Sakarya near Kavundzhi Kopru, which allowed the Greek divisions to receive supplies and bypass the “Salty Desert”. The III Division paid for its success with 200 killed, 50 missing and 1,100 wounded, X Division 80 killed and 1,200 wounded ^[4] .

Kemal left in the rear of the Greek divisions the infantry division of Muretep and the V cavalry group (XIV division and IV brigade) under the command of Fahredin Bey. In addition, irregular Turkish couples operated in the region. The victims of the activities of these Turkish units were not only supply wagons moving eastward, but wounded people moving westward. As a result of these actions and the resulting shortage of shells, Greek heavy artillery fired 412 shells on the first day of the battle on August 12 (25 ), 41 ( 13 (26) August) 41 projectiles and only 2 projectiles on August 14 (27), without ammunition replenishment. Soon there was a shortage of shells for field and mountain artillery . On August 14 (27), the headquarters of the expeditionary army announced to the corps that on August 15 (28) and August 16 (29) there would be no ammunition and the guns were silent.

The commander of the I Corps of the Greek Army, A. Kondulis, informed the command that his corps was left without ammunition and for small arms. Papoulas ordered the head of the IV Division, Lieutenant Colonel Spiridonos, the very one who, at the meeting in Kütahya, foreseeing intractable problems with the army, was categorically opposed to the march on Ankara to resolve the issue.

Having loaded a group of evzons on 3 trucks, Spiridonos reached with them the Balik Dami Bridge on Sakarya, where 120 trucks with ammunition accumulated. Truck crews did not dare to move east. Spiridonos led the column, speaking for Sakarya in the direction of the front. After only 20 km, the convoy came under artillery bombardment and attack by the V cavalry group of the Turks, under the command of Fahredin Bey. Spiridonos gave the command not to get involved in a fight and go forward at full speed. 90 trucks walking in the head of the column broke through. The 20 who were walking in the tail managed to turn around and go back. 10 trucks and their crews were destroyed ^[4] . The shortage of ammunition in the I Corps was temporarily resolved.

On the same day, August 15 (28), Kondulis I Corps was ordered to attack the heights of Chal Dag and Ardiz Dag on the second line of defense of the Turks.

But on August 17 (30), the headquarters of the Greek Expeditionary Army notified all corps that it would supply only ammunition, but not food, despite the fact that thanks to the advancement of army units along the eastern coast of Sakarya, a new bridge was built at Kavunji Köprп. The main reason for the growing shortage was not so much the partisan actions of the Turks and not even the shortage of trucks and their mechanical problems. The main reason was a banal fact, which was a consequence of the financial and military embargo on the part of former allies. Trucks making off-road deserts have worn out tires, but spare ones have not arrived for six months ^[4] .

Episode in Uzuna

In one of his raids, Fakhredin's cavalry intercepted a caravan of 200 camels with secondary supplies for the Greek army. From the Greek owners of the Turkish owners and camel drivers, Fahredin received information that the Greeks had organized a supply station and an airfield in the village of Uzun. In fact, what the drivers did not know, the headquarters of the expeditionary Greek army, led by Commander A. Papoulas and Crown Prince George and two field hospitals, temporarily settled in the village.

On August 14 (27) , when the Greek headquarters were preparing to move to Court Tahazhir, the village of Uzun began to be shelled by Fahredin’s artillery. A company of guards of the Greek headquarters and a machine-gun platoon had already left for Court Tahazhir. Only the 26th battalion of the 9th division remained in the village, which took up a defensive position. To help the battalion were mobilized staffers, clerks, etc. The wounded are able to carry weapons, were spaced around the perimeter of the defense. The nurses refused to leave the village. However, the Turkish attack weakened and soon ceased.

The explanation of the end of the episode came later. In the train Fahredina constantly was a radio, working intermittently. At the beginning of the attack on Uzun, the radio that was silent at that moment, suddenly started working. Fahredin received an order to urgently relocate. After the withdrawal of the Greek army for Sakarya, Fahredin ended up in Uzun, where he learned about who was in the village at the time of his attack. Bursting into abuse at the “cursed walkie-talkie”, Fakhredin ended his tirade with the word “Kismet” (fate) ^[4] .

After heavy fighting for Tambur Oglu and Sapanju, I and III Greek corps occupied not only the first line of defense of the Turks, but also intermediate fortified lines, from where they were preparing to break through the second line of defense.

In the north of VII, the combat division forced Sakarya on the night of 10 to 11 August and created a bridgehead on the east bank of the river. A roundabout of the Turkish left flank was entrusted to Prince Andrew's II Corps (V, IX and XIII divisions). In front of the hull, Kale Groto towed the impregnable rocks.

On August 13 (26), the V Division attacked the “inaccessible rocks”. The Turks did not expect this attack and only an hour later left their positions. The Greek infantry, without stopping, continued the offensive and by 9 pm took the highest peak of Kale Groto and with bayonets knocked out the Turks of the XXIV Division from the trenches, whose retreat had turned into a stampede.

The XIII Greek division attacked the heights west of Calais Groto on August 14 (27) , but was stopped by Turkish artillery fire. At night, the Turks tried to counterattack in this sector, but were rejected by the Greek counterattack.

The IX Greek division and cavalry brigade attempted to bypass the rocks of Kale Groto on the right, but their advance guard met Fahredin's cavalry, which managed to defend the left Turkish flank from encirclement.

Greek successes troubled Kemal, who arrived in this sector, where direct command was exercised by Chief of Staff Chakmak, Mustafa Fevzi . Upon arrival, Kemal issued an order: “All units will defend their positions until the last soldier. The enemy's sporadic successes are explained by the night storms and the inconsistency of our parts. We should not doubt that by defending our positions with calm we will finally stop the enemy. ” D. Fotiadis writes that this “we should not doubt”, on the contrary, showed how great the concern of the Turkish headquarters was. Kemal himself later wrote that “there were moments when I thought that everything was lost” ^[4] .

To the northeast, and beyond Kale Groto, an even more terrible ridge of cliffs — the Ulu Dag — 1483 meters high, which received the name “Monument of the Rocks” from Greek soldiers, rose to the ground. Ulu Dag dominated the region and was the main stronghold of the second line of defense of the Turks in front of the right Greek flank. The Turks believed that the rocks of Ulu Dag were impregnable.

On the evening of August 14 (27), the II Corps of the Greek Army reported that, due to a shortage of ammunition, it considers the continuation of the offensive problematic. In addition, the wounded were not exported due to the lack of cars and gasoline. The headquarters of the expeditionary Greek army insisted and in the conclusion of the order wrote: "We forbid the artillery preparation before attacking the infantry."

The main gravity of the attack was again assumed by the V Greek Division. Evzony climbed the cliffs and with bayonets knocked the Turks out of the trenches. The Turks initially desperately resisted, but were eventually broken. Turkish officers were forced to shoot the soldiers on the spot in order to force them to a counterattack. Positions incessantly passed from hand to hand. At 2 noon, with the Greek battle cry of “Aer”, the Evzones fully and finally occupied the Ulu Dag range, paying for their success with 150 dead and half of the officers outside the ranks.

On August 18 (31), the IX Division, after a “beautiful attack,” occupied three successive lines of Turkish trenches south of the village Karasuleyman. This was the last offensive operation of the II Corps of the Greek Army in battle. For 6 days of battles II, the Corps lost 550 killed and 2,800 wounded. August 19 ( September 1 ) On August 19 / September 1, the Corps received an order to transfer its IX division to Sapanje and hold the occupied positions by the forces of the remaining two divisions ^[4] .

Unlike the other divisions that went to Ankara crossing the waterless Salt Desert, the VII Division of A. Platis was tasked to march 130 km along the Eskisehir- Ankara railway line ^[4] and force the Sakarya at its north bend. The strategic goal was to occupy the railway station of Polatli (ancient Gordion ), which was located 80 km from Ankara and was then put forward by the supply base of the Kemalist army ^[4] . The division was counting only on its own strength and could not count on help in case of failure.

The fighting division forced Sakarya on the night of August 10 to August 11 and entrenched on the eastern bank began to expand the bridgehead ^[4] . The division received an order to occupy Polatly ^[4] .

On the way to Polatli there was a so-called "Conic Hill", which the soldiers of the division took in stride. However, after heavy fire by Turkish heavy artillery, the hill was abandoned. There was a threat to the beachhead. Platis ordered his 1/22 battalion to take the hill again "at any cost." In the night attack and the ensuing two-hour battle, the commanders of the three companies of this battalion were killed. In the battle around this hill, the divisions of Platis were confronted by four Turkish divisions. However, on 12 (25) August the 3/23 battalion managed to break the resistance of the Turks and occupy the Conic Hill.

Since the Turks were trying to avoid a breakthrough of their front before Ankara in the southern sector, where the rest of the Greek divisions were advancing, they were forced to transfer part of their forces from the Polatla sector. Platis took advantage of the situation and took the initiative in his hands. The division managed to break into the mountain passage of Polatli and occupy the “Jagged Hill” as well as the Besh Tepeler ridge. But the forces of the soldiers were exhausted in this continuous offensive outburst and Platis was forced to give them a break.

After a couple of hours, the offensive continued and the division occupied Dua Tepe (Gemini Hills) dominating the region. After this significant success, the division rushed to the attack on Polatly ^[4] . According to historian D. Fotiadis, the objective task set for the division of Platis "was almost achieved." 3/23 battalion approached Polatli at a distance of 4 km. The Turks were in a panic. They tried to remove ammunition from warehouses, but due to lack of vehicles they began to blow them up. Polatly was neutralized as the advanced supply base of the Turks.

VII Division united with the III Corps of the army, in the subordination of which it was. But Platis' division paid dearly for their success. She lost killed 17 officers and 260 privates, and 65 wounded officers and 1361 privates ^[4] .

Northeast of Sapanji, on the second line of the Turkish defense was dominated by the heights of Chal-dag and Ardiz-dag. The taking of these heights was entrusted to the I Corps of General Condoulis. On the left flank of the Corps was the 2nd Division, in the center of the XII and on the right flank of the I Division. But in order to reach the mountains, it was necessary to knock the Turks out of the intermediate lines of defense.

The main burden of Ardiz Dag's occupation fell on the XII Division of Colonel P. Kallidopoulos , which included the regiment of Lieutenant Colonel I. Kotulas and the I Division of Colonel A. Frang .

I Division attacked the top of 1329, was stopped by fire of Turkish artillery and infantry, but decided to throw 2 of its 3 regiments into battle. The Greek attack was swift and the Turks were forced to retreat to the Ardiz Dag range.

The division advanced 1/38 of the Evzon Guards Regiment to the aid of the 5th Regiment, against which the Third Turkish Division of the Caucasus defended. The attack of the Evzon regiment was so decisive that the Turkish division was in panic. The officers could not stop the flight - the gendarme behind him did not help shooting either.

The XII Greek division rushed into the final battle for Ardiz Dag at 5 am on August 19 ( September 1 ). The 14th regiment of I. Kotulas , being covered from the left flank by the 41st regiment, which occupied Gedik’s height the previous day, made a throw of 800 meters under fire in 15 minutes and broke into the Turkish trenches.

Seeing in their trenches “sheitan asker” (devilish army), the Turks abandoned their machine guns and ran. However, a whole battalion of the 176th Turkish regiment, 355 men, led by officers and commander, surrendered to Kotulas. Since the beginning of the battle for Ankara, this was the first case of the capture of a whole Turkish unit. The losses of the Turks could have been much greater if the retreating Turks came under fire from the Greek artillery. But the Greek artillery did not have shells.

At the end of the battle, Cotulus made two requests to the division: to replenish the officers, since most of them were killed or injured in a “crazy” rush to the top, and the second, to send people to collect weapons and supplies abandoned by the Turks ^[4] .

Under pressure from the forces of the III Greek Corps, the Turks left Gildiz Doug on the night of August 16 to 17, fearing the encirclement of the Greek troops attacking Chal Dag. The 28th Greek regiment took Sivri's position south-west of the summit of Chal Dagh, but the Turkish headquarters threw new forces into battle and managed to recapture these two positions. Two Turkish divisions, LVII and VIII, were thrown against the 28th regiment, but the Greek regiment, despite the enormous numerical superiority of the Turks, survived. However, the X Greek division, wedged into the location of the Turks, was without cover from both flanks and was in danger. The XII Division I of the Greek Corps managed to gain a foothold on the northern slope of Chal Dagh and thus cover the right flank of the X Division ^[4] .

On August 18 (31) , the 34th and 41st Greek regiments began to climb to the top of the mountain with a height of 1,340 meters, but were forced to stop their attempt due to the stubborn resistance of the Turks.

On the same night, the headquarters of the Greek Expeditionary Army gave the order to Corps III to occupy the next day the summit of Chal Dag at any cost. However, the III and X divisions reported that their soldiers were so exhausted that a new attempt was impossible. In addition, the X division all night reflected the continuous attacks of the Turks. The III Corps approved their position, giving them a hot lunch - the only thing he could give them.

That same evening, the 3rd Corps received a message that I Corps was occupied by Ardiz Dag, but was unable to continue the offensive, since the 3rd Corps did not advance further. A new order was followed by headquarters III Corps to take the indicated positions. The next morning, the X Corps Division III managed to gain a foothold on the eastern slopes of Chal Dagh. Then the XII Division I Corps, to help her, occupied the nearby slope, being subjected to constant attacks of the Turks. The Greek mountain artillery could not stop the impulse of the Turks, since it had practically exhausted all of its projectiles. Then the II division rushed into the general attack, managed to overthrow the XVII Turkish division and at 10 pm took the top of Chal Dagh.

After the Greek victories on Ardiz Dag and Chal Dag, Kemal ordered to transfer forces from his extreme left flank to the center, since he realized that the II Greek Corps in the Kale Groto region had taken defensive positions ^[4] .

During the 5 days of fighting from August 15 to 20, the losses of I and III of the Greek corps amounted to 650 people killed and 3,500 wounded. The Greek divisions, with losses, occupied the next “dag” one by one, but there was no end to the battle. At the same time, the ammunition and food of the Greek divisions dried up, their replacement hundreds of kilometers was problematic, especially given the fact that half of the trucks were already out of order. On the other hand, the supply warehouses of the Turks were a few kilometers from the front line. But the main thing, speaking to reporters and outlining the perspective of the struggle, Kemal declared: “I will defend myself against Ankara, I will defend myself in Ankara, I will defend behind Ankara”.

The raid of the Greek Expeditionary Army developed into a protracted military campaign, which was not in its plans and, most importantly, the Greek Army had no reserves for the continuation of offensive operations.

Towards the end of the battle for Chal Dag, Crown Prince George arrived at Prus , where he presented General Papulas' report to King Constantine and War Minister N. Theotokis . In the report, Papoulas wrote that his headquarters came to the conclusion that an attempt to take Ankara must be stopped. Papoulas informed that at the beginning of the battle the Turks had approximately equal forces with the advancing Greeks. But if the losses of the Greek army were irrecoverable, the V and IX divisions (from Cilicia, after the French left) and two more new divisions, XVII and XVIII, approached the Turks. The report also noted that, unlike the Turks, the Greek divisions had exhausted all their reserves and the delivery of new ones was becoming more and more problematic. In conclusion, General Papoulas wrote:

“The army remains completely ignorant of the political situation and cannot know if the political dividends expected from the occupation of Ankara are from a political point of view, so that an attempt to occupy (Ankara) at any cost risk the probability of defeat and consequently the failure of the entire Asia Minor question”

.

Papoulas received no reply and repeated the letter on August 26 ( September 8 ), demanding the conclusion of an armistice. However, the veiled response of Prime Minister Gunaris shifted the decision-making responsibility to the headquarters of the expeditionary army ^[4] .

On the night of August 26 ( September 8 ), the headquarters of the expeditionary Greek army informed the corps that, according to reliable information, the enemy had concentrated considerable forces against the third corps, in order to attack its left flank and, interrupting the communications of all the other corps, force the army to retreat through the Salt Desert, where will be destroyed. The III Corps was ordered to defend "to the last", while the other two corps, with the beginning of the attack, were to undertake "mad attacks" against the enemy.

Earlier, on August 21 ( September 3 ), the headquarters of the II Corps, commanded by Prince Andrew , expressed in the letter to General Papoulas the idea that since the II Corps, staying in Calais Groto, was inactive, it would be better if he moves closer to the III Corps. The II Corps at that time consisted of V and XIII infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade. Against it were located 3 Turkish divisions, totaling up to 14 thousand people.

Having received the order, the headquarters of the II Corps replied that it considered it impracticable and useless and added that the corps would go to Isri, according to its previous proposal. Having received an answer, taken aback by the disobedience of the whole corps, which was explained by the impunity of a member of the royal family, the angry General Papoulos replied at 3:30 that morning, ordering him to remain in his positions. Considering that the chief of staff of the corps was in charge, Papoulos replaced him, appointing Colonel P. Nikolaidis, who had previously been the commander of a cavalry brigade, for this post. Prince Andrew considered himself insulted and demanded a replacement, but his resignation was not accepted.

The fermentation in the II Greek Corps and its inaction allowed the Turks to transfer considerable forces from their left flank and use them in their counterattack. To a certain extent, the episode with the corps of Prince Andrew later influenced the adoption by the headquarters of the expeditionary Greek army of the decision to withdraw for Sakarya. A year later, Prince Andrew appeared for non-execution of an order before a revolutionary tribunal, but escaped execution due to the intervention of European royal courts. Prince Andrew, who escaped the execution, left descendants. One of his grandchildren, Charles, Prince of Wales , is the heir to the British throne ^[4] .

I and III Greek corps continued the battle. One of Kemal’s biographers, Englishman Armstrong, wrote in his book “The Gray Wolf - Mustafa Kemal”, published in 1932 (HC Armstrong. “Gray Wolf - Mustafa Kemal: Routledge Revivals):“ Greeks and Turks fought with incredible courage. Turks fought for their home. Half of the Greek army consisted of local Christians ... Both fought for their homes ” ^[4] .

For 14 days, the Greeks continuously attacked, but their forces dried up, and there were no reserves. Fevzi - Pasha correctly assessed the omissions of the II Greek Corps. He called Kemal, who was "nervously pacing in his heading at Alagöz, the material of those around him and hesitated to decide to retreat before it was too late." The night call took place at the moment when Kemal was already ready to give the order to retreat. One of Kemal's biographers, Frenchman Jacques Meshan (Jacques Benoist-Méchin (1901–1983) Mustapha Kemal - La mort d'un Empire (1954)) writes: “If the Greek attack lasted a few more minutes (!) Kemal would have ordered the withdrawal, to avoid a catastrophe ” ^[4] . Fevzi reported to Kemal that the attacks of the Greeks had weakened and that the Greeks were probably preparing to retreat.

Approximately the modern French-Russian biographer of Kemal Alexander Zhevakhov (Alexandre Jevakhoff, born 1952) also describes these historical minutes: "Kemal is annoyed and obviously nervous; ... The Greeks, after three days of fierce fighting, captured the dominant mountain of Chal-Dag. Kemal cannot hide his despair and doesn’t even try to do it. Is it worth continuing the resistance or is it better to retreat? " Zhevakhov also writes that “Fevzi and his call changed everything” ^[10] .

After the call, Fevzi-pasha, Kemal was inspired and decided to counterattack in the northern sector of the front and throw all reserves into battle in order to block the enemy’s way to retreat.

The decision to counter the attack was taken by the Turkish headquarters in Alagöz on the night of August 25-26. The diverting offensive was planned to be launched against the I Greek Corps, while the main offensive was planned to be launched on the left flank of the Greek Army, against the III Corps. If the Turkish plan succeeded, the Greek divisions had the only way to retreat - through the desert, where they could be broken. The Turkish headquarters planned to throw its corps, formed for this offensive, consisting of both the forces transferred from the extreme left flank of the Turkish army, which had been opposed to the inactive II Greek corps, and fresh reserve parts, leaving even the guard part of the Grand National Assembly . The headquarters of the Greek Expeditionary Army promptly realized the Turkish plan, as follows from the order of the Greek headquarters on the night of August 26 / September 5 ^[4] .

The Turkish counter-offensive began at 5 am on August 28 ( September 10 ) at the junction between the location of Division I of the I Corps of the Greek and V Division, which had been organically before as part of the Corps II. The attack of the Turkish infantry was immediately stopped by the fire of Greek infantry and the Turks stopped at a distance of 300 meters from the Greek trenches. At 17:00 two Greek divisions launched a counterattack. The Turks began to retreat, but soon their retreat turned into a rout. The demoralized and disorganized Turkish units, interspersed with animals and carts, fled north, followed in their footsteps by evzons ^[4] .

But after the victorious outcome of the battle, the Greek division I was left completely without ammunition. At noon on the same day, the II Greek Corps received an order to abandon its positions and make a forced march to the west, which corresponded to a maneuver that the II Corps wanted to perform without permission two days earlier. D. Fotiadis explains the change in the decision of the headquarters by saying that the extreme left flank of the Greek defense was broken.

The Turks launched an offensive here at 8 in the morning of the same day, and by noon they occupied the dominant Hills of Gemini (Dua Tepe), forcing the Greek forces defending here to retreat to a considerable depth. The III Greek Artillery Division, armed with Skoda captured weapons, was not notified of the withdrawal and was among the advancing Turks. The Greek artillerymen, armed with the ancient Gra rifles , managed to stop the onslaught of the Turks, after which they threw the guns into the gorge so that they would not fall into the hands of the enemy.

At 1:00 pm on August 28 ( September 10 ), the headquarters of the Greek Expeditionary Army gave a readable order to its III Corps to attack and reoccupy Dua Tepe and, at the same time, provide a bridge for withdrawing from the east to the west coast of Sakarya ^[4]

On the morning of August 29 ( September 11 ), the headquarters of the Greek Expeditionary Army decided to stop the fight east of Sakarya, believing that it had become aimless. In his letter to the Minister of War in Prus and the Athens premiere, General Papoulas wrote that the army could not stay any longer east of Sakarya and asked for replenishment to control the new front line and communications. By embarking on a raid on Ankara, the monarchist government hoped that the occupation of this stronghold of the Kemalists would enable it to demobilize several appeals and satisfy public opinion. On the contrary, the government was convinced that the army is returning for Sakarya, without reaching objective goals and asking for replenishment.

Although the headquarters of the Greek Expeditionary Army decided to withdraw in the morning of August 29 ( September 11 ), I and III corps received orders to depart only by the night of the same day and continued to fight all day. Having taken Dua Tepe, the Turks advanced to the railway line, trying to occupy Kara Dag. The Third Greek Corps gave the order to its Third Division to provide all of its forces (except for one regiment) to the VII Division, which took the brunt of the Turkish offensive.

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The soldiers of one of the companies of this Greek division, which numbered only 80 people, with the support of a machine-gun platoon, held the onslaught of the entire Turkish division for hours — the LVII infantry. Rote managed to repel the attack with grenades and bayonets, until 2/39 of the Evzons of the III division approached her for help. The fight continued without a break all night. At midnight, the Turks overturned one of the Greek battalions and fixed themselves on the slope of Karadag.

The situation for the Greek units here became critical, since the Turks were continuously sending reinforcements here, leaving only 4 divisions against the I Greek Corps. At 7 am on the last day of the battle, on August 29 ( September 11 ), the VII Greek division rushed into the attack on the Hills of the Twins and reached the top of the battle and was stopped at a distance of 600 meters from the top by Turkish artillery fire ^[4] . After that, the 1/37 Greek battalion was forced to leave the Sawtooth Hill just occupied by it north of Ezindley. The Turks tried to occupy the hill left by the Greeks, but the Greeks' counterattack forced them to leave the hill.

In its last attack, the 2/39 Greek regiment not only forced the Turks to retreat, but also captured 124 Turkish soldiers. At 11:30, the X Greek division entered the battle, but was soon stopped by Turkish artillery fire. At 17:30, the IX Greek division stepped into one of the bloodiest battles of the battle. Many companies remained without officers, they could not take the wounded out of the battlefield, because the orderlies could not approach them. It was only after dark that the survivors were brought out of the battlefield ^[4] . Greek military historiography notes that this time the “Turks did not pass,” and the victory remained with the Greek weapons. But "thousands of young Greek guys fell with glory in these treeless mountains and ravines", where "they left their bones silent witnesses of an unfulfilled dream that had raised New Greece" ^[4] .

At 20:45 the headquarters of the Greek Expeditionary Army gave the order to withdraw all three of its corps. The headquarters indicated 7 floating bridges for the crossing to the western coast of Sakarya. I Greek Corps left Chal Dag at 1:00 am on August 30 so silently that the Turks realized only at dawn that there were no Greeks in front of their positions. Also in perfect order and without any pressure from the Turks, on the night of August 30 to August 31, the entire Greek expeditionary army moved to the western bank of the Sakarya ^[4] .

Departing, the Greek army destroyed 134 km of the railway, which was envisaged when planning a raid on Ankara, in relation to the destruction of the Kemalist infrastructure. However, ironically, on the day when the Greek army moved to the western bank of the Sakarya, its engineering corps completed the restoration of the Beylik Köprру railway bridge, which in other circumstances would have allowed the offensive against Ankara, but was forced to start its destruction the next day.

A few days after the end of the battle, and addressing the Grand National Assembly , Kemal declared: “The great battle of Sakarya, which lasted from August 10 (23) to August 31 ( September 13 ) without a break 22 days and nights is one of the few examples of such battles the duration not only in the history of the new Turkey, but also in the pages of world history ” ^[4] . Naturally, the Turks considered the withdrawal of the Greek army from Ankara as their victory and the Grand National Assembly granted Kemal the title of Gazi and then, on September 21, the title of Marshal.

On the other hand, the fact that the Battle of Sakarya consisted of a continuous series of battles, in which the Greek army won, that the withdrawal of the Greek army was done in order, and the Turkish army was also exhausted and could not pursue the enemy, leaving the field for manipulation by greek government.

Despite the unfinished “raid on Ankara”, the Greek monarchist government also positioned itself as a winner, emphasizing that during the offensive of 1921 and the march on Ankara, it doubled the territory controlled by it, compared to the territory awarded to Greece by the World of Sevres.

Ernest Hemingway , who covered the war as a journalist and unequivocally sympathized with the Greeks, with an emphasis on the personnel policy of the monarchists, wrote:

“The Greeks were warriors of the first class and, probably, a few steps higher than the army of Kemal ... Evzons would have occupied Ankara and ended the war if they had not been betrayed. When Constantine came to power, all Greek officers in command posts were immediately demoted. Many of them got their shoulder straps for courage on the battlefield. They were great warriors and leaders. This did not prevent the party of Constantine from expelling them and replacing them with officers who had not heard a single shot. ”

^[11] .

Modern English historian Douglas Dakin , who in his work “The Unification of Greece (1770–1923)” refers to the Greek-Asian campaign of the Greek Army as the “Fourth Liberation War of Greece” ^[3] also writes that the Greek army was close to victory ^[3] .

The Greek historian Dimitris Fotiadis writes: “tactically we won, strategically we lost” ^[4] . Summarizing the battle, Fotiadis writes that the transition through the Salty Desert, the victorious battles at Tamburoglu, Sapanje, Chal Dag, Ardiz Dag, Kale Groto, Dua Tepe and other heights 700 km from the coast of the Aegean Sea are heroic pages in the history of the Greek army.

In the battle for Sakarya, the Greek army lost 736 officers killed and 217 wounded, 3,565 killed and 18,626 wounded soldiers killed, 376 missing. However, "all these victims were in vain." In conclusion, Fotiadis writes that the winner in the war is not the one who won a greater number of victories, but the one who won the last victory. And she, though a year later, went to Kemal.

Underestimating the success of the Kemalists under Sakarya, the allies on the Entente attempted to impose on the Turks as a peaceful settlement a somewhat modified version of the Peace of Sevres, but their proposal was rejected ^[12] . On the other hand, immediately after the battle, on October 13, 1921 , the Kemalists signed the Kars Treaty with the Soviet Republics, which contributed to strengthening their international position and deepening their military cooperation with Soviet Russia. No less significant was the Treaty of Ankara , signed just a week later, on October 20, 1921 , with France. France’s signature meant de facto recognition of the new government of Turkey and its official exit from the war ^[13] .

The positions of the Ankara government have been strengthened, both politically and financially and militarily. The command of the expeditionary Greek army was aware of the real situation and the letter commander A. Papoulas dated September 8 (21) informed the government that after nine years of continuous wars, the campaign must be completed, that is, only a political way out of the impasse ^[4] . By positioning themselves as winners, monarchists could not retreat. The government of monarchists with a “storm of indignation” refused the mediatory proposal of the Soviet envoy, in exchange for the recognition of Soviet Russia by Greece ^[5] .

The army continued to hold the front of “colossal length in relation to the disposable forces,” which, according to Alexandros Mazarakis , besides political mistakes, became the main cause of the ensuing catastrophe ^[5] . Government indecision in making political or military decisions led to the resignation of Papulas. “Unbalanced” was appointed to his place ^[4] G. Hadzianestis , who put forward the “crazy idea” to take Constantinople by two divisions, as blackmail of the allies and Kemal ^[4] . The transfer to Thrace of 20 thousand soldiers exposed the already not dense front line ^[3] .

When a year after the battle of Sakarya, the Kemalist army decided to launch an offensive, it managed without difficulty to interpose between the Greek divisions distant from one another, resulting in the indiscriminate retreat of the Greek army to the coast. The retreat and evacuation of the Greek army allowed the Kemalists to massacre in Smyrna and complete the genocide of the Greeks of Asia Minor.

The losses of the Greek army during the Asia Minor campaign (25-50 thousand killed according to different sources) are incommensurable with civilian casualties (600 thousand killed, 1,500,000 expelled from their ancient fatherly foci, which is why the event is referred to as the Asia Minor Catastrophe in Greece ^{[14 ]} )

Because of this, the term “Turkish Liberation War” is disputed not only by some Greek historians, but also by some modern Turkish historians. Attila Tuygan in the work “Genocide for the Mother-Motherland”, included in the collective book “Genocide in the East. From the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-State ”(Η γενοκτονία στην Ανατολή Από τννοΟ aq. as Professor T. Akcham notes , the liberation war "was not given against the aggressors, but against minorities."

For the Turks, the battle of Sakarya is a turning point in the formation of a new Turkey and is marked, among other things, by monuments throughout the country. The Greeks mark the battle as a turning point that broke the offensive outburst of the Greek army and became the prologue of the Asia Minor catastrophe , which broke off the Greek history of three thousand years ^[16] in Asia Minor. Because of this, the Greek monuments are not victorious and are only monuments of military prowess manifested by the Greek army at the Battle of Sakarya and “to the lost heroes whom Glory did not weave a wreath” ^[4] .