Intensional (from lat. Intentio - intensity, tension, effort) - the term of semantics , denoting the content of a concept , that is, the totality of conceivable signs denoted by a concept of an object or phenomenon. For example, the intension of the concept of Socrates includes all the properties that Socrates possesses: man, man, Greek, philosopher, etc. The intensional is contrasted with the extensional , that is, a multitude of objects that can be called a given linguistic unit .
Definition
The concept of intensional was introduced by the Austrian logician and philosopher R. Karnap to analyze the meaning of linguistic expressions. T. n. the method of intensions and extensions is a modification and further development of the semantic concept of the German mathematician and logician G. Frege .
The concept of intension arose from the need to revise the traditional categories of logic and linguistics, in the sense of the antinomy of the naming relationship. Such antinomies arise in some contexts when replacing an expression with an identity that is identical in meaning to it. For example, in the sentence “Peter believes that Kabul is the capital of Pakistan” the provision “Kabul is the capital of Pakistan” is not [for Peter] definitely false, as the concept of “Kabul” is not explicitly meaning the capital of a particular state (that is, Peter may not know that the capital of Pakistan is not Kabul, and that Kabul is the capital of not Pakistan). When replacing the concept of “Kabul” with the objectively identical “capital of Afghanistan”, the provision “the capital of Afghanistan is the capital of Pakistan” arises, which is false and contradicts the general statement.
The conceptual intension is determined not only through opposition to the extensionion, as an area of its objective reference , but also through opposition to the linguistic form of the concept. E.g. the words "brother" and "only begotten" (in the example, a clear mistake: the word "only begotten" means "the only child of the parents" and is incompatible with the word "brother"; the brother is native, consanguineous, unified, consolidated, named etc.) have a general intensional (possess one set of conceivable attributes of an object), but have a different linguistic form. Here, in opposition to the linguistic form, the intensional appears as its signified, signified.
Extensional and Intensional Contexts
The concepts of intensional and extensional are the basis for distinguishing the so-called. intensional and extensional contexts.
An intensional context is the set of statements in which the replacement of only intensionally equivalent expressions is permissible (that is, both intensional and extensional expressions are important to it). Extensional context refers to many statements in which only extensional equivalent language expressions are permissible (that is, only extensional expressions are important to it).
For example, the extension of the term “man” is a class of people. The predicates “creature capable of thinking” and “creature having limbs” will be extensional equivalent, since both can be denoted by the term “man”. The predicates “creature capable of thinking” and “creature capable of producing tools” are not only extensional, but also intensional equivalent, since both can be denoted by the term “man”, and both express the property that forms the term “man”.
Distinguishing between such contexts is important when defining a concept. For example, from the definition of “brothers in mind” as 1) “creatures capable of thinking” 2) “creatures with limbs” 3) “creatures capable of producing tools”, definition 2 should be deleted, since it is not necessary that the brothers reason can be humanoids.
Literature
- Linguistic Encyclopedic Dictionary. M .: Soviet Encyclopedia, 1989.
- Ivin A., Nikiforovich. A. Dictionary of logic. M. , 1998
- Kemerov V. Philosophical Encyclopedia. Panprint, 1998