ARA San Luis (S-32)

The “San Luis” was the second boat of this type built for the ARA . Her type " Salta " ( ARA Salta , S-31) was put into operation in February 1973 .

The order for the construction of the “San Luis” was issued on April 30, 1969 , and on June 16 of the same year it was placed at the Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft shipyard in Kiel , Germany . The term of construction was 36 months. Sections of the boat ( side number S-32) were made in Germany, and were assembled at the TANDANOR shipyard, near Buenos Aires . The assembled corps was launched on April 3, 1973 , baptized by the wife of the governor of the province of San Luis. (In ARA, it is customary to call submarines in honor of the provinces on S ).

On May 24, 1974, the submarine became part of the Command of the Submarine Forces ( COFS ), based on Mar del Plata , and on August 23 it was raised a naval flag.

After being added to the COFS, the boat went through all the stages of combat training, relying on the ships and aircraft of the ARA . On October 9, 1975 , taking full supply of fuel and supplies, the S-32 went into a 50-day autonomous voyage, with the task of patrolling designated areas of the South Atlantic, including the Falkland Islands zone. In particular, a photograph was taken of the shore and the launch of an attack on the ships and vessels in the zone. The overall goal of the trip was to check the combat capabilities of the boat.

At the end of 1978, disagreements over the status of the Picton Islands, Lennox and Isla Nueva in the Beagle Channel ( Tierra del Fuego ) led to a deterioration in Argentina’s relations with Chile . On December 22, 1978, Argentina launched Operation Sovereignty ( Spanish: Operación Soberanía ), a military occupation of the islands. The fleet, fulfilling the order of the executive power, sent a large force to the south ^[1] . S-32, along with the rest of the ships entered the conflict zone and took its designated position. When the clash seemed inevitable, the intervention of Pope John Paul II prevented hostilities. The boat returned to the base of Mar del Plata.

With the outbreak of hostilities in the South Atlantic, at the end of April 1982, San Luis and Salta were ordered to enter the blockade zone around the Falkland Islands, to observe and reconnoiter and attack the detected targets. Soon after the release, "Salta" reported on problems with the mechanisms - the noise of the boat increased, and the crew could not eliminate it. "San Luis" continued the campaign alone. Commanded the boat "Captain de Corvette" ^[2] Fernando Askoet ( Spanish: Capitan de Corbeta Fernando Azcueta ).

May 1, 1982

The initial position was assigned to him to the northeast of the islands. From intelligence data the British knew about the possible presence of the boat. On the morning of May 1, the HMS Brilliant and HMS Yarmouth frigates launched an anti-submarine search with the support of Sea King helicopters of the 826th squadron from the HMS Hermes helicopter carrier , the flight commander was Lieutenant Commander Hogg.

At 10:00 am Askueta, he said, found a large warship. He could not determine his class more precisely because of the haze, but he was sure that the ship was British and suggested that it was a destroyer. Having made a volley, he did not hear the explosions at the estimated time. Due to post-station maneuvering, he did not observe the results at the periscope either. With a delay against the settlement on the boat, one explosion was heard, but there were no signs of hitting the target. The commander concluded that both the torpedo firing computer and the torpedo guidance system were defective - one wire was cut off, the others clearly did not work. Having finished the evasion maneuver, Asquette put the boat on the ground and commanded silence in the boat.

On the British side, they found not only boats, but also torpedoes, and therefore continued the search in the previous mode. The frigates used the whistleblower gas in active mode, the helicopters - lowered passive gas and hydroacoustic buoys. The search continued continuously until dark, using interchangeable helicopter crews and refueling without landing in a hang mode. 2 torpedoes and 6 depth charges were dropped on possible contacts, to no avail. At night, only frigates continued their search.

In his report Askuta noted that he heard breaks, but they were too far away to be dangerous. He concluded that depth charges were not so much to destroy him as to make him go deep. What he did. Askueta never claimed that he reliably identified the target, or that he was confident in the results of the attack. But Argentine propaganda willingly picked up a reason for conjecture ^[3] . Most often it was claimed that the S-32 torpedoed the HMS Invincible anti- aircraft carrier , although at that time it was 180 miles to the north-west. Another "candidate" was HMS Exeter , a type 42 destroyer , although at that time he was in the West Indies and joined the squadron only on 21 May . Most likely, Askueta observed HMS Brilliant in the periscope, which is no less than a destroyer in size.

May 10-11, 1982

As a result of the loss of the cruiser " General Belgrano " on May 2, 1982 , the rest of the surface forces of Argentina were withdrawn to their waters. "San Luis" remained the only Argentine ship in the conflict zone.

On the night of May 10-11, the frigate HMS Alacrity , commander - Commander Craig ( eng. CJS Craig ) entered the Falklands Strait with the task of opening the coastal defenses and mine danger. Around midnight, he sank an unidentified vessel that did not respond to the signal by artillery fire ^[4] . After completing reconnaissance, Alacrity , paired with the waiting HMS Arrow, emerged from the strait through the northeast passage.

It is in this area that the S-32 was now located. According to the commander’s report, he found two ships, allegedly a destroyer, that were part of his patrol area. Using the data of hydroacoustics and manual guidance, he went on the attack and at 01:40 on May 11 he fired a single torpedo from a distance of 2.5 miles. The result of the attack was again unclear. According to the report, "both ships left the area at full speed." But it should be noted that there was no counterattack of anti-submarine forces.

Later, HMS Arrow picked up the anti-torpedo trap (simulator), which was towed at the junction. It turned out that it was damaged, but not by an explosion. Damage attributed to the touch of the ground. Later, given reports in the press, some experts began to argue that the damage was from a torpedo. However, this remains controversial. If it was a torpedo, then it did not explode again, and more importantly, it was not detected by acoustics.

“San Luis” continued patrolling until the order came (on the same day) to return to base. It is believed that

... at ARA decided that the propaganda value of the boat from further stay in the sea will not increase. ^[five]

The military value has not been mentioned. In reality, it consisted in a disproportionately large effort spent by the British in the early days on anti-submarine defense, and the tension associated with it. For example, on May 2, ships that came to the aid of the missile-damaged HMS Sheffield reported on submarine activity, although a post-war comparison of reports shows that there were no boats nearby ^[5] .

Summary

May 17, 1982 San Luis returned to Mar del Plata and began repairing torpedo tubes. The fighting ended earlier than she was ready for the next exit. The material damage from the action of the boat was zero. Despite this, it is considered the only Argentine ship that managed to break through the total blockade zone ( English Total Exclusion Zone, TEZ ) announced by the British. But here the classic “paradox of the submarine” manifests itself: if it hit the target, then it lost its secrecy, and if it remained undetected, was it there at all? For 2009, operational documents S-32 from that campaign remain inaccessible.

The reliability of open sources is questionable. So, although Askueta did not firmly declare that he had hit anyone, this did not prevent the Argentine propaganda from declaring one or the other ship torpedoed or even sunk. The British press, instead of approaching the reports critically, mostly followed this story ^[6] . When Invincible returned to base, his sailors were surprised to hear that they turned out to be sunk.

Another significant fact. After the change of government by the National Congress of Argentina , the participants of the conflict were awarded. The awards of three degrees were issued: the highest - for outstanding bravery (2 or 3 awarded); the second - for the difference in the battle (about 80 awarded); and badge for all involved. Fernando Askueta received a second-degree award with a modest wording: “From the National Congress - Fernando Askette, who fought under the Malvins” ^[7] .

Service "San Luis" lasted another 15 years. So, in 1990, she spent 59 days at sea without interruption, including 799 hours in a submerged position, and passed 6,253 miles ^[1] . In the same campaign participated in joint exercises with the new corvette " Parker ".

In 1994, she embarked on a modernization at the Manuel Domecq García shipyard, where, in particular, the electric motor and all 480 battery cells were replaced. However, for formal reasons, the repair was not completed, and the boat remained at the shipyard. By order of the Chief of General Staff No. 69/95 "C" of April 23, 1997, she was declared unfit for service and removed from the active structure, pending sale or liquidation. There were private initiatives to turn it into a museum of the Falklands (Argentines call Malvinas) war, but without result.

• ARA Santa Fe (S-21)

• Almost Total Exclusion ; in: Jon Guttman. Defiance at Sea . Cassell, London 1999 (Repr. 1995), pp. 170-181. ISBN 0-304-35085-0
• Duncan Anderson. The Falklands War 1982 . Essential Histories. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2002. ISBN 1-84176-422-1
• Diario La Nación: La guerra que no se vio (isp.)