Battle of Concepcion

Intending to put a decisive end to Mexican control of Texas, on October 13, 1835, the Texas army began a march on San Antonio de Bejar ^[1] . A few days earlier, the son-in-law of Mexican President Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, General Martin Perfecto de Kos, arrived in Bejar . He was to lead all Mexican forces in Texas ^[2] . On October 20, Texans, led by Stephen F. Austin , the first Texas (that is, the person who secured the right to settle in the Mexican lands of Texas ^{[comm. 1]} in exchange for bearing the obligation to recruit new English-speaking settlers ^{[comm. 2]} and bear for their responsibility) reached and began the siege of Bejar ^{[3] [4]} . The Mexicans decided to restrict entry and exit from Bejar so that the Texans could not receive information about their defensive measures. Despite their efforts, several people were able to leave their homes and join the Texans ^[5] .

On October 22, Austin promoted Bowie to colonel and assigned him the combined command of the 1st Battalion (Captain James Fannin ) ^{[6] [7]} . At dusk, the battalion went on a search to evaluate former Spanish missions around San Antonio as potential camps. After exploring the three missions, Bowie and Fannin chose as the most promising camp ^[8] . The remainder of the Texas army joined them on October 27th. In an effort to secretly approach Behar, Austin immediately sent Bowie and Fannin to find a good defensive position for an army night's rest ^[9] .

Bowie and Fannin divided their 90 soldiers into 4 companies under the command of captains , Robert Coleman, Michael Gochen, and Valentine Bennett ^{[9] [10]} . A squad of Texans set off along the northern road along the San Antonio River past the missions of and ^[9] . On the way, they came across a small Mexican reconnaissance group, who, after a short skirmish, retreated to Bejar ^[9] .

At a distance of about 2 miles from San Antonio de Bejar and 6 miles from the Texas camp in Espada, the Texas search party stopped at Concepcion Mission ^{[11] [12]} . Five hundred yards (460 m) west of the mission, the San Antonio River bends, forming a small ravine in the form of a horseshoe, about 100 yards (91 m) in diameter ^[12] . According to historian : “Trees obscured both sides of the riverbed, which was 6 feet lower than the surrounding plain” ^[9] . Instead of immediately returning to Austin, as required by order, Bowie and Fannin sent a courier asking Austin to go to Concepcion. The next day, an angry Austin wrote a decree on the betrayal of officers who disobeyed his order to a military court ^[9] .

The Texas intelligence group set up two camps. Fannin with 49 people went to the southern bend of the horseshoe, Bowie and the remaining detachment camped at the northern bend ^{[13] [9]} . Any Mexican detachment approaching from the north would immediately fall under the crossfire of both detachments ^[13] . The warlords placed pickets around the position and on the mission tower, from where an excellent view was opened ^[9] . As soon as the Texans sat down to dine over their camp, a Mexican core flew from one of Behar’s church towers ^[9] . Most Texas soldiers believed that the mission priest indicated their location to the Mexican army in this way ^[12] .

Hoping to neutralize the Texas detachment at Concepcion before the remaining Texas army forces arrived, Kos ordered Colonel launch an assault in the early hours of October 28th. At 6 a.m. Ugarteechea with 275 soldiers and two guns left Behar ^{[11] [14]} . However, heavy fog delayed their progress, and they reached Concepcion only at 7:30 - 8:00 in the morning ^[14] . A Mexican mounted reconnaissance group fired at the Texas picket of . However, Carnes managed to retreat and connect with his comrades, thereby upsetting the plans of the Mexicans. Alarmed by the exclamation of Carnes: “Guys, these scoundrels shot my horn for gunpowder!” ^[15] Texans rushed to seek refuge in the ravine, firing from behind the crest of the ravine and descending 6 feet (1.8 m) to the bottom of the ravine to reload guns ^[10] . All the remaining Texas sentries hastened to join the main detachment ^[12] . A Mexican bullet hit Pen Jarvis and he collapsed onto the river bank. However, he escaped with only a bruise ^{[14] [15]} , since the bullet only slipped along the knife blade.

The Texas position was surrounded by trees, thus giving the Mexican cavalry room to maneuver. 200 riders remained on the west bank of the river in the rear of the Texans to suppress any attempted escape ^[15] . Lt. Col. Jose Maria Mendoza led the Mexican infantry and artillery across the river to a position lower than the position of the Texans. In response, the Texans leveled their camp to provide better visibility and began to dig in to make it easier to shoot from the embankment. Random shooting from two sides lasted about two hours before the fog began to dissipate. At this time, 50-60 Mexican foot soldiers crossed the prairie to surround the Texans ^[14] . Noticing this progress, Bowie shouted: “Hold on to the cover, guys, and save the cartridges, we have no people to replace!” ^[14] . Three hundred yards (270 m) from Texas positions, the Mexican infantry stopped and formed a line with a gun in the middle. The Mexicans opened fire as soon as they reached the position of the Texans. Volleys of their ranks passed over the heads of the Texans ^[14] . Texan Noah Smithwick recalled: “Large and small buckshot flew through the branches of a hazel tree above our heads, raining ripe nuts on us, and I saw people gathering and eating nuts and not at all worried, as if these nuts were knocked down by the north wind” ^{[ 12]} . In his official report, Austin Bowie notes: “The shots from the Mexican side gave only fire from the shots, the shots from our side were less common, but they had a more deadly effect due to good aiming” ^[15] . The Mexican infantry was equipped with Brown Bess muskets, which hit a maximum of 70 yards (64 m) compared to Texas long-barreled rifles, whose effective firing range was 200 yards (180 m) ^[16] . Texans had little ammunition ^[12] , but plentiful Mexican ammunition was of poor quality. Several cases are known when Mexican musket bullets simply bounced off the Texas soldiers, causing them damage only in the form of bruises ^[12] .

When the Mexican officer ordered the attack on the southern bend of the horseshoe held by Fannin , Bowie sent a company to help him. Most Texans moved in their positions, hiding behind the walls of the ravine, but some rose from behind the shelter and rushed across the prairie ^[14] . One of such daredevils, was hit by a shotgun and died, a few hours after the battle ^{[17] [18]} .

As soon as the reinforcements sent by Bowie reached the southern part of the horseshoe, the Mexican infantry retreated, leaving the gun 100 yards (91 m) from the Texas position. The Texans immediately transferred the fire to the gunners ^{[17] [19]} . Having lost three wounded and killed, the gunners retreated, leaving guns ^[16] . The Mexican infantry launched three attacks, but all were repelled. As the Mexican Horns lost the retreat, the infantry moved back beyond the reach of the Texas rifles. The Mexican cavalry tried to pick up the wounded and return the guns. Noticing her approach, Bowie launched an attack on the plain ^{[17] [19]} . The Texans quickly grabbed the cannon and deployed it to the running Mexican soldiers. Kartechich struck down one of the mule drivers and his wagon with a charging box, without control, broke through the Mexican ranks ^[19] . The whole battle lasted only 30 minutes ^[17] .

Austin sought to connect with his army’s reconnaissance group on the morning of October 28, but the desertion of the group that had camped in the Espada mission and its pursuit delayed his departure. Lt. Col. William Bareth Travis with his cavalry company marched ahead of the main Texas forces. When they approached Concepcion, the Mexican army was still within sight ^[20] . A small group of Texas cavalry chased, but Mexican soldiers reached Behar without danger. ^[18]

Less than 30 minutes after the end of the battle, the rest of the Texas army arrived ^[17] . Austin considered that the Mexicans were demoralized after the attack, and wanted to immediately go to Bejar. Bowie and the other officers refused, believing that Behar was too heavily fortified ^[17] . The Texans searched the entire surrounding county for Mexican property, which they could abandon while retreating and found several charging boxes. Complaining that the Mexican gunpowder is “only slightly better than crushed coal,” the Texans emptied the charges, but retained the bullets ^[18] .

This evening, Austin allowed the local priest and Beharians to collect the bodies of Mexican soldiers killed in the battle. ^[21] Warr found that at least 14 Mexican soldiers were killed, 39 wounded, some of the wounded later died ^[21] . According to historian Timothy Todish, the number of Mexicans killed in this battle was about 60 people, while Stefan Hardin claims 76 dead Mexican soldiers ^{[10] [18]} . Only Andrews was the only dead Texan in the battle, and Jarvis was the only wounded ^[21] .

The battle, called by the historian J. R. Edmondson: “the first great clash of the Texas Revolution,” was the last Mexican offensive by Kos against the Texans ^{[22] [23]} . Barr attributes the Texans ' victory to “the abilities of leaders, a strong position and greater firepower” ^[21] . The Mexican cavalry was unable to operate effectively on the overgrown, crossed by rivers, and the weapons of the Mexican infantry had a lower fire range than the weapons of the Texans ^[21] . Although Barr admits that "the battle gave lessons ... to Mexican courage and the importance of a good defensive position" ^[24] . Hardin believes that “Concepcion’s relative ease of victory inspired the Texans to trust their long-barreled rifles and contempt for the enemy” ^[25] . A soldier who later served under Fannin’s command complained that “ Fannin ’s former experience of fighting the Mexicans (under Concepcion) made him neglect the precautions that were required,” which contributed to his defeat at the Battle of Coleto in March 1836. ^[24]

• Barr, Alwyn. Texans in Revolt: the Battle for San Antonio, 1835. - Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990. - ISBN 0-292-77042-1 .
• Edmondson, JR The Alamo Story-From History to Current Conflicts. - Plano, TX: Republic of Texas Press, 2000. - ISBN 1-55622-678-0 .
• Hardin, SL Texian Iliad - A Military History of the Texas Revolution. - Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1994 .-- ISBN 0-292-73086-1 .
• Manchaca, Martha. Recovering History, Constructing Race: The Indian, Black, and White Roots of Mexican Americans . - Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2001 .-- ISBN 978-0-292-75254-2 .
• Todish, Timothy J .; Todish, Terry; Spring, Ted. Alamo Sourcebook, 1836: A Comprehensive Guide to the Battle of the Alamo and the Texas Revolution. - Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 1998 .-- ISBN 978-1-57168-152-2 .