Able Archer 83

To understand how close the world was to nuclear war, it is necessary to consider a series of events prior to the exercises.

Operation RYAN

In May 1981, a closed meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee with high-ranking KGB officers took place. The meeting, which was also attended by Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev and KGB Chairman Yu. V. Andropov , it was announced that the United States was preparing a nuclear attack on the USSR. To develop means of counteracting the attack, Andropov announced the beginning of the operation of the NJ ( R- nuclear and nuclear attack) by the KGB and GRU ^{[note 1]} .

Operation Ryan became the largest and most complex intelligence gathering operation in Soviet history. Despite the name, the main task of the RYAN operation was to identify the intention to use nuclear weapons and only then to find means to prevent the latter. Until now, the means of carrying out the operation of Ryan are unknown. The main source of information is Oleg Gordievsky , the most senior KGB officer who secretly worked for the UK ^{[11] [12]} .

CIA official historian Benjamin B. Fischer identified several specific events that led to the operation of Ryan. The first on the list is NATO’s “Double Decision” (adopted December 12, 1979) on deploying missiles in Western Europe in response to the deployment of the USSR RSD-10 (SS-20) missiles, which began in 1976. The second - psychological operations (abbreviated PSYOP ).

West 81

The largest strategic exercises in the history of the Soviet Armed Forces . The scale of the resources involved is comparable to the offensive operations of the times of World War II . Passed from September 4 to September 12, 1981.

Shield 82

Strategic exercises of the army and navy of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. They practiced a full-scale nuclear war with the NATO bloc. Passed from June 14 to September 30, 1982.

Psychological Operations

The closest in meaning to the Russian analogue of the term is the expression "measures of information-psychological impact." PSYOP against the USSR began immediately after Reagan was elected president of the United States .

Korean Air 007 Flight

Largely due to the aggressive operations of PSYOP , a tragedy occurred with a South Korean airliner following the Korean Air 007 (KAL 007) flight on September 1, 1983 . For many hours the plane was in Soviet airspace outside the corridor provided by civil aviation . As a result, he was shot down by a Soviet fighter south of Sakhalin , seriously complicating relations between the USSR and the Western world.

Arms Race

On March 23, 1983, Reagan presented a strategic defense initiative plan, subsequently nicknamed by both critics and the media as "Star Wars." Despite the fact that Reagan viewed the plan as a defense system against the outbreak of nuclear war, Soviet leaders clearly perceived it as an attempt to move away from nuclear parity and defuse international tension , as well as an attempt to militarize outer space . Yu. V. Andropov , who became the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee after the death of L. I. Brezhnev in November 1982 , harshly criticized Reagan’s initiative “to develop new plans for how to start a nuclear war so as to win it” ^[13] .

Despite the hysteria surrounding the Star Wars program, the most worrying thing about the Soviet government was the Pershing-2 American medium-range ballistic missiles , deployed in Western Europe since November 1983 , that is, not placed at the beginning of the exercises. These missiles should be installed in response to Soviet medium-range SS-20 Pioneer missiles deployed on the western border of the USSR and representing the greatest threat to European NATO countries ^[14] . The Pershings were able to destroy such protected targets as silo launchers and buried command bunkers . Missiles could be prepared and launched within minutes, and their homing system was ideally suited for launching the first strike. Moreover, missiles launched from West Germany reached their targets on the territory of the European part of the USSR only six minutes after their launch. The Soviet Union had only two options to withstand these missiles: an urgent deployment on combat alert of the Perimeter system , with the symbolic name for NATO classification “Dead Hand” ( English Dead Hand - commissioned in 1985) and preventive war . According to CIA historian Benjamin Fisher, it was precisely the danger of the Pershings who unexpectedly launched the missile strike that was the immediate reason for the start of the RYAN operation: to reveal the US decision to start a nuclear war and, presumably, to forestall it ^{[11] [12] [15]} .

Nuclear Attack Warning False

September 26, 1983, put on combat alert in 1982, the satellite echelon of the Soviet first-generation missile attack warning system Oko (US-K) issued a message about an attack by the United States. But radar observation could not confirm this, since the "missiles" were still too far away. The alarm was recognized as a false decision of the operational duty lieutenant colonel S. E. Petrov ^[16] .

A subsequent investigation found that the cause of the alarm was the exposure of satellite sensors to sunlight reflected from high-altitude clouds. Thus, the false operation of the space echelon of the missile attack warning system revealed its insufficient effectiveness in the conditions of expectation of a nuclear war. There was no certainty that the next flare of sensors was not an attack. Only in 1987, it was possible to rid the system of the possibility of such false alarms by increasing the space group of SPRN from four to nine spacecraft.

Thus, on November 2, 1983 , when, with the start of the exercises, the Soviet intelligence agencies made every effort to identify the intention to prepare a nuclear attack, NATO began working on the latter. The exercises, codenamed "Experienced Archer" ( Eng. Able Archer ), involved a number of member countries of the Alliance. NATO operations on command, control and communications with troops during the nuclear war were worked out (abbreviated C³ from the English name Command, Control, and Communications ). Based on the events preceding the exercises and their realism, some Soviet leaders, in full accordance with the Soviet military doctrine , took Able Archer seriously as a cover for preparing an attack ^{[4] [17]} . Indeed, in a telegram to the KGB and GRU residency on February 17, a similar scenario is described as follows:

Since the state of “Orange Alarm” ^{[note 2] was} introduced in the strictest secrecy (under the pretext of maneuvers, training, etc.) and in the shortest possible time and without publicity of operational plans, it follows with a high degree of probability that a combat alarm was announced for preparation unexpected RYAN in peacetime ^[18] .

On February 17, 1983, the KGB operations department ordered agents to monitor several potential indicators for preparing a nuclear attack. It was instructed to take under the supervision of “ personnel military personnel involved in the preparation and execution of the RSE, as well as a group of people, including service and technical personnel ... who work in control centers associated with the adoption and execution of the decision to conduct the RSE; personnel in communication centers that ensure the operation of facilities and their interaction ” ^[19] .

Since the use of nuclear weapons was being practiced during the Able Archer 83 , the personnel mentioned in the telegram were called up for training. It was noteworthy that the Prime Minister of Great Britain Margaret Thatcher and the Federal Chancellor of West Germany Helmut Kohl took part (even if not of their own free will) in nuclear exercises. US President Ronald Reagan, Vice President George W. Bush (Senior) and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger ( English Caspar Weinberger ) were also the protagonists of the exercises. Robert McFarlane , who took over as president’s security adviser just two weeks before the exercise, anticipating serious international problems, suggested limiting their scope. A number of civilian and military specialists were removed from the exercises, but even on a reduced scale, the exercises were shocked by their realism ^[20] .

Another indicator that Soviet analysts noted was an increase in the number of encrypted messages between the UK and the USA. The Soviet intelligence agencies were informed that “the so-called nuclear consultations in NATO are probably one of the stages of immediate preparations by the enemy of the RYAN” ^[21] . For Soviet analysts, the explosive increase in the number of talks between the United States and Great Britain a month before the start of the Able Archer meant that it could be consultations on the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, the recorded increase in the number of communications was related to the diplomatic efforts undertaken by the Queen of Great Britain Elizabeth II in connection with the American invasion of Grenada on October 25, 1983 (the British crown is the sovereign of Grenada ) ^[22] .

The next shocking fact reported to the First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR by agents was the ciphers and communications used by NATO during the exercises. In accordance with the instructions of Moscow dated February 17, 1983:

It is most important to monitor the functioning of communication networks and systems, because through them the opposing side transmits information about its intentions, and mainly about intentions to use nuclear weapons and the practical implementation of the plan. In addition, a change in communication methods and encryption tools in itself can speak of the state of preparation for RYAN ^[23] .

Intelligence agencies of the USSR found that, in support of their suspicions, NATO actually switched to using unique, previously never used message encryption codes, much more complex than in previous exercises, which may have been an indication of an imminent nuclear attack ^{[24 ]} .

During Able Archer 83 , NATO forces practiced a sequential transfer of troops to a state of alert from DEFCON 5 (peacetime) to DEFCON 1 (state of war). Since each degree of combat readiness was worked out sequentially, KGB informants perceived them as a real combat alert. According to intelligence information, the NATO military doctrine read: “ Operational readiness No. 1 is announced when there are obvious prerequisites for a military operation. When it is precisely established that war is inevitable and can begin at any moment ” ^[25] .

Upon learning that American nuclear forces were on alert for a hypothetical nuclear attack, on November 8 or 9 (Oleg Gordievsky could not remember the exact date) Moscow sent its residents an urgent encryption, in which they demanded to identify further US plans for a preventive nuclear strike. The degree of increased combat readiness was interpreted as a 7-10-day readiness for the use of nuclear weapons ^[24] . These days were a peak of tension.

According to the assumption of Western historians, the leadership of the Soviet Union believed that the only chance to withstand the blow of NATO was to get ahead of it. In this regard, the CIA noted increased activity in the Baltic military district , Czechoslovakia , and in the places where the nuclear carrier aircraft are based in the NDP and the GDR: “ all the troops were raised on alert, nuclear weapons storage facilities were opened ” ^{[10] [26]} . Former CIA analyst Peter Vincent Pry went further in his reasoning, suggesting that the airborne alert was only the tip of the iceberg. He suggested that, in accordance with Soviet military doctrine and military history, intercontinental ballistic missiles were also put on hold for one minute ^[27] .

Soviet leaders calmed down only after the end of the Able Archer exercises on November 11. After a careful study of the reaction of the USSR to Able Archer 83 , which became known from a double agent of the KGB and the British secret intelligence service (MI-6) Oleg Gordievsky, President Reagan said:

I can’t understand how they could believe such a thing - you need to think carefully about it ^[28] .

The double agent Oleg Gordievsky was a resident of the KGB in London and is the only publicly available source of information about the Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83 . Oleg Kalugin and Yuri Shvets , who were also KGB officers in 1983, published materials about Operation RYAN , but did not mention Able Archer 83 ^[29] .

Gordievsky and other residents of the Warsaw Treaty intelligence agencies were very skeptical that NATO was preparing a nuclear attack. Nevertheless, the agents were ordered to report on observations, not on their own conclusions, and it was this flaw in Soviet intelligence (“you only watch there, and I will draw conclusions”) and led to a misunderstanding of the situation and fear of nuclear aggression with sides of the USA ^[30] .

Not a single Soviet politician has lifted the veil of secrecy over the Able Archer 83 . Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Akhromeev , who was head of the General Staff at that time, told Don Oberndorfer , a Cold War historian, that he had never heard anything about Able Archer 83 . The absence of any official reaction of the USSR to the teachings prompted many historians to assume that the Able Archer 83 was not seen as a direct threat from the United States ^[31] .

In May 1984, a CIA analyst from the USSR department, Fritz W. Ermarth, wrote the report “Results of the Recent Military-Political Activity of the USSR”, in which it was written:

We have every reason to believe that the actions of the Soviet leaders and their perception of the situation are not based on a genuine fear of an inevitable conflict with the United States ^[7] .

Robert Gates , who was the CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence for the CIA in 1983, who later became the Director of Central Intelligence of the United States , published his thoughts in his book:

The information about the strange and badly distorted sentiments of the Soviet leaders at that time, which appeared with the collapse of the USSR , makes me think that it is very likely - taking into account all the events of 1983 - that they really believed that an attack by NATO was at least possible, and took a number measures to increase combat readiness, except perhaps universal mobilization . Remembering the situation of those days, looking at the analysis of events, and now the documents, I do not think that the Soviets sounded a false alarm. Maybe they did not believe that an attack by NATO in November 1983 was inevitable - but they seemed to believe that the situation was very dangerous. And the American intelligence services were not able to assess the real degree of their concern ^{[7] [32]} .

Original text

Information about the peculiar and remarkably skewed frame of mind of the Soviet leaders during those times that has emerged since the collapse of the Soviet Union makes me think there is a good chance - with all of the other events in 1983 - that they really felt a NATO attack was at least possible and that they took a number of measures to enhance their military readiness short of mobilization. After going through the experience at the time, then through the postmortems, and now through the documents, I don't think the Soviets were crying wolf. They may not have believed a NATO attack was imminent in November 1983, but they did seem to believe that the situation was very dangerous. And US intelligence had failed to grasp the true extent of their anxiety ^[33] .

Historians talk about the still secrecy report provided by Nina Stewart for the US Department of State , which, in support of Gates’s findings, says the CIA was inconsistent and further analysis of the behavior of the Soviet military-political leadership actually points to real concerns about the possibility of aggression by the United States ^[34] . Some historians, including Beth B. Fischer in her book The Reagan Reversal , highlight Able Archer 83 as one of the most important reasons that prompted President Reagan to move from a policy of confrontation to a policy of rapprochement. Most other historians, however, believe that Reagan first sought to increase the defense potential of the United States, then to speak with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. Statements by Reagan and his entourage shed important light on the existing fear of nuclear war and its consequences. On October 10, 1983, just a month before Able Archer 83 , President Reagan watched the next day television film about the city of Lorenz, Kansas , destroyed by a nuclear bomb. In his diary, the president wrote that the film “brought me into a deplorable state” ^[35] .

Later in October, Reagan was persuaded to take part in a Pentagon briefing on nuclear war. During the first half of his presidency, he refused to participate in such meetings, considering it inappropriate to rehearse a nuclear apocalypse. Administration officials believe this meeting was a “real punishment” for Reagan. Weinberger recalls: “ [Reagan] deeply disgusted the very idea of ​​using nuclear weapons ... These exercises clearly showed everyone what fantastically scary events would accompany such a scenario .” Later, Reagan himself described the meeting as follows: “ The meeting with Casper Weinberger and General Wessay in the White House situation room on our action plan in case of a nuclear attack acted very sobering ” ^{[35] [36]} .

These two short visions of nuclear war prepared Reagan for a clear understanding of the situation with Able Archer 83 and its possible consequences in case of escalation. After receiving intelligence from various sources, including Gordievsky, it became apparent that Soviet leaders were putting troops on alert. Although American officials were seriously concerned about such serious retaliatory preparations for a nuclear conflict, they refused to believe that an attack by the Soviet Union was entirely possible. US Secretary of State George Schulz said that “ it was incredible, at least for us, ” that the Russians really believed in a probable American strike ^[37] . However, Reagan did not share the confidence of his secretary that sober heads would prevail in the Soviet leadership:

We had many plans for a likely response to a nuclear attack. However, the events would take place so quickly that I strongly doubt the possibility of any planning or analysis in such a crisis situation ... Six minutes to make a decision - how to respond to the mark on the radar screen and launch Armageddon or not! Can anyone reason soberly at such a moment? ^[38]

According to Mac Farlein, the president “with genuine anxiety” perceived the disbelief that conventional NATO exercises could lead to an armed attack. According to him, the still-classified retrospective analysis of 1990 shows that the president was right, reacting with much more concern than some reckless employees of his administration. For the Politburo Andropov, who initiated the Ryan operation, it seemed “ that the United States is preparing ... a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union ” ^{[34] [39] [40]} . In his memoirs, Reagan, who did not mention Able Archer 83 , since then he did not consider it possible to publish classified information, writes about his condition in 1983:

Three years led me to an amazing conclusion about the Russians.

Many individuals at the top of the Soviet hierarchy sincerely feared America and Americans. Perhaps this should not have surprised me, but nonetheless surprised me ...

During my first term in Washington, many in our administration were convinced that the Russians no worse understand us than the absurdity of the assumption that the United States could deal the first blow to them. But the more I talked with the Soviet leaders, as well as the heads of other states that knew them well, the more I began to understand that Soviet officials perceive us not only as a political rival, but also as a potential aggressor ready to use nuclear weapons in preventive hit ...

Well, in this case, I even more wanted to be in the same room alone with the Soviet leader and try to convince him that we were not plotting against the Soviet Union and that the Russians did not need to be afraid of us ^[41] .

Original text

Three years had taught me something surprising about the Russians: Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans. Perhaps that shouldn't have surprised me, but it did. [...]

During my first three years in Washington, I think many of us in the administration took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them. But the more experience I had with Soviet leaders and [those] who knew them, the more I began to realize that many Soviet officials fared us not only as adversaries, but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike [ ...]

Well, if that was the case, I was even more anxious to get a top leader in a room alone and try to convince him we had no designs on the Soviet Union and the Russians had nothing to fear from us ^[42] .

The exercises and the events around them formed the basis of the plot of the German television series Germany-83 .

Sources

Footnotes

• “Operation RYAN, Able Archer 83, and Miscalculation: The War Scare of 1983” by Nathan B. Jones.
• "Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities" , a declassified CIA publication from October 1984 that describes Soviet fears of a US attack.
• Did East German Spies Prevent A Nuclear War? by Vojtech Mastny.
• NATO's "Able Archer 83" Exercise and the 1983 Soviet War Scare
• CNN Cold War - Spotlight: War games
• NATO First Strike Doctrine - The NATO nuclear policy at the time of Able Archer
• The Straight Dope: Operation Able Archer: Were the United States and the Soviet Union on the brink of nuclear war?
• Rhodes, Richard (2007). Arsenals of Folly . Knopf (C-SPAN2 / BookTV segment )
• 1983: The Brink of Apocalypse - Channel 4, January 5, 2008
• Peter Scoblic, The US versus Them . 2008
• Alexander Berezin. Nuclear war of prejudice . The United States declassified the scenario of the current apocalyptic conflict (neopr.) . Lenta.ru (November 7, 2015) . Date of treatment November 7, 2015. Archived on November 7, 2015.