Sicilian expedition

Western politics of Pericles

Athens, by the middle of the 5th century BC e. Having achieved hegemony in the Aegean basin, even under Pericles they began to spread their influence over Great Greece - the traditional sphere of influence of Corinth. The first foreign policy action of Pericles as the sole ruler of Athens was the founding of the Panellian colony of Fury in Southern Italy ^[1] . This issue was discussed during the political struggle of Pericles and Thucydides . Thucydides wanted the colony to actually become pan-Hellenic, without the prevalence of any policy, and Pericles wanted to strengthen the Athenian influence in the Furies ^[2] .

The Western policy of Pericles was aimed at strengthening the position of Athens in Sicily and in southern Italy. In the 1950s, the Athenians made an alliance with Egesta , then with Regius , the Leontins , possibly Metapont ^[3] and Naples in Campania . Having expelled Thucydides, Pericles took control of the “Fury project”. Furies were founded, most likely, in 443 BC. e., but due to the predominance of the Dorian population, very soon got out of Athenian control, an internal political struggle began in them ^[4] . There is an assumption that in the disruption of the plans of Pericles, Thucydides, expelled from Athens and possibly arrived in Furies, played a role ^[5] .

The Western policy of Pericles actually contradicted the Thirty Years' Peace of 446 BC. e. Athens began to intervene in the affairs of the Spartan- Corinthian sphere of influence. This caused discontent primarily of the Corinthians, whose interests were offended by the Athenian competition ^[6] .

First Sicilian Expedition

In Sicily, the struggle between Selinunte and Egesta , as well as between Syracuse and the Chalkidian colonies, primarily the Leontins, did not stop. Syracusan was supported by all the Dorian cities except Kamarina , who were at enmity with Gela . Of the Italian cities of Lokra, Episephyric supported the Syracusans, and Regius supported the Leontins ^[7] . The reason for the intervention was the appeal to the Athenians of the inhabitants of Leontin, who did not have sufficient strength to confront the Syracusans, who blocked them from land and sea ^{[8] [9]} .

The Athenians decided to send help, under the pretext of a tribal relationship with the Ionians Leontin, but "in fact, wanting to prevent the delivery of bread from Sicily to the Peloponnese, and also to preliminarily try to subordinate Sicily to itself" ^[10] .

To start in September 427 BC. e. a squadron of twenty ships was sent westward under the command of Lacheth and Haread. Using Regions as a base, they replenished their forces with another twenty ships of the Regis and other Halkidians, and at the end of the year launched military operations ^[11] . For several years, Athenian strategists fought, not having achieved, however, decisive success. The strategists Eurymedon and Sophocles, who commanded additional forces directed to Sicily, lingered off the coast of the Peloponnese , helping Demosthenes and Cleon in the capture of Pylos and Sphakteria . They arrived in Sicily only at the end of the campaign.

Together with the available Athenian and Allied ships, the combined fleet amounted to an impressive force of 80 triremes ^[12] . With these forces, one could try to turn the tide of the war, however, the Athenians' intentions began to alarm not only the enemies, but also the allies, who were afraid that after the victory they would turn into Athenian subjects ^[13] , so in the summer of 424 BC. e. representatives of Sicilian cities gathered for a congress in Gela , where they concluded a common peace, which deprived the Athenians of a reason to continue the intervention ^[14] .

Athenian strategists agreed with the decision of their allies, for which, upon returning to the mother country, Pythodor and Sophocles were sentenced to exile, and Eurymedon was fined. They were “accused of having the opportunity to conquer Sicily, they left there because of bribery” ^[15] .

Alcibiades

The active political activity of Alcibiades began in 420 BC. e. He made a decisive opponent of Nikiev of the world with Sparta and a supporter of the resumption of hostilities . At the same time, he was guided by personal reasons. Alcibiades was unhappy that the Spartans did not negotiate through him, although he was a Spartan proxen , but through Nikia ^{[16] [17]} . Thus began the political struggle of Alcibiades and Nikias. Nicius was a supporter of peace with Sparta, Alcibiades - a supporter of war. Alcibiades was envious of Nikias and his authority.

In the same year he was elected a strategist and was reelected for this position for five consecutive years ^[18] . While in this position, in the first year of his strategy he was able to drastically change the foreign policy of Athens ^[19] . Formerly a previously popular tendency towards peaceful relations with Sparta, he preferred enmity with her. To do this, he began to look for allies in the Peloponnese. He managed to conclude an alliance with Argos , the eternal enemy of Sparta ^[17] . Then two more former Spartan allies, Mantinea and Elis, joined this alliance.

The creation of this coalition was the first major diplomatic success of Alcibiades ^[20] . The union allowed Athens to create a bridgehead in the Peloponnese and subjugate other cities to its influence ^[20] . At the same time, Nikiev, the world was still in force, and the situation was ambiguous. To clarify the situation, the Spartans sent ambassadors to Athens. However, Alcibiades discredited the ambassadors before the popular assembly and frustrated their mission. Nichy with great difficulty dissuaded the Spartans from the immediate severance of the peace treaty ^[17] .

In 419 BC e. At the initiative of Alcibiades, the Athenians accused the Spartans of violating the conditions of the world and declared them aggressors ^[21] , although in reality it was the other way around ^[22] . In 418 BC e. coalition troops (Argos, Mantinea, Arkady , Athens) were utterly defeated at the battle of Mantineus ; in the cities of the Peloponnese, supporters of an alliance with Sparta triumphed, and an oligarchy established. The democratic alliance broke up, and most of its members rejoined the Peloponnesian Union.

The confrontation between Nikias and Alcibiades led to the last ostracism in Athenian history. Ostracophoria was initiated by the demagogue Hyperbole ^[23] . Both Nichy and Alcibiades reached an influential position in the polis that might have seemed dangerous to the people ^[24] . According to the plan of Hyperbole, the Athenians were to expel either Alcibiades or Nikias. However, they “conspired and, having united the forces of their supporters, turned ostracism against Hyperbole himself” ^[23] . It was this outcome that had a decisive influence on ending the practice of ostracism. The exact date of ostracophoria is unknown. From the biographies of Plutarch, one can learn that this ostracophore occurred between the battle of Mantineus (418 BC) and the beginning of the Sicilian expedition (415 BC). That is, ostracophoria occurred in the spring of 417, 416 or 415 BC. e. The most popular in historiography was the date 417 BC. e. based on data from the historical work of Theopomp ^[25] . Thucydides mentions the ostracism of Hyperbole, talking about his murder in 411 BC. e. ^[26] The very fact of the collusion of Nikias and Alcibiades is questioned by modern historians. Supporters of Nikia and Alcibiades, even united, could not influence the outcome of the vote due to their small numbers (this would give a total of only 100-150 votes) ^[27] . Thus, some kind of event was to happen, prompting the majority of the Athenians to vote for the ostracism of Hyperbole.

In the winter of 416/415 BC e. ambassadors from the Sicilian city of Egesta arrived in Athens. They requested military help from the Athenians ^[28] . The Athenians reacted positively to this proposal and sent ambassadors to Sicily. In February or March ^{[29] the} Athenian embassy returned to Athens. Soon the National Assembly took place. At it, it was decided to send three autocratic strategists to Sicily: Alcibiades, Nicias and Lamach ^[30] . Alcibiades was the most determined supporter of the Sicilian expedition ^[31] . Nichy, on the contrary, considered the expedition “a difficult matter” and persuaded the Athenians to abandon this idea ^[32] . However, at this meeting Nikiy did not oppose the decision to appoint him a strategist on an expedition that he considered to be doomed to failure beforehand ^[33] . Only five days later, at the next meeting, Nikiy criticized the impending military expedition. As a result, the Athenians decided to further increase their expeditionary forces ^[34] . The historian I.E. Surikov suggests that during these five days an ostracophoria occurred between one national assembly and another ^[35] . At the first meeting, both Alcibiades and Nicias seemed to show that they have the same position on the Sicilian expedition. The mass of the demos was confused because they did not understand who to vote against. Previously, if they voted for Alcibiades, then for the expedition to Sicily, and if for Nikia, then against the expedition. But now ostracism was useless, and as a result, the Athenians expelled the initiator of this ostracophore of Hyperbole ^[36] .

A few days before sailing in Athens, an incident shocked everyone. At night, some attackers mutilated the hermes - the revered images of the god Hermes , who stood on the city streets. The investigation began. At first, rumors spread that the Corinthians did this, wanting to delay or frustrate the expedition. Some saw this as an unkind omen, but most Athenians saw this as an “ordinary drunken trick of promiscuous youths.” Political opponents of Alcibiades accused him and his hetery of mutilating the Germans. A certain Androclus brought several slaves and meteks who allegedly saw that Alcibiades and his friends mutilated herms. They said that Alcibiades also committed another sacrilege: he and his friends depicted in their drinking bouts a sacred religious ritual - the Eleusinian Mysteries . Alcibiades demanded an immediate trial, hoping to refute all charges. However, his opponents, fearing the presence of a loyal fleet, declared that it would be better to postpone the matter until the end of the war in Sicily ^[37] .

Athenians

Sent during the first expedition to Sicily, the fleet returned to Athens with 12 thousand people in 60 triremes, each of which 200 people. It is possible that not all ships that arrived in 424 BC. e., remained by 415 BC ^[38] . Nichy, realizing the difficulty of conquering Sicily, proposed to collect 100 triremes and heavy infantry from at least 5 thousand hoplites from the Athenians and allies. He also insisted on recruiting detachments of slingers, Athenian and Cretan archers ^[39] .

As for the real number of soldiers and built ships, the certificate of Thucydides is accepted, which counted such number of ships: 134 triremes, 2 ships from Rhodes, 100 from Attica, 60 high-speed, and the remaining 74 are intended for transport. There were only 5100 hoplites, of which 750 were Achaeans and Mantines , who were the best infantry units in the army, and to which another 700 lightly armed units had to be added; there were 480 archers, of which 80 were Cretans, 700 slingers, and a ship carrying 30 horsemen. In addition, 25,000 rowers and sailors also participated in the expedition ^[39] .

Considering how much the Athenians spent on maintaining the army (about 4.5-5 thousand Attic talents in total ^[40] ), we can say that this army was a significant force.

Syracusans

Sicilian cities could provide many horses, and these same cities, unlike Athens, could provide their horses with wheat that was not bought in distant lands, but grown on their own land. However, despite the fact that the Sicilians had a stronger cavalry compared to the Thessalian and Theban, the infantry was weaker. The Athenian soldiers were therefore not only stronger, but also with great experience thanks to the Peloponnesian war. Unfortunately, the ancient historians, including Thucydides, are not given the number of units present in the armies of the Sicilians. In order to give a meaningful reason for the lack of this information, especially from Thucydides, it was suggested that he simply did not want to talk about the army under the command of Germocrat, thus trying to mitigate the burden of responsibility of the Syracuse military commander for tactical errors, since this same the commander was repeatedly praised by the Athenian historian ^[41] .

Alcibiades, Nikias, and Lamach sailed to Sicily in one hundred and forty triremes ^[42] . Arriving in Italy, the Athenians took Regius . Then they crossed to Sicily and took the Katana ^[43] . On this, the successful actions of Alcibiades ended. The state ship Salaminia arrived from Athens to call for trial. He sailed with his Salaminia from Sicily, supposedly to Athens. However, in the Furies, Alcibiades and his friends landed and hid ^[44] . People with “Salamis” after an unsuccessful search returned to Athens ^[45] . There Alcibiades was sentenced to death in absentia, and his property was confiscated. Upon learning of this, Alcibiades exclaimed: “And I will prove to them that I am still alive!” ^[46] .

After the departure of Alcibiades, Nicius, according to Plutarch, actually became commander in chief. Lamah was subordinate to the more influential Nikias. Sailing along the coast of Sicily, the Athenians arrived in Gimera , but they were not accepted there, and they sailed on. They managed to capture the city of Hikkara , and then Nikiy arrived in Katana and tried to capture the small city of Gela Ghibla , but he failed ^{[47] [48]} .

At the end of 415 BC. e. the Athenians began to prepare for an attack on Syracuse. The Syracusans, noticing the indecision of the Athenians, were imbued with neglect and began to plan a campaign on the Katana, where the Athenian army stood. Nicius decided to lure the Syracuse army away from the city, while the Athenians on ships would sail to Syracuse and there they would occupy convenient positions for attacking the city. He sent a messenger to the Syracusans, whom he ordered to inform that the supporters of the Syracusans in Katana were ready to betray the city as soon as the Syracusans approached the city ^[49] . The Syracusans marched to Katana, and the Athenians boarded the ships and, landing near Syracuse, set up a camp in a convenient place. The next day, when the Syracusans returned from Katana and lined up in battle order near the walls of the city, Nicias led the Athenians on the offensive. In battle, the Syracusans were defeated and retreated. ^[50] Nicius did not take advantage of his victory and a few days later sailed to Naxos for winter apartments ^[51] .

In winter and spring, 414 BC. e. the Syracusans and the Athenians sought allies. The Athenians managed to form an alliance with several Sicilian cities, and the Syracusans sent ambassadors for help to Corinth and Sparta ^[52] . In Sparta, Alcibiades advised sending an army to Sicily ^{[53] [54]} . The Spartans agreed and sent a small detachment under the command of Gilippos to Syracuse ^[55] .

In the summer of 414 BC e. the Athenians approached Syracuse and besieged the city. Niceus occupied Epipola and defeated the Syracuse army ^[56] . He then ordered the construction of siege walls around Syracuse. Most of the wall was built in June ^{[57] [58]} . The Syracusans began to build a counter wall to prevent the Athenians from building their wall ^[59] . In one of the skirmishes, Lamah died ^{[60] [61]} .

By the end of the year, the Syracuse were ready to surrender, but after the arrival of Gilippos, the Syracusans perked up. Ему удалось пройти в город, так как афиняне не достроили стену. При первой вылазке сиракузяне были разбиты, потому что Гилипп выбрал неудачное для конницы место битвы. Вторая вылазка была более удачной: афиняне потерпели поражение, а сиракузяне выстроили контрстену, лишив афинян возможности полностью окружить город ^[8] .

В Афинах решили отправить подкрепление на Сицилию. Зимой к Сиракузам прибыли 10 кораблей под командованием стратега Эвримедона , а весной должен были прибыть Демосфен с 73 кораблями. Тем временем сиракузяне вступили в битву с афинянами на суше и на море. Они одержали победу на суше, взяв мыс Племмирий, но потерпели поражение на море, потеряв 14 кораблей из 80, в то время как афиняне потеряли только 3 ^{[62] [63]} .

Сиракузяне, узнав о приближении Демосфена, решили дать бой афинянам. Гилипп и на этот раз хотел напасть одновременно с суши и с моря. Первый день сражения результатов не принёс. Так же закончился и второй день. На третий день сиракузяне застали афинян врасплох, когда они ещё не успели выстроиться в боевой порядок. Они одержали победу и принудили афинян отступить ^[64] .

Тем временем в бухту вошёл флот Демосфена. Демосфен попытался разрушить стены Сиракуз с помощью осадных машин, но потерпел неудачу. Тогда он со всей армией предпринял ночное нападение на Эпиполы. Поначалу афиняне разбили несколько отрядов сиракузян, но, сражаясь в темноте, пришли в замешательство, были атакованы беотийскими гоплитами и частью сброшены с крутого обрыва, частью обращены в бегство. После этого Демосфен стал настаивать на возвращении в Афины. Никий, боявшийся возвратиться в Афины без победы, возражал против этого. Демосфен и Эвримедон без согласия Никия стали готовиться к отступлению. Но когда всё уже было готово к отплытию, вечером 27 августа 413 года до н. e. произошло полное лунное затмение ^[65] . Большинство воинов потребовало отсрочки отплытия на 27 дней, чтобы «дождаться конца следующего оборота луны».

Узнав об этом решении афинян, сиракузяне решили разгромить противника. В морском сражении 3 сентября ^[57] афиняне потерпели полное поражение, а Эвримедон погиб ^[66] . После этой битвы сиракузяне загородили выход из гавани, где стояли афинские суда. Никий решил начать прорыв и посадил некоторых воинов на корабли. 7 сентября ^[57] они попытались прорваться, но были разбиты и обратились в бегство. Теперь у афинян был только один выход — отступать по суше. Никий мог бы отступить ночью, но он промедлил, поддавшись на военную хитрость сиракузского предводителя Гермократа ^[67] : тот тайно отправил к Никию своих людей, которые сказали, что сиракузяне заняли все дороги, и афинянам не следует отступать ночью.

Утром отступление началось, но вскоре превратилось в бегство, так как сиракузяне преследовали, нападали, отрезали от афинского войска отряд за отрядом и разбивали их по частям. Был разбит отряд Демосфена, а сам он взят в плен. Затем Гилипп напал на отряд, возглавлявшийся Никием. Тот был вынужден сдаться, пав в ноги Гилиппу, со словами: «Пощады, Гилипп, вы победили! Нет, не за себя прошу, прославившего своё имя столь великими несчастьями, а за остальных афинян. Вспомните, что на войне беда может случиться со всяким и что афиняне, когда им сопутствовала удача, обошлись с вами благосклонно и мягко». Гилипп, тронутый словами Никия, поднял его с земли, постарался его успокоить и отдал приказ прекратить резню. Пленные были приведены в Сиракузы. Там Никия и Демосфена приговорили к казни, несмотря на возражения Гилиппа, который хотел привезти их в Спарту, а рядовых воинов обратили в рабство и заставили трудиться на сиракузских каменоломнях ^[68] .

Сицилийская экспедиция завершилась для Афин катастрофой. Погибло две трети флота, около трети всего гоплитского ополчения, которое мог выставить город, истощились финансы. В 413 году до н. e. в Афины пришла весть о разгроме афинского войска и флота на Сицилии . Спартанцы вторглись в Аттику, заняли Декелею и превратили её в свой постоянный плацдарм на территории противника.

В 412 году до н. e. , почувствовав ослабление Афин, восстал сильнейший союзник Афин Хиос , его поддержали ионийские города Клазомены , Эритры , Теос , Милет . Спарта послала им на помощь сильный флот, в который входили в том числе и корабли сицилийских союзников. К 411 году до н. e. Иония полностью отпала от Афин ^[69] . Спартанцы договорились с персидским царём Дарием II и его малоазийскими сатрапами о финансовой помощи. Целью этой помощи было создание спартанского флота, который мог противостоять сильному афинскому флоту. Спарта обязывалась передать Персии греческие города Малой Азии, отвоёванные в ходе греко-персидских войн ^[70] .

В этих очень тяжёлых условиях афиняне проявили незаурядную выдержку, хладнокровие и государственную мудрость. В 411 году до н. e. олигархические гетерии организовали государственный переворот , в результате которого власть в Афинах перешла к олигархическому Совету Четырёхсот . Этот режим продержался недолго и в конце года был заменён на умеренную олигархию, а позднее была полностью восстановлена демократия.

Однако полностью оправиться от поражения Афины так и не смогли. Сицилийская экспедиция обозначила перелом в войне, после которого стратегическая инициатива перешла к Спарте ^[71] .

В определении причин поражения Афин в Сицилийской экспедиции в антиковедении преобладает точка зрения о том, что экспедиция была непродуманной авантюрой, которая была обречена на провал ^[72] . Эта точка зрения восходит к древнегреческому историку Фукидиду , который в своём труде даёт этому предприятию негативные оценки. Описание Сицилийской экспедиции в его труде является кульминацией, и ощущается нагнетание, приводящее к мысли о том, что поражение афинян было предопределено ^[73] . Вероятно, Фукидид, размышлявший после поражения Афин в 404 году до н. e. о причинах этого поражения, считал, что Сицилийская экспедиция в большей степени предрешила исход войны, а значит, и спланирована она была плохо ^[74] .

Тезис Фукидида о том, что афиняне почти ничего не знали о Сицилии, не соответствует действительности, так многие античные историки свидетельствуют о том, что афиняне проявляли интерес к этому региону как минимум с середины V века до н. e. По мнению И. Е. Сурикова, экспедиция не была изначально авантюрной, а была логичным продолжением афинской политики, направленной на поиск путей для достижения победы над Спартой, однако на каких-то этапах сочетание нескольких факторов привели к неудаче экспедиции ^[74] .

Sources

• Фукидид . Story
• Плутарх . Сравнительные жизнеописания . Никий, Алкивиад
• Лисий . Речи

Research

• Белох Ю. Греческая история . — Т. 2.
• Голицынский Н. С. Всеобщая военная исторія древнихъ временъ . - SPb. : Типография А. Траншеля, 1872.
• Егер О. Всемирная история. — М. : АСТ, Полигон. — Т. 1. Древний мир. — ISBN 978-5-17-050157-1 .
• Карпюк С. Г. Никий: доблесть политика // Вестник древней истории. — 1994. — № 3 . — С. 38—57 .
• Кузищин В. И. Глава XV. Пелопоннесская война. 431—404 гг. до н. e. // История Древней Греции . — М. : Высшая школа, 1996. — ISBN 978-5-7695-7746-8 .
• Курциус Э. История Древней Греции. — М. : Харвест, 2002. — Т. III. — ISBN 985-13-1123-5 .
• Лурье С. Я. История Греции . - SPb. : Издательство С.-Петербургского ун-та, 1993. — 680 с.
• Сергеев В. С. История Древней Греции. - SPb. : Полигон, 2002. — 704 с. - ISBN 5-89173-171-1 .
• Суриков И. Е. Перикл: человек, давший имя эпохе // Античная Греция : политики в контексте эпохи: время расцвета демократии. — М. : Наука, 2008. — 383 с. — ISBN 978-5-02-036984-9 .
• Суриков И. Е. Античная Греция: политики в контексте эпохи. Година междоусобиц. — М. : Русский Фонд Содействия Образованию и Науке, 2011. — 328 с. — ISBN 978-5-91244-030-4 .
• Фролов Э. Д. Рождение геополитической идеи: программа Гермократа Сиракузского // Античное государство. Политические отношения и государственные формы в античном мире. - SPb. , 2002. — ISBN 5-288-013125 -8.
• Шустов В. Е. Войны и сражения Древнего мира. — Ростов-на-Дону: Феникс, 2006. — 521 с. — ISBN 5-222-09075-2 .
• Takeshi Amemiya. Economy and economics of ancient Greece. — Routledge, 2007. — ISBN 0-415-70154-6 .
• Buck RJ The Sicilian Expedition // AHB. — 1988. — Т. 2 , вып. 4 . — С. 73—79 .
• EA Freeman. History of Sicily from the earliest time . — 1892. — Т. 3.
• Kagan D. The peace of Nicians and the Sicilian expedition. — Cornell University Press, 1981.
• Marco Vinci. Reclutamento di truppe scelte a Siracusa in età classica (неопр.) .