The battle at Cape Matapan

In early March 1941, the Germans began intensive preparations for the invasion of Greece . To ensure the success of this operation, the Italian fleet was required to inflict several attacks on British shipping between Egypt and Greece in order to prevent the British from transporting supplies for their troops. The main routes of the British, along which the supply came, passed south and east of Crete .

The Italian naval headquarters planned an operation to disrupt British shipping in the area, it was a sudden raid of cruisers supported by the battleship Vittorio Veneto, which arrived in Naples from La Spezia on March 22. The Italian fleet was promised air support for the German 10th air corps, as the ships had to operate in the waters under the control of British aviation. The 10th air corps was to conduct intensive reconnaissance of the eastern and central Mediterranean, fly to Malta and intercept aircraft that could fly out of there. The Germans also claimed that on March 16, German torpedo bombers damaged two of the three British battleships east of Crete. The Italian Air Force was to provide air cover for ships with fighters from Rhodes during their entire stay in the area of ​​Crete.

On the evening of March 26, Italian ships set sail.

A marked increase in the activity of enemy aerial reconnaissance over southwestern Greece and Crete did not hide from the British. On March 25th, daily attempts began to conduct reconnaissance of the harbor of Alexandria , the main base of the British Mediterranean fleet. The unusual persistence with which the enemy monitored the movements of British ships led the British to suggest that the Italian fleet was preparing a major operation against convoys transporting troops and supplies to Greece. The further course of events indicates that, besides the assumptions, the British relied on the data of their intelligence and had approximate information about the release date and intentions of the Italian fleet. During the night of March 27, reports were received from a British reconnaissance aircraft about an Italian formation of 3 cruisers and 1 destroyer 80 miles east of the southeast tip of Sicily . The cruisers moved southeast towards Crete.

In the evening of March 27, after dark, the British fleet left Alexandria.

According to the Italian plan, the 1st and 8th cruiser divisions were to advance into the Aegean Sea to the extreme eastern point of Crete. After that, they should have turned back and connected with Vittorio Veneto 90 miles southeast of Navarin and then returned to the bases. Meanwhile, the Vittorio Veneto and the 3rd Cruiser Division were to reach a point 20 miles south of the island of Gavdos off the south coast of Crete. If contact with the enemy was not established, they should lie down on the opposite course.

March 27 at 12:20 the cruiser "Trieste" reported on the noticed British seaplane Sunderland , circling for half an hour. His broadcast was intercepted and decrypted, due to poor visibility, the plane noticed only the 3rd division of cruisers and did not notice the battleship and other divisions of the cruisers following behind. The Italians could no longer count on the effect of surprise, nevertheless, the operation was continued according to plan.

On March 27, in the sea south of Crete, there was only one British convoy, which followed to Piraeus . He was ordered to move the same course, but with the onset of darkness turn back. The return convoy from Piraeus was ordered to delay the exit.

After contacting the Sunderland, the Italian headquarters ordered the 1st and 8th cruiser divisions not to enter the Aegean Sea, but to move to join the battleship and the 3rd division and continue to work together, since there is no information about the enemy’s movements I had no time.

The formation of the British Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippel, who was in the Aegean Sea, was ordered by dawn on March 28 to go to the point south of Gavdos, where exactly at the same time “Vittorio Veneto” was supposed to appear. He also walked to the intended point at Gavdos, 10 miles ahead of him was the 3rd division, and the 1st and 8th divisions were located 15 miles to the left aft. Around 6:00, Vittorio Veneto and Bolzano sent their reconnaissance planes into flight, and after half an hour from the battleship the plane noticed 4 British cruisers and 4 destroyers 50 miles southeast of the Italian compound.

At 7:58, the 3rd division spotted British ships that were identified as the light cruisers Orion, Ajax, Perth, Gloucester and 4 destroyers. The cruisers of Admiral Sansonetti went on a rapprochement and opened fire at 8:12 from a distance of about 25,000 meters. The light cruisers of Pridham-Whippel were about 90 miles from the British battleships and aircraft carrier, the presence of which Admiral Iakino was still unaware of. Pridham-Whippel undertook a retreat, trying to bring the Italian cruisers closer to his battleships and aircraft carrier. The Italian cruisers concentrated their fire on the Gloucester, their shooting was quite accurate, forcing the British cruiser to zigzag. Around 8:55, the Italian cruisers ceased fire and turned west, Pridham-Whippel turned after them to maintain contact. At about 11:00 a.m. an Italian battleship was spotted in the north, which immediately opened precise fire at light cruisers from a distance of about 16 miles and the British cruisers turned away under cover of a smoke screen.

At 11:15, “Vittorio Veneto” was attacked by 6 aircraft - torpedo bombers from the aircraft carrier “Formideble”, sent to cover the cruisers Pridham-Whippela, who were in a difficult situation. Faced with strong anti-aircraft fire, torpedo bombers dropped their torpedoes at a distance of about 2000 meters from the target and the battleship successfully dodged them. Pilots reported to Cunningham that they achieved one reliable hit and another probable one. The air attack helped the English light cruisers to escape from the attacks of Italian ships without loss.

Around 11.30 Iakino, without waiting for the promised fighter cover and not finding the enemy convoys, gave the order to head for Taranto . The Italian Union began a retreat. The squadron was almost always accompanied by British reconnaissance aircraft. In 12.07, the 3rd cruiser division was attacked by torpedo bombers, but was not hit. At that time, the Italian force was 60 miles from the British, which was slower, but Cunningham hoped to catch up and destroy the enemy cruiser or battleship if they were damaged by torpedo bombers.

At 15.20, “Vittorio Veneto” was subjected to a combined attack by torpedo bombers and Albacore bombers, who used a new tactic: first bombers appeared and diverted the attention of anti-aircraft gunners, immediately after that, 3 torpedo bombers attacked the ship from the stern at a very low altitude. These aircraft simultaneously changed course and dropped torpedoes from three different directions. One plane was shot down, but the battleship could not evade all three torpedoes dropped from a short distance. One torpedo hit the port side of the ship in the propeller area. For some time the battleship could not move, about 4 thousand tons of water came through the hole, but soon the ship was able to give a move. Using only the starboard screws, the battleship developed a speed of 10 knots , but gradually increased it and exceeded 20 knots. All this happened at a distance of 420 miles from Taranto.

Expecting that the British air attacks would continue until sunset, Iakino sent the 8th division to Taranto, and rebuilt the rest of the forces in a kind of marching order around the damaged battleship. “Vittorio Veneto” was in the center, the 1st Cruisers Division marched on the right, the 3rd Cruisers on the left, and the destroyers formed the outermost columns.

At 17.45, the battleship Warspite lifted its reconnaissance aircraft with an experienced observer officer on board, who reported that the Vittorio Veneto was 45 miles from the Warspite and moving west at a speed of 15 knots, surrounded by cruisers and destroyers.

At 18.23, 9 enemy aircraft appeared over Italian ships, which were kept outside the radius of the anti-aircraft guns and went on the attack with the onset of darkness at 19.20. The attack lasted 20 minutes, the Paula cruiser got hit by a torpedo and lost speed.

Meanwhile, the Italian naval headquarters informed Iakino that according to radio direction finding at 17.45 some British ships were 75 miles from the current position of Vittorio Veneto. The Italian admiral decided that it was the cruisers with whom he had fought in the morning, or the patrol English destroyers.

After a series of air attacks, Admiral Cunningham knew about the damage to the Italian battleship. There was an opportunity to catch up and destroy the “Vittorio Veneto”. The English commander decided to pursue the retreating Italian fleet in the approaching darkness, the light cruisers of Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippela were ordered to go at full speed to establish visual contact with the enemy. A compound of 8 destroyers was created to strike at a damaged Italian ship.

At 20:18, Iakino ordered Admiral Cattaneo's 1st Division, to which Paul belonged, to turn around and go to the aid of the damaged cruiser. Cattaneo, unaware of the close presence of the British battleships, chose the formation of the column, with the destroyers moving at its end.

At 08:32 p.m., the cruiser Ajax, using the radar, found the immobile Polu in the dark. Pridham-Whippel, believing that it was a battleship, ordered the destroyers to torpedo him, and he and his cruisers set off in search of the remaining Italian ships. But the destroyers, due to communication problems, did not go on the attack and continued to move north, which became fatal for the Italians, since the Paula attack would have been seen on the ships of the 1st division.

Cattaneo's ships approached the Field at the same time as Cunningham's battleships. At 10:25 p.m., Italian cruisers marching in a convoy were found on the Worspayte with the help of a radar. At that time, a red rocket took off from the immovable "Pola", which was to facilitate its detection by their ships. The Italians paid all their attention there, unaware of the presence of the British ships, which were going almost parallel course from the other side. At 22:28, the British destroyer Greyhound, which was closest to the Italians, was spotlighted by the cruiser Cattaneo, the rest of the British ships did the same. The Italians were taken by surprise, the guns on their ships were in a stowed position. All three British battleships opened fire from their 381-mm guns at cruisers almost point blank. “Zara” and “Fiume” in a matter of minutes turned into flaming ruins, engulfed in flames from bow to stern. Having made several more volleys at them, the British battleships turned to the right, dodging torpedoes of the Italian destroyers, which went on the attack. A dump of Italian and British destroyers followed, during which the British almost suffered from the fire of their own ships.

The Fiume cruiser got a big roll, the fires on it got out of control, and the commander gave the order to leave the ship, which sank at 23:15. At Dawn, an order was also given to leave the ship, and at 00.30 it exploded. Admiral Cattaneo and the commander of the Zara died with the ship. The destroyers "Alfieri" and "Carducci" received heavy damage and also sank. The destroyers “Oriani” (got hit and managed to get out of the shelling on one machine) and “Joberty” (closed the line and avoided damage) managed to escape.

Around 23:00, Admiral Cunningham, fearing possible attacks by Italian destroyers, ordered all forces not involved in the destruction of the enemy to retreat to the northeast. As he later recalled, this order was “poorly thought out,” since the Pridham-Whippel compound also complied with it, having stopped attempts to establish contact with Vittorio Veneto, thereby giving him the opportunity to leave.

At 0:20, the destroyer "Haywok" discovered the drifting cruiser "Paul" and, taking it for a battleship, reported the coordinates of the ship to the rest of the destroyers. However, an hour later he corrected his report, reporting that he had discovered not a battleship, but a heavy cruiser. Soon, the Greyhound and the Griffin joined the Haywock, and then the destroyer Jervis approached the Paula. The ship was in an unserviceable state, according to the British, the cruiser was “not a shadow of order and discipline”, a “drunken crowd” gathered on the forecastle, the deck was “littered with personal belongings and bottles” (these statements of the British were later refuted by Italians and were called “ British propaganda ”). The Jervis removed 258 people from the Paula, including the commander, later the cruiser was sunk by two torpedoes.

At dawn, reconnaissance aircraft rose from the Formidedle aircraft carrier, additional planes took off from Greece and Crete, but they did not find Italian ships that had left in the west.

At the scene of the battle, there were dozens of life rafts filled with survivors from sunken ships, the sea covered with a layer of oil was strewn with debris and floating bodies. The British destroyers were engaged in the rescue of the survivors, but the operation was interrupted by the appearance of several German U-88 planes in the sky, the British began to retreat east, leaving hundreds of Italians in the water. Cannigham handed down the coordinates of the battlefield in clear text to the Italian naval headquarters. Approaching the Italian hospital ship "Gradiska" was saved 160 people.

The Italian fleet suffered a crushing defeat at Matapan, losing immediately 3 heavy cruisers and 2 destroyers. Relying on battleships and cruisers as the main striking force of the fleet and underestimating the role of aircraft carriers, the Italian command put itself in a knowingly losing position. After this defeat, it became apparent that only with aircraft carriers in its composition could the fleet receive proper air support in a modern war. The Italian military leadership made a belated decision to create their own aircraft carriers, which the Italians did not have time to build and put into operation before Italy left the war.

The Italian fleet was not ready for combat at night, while in the British fleet, night battle exercises were regular. By the beginning of the war, the British had already mastered the radar and installed it on warships, which gave them a serious advantage over the Italian fleet.

The low level of interaction between the fleet and aviation, the inefficiency of aviation intelligence of the Italians also became one of the reasons for the defeat at Matapan. Admiral Iakino did not wait for the promised air support, was forced to act almost blindly throughout the battle. As a result, he made a fatal decision to send 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers to the aid of the damaged Field, unaware of the close presence of the British battleships and underestimating the British’s ability to operate at night.

Победа при Матапане наглядно продемонстрировало большое превосходство британского Средиземноморского флота над военно-морскими силами Италии, которые так и не оправились от этого поражения до конца войны.

• С. Пак «Бой у мыса Матапан»
• СРАЖЕНИЕ У МЫСА МАТАПАН (Март 1941)

• Брагадин М. А. Битва за Средиземное море. Взгляд побежденных. — М. : «АСТ», 2001. — 624 с. — 8000 экз. — ISBN 5-17-002636-6 .

• Битва при Матапане (1717)