Battle of Kuantan

British ships, known as Compound Z, were sent to Singapore in late summer 1941, when Japan occupied French Indochina and the possibility of an attack on Malaysia arose. The Prince of Wales battleship, previously battling the Bismarck , set off for the Far East on October 25th. The battlecruiser Ripals left the port of Clyde on August 30, 1941 , circled Africa and arrived in Durban on October 3. He then headed to Colombo , where he connected with the Prince of Wales battleship. On December 2, the compound arrived in Singapore. Japanese intelligence discovered the ships even at the moment when they crossed the Indian Ocean. (Until December 10, the Japanese believed that King George V was the battleship)

Japan was already preparing for the landing in Malaysia, and the appearance of British ships was unpleasant news for her. The Japanese 2nd Fleet had some quantitative advantage (2 battleships and 4 cruisers versus 1 battleship and 1 cruiser), but the British ships were more powerful and faster. Admiral Yamamoto ordered an urgent transfer from Formosa to Indochina of 27 G4M bombers of the Kanoi air corps.

Japan was preparing for three expected events: a landing in Malaysia, the bombing of Singapore and the battle with battleships. It was assumed that the British immediately attack the Japanese forces. Constant patrols were organized to detect British activity. At that time, Japan used an air base in the Saigon area, which housed two air corps: Genzan and Mihoro. Each air corps by the beginning of December had 48 G3M2 bombers .

On December 7, 1941, 3 squadrons of the Mihoro air corps and 3 squadrons of the Genzan air corps flew out to bombard Singapore, but the Genzan air corps fell into a storm and returned to base.

On December 8, the Japanese were waiting for an air raid on their bases in Indochina, but, to their surprise, the raid did not happen. On this day, a Japanese convoy freely entered Kota Bara and began landing.

On December 9, the Mitsubishi Ki-15 reconnaissance aircraft took off towards Singapore and reported that the battleships were still in the harbor. Rear Admiral Matsunaga convened a meeting to prepare an air raid on Singapore Harbor, following the example of a raid on Pearl Harbor.

Meanwhile, Admiral Philips was slow for the reason that the original plans meant strengthening the British fleet by the American, and the American was put out of action by a raid on Pearl Harbor. Fighter cover was also inadequate. Still, the admiral decided to go to intercept the convoy - mainly due to an underestimation of the capabilities of aviation. The ships left Singapore on December 8 at 17:10 and planned to strike a convoy on December 10. On December 9, at 07:13, they went around from the east of Anamba Island and lay on course 330, then 345. Two Japanese scouts passed over them here, but did not notice the ships. And only at 14:00 the fleet was spotted by the Japanese submarine "I-65": "15:15. Two enemy battleships are heading north. ”

The Japanese command was confused by the discrepancies in the testimony of the aircraft and the submarine. The discrepancy could be understood as follows: that, in addition to the well-known battleships, there are two more in the sea. A torpedo attack order was given.

At 19:00, preparation for the attack was completed. Bombers flew in search of the enemy, not knowing their exact coordinates, not knowing the coordinates of their fleet. "Our naval and air forces rushed into the battle blindly." Already in the dark, one of the planes of the Mihoro air corps reported that he had noticed enemy ships. However, the discovered ship turned out to be the Japanese heavy cruiser Chokai. At this point, the aircraft were ordered to return to base.

The stocks of torpedoes at the bases of Indochina were so insignificant that in fact there was only one torpedo per plane. In such a situation, airplanes returning from the raid had to land at night without dropping torpedoes. The pilots waited for the moon to rise and landed the planes in the moonlight at midnight.

Meanwhile, at 20:55, Admiral Philips canceled the operation due to the fact that the effect of surprise was lost. He turned the ships south to Singapore.

At 06:25, 11 reconnaissance aircraft were sent in search of the British fleet. In the period from 07:35 to 09:30, all formations of torpedo bombers took off. The operation involved: 9 Mitsubishi G3M reconnaissance and attack aircraft, 2 Mitsubishi Ki-15 reconnaissance aircraft, 26 Mitsubishi G3M torpedo bombers, 26 Mitsubishi G4M torpedo bombers and 34 Mitsubishi G3M bombers . The fuel supply (30% less than usual) allowed them to move away from the base no further than 400 kilometers.

By 10:00, the enemy was not detected. At this point, the aircraft had already covered a distance of 400 kilometers. One of the aircraft began to interrupt with the motor and he turned to the base. One escort aircraft left with him. 11:45 a small transport ship was discovered. The 3rd Squadron attacked him, for some unknown reason, without causing damage. The squadron also turned to the base.

Before going to sea, Admiral Philips sent a request to the commander of the aircraft, General Pulford, whether the aircraft would be able to: 1) provide battleships with reconnaissance in the morning of December 9, 2) provide reconnaissance for Singora and its environs on the morning of December 10, 3) provide air cover at Singora on the morning of December 10. Pulford promised only the first. The answer came only on the evening of December 8th. Philips decided that he could do without air cover.

All day, December 9, the Ripals and the Prince of Wales walked north.

In the afternoon, the weather improved, tears appeared in the clouds, several times on the ships heard the noise of flying aircraft. There were no fighter cover. At first, Philips wanted to send the destroyers back and strike at Singor with two ships, but as he moved away from Singapore, confidence left him. Obviously, the operation should have been canceled altogether, as soon as it became known that there would be no air cover, but Philips expected that low cloud cover would not allow enemy aircraft to detect the squadron. The admiral's indecision led to the fact that the order to turn back was given only when the ships almost reached Singora. ^[one]

The squadron turned south. At midnight, a telegram was received from Singapore: "The enemy landed in Kuantan." Ships just passed the breadth of this city. The squadron had about eight hours left before the relative safety of the Singapore raid. A departure to Kuantan also required eight hours. An order was given to go ashore: Philips decided that this time he was sure to catch the Japanese by surprise.

In Singapore, they did not know that the squadron turned to Kuantan. As a result, the 453rd fighter squadron, which was expecting a signal in Singapore to fly to the aid of the squadron, remained on the ground.

When the Phillips ships turned towards Kuantan , they were spotted by a Japanese submarine. The second submarine found the squadron at 2 a.m. and fired five torpedoes into the ships, but none of them hit the target. At about 10 o’clock. in the morning one of the observers reported the coordinates of the English squadron, which remained 40 miles to the coast. The British sent two reconnaissance aircraft towards the coast, which reported that there were no Japanese in Kuantan. The squadron turned north, then east. Two hours later, a message came from the destroyer Tenedos, which had been sent to Singapore before: it was attacked by Japanese aircraft. The squadron turned south.

At 11:03 the squadron was spotted by the Japanese. At 11:13 a fire was opened from the air defense battleships.

After a pilot survey, the following was established: Ripals was attacked by 35 torpedo bombers and 8 horizontal bombers. AK "Genzan" dropped 7 torpedoes, 4 of them hit the target. Of the 20 torpedoes thrown by AK Kanoi, about 10 hit the target. Of the 7 torpedoes of AK Mihoro hit 4. Also, the Mihoro air corps dropped 8 bombs weighing 550 pounds on the Ripals, 1 of them hit the target, 7 tore next.

The Prince of Wales was attacked by 15 torpedo bombers. AK "Genzan" dropped 9 torpedoes, hit 4. 6 torpedo bombers AK "Kanoy" made 6 hits. 11 horizontal bombers of AK Mihoro dropped 14 bombs (1,100 f.), Only one hit. The other 9 bombers of the same AK dropped 18 bombs of the same weight, but did not achieve hits. ^[2] Attackers lost 3 aircraft: 1 Mitsubishi G3M and two Mitsubishi G4M .

Ripals sank at 12:33. "Prince of Wales" - at 13:20. After 40 minutes (approx. 14:00), the Japanese intelligence officer remaining in the battle zone noticed 8 British fighters.

• Sergey Zhurko. The hunt for a large beast (Russian) // Aviamaster: magazine. - 1998. - No. 02-03 . - S. 17-22 .

• Disaster in the Far East - V. Koffman. King George V-class battleships
• The death of the Ripals - A. V. Dashyan The battlecruisers Ripals and Rinaun
• Blitzkrieg in Malaya - S. Zhurko, A. Bulakh, S. Tsvetkov Mitsubishi G4M Betty torpedo bomber
• Force Z Survivors Association
• Order of Battle 10 December 1941
• Drowning. Roller.
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