Corruption (from the Latin. Corrumpere to “corrupt”, Latin. Corruptio “bribery, corruption; damage, decay; corruption”) is a term that usually means that an official uses his authority and the rights entrusted to him, and also associated with this official status of authority, opportunities, relationships for personal gain, contrary to law and moral standards. Corruption is also called bribery of officials, their venality, tardiness, which is typical of mafia states . The corresponding term in European languages usually has a broader semantics , stemming from the primary meaning of the original Latin word.
A characteristic sign of corruption is the conflict between the actions of an official and the interests of his employer, or the conflict between the actions of an elected person and the interests of society . Many types of corruption are similar to fraud committed by an official, and belong to the category of crimes against state power.
Corruption may be subject to any official having discretionary power [app. 1] in the distribution of any resources that do not belong to him at his discretion ( official , deputy , judge , law enforcement officer , administrator , etc.). The main incentive for corruption is the possibility of obtaining economic profits ( rents ) associated with the use of power, and the main deterrent is the risk of exposure and punishment .
The systemic nature of corruption is manifested in its coercive nature for those who work in government organizations that are covered by it: the lower ranks collect bribes and share with the upper ranks to preserve their position.
According to macroeconomic and political economics research, corruption causes significant damage [1] and impedes economic growth and development in the interests of society as a whole [2] [3] .
In many countries, corruption is a criminal offense .
Definition
Transparency International , the World Bank and other organizations understand corruption as the abuse of trusted power for personal gain [4] . There are also other definitions that make clarifications (that the authority includes trusted resources, that it can belong to the public and private sectors, etc. [5] ) or use more stringent legal language.
According to Russian law [6] , corruption is the abuse of official position, giving a bribe , receiving a bribe, abuse of authority, commercial bribery, or any other illegal use by an individual of his official position in spite of the legitimate interests of society and the state in order to obtain benefits in the form of money, values , other property or services of material nature, and other property rights for themselves or for third parties or illegal provision of such benefits specified person other fi nical persons; and also performance of the specified acts on behalf of or in the interests of the legal entity . The term “corruption offense” as defined in the law does not have a separate definition.
Abuse may be a form of corruption (one of the criminal acts of an official or a group of persons), but does not exhaust the full definition of corruption.
The European Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ratified by the Russian Criminal Law Convention on Corruption ), ratified by Russia, classifies corruption to individuals and legal entities. As of 2010, in Russia for the same corruption offense, it is possible to receive punishment both under the Code of Administrative Offenses and under the Criminal Code.
Corruption History
The first ruler, who was mentioned as a fighter against corruption, was Uruinimgin - the Sumerian king of the city-state of Lagash in the second half of the XXIV century BC. e. Despite demonstrative and often cruel punishments for corruption, the fight against it did not lead to the desired results. At best, it was possible to prevent the most dangerous crimes, but at the level of petty waste and bribes, corruption was widespread. The first treatise with a discussion of corruption - " Artha-shastra " - was published under the pseudonym of Kautilya by one of the ministers of Bharat ( India ) in the 4th century BC. e. In it, he made a pessimistic conclusion that “the king’s property cannot be, at least a little, not appropriated by those in charge of this property.”
Pharaohs of ancient Egypt also faced similar problems, in which a huge bureaucratic apparatus of officials was formed, allowing himself to create lawlessness and arbitrariness in relation to free peasants, artisans and even military nobility. There is a precept of a certain Itakhotela who recommends: “Kick your back in front of your superiors, then your house will be in order, your salary will be in good condition, because it is bad for someone who opposes the boss, but it’s easy to live when he favors” [7] .
Of particular concern was the corruption of judges, since it led to the illegal redistribution of property and the desire to resolve the dispute outside the legal field. It is not by chance that leading religions of all types of corruption condemn in the first place bribery of judges: “... the head demands gifts, and the judge judges for bribes, and grandees express their evil desires for their souls and pervert the case ...” [8] ; “Do not receive gifts, for gifts make blind the sighted and transform the cause of the right” ( Ex. 23: 8 ; see also Deut. 16:19 ); “Do not assign each other’s property illegally and do not bribe the judges in order to deliberately appropriate a part of the property of other people” ( Quran 2: 188 ), etc.
In the ancient Roman Laws XII tables, the term “corrumpere” begins to be used in the meanings of “changing testimony in court for money” and “bribing a judge”: [for the examination of the case] and were found guilty of accepting monetary money in [this] case?) ” [9] .
An important impulse to understanding corruption is given by the works of Niccolò Machiavelli . He compared corruption with illness, such as with consumption. Initially, it is difficult to recognize, but easier to treat. If it is running, then it is easy to recognize, but it is difficult to cure [10] .
Since the end of the XVIII century in the West in the attitude of society to corruption a turning point has come. Liberal transformations were carried out under the slogan that state power exists for the benefit of people under its control, and therefore citizens keep the government in exchange for strict compliance by officials with the laws. In particular, according to the US Constitution adopted in 1787, receiving a bribe is one of two clearly mentioned crimes for which an impeachment can be declared to the US President . Society began to exert more and more influence on the quality of the work of the state apparatus. As political parties and state regulation strengthened, episodes of collusion between the political elite and big business began to cause growing concern. Nevertheless, the level of corruption in developed countries during the XIX — XX centuries decreased in comparison with the rest of the world [11] [12] .
A new stage in the evolution of corruption in developed countries was the turn of the XIX and XX centuries. On the one hand, the next strengthening of state regulation and, accordingly, the power of officials began. On the other hand, a large private business was born, which, in competition, began to resort to “buying up the state” - no longer an episodic bribing of individual small state employees, but direct subordination of politicians and high officials to the cause of protecting capital interests. As the importance of political parties grew in developed countries (especially in Western Europe after World War II), party corruption developed, when large firms and transnational corporations paid for lobbying their interests not to politicians personally, but to the party funds.
In the second half of the 20th century, corruption increasingly began to become an international problem. Bribery by corporations of top officials abroad became widespread. Globalization has led to the fact that corruption in one country began to negatively affect the development of many countries. At the same time, countries with the highest levels of corruption were no longer limited to the third world : liberalization in the former socialist countries in the 1990s. accompanied by egregious official abuses. In its December 31, 1995 issue, the Financial Times newspaper declared 1995 the year of "the year of corruption." To promote knowledge of corruption, the United Nations established the International Day against Corruption (December 9).
Typology
Corruption can be classified according to many criteria: by types of interacting actors ( citizens and small employees, firms and officials, the nation and political leadership); by type of benefit (making a profit or reducing costs ); on orientation (internal and external); by the way the subjects interact, the degree of centralization , predictability, systemism, etc. In Russia, historically, corruption also differed according to whether there were unlawful advantages for committing legal actions (“bribery”) or illegal actions (“foolishness”).
Ethical assessment of corruption
Different manifestations of corruption have a different ethical assessment: some actions are considered criminal , others are immoral . The latter, as a rule, include cronyism and patronage on the basis of political orientation, which violate the principle of meritocracy .
However, there is a relatively positive attitude towards corruption: “Corruption can be considered a useful substitute for the rule of law where it is poorly developed. In other words, the benefits of corrupt activities — the value created by the additional productive transactions that it allows to carry out — can exceed the costs. This situation is most likely when legal opportunities for doing business are severely limited [13] , ”says economist Douglas Houston, a professor at the Department of Business at Kansas University.
It is necessary to distinguish corruption from lobbying . When lobbying, an official also uses his authority to increase the chances of reappointment or to move up the ranks in exchange for acting in the interests of a particular group. The difference is that lobbyism satisfies three conditions [14] :
- The process of influencing an official is competitive in nature and follows rules that are known to all participants.
- There are no secret or side payments.
- Clients and agents are independent of each other in the sense that no group receives a share of the profits earned by another group.
However, some researchers believe lobbying is only an integral part of corruption [15] .
The most dangerous forms of corruption are criminal offenses . These include, above all, waste (theft) and bribes . Waste is the expenditure of resources entrusted to the official, with a personal purpose. It differs from ordinary theft in that initially a person acquires the right to dispose of resources legally: from a boss, a client, etc. A bribe is a type of corruption in which the actions of an official consist in providing any services to an individual or legal entity in exchange for providing the last definite benefit to the first. In most cases, if giving a bribe is not a result of extortion, the bribe giver receives the main benefit from the transaction [2] . Criminal actions also include the purchase of votes (although some consider it not as a form of corruption, but as a type of unfair election campaign).
Corruption is often a pretext for calling for a violent change of power . At the same time, charges are often brought not only to a specific political elite, but also to the political system as a whole. As Oscar Arias Sánchez notes, authoritarian regimes are able to successfully conceal the overwhelming majority of abuses of power from the public, so that the conclusion about their corruption is made on the basis of an analysis of circumstantial evidence and consequences for society as a whole. On the contrary, corruption in democratic regimes is often widely publicized and stopped before it starts to cause significant damage. However, the periodic scandals cause citizens to doubt their ability to influence the political decision-making process in the country and frustration in democracy [16] .
Types of corruption
Domestic corruption is generated by the interaction of ordinary citizens and officials. It includes various gifts from citizens and services to the official and his family members . Cronyism (nepotism) also belongs to this category.
Business corruption occurs in the interaction of government and business . For example, in the event of an economic dispute, the parties may seek to enlist the support of a judge in order to render a decision in their favor.
The corruption of the supreme power refers to the political leadership and the supreme courts in democratic systems. It concerns groups in power, whose unscrupulous behavior is to implement policies in their own interests and to the detriment of the interests of voters.
Corruption Services Market
The most common is decentralized ( external ) corruption, when transactions are concluded individually between an official and an individual. However, the addition of internal corruption - between members of the same organization - gives it the features of organized crime.
According to the teachings of behaviorism , getting into the team, a person adopts the rules of behavior that are adopted in this team. Therefore, if inter-departmental culture is such that in relation to bribes, “an environment of complacency, sometimes irresponsibility in dealing with service issues, lack of publicity when discussing employee misconduct” reigns [17] , then newcomers will accept this behavior as normal and follow it in the future.
However, other researchers believe that a person always has a fundamental opportunity to escape from such an environment; and also struggle and giving publicity, or ignoring of violations from micro society, but at the same time non-fulfillment of violations by the person.
The spread of corruption among officials leads to the fact that both subordinates and bosses are interested in it. Estimation of potential benefits and risks associated with corruption in a simplified form is described by the following model [18] :
Chief | Subordinate | ||
pros | minuses | pros | minuses |
|
|
|
|
This system is quite stable and this ensures the stability of corruption activities. For example, you may be faced with the principle of presumption of good faith of law enforcement agencies, which means that the chances of catching their employee in unauthorized actions are negligible.
In practice, subordinates share bribes not only with superiors, but also among themselves. The final result is the formation of corruption-specific domestic markets and economic mechanisms. In particular, there are positions with particularly high illegal incomes . The struggle between officials for such positions forms the internal "labor market". As corruption develops, there is some centralization of the market, starting at the level of individual departments, when officials produce tariffs for making specific decisions in order to reduce internal competition for each bribe and increase total income. Supporting the stability of illegal financial flows requires administrative and legislative measures aimed at increasing the economic benefits of corruption and at reducing legal and social risks [14] .
Private Interest
Extortion (“government racketeering ”) is practiced by officials with discretionary power to prevent anyone from obtaining licenses , special permits, or any other services that are within the competence of the official. If the official has the authority to estimate the amount of proper payments (for example, taxes or duties ), this also opens up opportunities for extortion.
Faced with extortion by a civil servant, a private individual is faced with a choice: either to bribe (which carries the risk of exposure) or to appeal against the actions of a civil servant through an internal or external supervisory authority. The decision depends on how costly the appeal procedure is, as well as how well the citizen is aware of his legal rights and obligations of the civil servant.
Collusion arises under the same conditions as extortion, but differs in that it is beneficial to both parties and consists in making a transaction detrimental to the state. For example, in exchange for a bribe, the customs inspector may understate the amount of imports and thereby reduce the amount that the importing company must pay for duties. Structures responsible for supervising the official may also be involved in the transaction.
Areas of enrichment
One of the main ways of corruption enrichment for the bureaucracy, especially for the supreme political elite, is government spending [19] .
Investment projects are largely determined by decisions that senior officials take at their discretion. Large investment projects (especially with the participation of foreign corporations) often imply the transfer of monopoly rights to the winner of the competition, which promises bureaucrats especially large bribes. Some projects are created specifically to ensure that certain groups receive rent (“ government rent ” [note 2] ) from those who are appointed as a project executor.
Government procurement , as a rule, involves the selection of objectively the best offers from several based on competition, but sometimes the official can ensure the victory of the seller who promised the greatest “commission” (“reversal”) from the deal. To do this, participation in the competition is limited, its rules are not fully declared, etc. As a result, purchases are made at an inflated price.
Extrabudgetary accounts are often created with a legitimate aim (pension, road funds, etc.) However, in some funds, for example, to help people with disabilities, revenues can significantly exceed real costs, which stimulates the desire of some officials to assign "surplus". On the contrary, in the event of a deficit, officials often decide on their own who will ultimately get the money . In some countries, funds received through foreign aid or from the sale of natural resources are directed to special funds that are less transparent and less controlled than budget money. Due to minute fluctuations in the prices of goods, it is not easy to determine the true amount of the transaction and the amount of deductions to such funds, which allows part of the money to be redirected to the pockets of officials [19] .
Other areas that are most profitable in terms of corruption include:
- Tax breaks
- Selling commodities at lower market prices
- Zoning as it affects the value of the land
- Extraction of natural resources
- Sale of state assets, especially privatization of state enterprises
- Granting monopoly power to a certain type of commercial (especially export- import) activity
- Control over the shadow economy and illegal business (extortion, protection from prosecution, the destruction of competitors, etc.)
- Appointment to positions of responsibility in government
Prof. T. Gilvason notes that the lack of free access to government information by the citizens (that is, its lack of transparency) contributes to corruption and inevitably leads to economic crises [20] .
Corruption in the judicial system
The following forms of corruption relate primarily to judges, but in the case of administrative offenses, they may also apply to officials authorized to consider relevant cases ( law enforcement bodies, fire authorities, tax authorities, customs authorities, etc.)
"Forks" in the legislation . Many rules allow the judge to choose between soft and hard punishment, so that he can take into account the degree of guilt , the severity of the offense and other circumstances. In this case, the judge appears leverage on the citizen who committed the offense. The greater the difference between the upper and lower limits of punishment, the more a citizen will be willing to pay a bribe.
Alternative administrative penalty . There are rules of law with the imposition of an alternative administrative penalty, such as a fine or arrest . They are distinguished from most “forks” not only by a wider range of punishments (and consequently, a stronger motivation of the offender to pay a bribe), but also by the fact that justice is carried out by representatives of the executive , not the judicial, authorities. Many lawyers believe that the use of sanctions of this kind is justified only in a criminal trial, but has little basis in the administrative process: “Firstly, the trial is based on the principles of openness (publicity), adversarial, oral and immediacy proceedings. In administrative proceedings, a citizen, in most cases, is left alone with a government official. Secondly, even the highest punishment for an administrative offense is not so heavy for the offender as in criminal law, so that it makes sense to differentiate it ” [21] .
Re-qualification of the offense . Another type of “forks” is duplication of the offense composition in various codes. This opens up opportunities for retraining of the committed offense to a softer category (for example, from criminal to administrative or civil ) or vice versa, to a more severe category. It is often difficult to distinguish between crimes and other offenses because of the vagueness of the wording of the legislation, and in such situations judges (or officials) decide at their discretion, which opens up opportunities for bribes and extortion.
Non-monetary loss of citizens . Some rules of law can cause corruption if they impose on the individual losses associated with the subordination of the rule of law. Even in the case when the amount of the fine and bribe for a crime are nominally equal, it is worth noting that the payment of the fine is accompanied by non-monetary time spent on making a payment in a bank and submitting evidence of payment (receipt) to the fine-writing office. The non-monetary losses caused by the norms of law are diverse and, to varying degrees, unpleasant for citizens. It is also worth considering that not all citizens are ready to defend their rights in court.
Corruption damage
Эмпирические данные показывают, что коррупция вызывает:
- неэффективное распределение и расходование государственных средств и ресурсов;
- неэффективность коррупционных финансовых потоков с точки зрения экономики страны;
- потери налогов, когда налоговые органы присваивают себе часть налогов;
- потери времени из-за чинимых препятствий, снижение эффективности работы государственного аппарата в целом;
- разорение частных предпринимателей;
- отток квалифицированных кадров в другие страны [22] ;
- снижение инвестиций в производство, замедление экономического роста;
- понижение качества общественного сервиса ;
- inappropriate use of international assistance to developing countries, which dramatically reduces its effectiveness;
- inefficient use of the abilities of individuals: instead of producing material goods, people spend time on an unproductive rent search;
- growing social inequality ;
- increased organized crime - gangs turn into mafia ;
- damage to the political legitimacy of power;
- reduction of public morality [23] .
In highly corrupt bureaucracies, most state resources are deliberately sent to channels where it is easiest to plunder or where it is easiest to collect bribes. The policy of the ruling elite becomes aimed at suppressing mechanisms to control corruption (see below): freedom of the press, independence of the justice system , competing elites (the opposition), and further individual rights of citizens [14] . For example, some people note that there are cases where the behavior and appearance of a person are a signal to law enforcement agencies to detain a person for the purpose of extorting a bribe.
There is also the view that tolerance is tolerated towards corruption. According to one argument, in the history of the development of many countries (Indonesia, Thailand, Korea) there were periods when economics and corruption grew at the same time. According to another argument, bribery is only the realization of market principles in the activities of state and municipal structures. Thus, a tolerant attitude towards corruption is permissible in the conditions of an economic boom or until it affects the efficiency of the market as a whole. Critics of this view object that, due to the reasons listed above, countries with high levels of corruption after a period of growth risk losing stability and falling into a downward spiral [24] .
Optimal level of corruption
As the state eradicates corruption, the costs of fighting corruption increase in such a way that endless efforts will have to be expended to completely eliminate corruption [25] . Comparing the losses from corruption and the costs of eradicating corruption for each of its levels, we can find the optimal level of corruption, reflecting the lowest total losses. It turns out that it is more profitable for society not to eliminate corruption to the end, simply because of the high cost of this process. However, do not forget about the further effectiveness of funds spent on the fight against corruption.
In addition, excessive enthusiasm for fighting corruption, to the detriment of eliminating its causes, can deprive the administrative system of flexibility and the population of civil liberties . The ruling group can use punitive legislation to strengthen its control over society and prosecute political opponents [24] .
International Trade
Corruption inflicts multibillion-dollar losses on international trade . This was one of the reasons for the growing interest in the problem of international corruption in recent years. For example, US exporting firms claimed that they often lose profitable contracts due to the fact that, by law, they have no right to pay bribes to foreign officials. On the contrary, in most OSCE countries bribes to foreign partners were not only not prohibited, but could even be deducted from income when paying taxes. For example, in German corporations such expenses amounted to about 5.6 billion dollars a year [13] (Eng.) . The situation changed only at the end of 1997, when the OSCE countries signed the “Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Government Officials in International Business Transactions”. In pursuance of the convention, laws were passed in subsequent years explicitly prohibiting national companies from giving bribes to anyone.
Causes of Corruption
Fundamental Contradiction
The production of any goods requires the expenditure of certain resources, which is compensated by the funds received from the consumers of these goods. The salary of employees is one of the expenses ultimately borne by the consumer, but their activities are determined by the will of the authorities and the employer. This leads to a situation where the consumer receives the necessary service or product from an employee, but cannot directly affect the activity of that employee. A special case is the public good , which is paid at the expense of taxes and provided by public servants. Despite the fact that the work of officials is actually paid by citizens, their employer is the state, which gives them the right to make decisions affecting the competing interests of various persons, by law.
In the absence of any discretionary power, corruption would have been impossible [26] . However, a person or group with supreme power is not able to independently implement the policy that it defines. For this purpose, she assigns administrators, whom she empowers with the required powers, to which she transfers the necessary resources, for which she sets the rules of conduct and over which she oversees. And here the following problem arises:
- Conservatism of the law . In practice, instructions change much more slowly than external conditions. Therefore, they leave room for action at their discretion, because otherwise the control system becomes completely inflexible, and the inconsistency of rigid norms with realities can completely stop the work. However, this means that in an unforeseen situation of law, the administrator may begin to be guided by the most favorable rent.
- The impossibility of comprehensive control . Supervision requires costs, but in addition, overly tight control strikes at the quality of management personnel and leads to an outflow of creatively thinking personnel.
Thus, the principle of governance in itself contains the potential for corruption. This opportunity develops into objective conditions, when the potential rent prevails over the risks.
This problem is repeatedly reproduced in the bureaucratic apparatus , since top-level administrators appoint their subordinates, etc. A feature of systems with representative democracy is that the highest positions are occupied by political elites who have received authority from the people and are at risk of losing power in the next elections.
Causes of High Corruption
Most experts agree that the main cause of high corruption is the imperfection of political institutions that provide internal and external deterrence mechanisms (see the next section ). In addition, there is reason to believe that some objective circumstances make a significant contribution:
- Ambiguous laws [27] .
- Ignorance or misunderstanding of laws by the population , which allows officials to arbitrarily hinder the implementation of bureaucratic procedures or overstate proper payments.
- Unstable political situation in the country.
- The lack of formed mechanisms of interaction between government institutions.
- The dependence of the standards and principles underlying the work of the bureaucratic apparatus on the policy of the ruling elite.
- Professional incompetence of the bureaucracy.
- Cronyism and political patronage, which lead to the formation of secret agreements that weaken the mechanisms of control over corruption.
- The lack of unity in the system of executive power, that is, the regulation of the same activity by various authorities.
- Low level of citizen participation in state control.
Hypotheses about the causes of high corruption
Other assumptions are being considered regarding circumstances that may be the causes of high corruption:
- low public sector wages compared to the private sector;
- government regulation of the economy ;
- dependence of citizens on officials, state monopoly on certain services;
- isolation of the bureaucratic elite from the people;
- economic instability, inflation ;
- ethnic heterogeneity of the population [28] ;
- low level of economic development ( GDP per capita);
- religious tradition 3] ;
- the culture of the country as a whole.
To date, there is no consensus regarding the confirmation of these hypotheses [29] .
Thus, a wage increase in the public sector compared to the private sector does not lead to an immediate reduction in corruption. On the other hand, this contributes to the gradual improvement of the level of qualifications of the bureaucracy and in the long run has a positive effect. In countries with the lowest level of corruption, the salaries of officials are 3–7 times higher than those in the manufacturing sector.
One of the most controversial issues is the role of state regulation of markets and the state as a monopolist. Free-market proponents point out that reducing the role of the state and increasing competition contribute to reducing corruption, because it reduces the amount of discretionary power required and reduces opportunities to achieve an advantageous position in the market through protection regulation and, therefore, opportunities to find rent. Indeed, for all countries with low corruption is characterized by a relatively free economy. On the contrary, a planned economy , characterized by the monopolistic power of officials and maintaining prices at a level below market, generates incentives for bribery as a means of obtaining scarce goods and services [30] .
There are also a number of objections to this argument. Firstly, the private sector is not always able to offer a satisfactory solution to the problems, and in such cases most people find state intervention justified. This, in turn, creates prerequisites for unfair oversight and collection of state rent. Thus, complete deliverance from corruption is impossible even in an open economy. Secondly, the process of economic liberalization is carried out by the government, and therefore in its essence is also an active intervention in the economy (which, in addition, can be accompanied by the creation of sources of corruption enrichment for privatization). Therefore, in practice, the initial period of liberalization is often characterized by the opposite effect — a surge of corruption [31] . Third, studies show the lack of dependence of the level of corruption under a liberal-democratic political system on whether the country's leadership adheres to a neoliberal or social democratic ideology [32] . Moreover, in many countries with low corruption, relatively high taxes and government spending ( Canada , Netherlands , Scandinavia ).
Fighting Corruption
Corruption is growing, so it's time to take on the rich , the Jacobins said on the threshold of la Terreur [33] .
To date, methods in pedagogy and management are unknown, which would guarantee that the person will be the ideal official. However, there are many countries with very low levels of corruption. Moreover, historical examples are known when actions aimed at reducing corruption led to significant success: Singapore , Hong Kong , Portugal , Sweden . This clearly speaks in favor of the fact that anti-corruption methods exist.
From a formal point of view, if there is no state, there will be no corruption. Many functions of the state have a valid justification and cannot be eliminated: for example, it is impossible to fight corruption in tax authorities by abolishing all taxes [24] . Nevertheless, in conditions when corruption is widespread almost everywhere, the dissolution of corrupt government bodies seems to be one of the most effective radical ways to get rid of it.
In addition to the dissolution of government, there are three possible approaches to reducing corruption [34] . First, you can tighten the laws and their execution, thereby increasing the risk of punishment. Secondly, it is possible to create economic mechanisms that allow officials to increase their income without breaking the rules and laws. Third, the role of markets and competition can be strengthened, thereby reducing the amount of potential profits from corruption. The latter also includes competition in the provision of public services, subject to the duplication by some state bodies of the functions of other bodies. Most positively proven methods are related to internal or external oversight mechanisms.
Internal control
This includes the internal mechanisms and incentives that exist in the administration itself: clear standards for the performance of officials of their duties and strict supervision over each employee. In order to provide supervision, special controls are often distinguished that function autonomously . For example, law enforcement agencies often submit to the head of the executive branch, as well as the bureaucratic apparatus, but at the same time retain considerable independence.
Internal control was the main way to fight corruption in monarchies of the absolutism period and still retains high efficiency. In particular, Machiavelli believed that in monarchies “ruling with the help of servants,” corruption is less dangerous, since all “servants” are obliged to the sovereign's mercies and they are harder to bribe.
External control
These include mechanisms that have a high degree of independence from the executive. The UN Convention against Corruption leads a number of similar mechanisms. An independent judicial system, in which a lawbreaking bureaucrat can be easily and effectively found guilty, dramatically reduces the potential attractiveness of corruption. One of the most effective tools to control the corruption of the bureaucratic apparatus is freedom of speech and the media [35] .
External control is characteristic of countries with a market economy and liberal democracy. Presumably, this is due to the fact that the implementation of the normal functioning of the market requires clear rules, mechanisms to ensure the fulfillment of obligations, including an effective legal system that ensures a healthy competitive environment [36] . Liberal democracy also relies on the electoral system, the rule of law , independent justice, separation of powers, and the system of checks and balances to achieve its goals. All of these political institutions are simultaneously mechanisms for external control over corruption.
However, not all provisions of liberal democracy unambiguously contribute to the fight against corruption. An example is the principle of separation of powers. The separation of powers horizontally stimulates their supervision of each other. For example, in parliamentary democracy, representative power has the authority to dismiss a government. On the other hand, in presidential democracy, the branches of government are even more functionally divided. Despite this, corruption in presidential republics is generally higher than in parliamentary ones, which is probably connected with the time-consuming procedure of impeaching the president [29] . Further, the separation of powers at the territorial level and the associated transfer of most executive powers to the level of local self-government leads to an effective reduction in the size of government. This increases the information transparency of power and reduces corruption. Nevertheless, the federal structure of the state, ensuring maximum decentralization, often leads to the regulation of various aspects of the same activity by officials of different instances, and, consequently, to greater corruption compared to unitary states [29] .
Election system
In democratic countries, the main way to punish elected representatives for corruption is to remove them from power in the next election. This implies that the voter himself is responsible for the degree of honesty and responsibility of those he elects. Despite the high effectiveness of elections as a weapon against corruption, their action is manifested rather slowly. Every 30 years, a stable democratic system has the same effect on corruption as the transition to a liberal-democratic model of government [29] .
A number of authors have suggested that flaws in the electoral process can have a significant impact on the scope of corruption. Even if the elections are held without violations, their system itself can encourage the voter to vote for one candidate or another for ideological reasons, ignoring the corruption of him personally, his subordinates or his party as a whole. This hypothesis is confirmed [37] . Corruption turns out to be significantly less in countries where several representatives are elected by a majoritarian system in each constituency than in countries with proportional elections and closed party lists or in countries with small constituencies and the choice of one representative in each district. This is due to the fact that the majority system ensures the greatest individual accountability, and the choice of several representatives or on open party lists greatly increases the attention that voters place on the honesty of candidates.
General Measures
Elimination of the aforementioned related causes of corruption also applies to anti-corruption measures.
Unconstitutionality of corruption norms . Any rules that impose restrictions on the citizen may cause corruption, with the exception of the rules describing constitutional freedoms and human rights. The latter impose restrictions not so much on individuals as on state authorities, being institutional guarantees against both the exaggerated demands of the law and the empowerment of state bodies with discretionary powers [38] . Corruption-related norms inevitably violate the rights and freedoms of a person and citizen enshrined in the Constitution. Corruption norms can be identified through independent anti-corruption expertise [39]
Information support of citizens . This method includes the analysis of laws so that, after analyzing the law, clearly, concisely and intelligibly explain to citizens what their rights and obligations are, what violations they should entail, how the judicial procedure goes and what is taken into account in it. Knowing all this, citizens will behave more confidently, finding themselves one-on-one with an official pushing them to bribe.
Openness of departmental systems . Transparency of operations occurring within departments and proper civilian control can be implemented through the publication and open discussion of internal documents on the public Internet, which can seriously shake the foundation of corruption. However, such mechanisms are limited by excessively stringent regulations on the protection of commercial secrets or their use in some departments is associated with the need to provide additional measures to protect the personal data of citizens and secret information in defense ministries and organizations. A serious problem for the introduction of open information systems is the low competence of officials who are not only unaware of the advantages of free licenses , but are not able to include in government contracts the requirements for the mandatory provision of open read access to software version control systems for the taxpayer’s money.
Social security officials . First-class medical care, interest - free loans for the purchase of real estate , a large pension - all this is equivalent to a salary increase in the public sector, and consequently, increases the official’s losses if he is caught in corrupt activities. Judging by research, this measure does not have an immediate impact on corruption, but it contributes to improving the quality of bureaucracy over time.
Objective difficulties
The crux of the problem in the fight against corruption was formulated by James Madison : “If angels ruled people, there would be no need for any supervision over the government, whether external or internal. But when creating a board in which people will be in charge of people, the main difficulty is that first of all it is necessary to provide the ruling with the opportunity to supervise the governed; but after this it is necessary to oblige the ruling to supervise themselves ”(“ Federalist ”, No. 51) [40] .
One of the most important deterrents to corruption is criminal law. In practice, laws in most countries provide a fairly narrow framework for interpreting types of corruption that are considered criminal offenses, in order to eliminate the risk of selectively applying legislation to suppress civil liberties and opposition. Therefore, for example, a gift can be considered a bribe only if there is an intention to influence the official. If an official is not prohibited by law to accept gifts in principle, then it is usually difficult to prove the fact of a bribe. On the contrary, waste is often considered proven in the presence of damage, regardless of whether the employee had the intention to appropriate the funds or not.
Another difficulty, especially in large-scale corruption, when most individuals give bribes, is known in psychology and game theory as the “ prisoner 's dilemma ”. On the one hand, if all individuals stop paying bribes, they will all benefit from it. However, if only one private person refuses bribes, then he will put himself in extremely unfavorable conditions.
Finally, a serious problem is the stability of corruption markets mentioned above.
Singapore Anti-Corruption Strategy
The Singapore anti-corruption strategy is rigorous and consistent, based on “logic in controlling corruption”: “attempts to eradicate corruption should be based on the desire to minimize or eliminate conditions that create both an incentive and the ability to induce a person to commit corrupt actions” [41] .
At the time of independence in 1965 , Singapore was a country with high corruption. The tactics of its reduction was built on a number of vertical measures: regulation of the actions of officials, simplification of bureaucratic procedures, strict supervision over the observance of high ethical standards. The central element was the autonomous Corruption Investigation Bureau, to which citizens can lodge complaints with civil servants and claim damages. At the same time, legislation was tightened, the independence of the judicial system increased (with a high salary and privileged status of judges), economic sanctions were introduced for giving a bribe or refusing to participate in anti-corruption investigations, as well as harsh actions, including the complete dismissal of customs and other state services. This was combined with the deregulation of the economy, higher wages of officials and the training of qualified administrative personnel.
Currently, Singapore occupies a leading position in the world for the absence of corruption, economic freedom and development.
Finnish anti-corruption strategy
A special feature of the Finnish anti-corruption strategy was the actual absence of a special law on corruption and special [42] . Corruption was considered as part of criminal crime and was regulated at all levels of legislation, norms and other control systems [42] . A feature of Finland was a relatively mild punishment for accepting a bribe by officials - from a fine to four years in prison [42] . During the post-war period, there was a sharp decline in the previously high level of bribery - in 1945-1954 549 people were convicted of receiving bribes, 81 were pronounced in 1980-1989, and only 38 in the 1990s [42] . Since the 1990s, Finland began to use international instruments - the 1997 EU Convention on Combating Corruption, the 1998 OECD Convention on Combating Bribes, the 1999 Council of Europe Convention on Criminal and Civil Law concerning corruption, the UN Convention against Corruption, were ratified adopted in Mexico City in December 2003. [42]
Swedish anti-corruption strategy
Corruption flourished in Sweden until the middle of the 19th century. One of the consequences of the modernization of the country was a set of measures aimed at eliminating mercantilism . Since then, government regulation has concerned more households than firms, and has been based on incentives (through taxes, benefits and subsidies ) than on bans and permits. Access to internal government documents was opened and an independent and effective justice system was created. At the same time, the Swedish parliament and government set high ethical standards for administrators and began to push for their execution. After just a few years, honesty has become a social norm among bureaucracies. Salaries of high-ranking officials initially exceeded workers' wages by 12–15 times, however, over time, this difference decreased to double [43] . Today, Sweden still has one of the lowest levels of corruption in the world.
Economic Analysis of Corruption
If the size of a bribe is easy to compare with the monetary expression of the amount stolen, then for the losses of subjects from punishment one has to take into account opportunity costs - the number of years the offender will spend in prison, multiplied by the difference between his possible average annual income and spending on his detention. You can also take into account the negative social consequences of reducing the weight of a caught criminal in a society and lowering his potential income.
The resource allocation model in an economy with corruption
A model in which a ministry produces one uniform product with a demand curve D ( P ) on the part of individuals [28] . A product (service) is sold by an official who has the ability to influence the quantity of goods sold. He can simply refuse any individual to provide the goods without any risk of punishment.
The official’s goal is to maximize the amount of bribes that he collects from the sale of government goods, the official price for which is equal to P , and there are no production costs for the official, since they are paid by the state. There are two cases - with theft and without, the marginal costs MC ( English marginal cost ) for the official depend on it.
If the employee receives from the citizens the amount from which the official price of the goods is transferred to the state - then the MC will be equal to P. If he does not transfer anything to the state and appropriates the entire amount received from the citizens, then the MC for him is zero, and the citizen pays only a bribe. To discriminate citizens by giving each person their own price, he cannot and therefore acts as a monopolist.
According to this model, corruption spreads primarily due to competition between officials, since the most attractive positions go to those who can pay the highest price for them, which encourages the collection of bribes. In the case of corruption with theft , the spread of corruption is accelerated due to two factors. First, officials compete for budget funds. Secondly, for consumers of public services, spending on a bribe in collusion with an official turns out to be less than on tax or duty, and therefore bribe givers find themselves in a better position in the market than their law-abiding competitors.
In the light of the fight against corruption, in this case it is enough to introduce strict accounting in order to impede theft. The transition to corruption without theft, as can be seen from the graphs, will also lower the number of bribes.
At the same time, the authors of the model note that it is applicable mainly to authoritarian regimes and undeveloped markets. In countries with open economies, competition in general has the opposite - deterrent - effect on corruption. If different agencies provide the same services, then the consumer has a choice, and the level of extortion of bribes decreases. Private firms are reporting on bribing competitors to law enforcement agencies. Competition among political elites in democratic regimes makes the government more transparent.
Agent Principal Theory
The theory of the principal-agent considers the situation when the guarantor (the "principal") does not have complete information about the actions of the performers ("agents"). Therefore, he enters into a contract with them containing favorable conditions for agents that motivate them to behave (mainly providing services to clients) in the interests of the principal. The main conclusions of the agent model — without the use of special terminology — are set forth in the Fundamental Contradiction section.
This model is also used to study the behavior of elites that are influenced by various groups. Corruption refers to the conflict of interests of these groups with the interests of voters: the principal is the nation as a whole, which concludes a social contract with elected representatives (agents) [18] . The analysis shows that the more informed the voters, the less opportunities for corruption among representatives. For their part, representatives seek to pursue a policy that will ensure their re-election and at the same time allow them to increase their personal income. An example of a solution that creates opportunities for corruption is an increase in budget spending on defense, since this decision is determined by both the policy and the economic interests of various groups.
Corruption in Russia
At the beginning of 1999, the Deputy Prosecutor General of Russia, Yu. Ya. Chaika, stated that Russia is among the ten most corrupt countries in the world and that corruption is one of the most destructive forces in the Russian state. [44] In 1999, Academician of RAS D.S. Lvov and Doctor of Economic Sciences Yu.V. Ovsienko assessed corruption in Russia as “total”. [45]
В 2006 году первый заместитель Генпрокурора РФ Александр Буксман заявил, что по некоторым экспертным оценкам объём рынка коррупции в России оценивается 240 с лишним млрд долларов США [46] Согласно оценкам фонда ИНДЕМ , эта величина ещё выше: только в деловой сфере России объём коррупции вырос между 2001 и 2005 гг. примерно с 33 до 316 млрд долл. США в год (не включая коррупцию на уровне политиков федерального уровня и бизнес-элиты). [47] По оценке того же фонда, средний уровень взятки, которую российские бизнесмены дают чиновникам, вырос в тот период с 10 до 136 тыс. долл. [47]
В 2000 году показатель индекса восприятия коррупции , составляемого организацией « Transparency International » , равнялся 2,6 (из 10), в 2009 году — 2,2 (чем выше показатель, тем меньше уровень коррупции). [48] The New York Times утверждает, что главные проблемы вывода из обращения и инвестиционных возможностей огромных денег, или вывоза из России капитала, — коррупция [49] .
В 2007 году председатель Национального антикоррупционного комитета России Кирилл Кабанов заявил, что никакой борьбы с коррупцией в России нет: аресты чиновников среднего звена систему взяточничества не нарушают, политика по противодействию коррупции не выработана. [50] [51]
В 2009 году Transparency International оценивала коррупционный рынок в России в 300 миллиардов долларов [52] .
В 2010 году в ежегодном рейтинге восприятия коррупции в странах мира, составляемом Transparency International, Россия заняла 154-е место из 180 с индексом 2,1 балла (индекс 0 означает максимальный уровень коррупции, 10 — отсутствие коррупции). Генеральный директор отделения Transparency International в России Елена Панфилова отметила: «В прошлом году Россия в этом рейтинге занимала 146 место. Вывод — за год у нас ничего не поменялось за исключением соседей по рейтингу — Папуа-Новой Гвинеи, Кении, Лаоса и Таджикистана» [53] .
Следует отметить, что во многих статьях и дискуссиях при упоминании названия этого индекса слово «восприятие» (Perception) принято опускать, в результате чего создаётся ложное впечатление, что индекс отражает реальное состояние дел в области коррупции, в то время как на самом деле речь идёт, фактически, об уровне озабоченности населения вопросами коррупции.
К сферам деятельности (помимо перечисленных в разделе Области обогащения ), которые в наибольшей степени подвержены коррупции в России, относятся :
- таможенные службы: пропуск через границу запрещённых к перевозке товаров; возврат конфискованных товаров и валюты; занижение таможенных пошлин; занижение таможенной стоимости товаров; необоснованные отсрочки таможенных платежей [47] ;
- медицинские организации: закупка оборудования и лекарств по завышенным ценам; выдача несоответствующих действительности медицинских заключений; приоритетное обслуживание одних граждан за счёт других;
- car inspections: unjustified granting of licenses (driver's license, certificates of technical inspection); lack of legal punishment for violators of road rules; falsification of information and conclusions about road accidents in favor of interested parties;
- judicial authorities: biased consideration of the circumstances of the case; making unjust decisions; violation of legal procedures; opposite decisions of different courts in the same case; the use of ships as a tool for raiding ;
- tax authorities: non-receipt of taxes in full; VAT return; caused by competitors check and stop production;
- law enforcement agencies: initiation and termination of criminal cases, as well as sending them for additional investigation; lack of legal punishment for offenses of varying severity;
- licensing and registration of business activities;
- issuing permits for placing and conducting banking operations with budget funds;
- obtaining loans;
- obtaining export quotas;
- tenders for the purchase of goods / services at the expense of budget funds;
- construction and repair at the expense of budget funds;
- notarization of transactions;
- monitoring compliance with licensing conditions;
- supervision of compliance with the rules of hunting and fishing;
- exemption from conscription for military service in the armed forces;
- admission to state higher education institutions (mainly legal and economic specializations);
- state registration, certification and accreditation of non-state higher education institutions;
- entering specialized secondary schools and pre-school educational institutions;
- recruitment to a service that allows you to have significant illegal income from positions in state and municipal institutions;
- formation of party election lists.
Anti-corruption activities are one of the factors for the development of the Russian economy [54] . In order to combat corruption in Russia in July 2008, the National Anti-Corruption Plan was approved by the President of the Russian Federation .
According to the public organization “Business Russia”, the most corrupt regions in Russia are Moscow , Moscow , Omsk , Volgograd regions and the Altai Territory [55] .
According to a study conducted by the British audit company Ernst & Young in the spring of 2012, for 2011, corruption risks in Russia have decreased significantly and in many ways have become lower than the world average. Over 1,500 top managers from major companies from 43 countries took part in the Ernst & Young survey. So, if in 2011, 39% of managers surveyed in Russia expressed the need to give bribes in cash to protect a business or achieve corporate benefits, in 2012 these were 16%. [56]
Corruption Indicators
Free
- World Bank's Enterprise Surveys (English)
- World Bank's Control of Corruption (English)
- Transparency International (English)
- Global Competitiveness Report (English)
Paid
Auxiliary Surveys
In art and culture
- Gogol N. V. “Auditor”
- Corruption is a board game designed by Bruno Faydutti [57]
- Octopus
- The Seagull (film)
- He is not Dimon to you (film)
See also
- Treasury
- Bribe
- Magarych
- Mzda
- Kleptocracy
- Tender (bidding)
- Administrative resource
- Kumovsky capitalism
- Declaration of income and property of public officials
- Briber index
- Corruption Perception Index
- Transparency International
- Tweed Gang
- Corruption in Russia
- International Day against Corruption
Comments
- ↑ Discretionary power - the authority to act within the law at its own discretion. (See I. Kalinsky. Discretionary Power. Archival copy dated November 21, 2014 on the Wayback Machine (inaccessible link from 14-06-2016 [1141 day]). In the book: G.Ivanets, I.K. Kalinsky, Chervonyuk V. I. Constitutional Law of Russia: Encyclopedic Dictionary / Under the General editorship of V. I. Chervonyuk. - Moscow: Law. Lit., 2002.)
- ↑ Along with the term “state rent”, denoting bribes and missing bribes by officials, the expressions “administrative rent” (introduced by E. Gaidar in 1995 at the conference “Reforms in Russia. Established interests and practical alternatives”) and “status Rent ”(introduced by President V. Putin in 2001 in his annual address to the Federal Assembly).
- ↑ Many people point out that the majority of the least corrupt countries in the world are predominantly Protestant (see Calvinist perspective on the problem of corruption ).
Notes
- Е. E. Rumyantseva. What is the damage from corruption in the aggregate and in its parts - who will provide the society with the most correct method of calculating it? // Expert Network on Public Administration "Goskuk"
- ↑ 1 2 Bardhan P. Corruption and development // Journal of Economic Literature. - 1997. - Vol. 25. - P. 1320. [1] Archival copy of September 20, 2009 on the Wayback Machine (eng.)
- ↑ Tanzi, V. Corruption, Governmental Activities and Markets // IMF Working Paper 94/99. - International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. - 1994. [2]
- ↑ The Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide
- ↑ See, for example, Chinhamo O., Shumba G. Institutional Working Paper. 2007. No. 1 [3] (not available link)
- Federal Law of the Russian Federation of December 25, 2008 N 273-FZ “On Combating Corruption” [4]
- ↑ Reader of the state and rights of foreign countries. Antiquity and the Middle Ages / comp. V.A. Tomsinov. - M .: Zertsalo, 1999; 2004. - p. 56.
- ↑ the Bible. Old Testament. - M., 1994. - p. 352.
- ↑ Table IX. 3. Avl. Helium / Laws XII tables. Readings on the history of the state and the rights of foreign countries / ed. V.A. Tomsinova. - M .: Zertsalo, 1999. p. 120.
- ↑ Machiavelli N. Favorites. - M., 1989. - p. 78-79.
- Ard Bardhan P. Corruption and review of issues. - In: Political corruption: concepts and contexts / Ed. Heidenheimer AJ, Johnston M. 3rd ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002. - ISBN 978-0-7658-0761-8 - P. 331. (eng.)
- ↑ Glaeser EL, Goldin C. Corruption and reform: an introduction (English) // NBER Working Paper 10775. 2004.
- ↑ Douglas Houston. Can corruption improve the state of the economy? inLiberty.ru .
- 2 1 2 3 Jain AK Corruption: a review // Journal of Economic Surveys. - 2001. - Vol 15, No. 1. - P. 71. DOI : 10.1111 / 1467-6419.00133 (English)
- ↑ S. Zagraevsky. On possible ways to fight corruption in Russia
- ↑ Arias Sánchez, O. Preface // Fundamentals of the fight against corruption (the system of national ethical behavior) / Ed. S.V. Maksimova - Moscow: 1999. [5]
- ↑ Order of the SCC of the Russian Federation of 26.04.1995 No. 287 “On the state of work in the fight against corruption, official misconduct and the tasks of ensuring the own security of the customs authorities of the Russian Federation”.
- ↑ 1 2 See bibliography .
- ↑ 1 2 Tanzi V. Corruption around the world. // IMF Staff Papers. - 1998. - Vol. 45, No. 4. - P. 559. [6] (Eng.)
- ↑ Vladimir Snegirev: We need to learn from Iceland’s experience in dealing with the crisis - Vladimir Snegirev - Rossiyskaya Gazeta
- ↑ Rating of “anti-corruption” votes of deputies
- ↑ Corruption affects the migration of qualified personnel
- As Thomas Hobbes wrote, corruption "is the root from which contempt for all laws flows at all times and with all sorts of temptations."
- 2 1 2 3 Rose-Ackerman S. The Political Economy of Corruption // Corruption and the global economy / Ed. Elliott KA - Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. - 1997. - P. 31. [7] (English)
- ↑ Books. Yu. V. Latov
- ↑ The following analysis is based on the agent model. See: Rose-Ackermann, S. Corruption and the State. Causes, effects, reform / Trans. from English O. A. Alyakrinsky. - M .: Logos, 2003.
- “Simple, unambiguous, concise and understandable legislation reduces the need for a large apparatus of officials and facilitates the understanding of laws by citizens.” (Resolution of the VI All-Russian Congress of Judges of 02.12.04 "On the state of justice in the Russian Federation and the prospect of its improvement").
- ↑ 1 2 Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. Corruption // Quarterly Journal of Economics . - 1993. - Vol. 108, No. 3. - P. 599. [8] Archival copy dated October 27, 2006 on the Wayback Machine (eng.)
- 2 1 2 3 4 Lederman D, Loayza NV, Soares RR Accountability and corruption: political institutions matter // Economics & Politics. - 2005. - Vol. 17, No. 1. - P. 1. DOI : 10.1111 / j.1468-0343.2005.00145.x (English)
- ↑ Shleifer A., Vishny R. Pervasive shortages under socialism // RAND Journal of Economics. - 1992. - Vol. 23, No. 2 - P. 237.
- ↑ Weyland K. The politics of corruption in Latin America // Journal of Democracy. - 1998. - Vol. 9, No. 2. - P. 108.
- ↑ Kaufmann D. Research on corruption: critical empirical issues // Economics of corruption / ed. Jain AK - Mass .: Kluwer. - 1998. - P. 129.
- ↑ IDEOLOGY - Foundation - Extremists of the moral revolution (Inaccessible link) . The appeal date is April 12, 2014. Archived April 13, 2014.
- Des Ades A., Di Tella R. The new economics of corruption: // Political Studies. - 1997. - Vol. 45, No. 3. - P. 496. DOI : 10.1111 / 1467-9248.00093 (English)
- ↑ Brunetti A., Weder B. A Journal of Public Economics. - 2003. - Vol. 87. - P. 1801. DOI : 10.1016 / S0047-2727 (01) 00186-4 (eng.)
- ↑ Brodman G., Ricanatini F. The Roots of Corruption: Are Market Institutions Important? / Per. from English // World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2368. - 2000. [9]
- ↑ Persson T., Tabellini G., Trebbi F. Electoral rules and corruption // Journal of the European Economic Association . - 2003. - Vol. 1, No. 4. - P. 958. DOI : 10.1162 / 154247603322493203 (eng.)
- ↑ Golovschinsky KI. Diagnosis of corruption-related legislation. / Ed. G. A. Satarov and M. A. Krasnov. [ten]
- Efficiency of independent anti-corruption expertise as an institution of civil society // Civil Society In Russia And Abroad. - 2019. - Vol. 2 - P. 31–34 . - ISSN 2221-3287 .
- ↑ Federalist: The political essays of A. Hamilton, J. Madison and J. Jay. Federalist number 51 [50]. James Madison (with Alexander Hamilton)
- ↑ VTsIOP - Singapore Anti-Corruption Strategy (inaccessible link) . The appeal date is September 25, 2006. Archived April 29, 2005.
- ↑ 1 2 3 4 5 Institute of Europe, RAS
- ↑ Lindbeck A. Swedish lessons for post-socialist countries. - Institute for International Economic Studies, Seminar Paper No. 645. - Stockholm: 1998. [11]
- ↑ News for 02/03/1999 (inaccessible link) // Polit.Ru
- ↑ D.S. Lvov, Yu. V. Ovsienko “On the main directions of socio-economic transformations” // Economics of modern Russia. 1999. № 3. S. 99-114.
- ↑ A. Sharov Neither give nor take. The Prosecutor General’s Office launched a new offensive against corrupt officials. Rossiyskaya Gazeta Federal Issue No. 4215, dated November 7, 2006.
- ↑ 1 2 3 Research of the INDEM Foundation “Diagnostics of Russian Corruption 2005” [12] Archival copy of June 22, 2006 on the Wayback Machine .
- ↑ Corruption Perceptions Index 2010
- ↑ At the Time Warner Center - The Enclave of Mighty Russians // The New York Times, February 11? 2015
- ↑ Latukhina K., Bausin A. Two for bribes // Vedomosti, № 182 (1956), September 27, 2007
- ↑ Frolovskaya T., Kotov A. Battle for make-believe // RBC daily. September 27, 2007
- ↑ Transparency International - the global coalition against corruption (inaccessible link) . The appeal date is September 6, 2011. Archived October 20, 2010.
- ↑ Rating of the perception of corruption in the countries of the world (Verified January 28, 2011)
- Anti-corruption activities as a factor in Russia's economic security .- Article. - Economics and environmental management.
- ↑ Russie: liste noire des régions les plus corrompues (Fr.) // Le Figaro. 2010-10-12.
- ↑ VEDOMOSTI - Ernst & Young has noted the reduction of corruption risks in Russia
- ↑ "Corruption" - a board game (English)
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International Law
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- Civil Law Convention on Corruption - Council of Europe. European Treaty Series. No. 174.
- United Nations Convention against Corruption. New York: UN, 2004. [15]
- UN Convention against Corruption
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- Solovyov V. R. The Empire of Corruption. The territory of the Russian national game. - M., Eksmo, 2012. - 288 p.
- Fisman, R., Miguel, E. Economic Gangsters. Corruption, violence and poverty of national proportions. - M., 2012. - 302 p.
- Larisa Burakova. Why did Georgia succeed? - Alpina Publisher, 2011. - 271 p. - ISBN 978-5-4295-0012-6 .
Artworks
- Dubovitsky Natan ( Vladislav Surkov Surkov acknowledged the authorship of “Okolonol” // Russian pioneer. Special issue. - Moscow: “Live”, 2009. - 112 p.
Links
- Corruption Perception Index , in English. - rating of corruption by country.
- Anti-Corruption. RU. Corruption, corruption, facts of corruption, the fight against corruption.
- Corruption and the fight against it
- NetKorruptsii.ru - all about corruption, bribes, nepotism
- Bribe table
- The plot of the program "The View" on corruption in the USSR
- Tishchenko PD Corruption: the Russian Experience
- News about corruption - Help.su
- Short essay and world history of corruption
- State policy on combating corruption and the shadow economy in Russia Materials of the All-Russian Scientific Conference (Moscow, June 6, 2007)
- rospil.info - Fighting government officials who use the public procurement system for personal enrichment. .