History of Israeli special services

Creating Shai

The history of the Israeli secret services dates back to 1929 during the British Mandate in Palestine . The increase in Arabs' violence since 1920, and especially the mass pogroms of 1929, when 133 were killed and 339 injured during the week, led to the creation of an intelligence and information service in the framework of the organization of Jewish self-defense Hagan . The creation of such a service, called “Sherut Unity” ( Hebrew שירות ידיעות , “Information Service”) or abbreviated “ Shay ” ( Hebrew ש"י ), was initiated in 1929 by the National Committee and the Jewish Agency (“Sokhnut” is a prototype of the future government of Israel.) In parallel, the political department of “Sokhnut” began operational work. Its main directions were collecting political and military information in the Middle East and other countries and creating an agent network to monitor the Jewish population around the world ^{[ 1]} .

In April 1936, one of the commanders of the Hagan Jewish self-defense units called on Ezra Danin , who had extensive acquaintances among the Arabs , to find out who killed the two unarmed Jews on April 15 on the road between Anabta village and the British Nur Shams camp. ^{[2] [3]} Then Ezra Danin recruited his first agent - an Arab, who agreed to report everything that he would know about the plans of the militants to attack the Jewish settlements.

Danin turned to the political department of the Jewish Agency and proposed forming an agent network among the Arabs. For these purposes, six British pounds a month were allocated. As a result, recruiting agents, Danin paid them out of his own pocket ^[4] . At the end of August 1936, at the peak of the Arab unrest, Danin wrote a 2-page memorandum proposing the creation of a special intelligence service in Hagan and explained why it was needed ^[5] . Together with Danin, Reuven Shiloah (Zaslansky), who worked in the political department of the Jewish Agency and Shaul Avigur (Meyerov), one of the leaders of the “Hagana” ^{[1] [6],} took part in the creation of the intelligence service.

In the summer of 1940, the Arab department was established at the headquarters of the Haganah, headed by Danin. His deputy was Shimshon Mashbets. Almost simultaneously with this, a counterintelligence department was also created ( Rigul negdi ) to counter the penetration of British agents into the Hagana , it was led by Shaul Avigur and David Shaltiel . ^{[7] [8] [9]}

Danin considered his main task the development of a theory of intelligence work in relation to the conditions of Palestine . It was he who formulated the key principle of Israeli intelligence: "Know your enemy . " He claimed ^{[2] [10]} :

Danin counted 25 organizations and fields of activity in which Arabs and Jews worked together. For example, freight and shipping, telecommunications , railways , journalism , municipalities , prisons and offices of the British administration. He suggested that Jewish workers recruit Arab agents there. This concept was different from British intelligence methods, which allowed searching for potential informants only in political, paramilitary and subversive organizations. ^[eleven]

Initially, Cherut Unity consisted of three departments: the internal security department (the so-called Jewish Division), the political (penetration into the British authorities) and the Arab. It was also envisaged the creation of three regional departments, but during this period they existed only on paper ^[1] .

Reorganization of 1942

In March 1942, Shay was reorganized. She was relieved of counterintelligence functions and withdrawn from the structure of military organs. The Shay was directly subordinated to the leadership of the Haganah and the political department of the Jewish Agency. Instead of Moshe Shertok, the entire Shay special service was headed by Israel Amir , who had previously been engaged in arms purchases for the Hagana. The organization worked under the guise of the Soldiers' Social Security Committee, its headquarters was located in Tel Aviv at number 85 on Ben Yehuda Street ^[12] .

Since 1945, the political department was headed by Boris Guriel (Gurevich) ^[13] , the Arabian - Ezra Danin (the only professional in the organization), since 1945 Benjamin Ghibli (future chief of military intelligence ) became his assistant instead of Mashbets ^[7] The "Jewish Division" was headed by Joseph Krakovsky ^[14] , and by 1944 he was replaced by Isser Harel (future head of Shabak and Mossad ) ^[15] .

During the Second World War , the creation of file cabinets for Arab extremists began, which was systematized by 1943 ^[14] . The last chief of the Shay was Lieutenant Colonel Isser Beyeri , who, since February 1948, succeeded David Shaltiel ^{[9] [16]} .

At the same time, Reuven Shiloah formulated the goals and objectives of the Israeli secret services, which remain relevant to this day ^{[17] [18]} :

Thus, by the time of the proclamation of Israel, a theoretical and personnel base had been prepared for the creation of special services of the new state.

Reorganization of 1948

With the beginning of the second stage of the Arab-Israeli war in May 1948, the network of informants created by Danin practically collapsed - the settlements were separated by a front line, and Shay had no radio transmitters ^[19] . At the time the war began, all Jewish intelligence had 68 employees. ^[20]

On June 7, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion summoned two Hagana officers whom he trusted: Reuven Shiloh and Isser Beeri. The three of them decided to reorganize the Israeli intelligence services on the British model. ^[21]

On June 30, Beeri convened a meeting at Shay headquarters at 85 at Ben Yehuda Street in Tel Aviv . In addition to Beeri himself, five top leaders of this organization attended: Abraham Kidron from Galilee , David Karon from the Negev, Benjamin Ghibli from Jerusalem, Isser Harel from Tel Aviv and Boris Guriel, who headed the political department of the newly created Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At this meeting, Beyer announced that the “ Old Man ” (as Ben-Gurion was called for his eyes) decided to dissolve “Shay” and reorganize the special services ^{[22] [23] [24]} .

Lieutenant Colonel Beery led the Intelligence Service ( Cherut Modiin , Hebrew שירות מודיעין ), Haim Herzog became his deputy. The counterintelligence, dubbed the Israeli Security Agency , was led by Isser Harel , and Yosef Izraeli from the Ministry of Defense became his deputy. Both of these services were subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. Intelligence operations outside of Israel were entrusted to the political department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which for this purpose the so-called “Research Department” ( Makhleket ha-Mihkar ) was created under the leadership of Boris Guriel ^{[25] [23] [26]} .

Both military intelligence and the Guriel department began to create full-fledged residencies outside of Israel. In fact, intelligence work abroad began in 1947 , when the Shay intelligence service sent the Daat ( Cognition ) group under the leadership of Yehuda Ben-Menachem to Europe for this purpose. After the creation of the political department of the Foreign Ministry, Ben-Menachem's communications were transferred to Boris Guriel. ^[21] The first official residency of Israeli intelligence was established in Rome in 1948.

The general supervision of all special services was entrusted to Reuven Shiloh, who received the title of adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on special issues, and his colleagues gave him the nickname "Mr. Intelligence" ^[23] .

The fourth and separate special organization created by Hagana back in 1937 was Mossad le Aliyah Bet ( Hebrew המוסד לעלייה ב ' ) ^{[comm 1]} or simply Aliyah Bet engaged in illegal immigration of Jews to Palestine The creation of the state of Israel, as it turned out, did not solve the issue of legalizing the departure of Jews from many countries, and Aliya Bet continued its work. This service was headed by Shaul Avigur , he was also engaged in the procurement of weapons with the help of the Rehesh agency ^[27] .

Beeri case

On June 30, 1948, literally a few hours after the meeting at which the Shay was dissolved and the reorganization of intelligence services, Isser Beeri ordered the execution of the captain of the Israeli army Meir Tuvian , whom he and Benjamin Ghibli suspected of transmitting Jordan’s secret information through the British ^{[28] ] [29] [30]} .

Isser Beeri, Benjamin Ghibli, Abraham Kidron and David Karon ^[20] were tried by the Tuvan Military Court (the so-called “ Kangaroo Court ”) and sentenced to death. The sentence was immediately executed, preventing Tuvan from defending himself and appealing against the verdict. Subsequently, Meir of Tuvan was posthumously acquitted, rehabilitated and buried with military honors ^[28] . Tuvian became one of two people executed by court in the history of Israel, the second was the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann , hanged in Ramla in 1962. ^[31]

On May 14, 1948, Beeri arrested Yehuda Amster, a relative and assistant to the mayor of Haifa, Abba Hushi, on charges of espionage , and tortured him for 76 days in order to secure a slander of Hushi. Amster was released ( August 1, 1948) without charge and classified his case for several years. Subsequently, it turned out that Beyer had falsified evidence that Hushi was engaged in espionage in favor of the British ^{[32] [33]} .

In the summer of 1948, Beeri ordered the assassination of his own agent, Ali Kassem, an Arab suspected of "double play" ^{[34] [35]} .

After these events, on behalf of David Ben-Gurion, an investigative committee was created, which, having examined the activities of Beer, recommended that he be removed from his post. Beer was fired from the army. The chief of military intelligence was his deputy Haim Herzog ^{[34] [36] [37]} .

On October 15, 1949, the court found Isser Beeri guilty of the murder of Meir of Tuvan, but, given the circumstances and merits of the accused, sentenced him to one day in prison. Beyer received a pardon from the first President of Israel, Chaim Weizmann ^{[38] [30]} .

Beeri himself and his son Itai subsequently claimed that the " Big Isser " only obeyed the orders of David Ben-Gurion ^{[34] [38]} .

The Beeri case was an important precedent for placing the work of the Israeli secret services under the rule of law. Beer’s argument that the work of the special services and the observance of the law are incompatible was rejected by the court ^[39] .

Intelligence coordination

The “Intelligence Coordinating Committee,” ( Vaadat Rashe Hasherutim ; Heb. ועדת ראשי השירותים ) or abbreviated as “ Varash ”, headed by Reuven Shiloh, first met in April 1949. This committee included the heads of special services, their deputies and the inspector general of police ^[40] .

On December 13, 1949, Ben-Gurion signed a secret letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he reported on the organizational unification of all intelligence services under the leadership of Shiloah, with personal submission to the Prime Minister. The “Central Office for the Concentration and Coordination of Intelligence and Security Services” (ha-Mossad Leteum) has been created ^[25] . Reuven Schiloach became Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Policy and Strategic Affairs ^{[41] [42]} .

Some traditions of intelligence, introduced under Shiloh, are preserved to this day. So, the staff of special services is rather small (in the state of Mossad there are only 1,200 people including technical personnel), but a very large number of recruited agents are used, of which only Mossad has about 35,000. In addition to agents, voluntary helpers are used - Sayanim , who are traditionally recruited among Jews from different countries. ^[43]

Spy Riot

The duplication of functions and some personal qualities of Guriel's employees gave rise to a conflict that ended in the so-called "spy riot" in 1951 .

In 1950, Asher Ben-Nathan , the head of the Makhlekat Ha-Mihkar operational unit, who was engaged in conducting intelligence operations abroad, undertook to open the diplomatic mail of foreign missions in Israel, thereby invading the sphere of competence of Isser Harel. After Harel’s complaint to Ben-Gurion, Boris Guriel received a reprimand and a ban on all activities in Israel ^{[44] [45]} .

The conflict between military intelligence and Shabak, on the one hand, and Guriel’s department on the other, arose because of fundamentally different approaches to work and life. Colonel Benjamin Ghibli, who became the head of military intelligence after removing Beer and leaving for diplomatic work of Chaim Herzog, could not stand the manners of Ben-Nathan, nicknamed Handsome Arthur and his people from European residences, who dined in expensive restaurants that spend large sums, but at the same time reach poor results in terms of quality information. Ghibli was supported by the head of the Shabak, Isser Harel, who believed that the scout should lead a modest, almost Puritan way of life. Harel wrote about this: ^[46]

In turn, Guriel’s operatives despised the uneducated and uncouth "military and police" and believed that they could not turn out to be good scouts ^{[47] [45]} .

The conflict did not slow to affect the results of work and especially on partnerships with friendly special services of other countries, in particular Italy and France . It came to the point that European intelligence began to engage in smuggling, citing its costs for operational needs. When these scandals reached Ben Gurion, he became furious and ordered the intelligence services coordinator Reuven Shiloah to put an end to this. As a result, Guriel was fired, the corresponding department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was dissolved, and residents were informed that they would now work under the leadership of Shiloah ^{[48] [49] [50]} .

Guriel reacted calmly to this information. However, on March 2, 1951, Ben-Nathan gathered in Switzerland on the shores of Lake Geneva European residents who previously worked under his leadership, and they actually went on strike , saying that they would not continue their previous work. Ben-Nathan himself remained in Switzerland, and some of his people even refused to transmit documents and information about current operations to Shiloah ^{[48] [51] [47]} .

The riot was suppressed quickly and efficiently - with the support of Ben-Gurion, all the functions of the Makhleket ha-Mihkar were transferred to other divisions of the intelligence special services. Most of the operatives returned to their duties ^{[52] [53]} .

1951 Reorganization

•  

  David Ben-Gurion - Israel's first Prime Minister

•  

  Reuven Schiloach , Mr. Intelligence, First Director of Mossad

•  

  Isser Harel - Memune, the head of all special services from 1952 to 1963

•  

  Yehoshafat Harkaby , head of military intelligence (1955-1959)

•  

  Meir Amit , head of the AMAN (1962-1963) and Mossad (1963-1968)

The transfer of all intelligence functions to the military was not the best solution: the new head of the European residency, Lt. Col. Mordechai Ben-Zur, was not very suitable for this work, and Ghibli himself was more likely to engage in sabotage than intelligence activities ^[54] .

Problems in the work of the special services of the late 1940s - early 1950s brought to life a new reorganization - already on the American model. This scheme as a whole persists today. ^{[25] [55]}

On the ruins of the political department, the “Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks” ( ha-Mossad le-modiin u-le-tafkidim meyuhadim , ( Hebrew המוסד למודיעין ולתפקידים מיוחדים ), known as " Mossad ", began its work. Its director was appointed Reuven Shiloh with direct subordination to the Prime Minister ^{[56] [57]} .

On March 2, 1951, by order of Ben-Gurion, an independent central authority was established to conduct intelligence activities abroad. This body is called “Ha-Rashut” (“Management”). Haim Yaari was appointed its head. ^[46] Since its founding, Ha-Rashut has been the main unit of the Mossad and included representatives of two other special services, both at the headquarters and operational levels. Thus, Mossad came out of submission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the leadership of the Prime Minister, and was included in the ministry of the head of government. Until 1957, Mossad did not have operational units, so it could only carry out operations with the involvement of operatives from other special services ^{[58] [59] [15]} .

Military intelligence has also been reorganized. Instead of “Cherut Modiin,” it became known as Agath Modi'in shel mate ha-klali ( Hebrew אגף המודיעין ) - “Intelligence Division of the General Staff” - or abbreviated as “ AMAN ” and became subordinate to the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces . Intelligence of the ground forces , air force and navy were in her command. The functions of military counterintelligence (with the exception of field services) were transferred to the Israeli General Security Service, Shabak . The head of "AMAN" remained Ghibli. Censorship of the Israeli media has also been entrusted with military intelligence, and AMAN has been engaged in this work to this day ^{[60] [59]} .

The activities of Aliya Bet were declared unsatisfactory given the situation of Jews in the USSR and the countries of the Eastern bloc . Therefore, in June 1951, instead of “Aliya Bet”, a “Bureau for Jewish Relations” ( Hebrew נתיב - לשכת הקשר ) was established to work in these countries, known as “ Nativ, ” and help in the departure of Jews from other countries was assigned to the Mossad. The Nativ bureau was subordinate to the prime minister, and Avigur remained his head ^[61] . Nativ lost the status of special services in the late 1990s.

Period Results

The period until 1952 is characterized by numerous reorganizations of special services and growth diseases associated with their initial formation. This was due to a change in the external political situation and the complexity of the tasks assigned to the new special services - from military operations to protecting the state in a hostile environment.

Reuven Shiloh , who led the Mossad , was a good theorist, but a completely useless practitioner, incapable of daily painstaking work. Shiloah himself understood that he was not in his place and resigned on September 12, 1952 ^{[62] [18]} .

After that, the post of director of Mossad and at the same time curator of all intelligence services was taken by Isser Harel , who remained in this post until March 26, 1963 . David Ben-Gurion called Harel "Memune" ( Heb. ממונה - lit. responsible ). At the same time, he led the joint committee of heads of special services and was an adviser to the prime minister on defense and security issues. For 11 years, Harel was actually the number two person in the state, single-handedly managing all the special services and reporting only to the prime minister ^{[63] [57]} . At the time Harel came to Mossad, the organization had 12 employees, ^[62] by 1963 - about 1,200.

The Lavon Affair

In 1954, military intelligence organized a failed sabotage operation in Egypt , after which 13 agents were captured. Two committed suicide , two were hanged by an Egyptian court, two were released for lack of evidence , and the rest spent many years in prison.

As a result, one of the largest political scandals in the history of the country broke out in Israel, called the “ Lavon Affair ” or “Shameful Affair” (“ Esek Bish ”), which lasted intermittently from 1954 to 1964. ^[64] Chief of Military Intelligence Benjamin Ghibli and Minister of Defense Pinchas Lavon accused each other of failure. Gibley claimed that he acted on the orders of Lavon, and Lavon denied, saying that there was no order and Ghibli acted behind him. As a result, in 1955, both lost their posts, and who was right remained unknown. In 1960 and 1964, on the initiative of Lavon and Ben-Gurion, respectively, attempts were made to review the case. The result was a conflict within the ruling Mapai party and the resignation of Ben-Gurion himself ^{[65] [66] [67]} .

The failure of Operation Susanna was an occasion for Isser Harel to set up operational units at Mossad, independent of military intelligence. The Mossad operations department was led by Abraham Shalom and Rafi Eitan , who came with Harel from the Security Service ^[68] . After the revelation in 1958 of the military intelligence officer Avri Elad , who worked for Egypt, Harel gained the right to conduct the “Mossad” not only reconnaissance, but also sabotage ^{[69] [70]} .

Khrushchev Report

One of the most famous operations of the Israeli secret services was the extraction in 1956 of a secret report by Nikita Khrushchev at the XX Congress of the CPSU "On the cult of personality and its consequences . " The report was received from Poland thanks to the journalist of the PAP news agency Viktor Graevsky , who handed over one of the copies of the document to the Israeli Embassy ^[71] .

After reviewing the report, Ben-Gurion said a prophetic phrase, having been mistaken for a few years: ^{[72] [73]}

With the consent of David Ben-Gurion, the then head of the Shabak, Amos Manor, handed over the text of the report to the CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton . Engleton, who served in the European branch of the Office of Strategic Services since 1943, trusted the Zionists, who were a useful source of information for him during the war. Since 1951, when the CIA entered into a cooperation agreement with Shiloah, Angleton worked actively with the Israeli secret services. After receiving the report of Khrushchev, Engleton became a loyal ally of Israel and his most ardent supporter in the American intelligence community ^{[74] [75]} .

The KGB did not establish who transmitted the report to the West ^{[76] [77]} .

On June 4, 1956, a report by Khrushchev with the sanction of the head of the CIA, Allen Dulles, was published in the New York Times . Since that time, Israel has gained the opportunity to exchange intelligence with the CIA ^{[78] [79]} .

Political Murders

The first so-called “ targeted elimination ” of Israeli intelligence was the July 13, 1956 murder of Colonel Mustafa Hafez, head of Egyptian intelligence in the Gaza Strip , who organized many terrorist attacks against Israel. Hafez was blown up by a bomb mounted in a book handed to him. A few days later, the resident of the Egyptian military intelligence in Jordan, Colonel Salah al-Din Mustafa, was killed in the same manner. Operations against them were planned and carried out by Israel’s military intelligence chief Yehoshafat Harkabi . There is information that David Ben-Gurion was dissatisfied with these "cold-blooded killings" and the next 6 years of "targeted elimination" Israel did not carry out. ^{[80] [81] [82]}

The situation changed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when Israel and the Israelis became targets of mass terror on the part of radical Palestinian groups. After the terrorist attack at the Munich Olympics in September 1972, Mossad received the task of Prime Minister Golda Meir to find and destroy all participants in this action. The mission was completed, although in Lebanon and Norway , several outsiders who were not involved in terrorism were killed. ^[83] The first of the organizers of the attack, Abdel Wail Zwaiter , was shot dead on October 16, 1972. By June 1973, according to various data, 12 or 13 out of 17 people on the Mossad list were killed ^{[84] [85]} . The last of all to be destroyed, the leader of the organization " Black September " Abu Ayyad , was killed by his associates in 1991, 19 years after the Munich rally. ^[86]

Since that time, Mossad and other Israeli special services regularly conduct operations to destroy the leaders of terrorist organizations, including outside the country. ^{[87] [88]} One of the most famous operations of this kind was the assassination on April 17, 1988 in Tunisia of the Fatah military leader Abu Jihad in the joint operation Mossad, special forces Sayeret Matkal and Shayetet 13 . ^{[89] [90] [91] [92]}

In 1992, an assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein was also planned as revenge for the rocket attacks on Israel during the Gulf War . ^[93]

Lacam

In 1957, another organization appeared in the community of Israeli special services - the Bureau of Scientific Relations ( Hebrew הלשכה לקשרי מדע , Lishka le-kishrei Mada ), abbreviated as Lakam . Its creation was associated with the desire of Israel to acquire nuclear weapons . The creation of “Lakam” was arranged with such secrecy that even the then curator of all special services Isser Harel did not know about its existence, and the chief “Lakam” was not a member of the Committee of Heads of Intelligence Services, communicating exclusively with the Prime Minister ^[94] .

Initially, the Lakam was entrusted with the tasks of ensuring the safety and secrecy of the nuclear reactor being built in Dimon , but later the Lakam ensured that Israel received the necessary nuclear components, and after 1979 this special service was entrusted with obtaining high-tech information ^{[95] [96]} .

Until 1981, Lacam was led by Benjamin Blumberg , and over the next five years, by Rafi Eitan ^{[97] [55]} .

The Case of Israel Beer

After the appointment of Amos Manor as head of counterintelligence, this special service began to pay great attention to espionage by the USSR and its allies. These efforts have led to the discovery of a number of agents. Prior to this, in 1950, three servicemen were arrested on charges of spying for Poland, in 1956, a Soviet agent in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Zeev Avni, and in 1960, physics professor Kurt Sitt worked for Czechoslovak intelligence ^[98] .

Isser Harel was suspicious of the left in general and the Communists in particular, believing them to be potential agents of the USSR . The incident with a member of the Mapay party, Colonel Israel Beer, showed that these fears were justified.

Colonel Beer was one of the most honored military men in Israel with many awards. He was a military adviser to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, served as chief historian of the Department of Defense and had access to secret archives. His arrest on April 1, 1961 was the result of an eight-year observation established by counterintelligence on the orders of Harel. It turned out that Beer was recruited in Vienna before his arrival in Israel and handed over many documents to Soviet intelligence , including a number of pages from Ben-Gurion's personal diary. This was Israel’s first betrayal by such a high official. Beer was sentenced to 15 years in prison and died in prison on May 1, 1966 . ^{[57] [99] [100] [101] [102]}

Eichmann's abduction

In 1960, Israeli secret services discovered in Argentina a Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann , who was responsible during the Second World War for the "final solution of the Jewish question" and directly responsible for the extermination of millions of Jews .

Fearing that an open diplomatic demand for extradition could lead to his next disappearance, Mossad, with the knowledge of the Prime Minister, organized the abduction of Eichmann and his removal to Israel. The operation was personally led by Mossad director Isser Harel. ^[103] In Israel, Eichmann was tried and sentenced to death . This is the only death sentence imposed by the Israeli judiciary in the entire history of the state of Israel, with the exception of the kangaroo trial of Meir of Tuvan , recognized June 30, 1948 as a murder.

Official recognition that it was Mossad’s agents who abducted Eichmann, and not some “Jewish volunteers”, appeared only in February 2005 , ^[104] and the full list of Eichmann’s capture participants was published only in January 2007 . ^[105]

Eichmann’s abduction was not the only operation against Nazis hiding from punishment after the Second World War. According to some estimates, Israeli intelligence services killed more than a thousand people involved in the Holocaust . ^[106] At the same time, several cases are known in which the Israeli secret services released former Nazis in exchange for valuable intelligence information. ^[107]

Period Results

The years 1952-1963 in the Israeli secret services were called the "era of memune, " because neither before nor after that a similar concentration of power in one hand was not allowed. It was at this time that the special services took on the form in which they are known today: Aman, Shabak, and especially Mossad, gained not only regional, but worldwide fame thanks to a number of complex and large-scale operations that became public. ^[57]

Amita Reforms

On March 26, 1963, because of a conflict with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, Isser Harel, the permanent leader of Mossad, who oversaw all intelligence services, resigned. Major General Meir Amit , chief of military intelligence, was appointed the new Mossad director, whose leadership style was fundamentally different from his predecessor ^[111] .

Amit more clearly distributed tasks between the special services, introduced computerization , organized strategic planning and delegation of authority ^[112] . Amit’s reforms brought results during the Six Day War , when Israeli intelligence knew almost everything about the enemy that was necessary for victory. Mossad agents Wolfgang Lotz in Egypt and Eli Cohen in Syria made a special contribution to this. ^{[113] [114] [115]}

After the war, special services, primarily Mossad and Shabak, were forced to increase attention to the activities of Palestinian terrorist organizations, in particular the Palestine Liberation Organization . By the end of 1967, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were covered by a dense network of Shabak informants, which thwarted the first attempt at an armed Arabs in these territories. In 1972, Shabak arrested the Matzpen group of Israeli leftist extremists, which was preparing a series of terrorist acts and sabotage ^[116] .

In the fall of 1972, in connection with the growing terrorist threat, the post of adviser to the Prime Minister on counterterrorism was established, which was taken by former head of military intelligence Aaron Yariv ^[117] . To date, there is already a whole counter-terrorism bureau within the office of the Prime Minister. ^{[118] [119]}

Ben Barca Case

By the mid-1960s, Israel had established relations with Morocco , which was one of the few Arab states that recognized the country. Including relations were established between the special services of the two countries. In 1965, King Hassan II of Morocco turned to Meir Amit with a request to help capture the leader of the Moroccan opposition, Mahdi Ben-Barca, in Europe . Under the threat of breaking Israeli-Moroccan relations, Amit helped to lure Ben-Barca from Geneva to Paris , where he was detained by SDECE French intelligence officers and handed over to the Moroccan secret services. Ben-Barca was killed in a villa in a suburb of Paris on November 2, 1965 . ^{[62] [120] [121]}

Mossad’s involvement in the abduction of Ban Barca provoked the ire of French President Charles de Gaulle and significantly affected Israeli-French relations. In Israel itself, a public scandal was avoided, however, Isser Harel , who was an adviser on intelligence and the fight against terror, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol , demanded the resignation of Meir Amit, relations with whom Harel had been strained since 1963. As a result, Harel himself resigned, this time finally completing his work in the security agencies . ^{[62] [120] [121]}

Agranath Commission

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria unexpectedly attacked Israel, the Doomsday War began, as a result of which the country suffered heavy material and human losses, and the very existence of the state was jeopardized.

In 1974, the Knesset created a commission to investigate Israel’s unpreparedness for war. The commission, led by Judge Shimon Agranat , concluded that the leadership of the army and military intelligence was guilty ^[122] .

The final report mentioned that Mossad received a timely warning about Egypt’s intention to attack Israel on October 6, but the military intelligence’s categorical opinion that there wouldn’t be such an attack had a dazzling effect on both the Mossad’s leadership and the political leadership countries ^[123] .

As a result of the findings of the commission, the chief of the General Staff, David Elazar , the commander of the Southern Military District, General Shmuel Gonen , the head of military intelligence Eli Zeyra and his deputy (head of the intelligence analysis department) Arie Shalev were fired . Lieutenant Colonel Yoni Bandman, head of the Egyptian sector at AMAN (Anaf-6) and Lieutenant Colonel David Gedeli, who was responsible for intelligence in the Southern Military District, was not recommended for use in intelligence-related posts ^[123] . ^[124] . Although the reports of the commission were blamed on the military, Prime Minister Golda Meir resigned in 1974.

After this war, special services began to pay increased attention to the Arab countries and verify the reliability of the information received. Another consequence was Doomsday Syndrome, when intelligence did not believe in Anwar Sadat’s peaceful intentions before concluding the Camp David Agreement until the very last minute. On the eve of his visit to Israel in November 1977, the army was fully operational, since there was widespread fear in Israel of another sudden attack ^[125] .

In addition, a Political Research Center was established at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to further evaluate intelligence, ^{[comm 2],} and in 1999, the National Security Council, as a separate government security advisory body , in the Prime Minister’s office.

Period Results

During this period, the value of Mossad increased sharply, both as a result of Meir Amit’s reforms and because of failures and scandals related to military intelligence. In the Israeli intelligence community, slang abbreviations have been circulated: “BA” - Before Amit (before Amit) and “AM” - After Meir (after Meir) ^[126] .

The poor work of military intelligence led to a change not only in the military, but also in the political situation. The result of the “Lavon case” was the resignation of not only the direct defendants in the scandal, but also of David Ben-Gurion himself . The findings of the Agranat commission led, among other things, to the resignation of the Golda Meir government, and also became one of the factors due to which in 1977 , for the first time in 30 years of the existence of the state, the right-wing Likud party led by Menachem Begin came to power in Israel.

By the end of the 1970s, intelligence agencies had strengthened a shaky reputation. A CIA secret report captured at the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979 read:

In general, in the 1980s, the authority and reputation of the Israeli secret services suffered quite a lot as a result of a number of incidents.

The Pollard Affair and the Vanunu Affair

On November 21, 1985, a US naval intelligence analyst Jonathan Pollard was arrested in Washington , who turned out to be an Israeli spy who worked for the Lacquers. Pollard was sentenced to life imprisonment. All attempts to achieve the release of Pollard so far run into the stubborn refusal of the US government. ^{[128] [129]}

After the story of Pollard, Israel stated that it refuses any espionage against the United States and categorically rejects any allegations in this regard. ^[130]

In 1986, the Israeli nuclear technician Mordecai Vanunu, through the Sunday Times , revealed to the world the secret of Israel's possession of nuclear weapons . The Lakam, who was responsible for the safety of the Dimon reactor, did not notice that Vanunu had brought a camera to the guarded object and photographed it for a long time. Shabak, in turn, missed the fact that Vanunu was traveling abroad. Vanunu was abducted by Mossad agents in Rome and taken to Israel ^{[131] [132]} .

After these two failures, Lakam was disbanded, its leader Rafi Eitan was dismissed, and the functions of Lakam were transferred to other services.

Route 300

In April 1984, there was a major scandal over the killing of Shabak by detained Palestinian terrorists.

On April 12, four terrorists seized a bus full of passengers traveling on route 300 from Tel Aviv to Ashkelon . The bus was stormed, the terrorists were killed. Later it turned out that two of the four terrorists were shot dead after they were neutralized. During the investigation, the facts of perjury in this case by high-ranking Shabak officers were also revealed. This caused a great resonance in Israel and raised the question of regulating the activities of special services. As a result of the scandal in June 1986, the head of Shabak Avraam Shalom , his deputy Reuven Hazak, and another 13 employees resigned. In 1996, Ehud Yatom , the head of the Shabak operations department, Ehud Yatom , the brother of the then acting director of Mossad, Dani Yatom , admitted to this murder, committed by order of Abraham Shalom. ^{[133] [134] [135]}

Klingberg Case

In January 1983, Shabak arrested Markus Klingberg , who from 1957 to 1975 , being deputy head of the Israeli Institute for Biological Research , located in Ness Ziona , transmitted information about chemical and biological military programs to the USSR . Klingberg inflicted tremendous damage to the country's security, as it undermined Israel's ability to protect against weapons of mass destruction . Klingberg’s arrest became known only in 1991 , when he had been in prison for 8 years. Klingberg is considered the most dangerous Soviet spy in the history of Israel. Klingberg was released from prison 15 years after his arrest; as of the end of 2008, he was living in Paris and received the retirement of a lieutenant colonel in the Israeli army. ^{[109] [136]}

Period Results

Journalists Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman in the book “History of Israeli Intelligence Services” write ^[137] :

The head of military intelligence, Shlomo Gazit, claims that during this period “ professionalism fell on both the operational and analytical levels of the security services ” ^[138] .

Problems in the work of special services that began in the 1980s continued into the 1990s. Especially often, failures began to haunt foreign intelligence officers of the Mossad.

Mossad Failures

In 1991, Mossad agents were arrested in Nicosia while installing bugs at the Iranian embassy. In 1995, Mossad resident in Moscow Reuven Dinel was detained while receiving secret documents from former GRU officers ^{[139] [140]} .

In 1997, an unsuccessful attempt was made on the head of the Hamas terrorist organization, Khaled Mashal, in Jordan ^{[141] [142]} and a Yehuda Gil scam was discovered, who for many years tricked the Mossad by slipping fictitious information from a supposedly recruited Syrian general ^{[143] [144]} .

In February 1998, Mossad employee Yitzhak Ben-Tal was arrested in Switzerland while trying to listen to the Iranian representation at the UN ^{[143] [145]} .

In connection with these scandals, on February 24, 1998, Mossad director Dani Yatom ^{[143] [146]} resigned.

The Killing of Yitzhak Rabin

The biggest crisis of the decade was the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995 by right-wing extremist Yigal Amir . For the Shabak security service, which is responsible for protecting the country's top officials, this has become the most shameful page in the entire history of the organization.

The Shabak management voiced a version of a lone terrorist whose actions could not have been foreseen, but there are a number of indications that the police and special services received warnings about the intentions of Igal Amir, but for some reason did not take them into account. ^[147] In this connection, a number of versions of a conspiracy arose in Israel, the alleged members of which “blindly” used Igal Amir. ^{[148] [149] [150] [151]}

Period Results

The crisis of the 1980-1990s in the work of the special services led Israeli society to the opinion of the need for legislative regulation and independent control of their work. In particular, the famous Israeli political scientist, Doctor of Sciences Alexander Epstein wrote: ^[152]

These approaches began to be implemented in 1999 .

•  

  Rafi Eitan , Lacam Executive

•  

  Ami Ayalon , Head of Shabak (1995-2000)

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  Avi Dichter , Head of Shabak (2000-2005)

•  

  Amos Yadlin , head of military intelligence (2006—2010)

In accordance with Government Decision No. 4889 of March 7, 1999, the National Security Council ( MALAL ), a centralized advisory body on national security issues under the Prime Minister and the Government of Israel, was established within the Prime Minister’s office. Major General Reserve David Ivry was appointed the first head of this body. Among the functions of the Council are assistance to the Prime Minister in the development and adoption of decisions, as well as monitoring their implementation in relation to the work of special services.

In 1999, the Israeli Supreme Court for the first time adopted a normative act regulating the activities of special services, which contained a ban on the use of torture . Prior to this, the special services operated outside any legal framework, relying solely on internal instructions and instructions of the leadership ^[153] . This tradition has been preserved since the time of David Ben-Gurion , who was an opponent of such regulation. On February 21, 2002, the Knesset passed the relevant law. ^{[154] [155]} In 2004, another law appeared with detailed instructions for security personnel. ^[156]

Mossad’s foreign intelligence is aggressively opposing the supply of modern weapons to Arab countries. So, in 2005, Israel managed to disrupt the planned delivery of the Iskander-E Russian operational strategic missiles to Syria , organizing a leak of information about this deal, which caused the so-called “missile scandal”. ^{[157] [158]}

The war in Lebanon in 2006 gave impetus to radical reforms in military intelligence. AMAN introduced a new division of analytical groups, a fundamentally new intelligence analysis system, and intensified contacts between mining units and analysts. But the main goal of the reforms is to establish dialogue and interaction between decision-makers and intelligence analysts. The new system will allow, according to the professor of the Academy of Military Sciences, Alexander Kondratiev, "not only to improve the quality and reliability of intelligence products, but also to present their intelligence assessments directly to politicians, which was not the case before." ^[159]

Promising Tasks

Iran

With the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq , Iran became the main external threat to Israel, whose president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad proposes to “wipe Israel from the face of the earth” ^[160] or “create it in Europe, the USA, Canada or Alaska” , ^[161] finances and arming the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah ^[162] and, according to some experts, seeks to obtain nuclear weapons ^[163] .

Israeli intelligence showed particular attention to Iran in the 1990s, when it became known that the Israeli navigator Ron Arad , who was shot down in Lebanon in 1986, was transported there. In 2001, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon held a meeting with security officials on the Iranian military threat. ^[164]

Having become the head of the Mossad in September 2002, Major General Meir Dagan began reprofiling the Mossad by collecting information on direct actions against Islamic fundamentalists , primarily Iran. He said the Mossad is "intelligence, not Foreign Ministry Number Two . " ^[165]

In July 2003, under unclear circumstances, a leading Iranian ballistic missile designer, Ali-Mahmoudi Mimand, died as a result of an explosion in a research center. The explosion occurred during testing of systems for ballistic missile Shihab-3 . Unofficially, Iran believes that the Israeli intelligence services could be related to the explosion. ^[164]

There is speculation that Mossad was involved in the disappearance on February 7, 2007 in Istanbul of the former deputy defense minister of Iran and the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, General Ali Reza Askari. ^{[166] [167]} A month later, the general appeared in the United States , where he sought asylum. ^[168]

Hamas

Since 2000, the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Gaza Strip and the increase in the number of terrorist acts have posed new problems for the security services and, first of all, for Shabak. The situation escalated after Hamas took full control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 . According to some observers, this has led to the transformation of the Gaza Strip into an "enclave of anarchy and terrorism." ^{[169] [170]} However, thanks to the work of special services and the police in Israel, about 97% of planned terrorist attacks are prevented. ^{[171] [172] The} high quality of intelligence services was noted by analysts as a result of the Cast Lead military operation carried out by Israel in the Gaza Strip from December 27, 2008 to January 20, 2009 . ^[173]

Terrorism Trends

On September 27, 2004, Shabak published a report analyzing data and trends in the field of terrorism in Israel since the beginning of the second intifada . The report noted the mass deaths of civilians in Israel as a result of targeted attacks by Islamic terrorists , the involvement of Israeli Arabs in the organization of attacks, and not just the residents of Judea , Samaria and Gaza , the increasing coordination between individual terrorist groups as a reaction to the mass arrests of participants carried out by Israeli security services , preserving the role of the Jews as an ideological and organizational center of terrorism, active participation of the Lebanese Shiite "organization Hezbollah " terrorist activities in Israel. ^{[174] [175]}

Right extremism

One of the relatively recent problems is right-wing extremism ^[176] among part of the Jewish population of Israel. ^[177] Its history goes back to the underground Jewish organizations “ Irgun ” and “ LEKHI ” (“The Stern Gang”) during the British mandate ^{[178] [179]} , known for a number of terrorist attacks against the British and Arabs ^[180] . Separate actions of right-wing extremists occurred in 1983-1984 ^[181] , the most notorious case was the above-mentioned assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin . One of the important directions of Shabak's work in the 1990s was the suppression of the activities of terrorist extreme right-wing Jewish groups ^[182] .

The growth of these sentiments is associated with the government’s inability to radically solve security problems as a result of the implementation of the Oslo Accords and the Unilateral Disengagement Program , as well as unilateral, in the opinion of part of the Israeli population, concessions to the Arabs ^[176] . In October 2008, Defense Minister Ehud Barak created an interagency unit to maintain order in the settlements of Judea and Samaria and to combat extremism among settlers. ^[183]

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