The Ruhr conflict is the culmination of a military-political conflict between the Weimar Republic and the Franco-Belgian occupation forces in the Ruhr basin in 1923 .
| Ruhr conflict | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Main Conflict: Occupation of the Rhine Region | |||
Managed and occupied territories of Germany. 1923 year | |||
| date | 1923 | ||
| A place | Ruhr region | ||
| Cause | reparation delay | ||
| Total | the withdrawal of French troops from Germany | ||
| Opponents | |||
| |||
The Versailles Treaty of 1919 imposed obligations on the Weimar Republic to pay reparations to the victorious countries in the First World War . The uncompromising implementation of the provisions of the agreement was insisted primarily by French President Raymond Poincare , who defended the economic and political interests of his country. When delays in deliveries or payments occurred, French troops entered the unoccupied territories of Germany several times. On March 8, 1921, French and Belgian troops occupied the cities of Duisburg and Dusseldorf , which were located in the Rhine demilitarized zone , thereby providing themselves with a bridgehead for the further occupation of the entire industrial region in Rhineland-Westphalia. France was able to control the ports of Duisburg and receive accurate information about the total export of coal, steel and finished products from the Ruhr. The London ultimatum of May 5, 1921 set a schedule for reparations in the total amount of 132 billion gold marks , and in case of refusal, the occupation of the Ruhr region was provided as a response.
The “ execution policy " ended with the partition of Upper Silesia , initiated by France and perceived in Germany as a deafening defeat: in a referendum on the state ownership of this province on March 20, 1921, Germany received 59.4%, and Poland - 40.6%. The new political course of Berlin was focused on the fight against the anti-German Franco-Polish alliance, which largely determined the conclusion of the Rapallo Treaty with Soviet Russia on April 16, 1922. The Rapallo Treaty, in turn, led to a change in the course of France’s foreign policy and directly influenced its decision to occupy the Ruhr.
In 1922, taking into account the worsening economic situation in the Weimar Republic, the Allies abandoned reparations in cash, replacing them with in-kind payments ( steel , wood , coal ). On September 26, the Allied Reparations Commission, by unanimous decision, recorded the fact that Germany was lagging behind in terms of reparation supplies. When the reparation commission announced on January 9, 1923, that the Weimar Republic deliberately delays supplies (in 1922, instead of the required 13.8 million tons of coal, only 11.7 million tons, and instead of 200,000 telegraph masts, only 65,000), France used this is an occasion to send troops into the Ruhr basin.
Between January 11 and 16, 1923, French and Belgian troops, originally 60 thousand people (later up to 100 thousand), occupied the entire territory of the Ruhr region, taking the coal and coke production facilities located there as a “production guarantee ” to secure execution Germany of its reparation obligations. As a result of the occupation, about 7% of the post-war territory of Germany was occupied, where 72% of coal was mined and more than 50% of pig iron and steel were produced. However, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, Raymond Poincare, sought to achieve the assignment to Rhineland and Rhur of a status similar to that of the Saar region, where German territory was only formal in nature and the power was in the hands of the French.
The introduction of the occupation forces caused a wave of popular anger in the Weimar Republic. The government, led by non-partisan Chancellor Wilhelm Kuno, called on the population to "passive resistance . " Reparations were discontinued, and a general strike struck industry, management, and transportation. Some enterprises and departments refused to obey the orders of the invaders. France reacted to this by imposing 150 thousand fines, which were sometimes accompanied by expulsion from the occupied territory. Former Freikor members and Communists organized acts of sabotage and attacked the occupying forces. The occupation authorities responded with punitive operations, as a result of which 137 people died in a tense situation. In order to intimidate the death penalty for espionage and sabotage, a member of the Freikor Albert Leo Schlageter was sentenced and executed, later elevated to the rank of martyr by German propaganda.
In addition to passive resistance, causing economic damage, language pressure was also used in the struggle against the invaders: all words borrowed from the French language were replaced with German (for example, instead of Kantine - Werksgasthaus (staff canteen), instead of Telefon - Fernsprecher ( Telephone ), instead of Trottoir - Gehweg ( Sidewalk ) or instead of automatisch - selbsttätig (automatic)).
During passive resistance, the German state assumed the payment of wages to the workers of the Ruhr region through an additional issue of money. For a long time, this situation could not continue, since the aggravation of the economic crisis, inflation, idle production and tax shortages negatively affected the German economy.
On September 26, 1923, the new Reich Chancellor Gustav Stresemann was forced to announce the end of passive resistance. The reactionary forces in Bavaria used the cessation of the struggle against the invaders to establish a dictatorship . According to various sources, the total damage to the economy from the Ruhr conflict was from 4 to 5 billion gold marks.
Under pressure from the United States and Great Britain, France signed the MIKUM agreement ( fr. Mission interalliée de Contrôle des Usines et des Mines (MICUM) - Allied control commission for the factories and mines of the Ruhr) 1923-1924. The occupation of the Ruhr region was completed in accordance with the Dawes plan adopted in 1924 in July-August 1925 .
Literature
- in Russian
- Ruhr conflict 1922–23 // Romania - Saint-Jean-de-Luz [Electronic resource]. - 2015. - P. 40. - (The Big Russian Encyclopedia : [in 35 vols.] / Ch. Ed. Yu. S. Osipov ; 2004—2017, vol. 29). - ISBN 978-5-85270-366-8 .
- in other languages
- Michael Ruck: Die Freien Gewerkschaften im Ruhrkampf 1923 , Frankfurt am Main 1986;
- Barbara Müller: Passiver Widerstand im Ruhrkampf. Eine Fallstudie zur gewaltlosen zwischenstaatlichen Konfliktaustragung und ihren Erfolgsbedingungen , Münster 1995;
- Stanislas Jeannesson: Poincaré, la France et la Ruhr 1922-1924. Histoire d'une occupation , Strasbourg 1998;
- Elspeth Y. O'Riordan: Britain and the Ruhr crisis , London 2001;
- Conan Fischer: The Ruhr Crisis, 1923-1924 , Oxford / New York 2003;
- Gerd Krumeich, Joachim Schröder (Hrsg.): Der Schatten des Weltkriegs: Die Ruhrbesetzung 1923 , Essen 2004 (Düsseldorfer Schriften zur Neueren Landesgeschichte und zur Geschichte Nordrhein-Westfalens, 69);
- Gerd Krüger: “Aktiver” und passiver Widerstand im Ruhrkampf 1923 , in: Besatzung. Funktion und Gestalt militärischer Fremdherrschaft von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, hrsg. von Günther Kronenbitter, Markus Pöhlmann und Dierk Walter, Paderborn / München / Wien / Zürich 2006 (Krieg in der Geschichte, 28) S. 119-130.
Links
- Piskunov S. A. Ruhr conflict 1923 // Chronos