Battle of Helgoland Bay

In August 1914, the British and German fleets operated in the North Sea very indecisively. The British fleet covered the transportation of the British expeditionary force from Southampton to Le Havre (its main forces were transferred on August 14-17). In the North Sea, the actions of the Grand Fleet were limited to maintaining a long watch between the Orkney and Shetland Islands in order to prevent the German raiders from breaking into the ocean communications. The passivity of the Kaiserlichmarine was explained by the position of Moltke , who told the German naval general staff that the war with France and Belgium would be fleeting, and the Reichsheer would be “only glad of the opportunity to settle accounts with the 160,000-strong British army” ^[1] .

On August 21, Belgian troops left Ostend , which was threatened by German cavalry, and retreated to Antwerp . On August 22, a British unit of three old armored cruisers and a destroyer detachment under the command of Admiral Christian ^[1] came to Ostend to demonstrate power. But intelligence showed that the defense of Ostend without the support of the ground forces is impossible, since the approaches to the city close the dunes and the naval artillery is not able to fire at an advancing enemy on the city. On August 23, the positions of the French at Charleroi and the British at Mons were attacked, and all of them were forced to retreat. As a result, there was a threat of capture not only Ostend, but also Boulogne and even Le Havre. Therefore, it was decided to support an army of 3,000 marines in Ostend to support the army. The landing of troops began on the morning of August 27 ^[2] .

To cover the expedition in Ostend, the British naval headquarters decided to conduct a distraction operation in Helgoland Bay ^[3] . Submarines under the command of Commander Keyes ( Eng. Roger Keyes ) scouted the organization of the patrolling of German ships in Helgoland Bay. It became known that in the evenings the light cruisers drove destroyers to certain sections of the bay, from where they dispersed to their watch areas. At dawn, the destroyers were returning, and at about 8 a.m., 20 miles northwest of Helgoland, they were met by the cruisers. The night patrols of the destroyers were replaced by day patrols located in the areas south and north of Helgoland. An attack by day was considered impossible, and Keyes suggested attacking returning night patrols at dawn from the shore. This proposal was revised, and a decision was made to attack the day patrols entering the patrol, lure them into the sea and, cutting them off from the bases , destroy them ^[4] .

On the part of the British fleet, the 1st squadron of battle cruisers of Vice Admiral Beatty ( Lyon , Queen Mary , Princess Royal ), the detachment of battle cruisers "K" Rear Admiral Gordon Moore (" Invincible ", "participated New Zealand ”), the 7th cruising squadron of Rear Admiral Christian ( armored cruisers of the“ Kressi ”type :“ Yuriales ”,“ Bashanti ”,“ Kressi ”,“ Hog ”,“ Abukir ”and the light cruiser“ Amethyst ”), 1 1st squadron of light cruisers of Commodore Goodenough ( born William Goodenough ) ^[5] ( Southampton , Birmingham , Falmouth , Nottingham , Lowestoft and L iverpool "); the fleet of submarines of Commodore Keyes (destroyers Lercher and Firerake, submarines E-4, E-5, E-6, E-7, E-8, E-9); 3rd Flotilla of destroyers of Commodore Terwith ") ^[3] .

Submarines E-4, E-5 and E-9, according to the original plan, were to wait for the opportunity to attack at positions north and south of Helgoland. Submarines E-6, E-7 and E-8 - appear in the surface position south of Helgoland and carry German light cruisers into the sea. By 4:00 the 1st and 3rd destroyer fleets were supposed to be 25 miles west of the Sylt island by 4:00 and head south from there, going 12 miles west of Helgoland to the rear of German submarines pursuing the pursuit of submarines. Detachment "K" and the 7th cruising squadron were supposed to provide support. The operation was scheduled for early morning on August 28 ^[3] .

The plan was reported to Grand Fleet Commander Admiral Jellico on August 26th. He made his own adjustments to it. Additionally, the 1st Squadron of battle cruisers and the 1st Squadron of light cruisers were allocated for support, and the Grand Fleet itself advanced to the point 100 miles southeast of the Orkney Islands on the morning of August 28. Changes to the plan were not notified to the destroyers and submarines of Teruit and Kiyz that had already entered the sea, which could lead to their erroneous attack by the ships of Beatty and Gudenaf ^[3] .

On the morning of August 28, the tide was off the German coast, so heavy German ships could not leave their base until 12:00 (13:00 Berlin time) ^[6] . The river estuaries had clear, calm weather, but there was fog in the Helgoland area and visibility did not exceed 3-4 miles, so the German coastal battery located on the island could not take part in the battle, which took place at least in the initial phase in the zone of its guns ^[6] , and the battle itself assumed the character of individual scattered clashes ^[3] .

In the area of ​​Helgoland Bay there were a number of naval bases, including Wilhelmshaven , on which battleships and kaiserlichmarines were based . The entire German bay , including Helgoland, was guarded by the 1st reconnaissance group under the command of Rear Admiral Hipper , which included German battle cruisers. For this purpose, all the ships of the guard service, aircraft and airships were transferred to her subordination ^[7] . The commander of the German light forces in the Helgoland region was Rear Admiral Leberecht Maass , holding his flag on the light cruiser Cologne . German ships were not warned of the appearance of the enemy and were taken by surprise. 35 miles from Elba’s floating lighthouse, 9 German destroyers of the 1st Flotilla were on patrol, and the light cruisers Hela , Stettin , and Frauenlob supporting them were located 15 miles from this lighthouse. In the Helgoland harbor there were 10 destroyers of the 5th flotilla and 8 submarines, of which only two were combat ready. At the mouth of the Weser River was the old light cruiser Ariadne , and at the mouth of the Ems River was the light cruiser Mainz . In Wilhelmshaven there were light cruisers “Cologne” (the flagship of Maass, loaded with coal), “ Strasbourg ” and “ Stralsund ”. All German battle cruisers and battleships were locked in the harbor and could not go to sea due to low tide ^[3] .

Initial phase

Around 5:00, the E-7 submarine attacked the German destroyer G 194 from the 1st Flotilla with two torpedoes. Hipper was informed of the attack, and he sent in search of aircraft and put forward the 5th fleet of destroyers at sea. Around 7:00, G 194 discovered the Arethusa and four destroyers marching from the northwest. To the right of him, the “G 196” also noticed British ships coming up. Destroyers raised the alarm and began to withdraw, pursued by British ships ^[3] . The destroyers received an order from Maass to retreat to Helgoland ^[8] , and the Stettin and Frauenlob received an order to go to their aid ^[3] . In pursuit of the German destroyers, the ships of the 1st and 3rd fleets of the British rushed. The German destroyers "S 13" and "V 1" began to receive damage and lose speed, but at 7:58, the Stettin managed to come to their aid, whose fire actually saved the 5th flotilla. The German destroyers and the Stettin retreated under the cover of Helgoland's batteries. "Stettin" got hit by one shell, which killed and injured 7 people ^[3] .

The British ships did not approach Helgoland, heading north. Soon they were faced with obsolete German destroyers engaged in trawling . In the ensuing battle, the German "D 8" and "T 33" received significant damage. The Frauenlob came to their aid. Around 8:00, the Frauenlob battle with the Arethuse began. Shooting was conducted at a distance of about 30 cable . The Arethusa was a more powerful ship, but its recently recruited crew had no experience, and therefore the chances were equal. During the battle, which lasted until 8:25, the British cruiser received about 25 hits. There was a moment when out of all his guns only one 152 mm was active, and the speed dropped to 10 knots. "Frauenlob" also received damage and was forced to turn away under the guise of Helgoland batteries ^{[9] [3]} .

Even before the start of the battle between the Frauenlob and Arethuse, the Fireless with the destroyers of the 1st Flotilla turned away to the west. They spotted the German destroyer V 187 walking towards Helgoland and began to pursue it. "V 187" tried to go south to the mouth of the Yad, but 2 four-pipe cruisers were on its way. The Germans mistakenly identified them as their "Strasbourg" and "Stralsund" and went on rapprochement. In fact, they were the British cruisers Nottingham and Lowestoft, sent by Gudenough in support of the destroyers. The British opened fire, detrimental to the German destroyer, from 152-mm guns from a distance of 20 cable. The German destroyer tried to turn around and leave, but the destroyers of the 1st flotilla blocked his path. Under crossfire, the “V 187” lost speed. The cruisers left, leaving him to finish off their destroyers. "V 187" went to the bottom with a raised flag, firing to the last. Of the 90 people of the crew of the destroyer, 24 were killed and 14 injured ^{[10] [3]} .

The British destroyers launched boats to save the drowning. At this time, "Stettin" emerged from the fog and, not understanding it, opened fire. British destroyers without cruising cover had to retreat, throwing boats. Then the British submarine E-4 appeared and, attacking the Stettin, forced him to hide. One of the British destroyers was not able to remove their sailors from the boat, so the E-4 picked them up and several prisoners. Having stocked with the supplies of the Germans remaining on the boats and pointing the way to land, the boat left. This is the first phase of the battle, during which the Germans lost one destroyer, ended ^{[11] [3]} .

Final phase

Further events unfolded against the backdrop of the confusion that had arisen among the British due to inconsistency of action. Keyes, who commanded submarines from the destroyer, found four Gudenaf cruisers and identified them as German, because he did not know that there were British cruisers in the area. The signal for help sent by Keyes made Teruit, who was leaving the battlefield to the west, turn around and follow east. The cruiser Goodenough went there too. The British began a hunt for themselves. Due to confusion, one of the submarines attacked one of the cruisers, in turn, the E-6 was almost rammed by the cruiser, but dived under it in time ^{[12] [3]} .

Keyes and Goodenough recognized each other. Goodenough decided to leave the area to free him for submarines.

At 10:55, Teruit, heading east with two fleets, was attacked by the Strasbourg. Mistakenly identifying them as stronger “Towns” ^{[approx. 2]} Gudenaf, the German cruiser opened fire from a long distance, which was in the hands of the damaged British cruisers. The opponents exchanged several unsuccessful volleys, and after the British destroyers launched the torpedo attack, the Strasbourg was forced to hide in the fog. He later returned and resumed fire on British cruisers. ^{[13] [3]}

The position of the British light forces as new German cruisers appeared began to deteriorate, so Teruit requested help. Beatty turned Gudenaf back and sent Southampton, Birmingham, Falmouth and Liverpool in support of Terwith. Reasoning that only linear battlecruisers could provide real assistance in the case of the approach of the new light cruisers, at 11:30 Beatty decided to go east with his formation, despite the risk of meeting with German submarines and battleships ^{[14] [3]} .

The Strasbourg soon disappeared into the fog, and the Arethusa and Fireless began to turn west. At this time, “Shtettin” appeared, forcing “Aretyusa” and “Fireless” to continue the fight. Initially, the battle took place between cruisers, but later British destroyers joined it. At 11:30 a.m. on the Arethuse and Fireless with the destroyers, the Mainz fired from the mouth of the Ems. The destroyers tried to attack him and force him to turn away. The position of the English became threatening ^{[15] [16]} .

At this time, the cruiser Goodenough approached, and the situation radically changed. The Mainz fought an unequal battle with the well-armed Towns. Soon, the Mainz’s steering wheel jammed and he began to describe the circulations, but continued to conduct heavy fire on the destroyers Liberty, Laertes and Laurel. One of the torpedoes from the British destroyers hit the Mainz, and it completely lost its course, turning into a target. The crew began to leave the sinking ship, although it remained afloat until at least 12:30 ^{[17] [3] [18]} .

In the meantime, the Arethusa and Fireless came under fire from new, suitable German cruisers. It was the Cologne and the Stettin following him. The British cruisers were in a very difficult situation, but then the battle cruisers Beatty came to their aid. After giving around 12:30 a few volleys at the Mainz, they went further east. The Cologne, recognizing Lyon, turned around and tried to hide in the fog. Beatty began to pursue him, and the Cologne suffered severe injuries. Fires started on the cruiser, but he temporarily managed to hide in the fog, when at 12:56 the cruisers Beatty were distracted by the outdated cruiser Ariadne. The Ariadne was hit by several volleys that turned the ship into a bonfire. Despite the fact that he also managed to hide in the fog, he could not cope with the fires, and the crew left the sinking cruiser ^{[19] [3] [20]} .

The rest of the German cruisers managed to hide in the fog. Beatty considered that he had already gone far enough and the risk of meeting heavy German ships became too great, and according to destroyers, German ships began to drop floating mines. Therefore, at 13:10 he gave a signal to withdraw. The battlecruisers strayed north, gradually turning to head home - west. On the way back at 13:25 they came across a damaged Cologne. At 13:35, two volleys point blank from heavy guns sent the German cruiser to the bottom. The battle cruisers, fearing submarines, did not stop to save the drowning, therefore, along with the Cologne, almost all of his crew, including Rear Admiral Maass, died - out of 380 people only one stoker escaped ^{[21] [3]} .

At 13:08, he rolled over and sank the Mainz. British ships managed to raise 348 out of 380 crew members from the water. Of the 60 wounded, some did not live to arrive at the port. The battle cruisers Beatty fired several more salvos from a great distance at the Strasbourg and Stettin, which were in the fog, but failed to hit. By 2:00 p.m., all British ships were on their way home, not observing a single German ship. The battle ended ^{[22] [3]} .

The British did not lose a single ship, although the damage to the Areretus cruiser and the Laurel destroyer was so great that they had to be towed by the Hog and Amethyst cruisers. Losses of crews amounted to 32 people killed and 55 wounded, including 11 killed and 16 wounded at Aretyus, 11 killed and 12 wounded at Lorel and 8 killed and 10 wounded at Liberty ^{[3] [approx. 3]} .

The Germans lost the cruiser Cologne, Mainz, Ariadne and the destroyer V-187. The total crew losses exceeded 1,000 people, including Rear Admiral Maass, who became the first German admiral to die in World War I. Among the prisoners was one of the sons of Tirpitz ^[24] .

When analyzing the battle, the researchers noted the poor management of German ships. In foggy weather, it was a mistake to send light cruisers one after another towards an enemy of unknown force. The English historian Wilson believes that this was due to the fact that clear weather was in the area of ​​German bases at the mouths of the rivers. When sending the cruiser to the sea, the commander hoped that, having timely noticed the superior enemy forces, they would leave for their bases. But in foggy conditions this was impossible, which led to such losses. At the same time, British sailors noted the high morale of German sailors who, even in conditions of unequal battle, fired to the last, without releasing the flag ^[3] .

German naval minister Tirpitz condemned the commander of the High Seas Fleet, Ingenol, for not sending linear forces to help the cruisers, which would certainly be correct. However, the battleships could not go to sea due to the ebb, which played into the hands of the British ^[3] .

Despite the operation successfully carried out by the British fleet, the staff was extremely unsuccessful in organizing it. The commanders of the units were not notified of the presence in the area of ​​their forces ^[3] . Only Beatty’s rather risky decision to send battlecruisers to Helgoland Bay provided the British with an enormous advantage in power. Do not do this, the outcome of the operation could be different, so some contemporaries began to compare Beatty with the legendary Nelson ^[25] .

Kaiser Wilhelm II spoke Russian to the Chief of the Naval General Staff Полю замечание, что германский флот стал излишне беспечен, и приказал принять меры для предотвращения внезапных атак англичан, при этом ещё больше ограничив активность флота, запретив выходы флота и даже отдельных крейсеров в море без его разрешения ^[3] . Во многом успеху британцев способствовали неудовлетворительная охрана Гельголандской бухты и нахождение в ней британских подводных лодок. Из-за распоряжений кайзера германский флот занимал пассивную позицию и не имел удалённых разведывательных дозоров, а британские подлодки беспрепятственно могли производить операции в самой бухте. Кроме того, несение дозоров миноносцами выматывало их экипажи ^[26] .

Германский флот пересмотрел порядок ведения охраны Гельголандской бухты. К разведке стала привлекаться авиация. Миноносцы в дозорах были заменены вооружёнными траулерами , более приспособленными для длительного пребывания в море. К западу от Гельголанда были также установлены несколько минных заграждений. После того, как траулеры были оснащены оборудованием для поиска подводных лодок, пребывание британских субмарин в бухте резко ограничилось ^[27] .

Британцы отметили, что лёгкий крейсер имеет преимущества даже перед большим количеством эсминцев, так как является более устойчивой орудийной платформой и обладает лучшей системой приборов управления огнём . Немцы сделали вывод о недостаточной мощности своих орудий и ошибочности решения вооружить лёгкие крейсера 105-мм орудиями, а миноносцы 88-мм. Было решено на новых крейсерах увеличить калибр до 150-мм и на миноносцах до 105-мм, а на находящихся в строю постепенно, в процессе модернизаций , произвести замену ^[3] .

Подчёркивались также крайне неудовлетворительное качество британских снарядов и неэффективная тактика применения торпедного вооружения. Но, в отличие от немцев, британцы не сделали из этого никаких выводов ^[3] .

Победа в Гельголандском сражении приподняла боевой дух королевского флота . Британская общественность с воодушевлением восприняла победу флота, особенно на фоне неутешительных вестей с сухопутного фронта. Моральный эффект этого успеха некоторые современники считали не менее важным, чем материальный ^[25] .

Обломки шлюпки, на которой спасся старший кочегар «Кёльна» Адольф Нойман, 10 сентября 1914 года выбросило на побережье острова Нордерней . Комендант острова фрайхерр фон Солемахер-Антвайлер выкупил их и подарил городу Кёльну. 21 сентября украшенная флагами и гирляндами шлюпка была выставлена во дворе городской ратуши . В 1915 году она была перенесена к Айгельштайнским воротам , где был открыт мемориал крейсера, а с 1926 года — укреплена под куполом их восточной башни ^[28] .

На набережной Рейна в Майнце 26 августа 1939 года был воздвигнут памятник погибшему в сражении крейсеру «Майнц». 11,5-метровая увенчанная орлом стела была создана скульптором Карлом Хоффманом из красного песчаника ^[29] .

• Гельголандская бухта // Вавилон — «Гражданская война в Северной Америке» / [под общ. ed. Н. В. Огаркова ]. — М. : Военное изд-во М-ва обороны СССР , 1979. — ( Советская военная энциклопедия : [в 8 т.] ; 1976—1980, т. 2).
• Вильсон Х. Линкоры в бою. 1914-1918 гг. — М. : Изографус, ЭКСМО, 2002. — 432 с. — (Военно-морская библиотека). - 7000 copies. — ISBN 5-946610-16-3 .
• Корбетт Дж. Операции английского флота в Первую мировую войну = Corbett, Julian S. Naval Operations. — New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1920. — 2 vols. - Mn. : ООО «Харвест», 2003. — 480 с. - (Military Historical Library). - 5,000 copies. — ISBN 985-13-1058-1 .
• Шеер Рейнхард. Германский флот в Мировую войну 1914—1918 гг = Scheer R. Deutschlands Hochseeflotte im Weltkrieg. Persönliche Erinnerungen. — Berlin, Scherl, 1920. — М. : Эксмо , 2002. — 672 с. — (Военно-морская библиотека). — 5100 экз. — ISBN 5-7921-0502-9 .

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