Tikhvin defensive operation

Territory

The maximum advance of the German troops. Mid november

Fighting by the parties during the operation was conducted in the east of the Leningrad region . From the north, the border of the operation was limited to its end by the line south of the Sinyavino - Voybokalo - Volkhov railway line, the southern approaches to Volkhov, then along the railway line (sometimes cut by German troops) to Tikhvin , the area north, east and south of Tikhvin, surrounding it, then went to south-west through the station Taltsy , Berehok , through the area slightly east and southeast of Malaya Vishera went out to the Volkhov north of Dubrovka . The western border of the operation ran along Volkhov to Kirisha , and at Kirisha it turned north-west through Voronovo again to the railway line.

The operation lasted for 43 days, with a fighting front of 300–350 kilometers and a Soviet withdrawal depth of 100–120 kilometers ^[2] .

Period

The operation was conducted from October 16 to November 18, 1941 . The end date of the operation is specified as defined by official Soviet historiography, but it is very conditional and is formally determined by the beginning of the offensive of the 4th Army directly on Tikhvin on November 19, 1941 ^[4] . At the same time, Soviet troops in the southern part of the territory covered by the operation, in the Malaya Vishera region , launched an offensive on November 12, 1941, ^[4] but at the same time, in the northern part of the territory, defensive battles of Soviet troops with enemy units, which did not abandon attempts break through to Lake Ladoga continued at Volkhov until November 25, 1941, and at Voybokalo in the first decade of December 1941.

The operations immediately preceded in time and space the Leningrad strategic defensive operation . The continuation of the operation on the same territory by the Soviet troops was the Tikhvin strategic offensive operation . The second Sinyavino offensive operation (1941) partially coincided with the operation in time.

Germany's plans

In mid-September 1941, the German high command made a final decision regarding the fate of Leningrad , namely: the city should be cut off from the rest of the country and forced to surrender . As a result of the events that occurred during the offensive of the German troops on Leningrad , the land communications leading to the city were cut, and as further developments showed, they were reliably cut. However, Leningrad remained the route of communication on Lake Ladoga , since the southern and southeastern shores of the lake, as well as part of the eastern shore, were under the control of Soviet troops.

In order to stop all communications, the command of the Army Group North developed a plan according to which the German troops were to develop an offensive from the line of the Volkhov in the general direction of Tikhvin , go to Svir and connect there with the Finnish troops . The main offensive was to be secured from an attack from the right flank by an attack on Malaya Vishera - Bologoye, with the prospect of merging there with the troops of the Army Group Center , which by its left flank were to advance in the direction of Kalinin - Vyshny Volochek . Such a connection, besides that excluded the possibility of a counterblow from the south, also cut off the entire North-Western Front in the region of the lakes of the Seliger system. In addition, the motorized troops of the right flank, taking Malaya Vishera , had to develop an offensive to the east in order to reach Tikhvin from the south. A limited offensive to the north was also planned from the left flank of the strike force, with the aim of dissecting and squeezing the Soviet troops to the southern shore of Lake Ladoga.

USSR plans

The offensive of the German troops on Tikhvin was to some extent unexpected for the Soviet command, which concentrated its forces northward (up to 70% of all forces stationed south of Lake Ladoga ^[5] ), conducting Sinyavino offensive operation in the Sinyavino area, trying to cut off enemy forces that had broken through to Lake Ladoga, and restore land communication with Leningrad . Actually, during the period of this operation, the German troops struck at the direction of which there were limited Soviet forces, especially weakened by sending a number of formations to Moscow . Consequently, the planning of the operation by the Soviet command was already carried out during the German offensive.

German Forces

On the German side, the 39th motorized corps and the 1st army corps were involved in the operation. The Wehrmacht infantry units concentrated in two places along the left bank of the Volkhov: opposite Gruzino and in the area of ​​the railway bridge across the Volkhov Oktyabrskaya railway . Tank units are located behind the infantry in readiness to force the river after the capture of bridgeheads.

The command of all the troops participating in the operation was assigned to the commander of the 1st Army Corps General of the Infantry Kuno von Bot ^[6] .

USSR Forces

The Soviet command at the time of the start of the operation held a defense south of Lake Ladoga along the line from Lipok on the lake shore, to Novgorod . The 54th Army of the Leningrad Front , to which almost all suitable reserves were sent, concentrated on a 35-kilometer stretch from Lipok to Voronovo and the Maluksinsky moss bog. Since September 1941, the Sinyavino operation was carried out in the army strip. By the beginning of the described operation, the battles subsided somewhat and the army accumulated forces to strike at Sinyavino and then towards Leningrad . The Maluksinsky moss bog and the line from it through Kirishi to the mouth of the Pchevzha River, over 50 kilometers long, were defended by the 4th Separate Army , whose formations were stretched into a thin chain along the line, having one rifle regiment in reserve in the depth of the defense. From the mouth of Pchevzhi to the village of Dubrovka, at the turn along the bank of the Volkhov, 80 kilometers long, there were two divisions of the 52nd separate army . To the south, up to Novgorod and including the immediate approaches to it, defended the Novgorod army task force

On October 16, 1941, German troops ( 11th Infantry Division and 21st Infantry Division ) crossed at two places through the Volkhov and managed to create and expand a bridgehead in Georgia ^[7] , despite the bitter resistance of the 267th and 288th Infantry Division . On October 18, 1941, having crossed the right bank of the Volkhov, a strike group of German troops entered the battle: the 12th Panzer Division and the 20th Motorized Division advanced on the direction of the main attack on Budogoshch , and the 8th Panzer Division and the 18th Motorized Division with the assigned 126th Infantry Division, they attacked in the direction of the strike in the general direction of Malaya Vishera . At the same time, the 11th Infantry Division and the 21st Infantry Division, turned to the north, and launched an offensive along the Volkhov in the direction of Kirishi ^[8] .

From October 20, 1941, units of the 52nd army began to retreat east and southeast, and thus a gap was formed between the 52nd army and the 4th army , into which, German troops rushed towards Budogoshch ^[9] .

Since essentially in different directions offensive and events developed in different ways, including in temporary boundaries, it makes sense to consider defensive operations separately.

Southern flank of the German grouping, October 16 - November 12, 1941

As for the offensive on the southern flank, there, according to the plans of the German command, the group had, pushing the troops of the 52nd army bypass Malaya Visher and attack Tikhvin from the south. On October 22, 1941, in the fierce battles, units of the 52nd Army were forced to leave the Great Vishera . However, the German troops, having encountered resistance, could not develop a frontal attack on Malaya Vishera , and the 8th Panzer Division moved north of Malaya Vishera, in order to develop the attack on Tikhvin not from the region to the south of the city, but from the region to the north. Nevertheless, in the evening of October 23 (according to Soviet sources on October 24 ), the 126th Infantry Division and Malaya Vishera were abandoned. The Soviet command hastily transferred the 259th rifle division and the 25th cavalry division from Demyansk region, which strengthened the 52nd army. The German troops managed to advance slightly east of Malaya Vishera, but by redeployed divisions, along with the remnants of the 52nd army, the German advance was stopped at the turn of the Malaya Visherka river ^[4] . Thus, the troops of the 52nd Army thwarted the plans of the German command to reach Tikhvin from the south with deep coverage. At the end of October, the situation in the 52nd Army's band was relatively stabilized and remained so until November 12 . From this line, the 8th Panzer Division was withdrawn by the German command first, and then, in early November, the 18th Motorized Division (replaced by the Spanish 250th Infantry Division ), which on October 18 crossed the Volkhov south of Shevelyov.

The battles on the southern flank of the battle took a limited part and the troops of the right flank of the Novgorod task force . Their participation was limited to the defense of individual strongholds on the right flank of the German grouping, in particular, the Muravyovsk barracks and the laying of counterstrikes, but by no means due to the small size and weakness of the parts of the group that did not affect the overall situation.

Center for German grouping, October 16 - November 19, 1941

After taking the bridgehead from the Georgian infantry units, on October 18, 1941, tank units (the 12th Panzer Division and the 20th Motorized Division ) crossed there and launched an offensive in the direction of Tikhvin . By October 20, the right-flank German units pushed the Soviet 288th rifle division to the south-east towards the headwaters of the Oskuya River, after which the path to Budogoshch was practically open (not counting the units coming from the north and not having time to deploy the 292nd rifle division ). However, the German troops, including because of the thaw, took three days to reach Budogoschi.

On October 23, German troops took Budogoshch , going out to the rear of units of the 4th army and forcing it to withdraw troops. In a hurry, the Soviet command began to remove units from other sectors of the fronts in order to prevent an expansion of the breakthrough: by October 29, the 4th Guards Rifle Division , deployed from under Sinyavino , was deployed on the outskirts of Sitomla on October 29 the 191st Infantry Division deployed by the vessels of the Ladoga military flotilla from Leningrad , the 44th Infantry Division also deployed from Leningrad began to unfold in the beginning of November; also in the region of October 29, the 92nd Infantry and 60th Panzer Divisions arrived in Tikhvin.

From Budogoschi, the 12th Panzer Division launched an offensive against Sitomlu, which was abandoned on October 31 by Soviet troops.

The 20th motorized division, under the blows of the Soviet troops, was forced to turn its front to the southeast and repel the strikes from the Taltsy station in the planned direction of Budogoshch - Gruzino. In the first days of November, units of the 18th motorized division began to join the 12th Panzer Division , and then the 8th Panzer Division from under Malaya Vishera. On November 4, Soviet troops stopped active counterattacks; on November 5, the Wehrmacht units resumed the offensive and by joint efforts on the night of November 9, units of the Wehrmacht (51st Infantry Regiment) took Tikhvin without a single shot.

... the enemy reacts extremely weakly to our attack on Tikhvin. Perhaps he has no more reserves ^[10] .

On November 12, units of the 12th Panzer Division went on the offensive from Tikhvin along the railroad to Volkhov , and by November 18 occupied Kudrovo and came close to the Island on the Syas River.

The Soviet command made changes in leadership: V. F. Yakovlev was replaced as commander of the 4th Army, KA Meretskov . Organizational changes followed and reinforcements arrived — in the 4th Army on November 10, three task forces were created:

• The Northern Task Force (two regiments of the 44th Infantry Division , the 1067th Infantry Regiment , withdrawn from the positions on the Sviry 46th Tank Brigade ), which developed in the region north and northwest of Tikhvin;
• The Eastern Task Force (the fresh 65th Infantry Division , the 191st Infantry Division, the 27th Cavalry Division , the regiment of the 44th Infantry Division, the 121st Panzer Regiment , the 128th Separate Tank Battalion ), deployed in the area east and south - east of Tikhvin;
• The Southern Task Force (4th Guards Rifle Division, 92nd Rifle Division, 292nd Rifle Division, 120th Tank Regiment ), deployed in the area a lot (in comparison with the previous groups) south and southwest of Tikhvin;

On November 19, the defensive phase of the operation near Tikhvin was over.

Northern flank of the German grouping, October 16 - December 4, 1941

As for the offensive to the north in the direction of Voybokalo and Volkhov , the German command transferred the 254th infantry division to the offensive zone, thus, starting from Kirisha (German troops reached Kirisha almost unhindered) on the western bank of the Volkhov advancing on the left flank 254 Infantry Division, Volkhov 11th Infantry Division (the main part of the division forced the Volkhov and moved along the eastern coast to the north to Kirisham, where they returned to the western coast) on the eastern bank of the Volkhov - 21st Infantry Diva iziya .

Having regrouped, the 11th Infantry Division launched an offensive on the defense of the 285th Infantry Division on October 24, 1941 in the area of Posadnikov Island, and on the very first day threw Soviet troops 5 to 10 kilometers to the north. Also, along with the 285th Infantry Division, the regiments of the 311st Infantry Division were retreating. The 21st Infantry Division, in turn, attacked some parts of the 311th Infantry Division, which defended the right bank of the Volkhov, and scattered units of the 292nd Infantry Division .

October 30, German troops entered the territory of the Volkhov district .

At the beginning of November 1941, during the retreat of our troops, there was no continuous front for the defense of the Volkhov. Scattered, deprived of a single command and not united by a common goal, the bloodless Soviet units in their own area created centers of resistance for the insolent enemy and tried to stop it with insignificant forces ^[7] .

Nevertheless, the Soviet troops put up fierce resistance:

Losses were very high. The 21st Infantry Division lost only 79 officers and 2,522 privates in the first four weeks from the time of the crossing at Gruzino to 10 November. ¹¹ officers were killed and wounded.

During the offensive, from the beginning of November, the left-flank 254th Infantry Division was forced under the threat of a strike from the 54th Army to turn to the north-west, in the direction of Voybokalo and to the west, thus covering the flank of the group. It should be noted that the troops of the 54th Army could not strike at the flank of the group advancing on the Volkhov, because, by order of the Stavka, they continued the Sinyavino operation launched on October 20 , advancing west.

By early November, the Soviet command, reasonably preoccupied with the possibility of the German troops seizing Volkhov and entering the rear of the 54th army, carried out a transfer of troops both to the Volkhov and Tikhvin directions. At the end of October, the 310th Rifle Division from the Sinyavino direction occupied the position south of Volkhov, and in the beginning of November, the 6th Marine Brigade . Положение тем не менее оставалось весьма тяжёлым: в течение первой половины ноября наступление немецких войск медленно, но верно продолжалось. 285-я и 311-я стрелковые дивизии понесли тяжелейшие потери и не могли уже сдерживать натиск немецких сил. 21-я пехотная дивизия, в свою очередь, наступала на некоторые части 310-ю стрелковую дивизию, которая под ударами отходила к Волхову, а также вела бои с разрозненными частями 292-й стрелковой дивизии.

К 4 ноября 21-я пехотная дивизия продвинулась севернее Заречья.

С 5-го по 12 ноября 21-я пехотная дивизия, продолжая наступление, в ожесточённых боях с 6-й бригадой морской пехоты, подошла на подступы к Волхову, выйдя к селу Вельца . Вместе с тем, советские войска ещё удерживали за собой восточный берег Волхова в районе села Прусын. В то же время, 11-я пехотная дивизия продолжала продвижение вдоль западного берега Волхова, к 4 ноября выйдя к Оломне , к 12 ноября выйдя в район несколько севернее Глажево .

После небольшой паузы, с 14 ноября немецкие войска вновь перешли в наступление. 6-я бригада морской пехоты, 16-я танковая бригада , остатки 310-й стрелковой дивизии, другие отдельные подразделения в тяжёлых боях южнее Волхова оказывали сильное сопротивление и немецкое командование сместило акцент на наступление в обход Волхова с запада, в направлении села Шум . К тому времени, 14 ноября, обескровленную 311-ю стрелковую дивизию сменила на позициях 3-я гвардейская стрелковая дивизия , а также 122-я танковая бригада . Ещё 28 октября советские войска, оборонявшие Волхов, были объединены в Волховскую оперативную группу, переданную 4-й армии , а 12 ноября — подчинённые 54-й армии. Немецкие войска, ведущие боевые действия там же, 20 ноября сведены в оперативную группу Бёкмана, включая переброшенную на это направление к 14 ноября 223-ю пехотную дивизию и некоторые части 8-й танковой дивизии .

Несмотря на смещение главного удара, наступление непосредственно на Волхов продолжалось, бои шли за каждую деревню и лишь 25 ноября немецкие войска были остановлены в шести километрах от Волхова. Восточнее Волхова сапёрные части 21-й пехотной дивизии сумели просочиться в тыл и подорвать железную дорогу от Волхова в направлении на Петрозаводск , и наряду с тем, что разведывательный батальон 11-й пехотной дивизии западнее Волхова сумел на некоторое время перерезать шоссе Волхов — Ленинград, это стало самой северной точкой, которой смогли достигнуть немецкие войска. Наступление на Шум медленно продолжалось до 3 декабря , ещё на 1 декабря 1-й армейский корпус имел продвижение, был остановлен в полутора километрах от села и с 3 декабря уже отражал наступление советских войск, в частности, пополненной в Волхове и спешно переброшенной под Войбокало 311-й стрелковой дивизии.

Тихвинская оборонительная операция стала одной из первых оборонительных операций советских войск, в ходе которой немецкие войска не смогли достичь своих оперативных целей. Несмотря на то, что вермахт имел в ходе операции частные успехи, в частности в центре был захвачен Тихвин , тем самым было прекращено снабжение Ленинграда железной дорогой, был сорван план прорыва блокады Ленинграда войсками 54-й армии , но в целом ни на одном направлении наступления цели достигнуты не были. В ходе оборонительной операции был сорван главный план немецкого командования на соединение с финскими войсками в районе реки Свирь , посредством чего была бы довершена блокада Ленинграда, и несомненно, в этом случае Ленинград, а вместе с ним Балтийский флот и войска в Ленинграде, были бы потеряны. Вспомогательные удары на север и на юг также не принесли успеха. На южном фланге немецкого наступления был сорван план взятия Тихвина глубоким охватом с юга и возможное соединение войск Группы армий «Север» с войсками Группы армий «Центр» севернее Калинина . На севере же, несмотря на настойчивые попытки немецких войск, был сорван их план выхода на южное побережье Ладожского озера . При этом, однако, указывается, что взятие Тихвина немецкими войсками явилось одной из реальных причин уменьшения пайков, и как следствие массового голода зимой 1941—1942 года в блокадном Ленинграде ^[3] .

Сопротивление советских войск, растянутость немецких коммуникаций, тяжело восполнимые потери вермахта в личном составе (Группа армий «Север» в период от 10.10.41 по 20.11.41 потеряла 26 808 человек убитыми, ранеными и пропавшими без вести, в основном в ходе наступления на Тихвин) и технике, создали предпосылки для проведения контрнаступления, вошедшего в историю как Тихвинская стратегическая наступательная операция

Memoirs

• Гальдер Ф. От Бреста до Сталинграда. Военный дневник. Ежедневные записи начальника генерального штаба сухопутных войск 1941—1942 годов. — Смоленск: Русич, 2001. — 656 с. — (Мир в войнах). — ISBN 5-313-00026-8 .
• Хаупт В. Группа армий «Север». Бои за Ленинград. 1941 - 1944. / Пер. Е. Захарова. — М. : Центрполиграф, 2005. — 384 с. — (За линией фронта. Мемуары). — ISBN 5-9524-1672-1 .

Исторические исследования

• Исаев А. В. Котлы 41-го. История ВОВ, которую мы не знали . — М. : Эксмо, 2005. — 400 с. — ISBN 5-699-12899-9 .
• Исаев А. В. Пять кругов ада. Красная армия в котлах. — М. : Эксмо, 2008. — 416 с. — ISBN 978-5-699-28995-0 .
• Кривошеев Г. Ф. Россия и СССР в войнах XX века. Потери вооруженных сил: Статистическое исследование. — М. : Олма-Пресс, 2001. — 320 с. — ISBN 5-17-024092-9 .
• Сяков Ю. Волхов в огне. Документальный очерк. - SPb. : Волховская типография, 1997.
• G. Shigin. The Battle of Leningrad: Major Operations, “White Spots”, Loss, Ed. Н. Л. Волковского. - SPb. : Полигон, 2005. — 320 с. — ISBN 5-17-024092-9 .

Тихвинская оборонительная операция (неопр.) . Дата обращения 17 мая 2012. Архивировано 6 июня 2012 года.