Alexander Andreyevich Korobkov ( June 20, 1897 - July 22, 1941 ) - Soviet commander, in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, commander of the 4th army, Major General . July 22, 1941 was shot "for the loss of command and control". After Stalin’s death , he was rehabilitated “for lack of corpus delicti,” restored in military rank and rights to rewards (posthumously).
| Alexander Andreevich Korobkov | |||
|---|---|---|---|
 | |||
| Date of Birth | |||
| Place of Birth | |||
| Date of death | |||
| Place of death | |||
| Affiliation |  the USSR | ||
| Years of service |  1915 - 1918 USSR 1918 - 1941 | ||
| Rank |  (1940) | ||
| Commanded | 4th Army | ||
| Battles / Wars | Bialystok-Minsk battle | ||
| Awards and prizes |
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Content
Biography
Early years
Alexander Andreevich Korobkov was born on June 20, 1897 in the town of Petrovsk, now in the Saratov Region . Russian .
In the royal army - since 1915 . In 1916 he graduated from the Orenburg school of ensigns . During the First World War he commanded a platoon on the South-Western Front . In the Red Army - since August 1918. Member of the Civil War . In 1922 he graduated from the Military Academy named after MV Frunze . Since 1924 - commander of a rifle regiment, since 1931 - chief of staff of the 95th rifle division .
Rise of career
In 1936, A. A. Korobkov was appointed commander of the 100th rifle division , in May 1939, commander of the 16th rifle corps , and in January 1941, commander of the 4th army.
In his memoirs, the former chief of staff of the 4th Army, L. M. Sandalov, wrote [1] :
... at this time, arrived the new commander of the 4th Army, Major General A. A. Korobkov. I knew him for a long time. He was a very active commander, quickly moving up the career ladder and leaving behind many of his fellow soldiers. In 1938, he commanded the rifle division, from the division "went to the corps", and by the spring of 1941 he was appointed commander of the 4th army .
The new commander meticulously executed the will of the district commander for the deployment of troops. He either did not have his point of view on this subject or carefully concealed it.
Doom
By the time the German invasion of the USSR began, the 4th Army of the Red Army under Korobkov's command (28 rifle corps (2 rifle divisions), 14 mechanized corps (2 tank and 1 motorized divisions)), two separate rifle divisions (49 and 75 detachment) and parts located in the Brest area with headquarters in Kobryn . In Brest Fortress as the main army barracks fund, since 1939, 6 and 42 pr units were stationed, to the south of Brest in the military camp — armored divisions of the mechanized corps, while the mechanized division was closer to Kobryn. At the junction with the 10th Army (right flank), under the Cover Plan, the 13th Army was to be deployed (headquarters in Belsk), but until June 22 the army headquarters did not appear in the RPD, and some parts of the future formation were located in the Minsk region and even east of it.
In the operational subordination of the army was a mixed aviation division, part of the Brest fortified area. On the left flank, the Pinsk military flotilla carried out interaction with the army.
In the spring of 1941, units of the 4th army took part in a number of military exercises of various levels (from regimental to divisional). The exercises were pronounced offensive in nature and were associated with the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, its fortified line and the introduction of parts of the mechanized corps into the breakthrough.
The army command repeatedly raised the issue of the withdrawal of most of the units from the fortress, where in addition to the army units there were units of the border troops, convoy units of the NKVD, as well as repair and rear units, including the district hospital. The same request was repeatedly made by the district command, directing relevant requests to NGOs and the General Staff (according to the practice established by the early 40s, determined the central leadership of the Red Army), indicating that such a dislocation could be a trap for all parts of the fortress however, the situation remained unchanged until the second half of June.
On June 22, 1941, the army was attacked by the 2nd Wehrmacht Tank Group (commanded by Heinz Guderian ), supported by the general offensive of the Wehrmacht 9 Army. Two German motorized corps forced the Western Bug River north and south of Brest. The units of the 4th Army, located in Brest and the military camps around Brest, were blocked and defeated for several hours: by 7:00 on June 22, Brest was captured by the enemy . 1] . The army was driven over the line Kobrin.
On June 23, the 4th Army, in accordance with the “Directive No. 3” of the USSR NKO , struck by the forces of the 14th Mechanized Corps and the 28th Infantry Corps . However, these actions were not successful. On June 24, the German assault units reached Pruzhany and Ruzhany , deploying a strike on Slonim and Baranavichy , and the 4th army ceased to exist as a single organized unit - fighting with the enemy now in different directions was conducted by scattered units, often from different divisions. The army headquarters, although it maintained contact with the front, could no longer organize steady resistance, just as it could not organize a planned departure and withdrawal of equipment. The huge mass of troops, who lost control and commanders, rolled eastward along the highway to Minsk and Slutsk . Nevertheless, the headquarters did not cease to exist and did not dissolve into small groups in the Pripyat forests, trying to organize randomly retreating parts during the retreat. The front command of the army subordinated the 55th and 155th rifle divisions, then the combined detachment of the 47th rifle corps, but these units entered the battle separately, one by one, and therefore could not change the overall catastrophic picture. There was no anti-tank artillery in the Brest region from the very beginning, and the 4th Army could not lead the battles with enemy tanks correctly.
On June 25, the front command issued an order for the general withdrawal of the Slonim- Pinsk line to the Shchara River, in order to avoid encircling units and formations located to the west, above all, 10 and 3 armies. However, on the same day, the ring in the area of Baranavichy closed - 2 tank group made a breakthrough to the north, deploying a further march to the east and northeast along the highway to Minsk and Slutsk. German motorized corps continued the offensive: on June 26, the right wing of the enemy took Slutsk , June 28 - Bobruisk . Minsk fell on June 28, and the second ring of encirclement thus closed.
June 29 - July 1, scattered units of the 4th army began to emerge from encirclement in the area of the Dnieper, south of Mogilev . Together with them came the army headquarters, headed by the commander-in-chief.
On July 2, 1941, the 4th Army was transferred to the operational subordination of the 21st Army , located at that time in the Gomel area, then withdrawn to the second echelon of the front. On July 8, A.A. Korobkov was removed from command and arrested.
The leadership of the USSR blamed the catastrophe on the command of the Western Front . On July 4, the front commander DG Pavlov and other generals were arrested. After a short investigation, they were all shot.
Korobkov got into this group. On July 22, 1941, the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court was convicted under article 93-17b and 193-20b of the RSFSR Criminal Code - “negligence” and “non-fulfillment of their official duties”, deprived of military rank, decorations, and sentenced to death . Shot the same day.
Rehabilitation
In the summer of 1956, Colonel General L.M. Sandalov sent a letter to Army General V.V. Kurasov. :
Why was the commander of the 4th Army Korobkov arrested and put on trial, whose army, although it suffered huge losses, still continued to exist and did not lose contact with the headquarters of the Western Front? By the end of June 1941, one commander was appointed according to a schedule for trial from the Western Front, and only the commander of the 4th Army was present. The commanders of the 3rd and 10th armies were in those days unknown where there was no connection with them. This determined the fate of Korobkov. In the person of General Korobkov, we then lost a good commander, who, I believe, would later become a line-up of the best commanders of the Red Army. General Korobkova should be rehabilitated first.
On July 31, 1957, A. A. Korobkov was posthumously rehabilitated “for lack of corpus delicti,” restored in military rank and rights to awards [Approx. 2] .
Awards
- Order of the Red Banner
- medal "XX years of the Red Army"
- honorary weapon
Order announcing a death sentence
ORDER OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE TREATY OF THE USSR SUPREME COURT
ON THE CASE OF THE ARMY GENERAL D. G. PAVLOV, GENERAL MAYOROV V. E. KLIMOVSKY,
A.T. GRIGORIEVA AND A.A. KOROBKOVA
No. 0250 July 28, 1941By order of the State Defense Committee, the military tribunal was arrested and put on trial for cowardice, unauthorized abandonment of strategic points without permission from the high command, disruption of command and control, inaction of the government, former commander of the Western Front, General of the Army Pavlov DG, former Chief of Staff of the same front, General Major E. Klimovskikh, former head of communications of the same front, Major General A. T. Grigoriev, former Commander of the 4th Army, Major General A. A. Korobkov
On July 22, 1941, the Supreme Court of the USSR reviewed the case against Pavlov D.G., Klimovskiy V.E., Grigorieva A.T. and Korobkova A.A.
The judicial investigation established that:
a) the former commander of the Western Front, Pavlov D. G. and the former chief of staff of the same front, V. Klimovskiy, from the outbreak of hostilities by the German fascist troops against the USSR, displayed cowardice, inaction of the authorities, lack of control, allowed the collapse of command and control, surrender of weapons and warehouses to the enemy, the unauthorized abandonment of combat positions by units of the Western Front, and these gave the enemy the opportunity to break through the front;
b) the former head of communications of the Western Front, A. Grigoryev, having the opportunity to establish uninterrupted communication of the front headquarters with active units and formations, showed alarmism and criminal inaction, did not use radio communications, as a result of which the control of troops was violated from the first days of hostilities;
c) the former commander of the 4th Army of the Western Front, A. A. Korobkov, showed cowardice, cowardice and criminal inaction, shamefully threw the units entrusted to him, with the result that the army was disorganized and suffered heavy losses.
Thus, Pavlov D.G., Klimovskiy V.E., Grigoriev A.T. and Korobkov A.A. violated the military oath, dishonored the high rank of the Red Army soldier, forgot their duty to the Motherland, their cowardice and anxiety, criminal inaction. , the collapse of the control of troops, the surrender of weapons and warehouses to the enemy, the assumption of the unauthorized abandonment of combat positions by the units caused serious damage to the troops of the Western Front.
The Supreme Court of the USSR Pavlov D.G., Klimovskiy V.E., Grigoriev A.T. and Korobkov A.A. are deprived of military ranks and sentenced to death.
The sentence is enforced.
I warn you that in the future all those who violate the military oath, forget the duty to the Motherland, discredit the high rank of the Red Army soldier, all cowards and alarmists who arbitrarily leave their military positions and give up their weapons to the enemy without a fight will be mercilessly punished according to all the austerities of martial law without looking on faces.
Order to declare to the entire commander of the regimental commander and above.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I. STALIN
See also
- Pavlov, Dmitry G.
- Klimovskiy, Vladimir Efimovich
- Grigoriev, Andrei Terentevich
Notes
- ↑ The resistance of the Soviet units of the Brest Fortress and at the station continued for another month.
- ↑ All the generals shot in the Pavlov group were rehabilitated
Sources
Literature
- The team of authors . The Great Patriotic War. Commanders. Military biographical dictionary / Under the general ed. M. G. Vozhakina . - M. Zhukovsky: Kuchkovo Pole, 2005. — pp. 102-103. - ISBN 5-86090-113-5 .
- Cherushev N. S. , Cherushev Yu. N. The executed elite of the Red Army (commanders of the 1 st and 2 nd ranks, com-corps, divisional divisions and their equal): 1937-1941. Biographical dictionary. - M .: Kuchkovo field; Megapolis, 2012. - p. 458-459. - 496 s. - 2000 copies - ISBN 978-5-9950-0217-8 .