6th Army Corps (Russian Empire)

6th Army Corps
6th Army Corps
Years of existence	February 19, 1877 - 1918
A country	Russian empire
Subordination	Russian imperial army
Type of	army corps
Includes	; ; ; ; ;
Number	up to 20 thousand people
Dislocation	Warsaw Military District
Participation in	Russian-Turkish war (1877-1878) , World War I
Commanders
Famous commanders	see list

6th Army Corps - combined - arms operational formation ( army corps ) of the Russian Imperial Army . Formed on February 19, 1877 as part of the 4th , 6th , 10th Infantry Divisions and 6th Cavalry Division . In the spring and summer of 1917 he was "Ukrainized" and became the 2nd Sich Zaporizhzhya Corps .

Content

1 Composition
2 Battle Path
- 2.1 VI-th Corps in the battles in East Prussia in 1914-1915
3 Commanders
4 notes
5 Sources

Composition

Before the start of World War I, it was part of the Warsaw Military District . Composition on 07/18/14

4th Infantry Division
- 1st brigade
  - 13th Belozersky Infantry Regiment
  - 14th Olonets Infantry Regiment
- 2nd brigade
  - 15th Shlisselburg Infantry Regiment
  - 16th Ladoga Infantry Regiment
- 4th artillery brigade
16th Infantry Division
- 1st brigade
  - 61st Vladimir Infantry Regiment
  - 62nd Suzdal Infantry Regiment
- 2nd brigade
  - 63rd Uglich Infantry Regiment
  - 64th Kazan Infantry Regiment
- 16th artillery brigade

67th Infantry Division (from November 16, 1914 - early 1915) ^[1]
55th Infantry Division
4th Cavalry Division
- 1st brigade
  - 4th Dragoon Novotroitsk-Yekaterinoslav Regiment
  - 4th Lancers Kharkov Regiment
- 2nd brigade
  - 4th Hussar Mariupol Regiment
  - 4th Don Cossack Regiment
- 4th Horse Artillery Division
6th mortar and artillery division
10th Engineer Battalion
1st convoy battalion

Battle Path

VI-th Corps in the battles in East Prussia in 1914-1915

By August 12/25, 1914, thanks to the ill-considered directives of the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Front, General Zhilinsky and the actions of General Samsonov , instead of concentrating, the 2nd Russian army was fanned out on a front of 120 versts during the decisive battle (Battle of Tannenberg ) with the 8th German army.

The German 8th army was led to the battlefield in two groups: the southern one with 8 and a half infantry divisions was sent to strike the left flank and the rear of Samsonov’s army, the northern 4 and half infantry divisions were sent to Bischofsburg to inflict separate defeat on the isolated VI Russian corps ^{[2 ]}

.

The battle was divided into a number of isolated corps battles. On August 12/25, the VI Russian corps received a change in the directive, caused by the permission of the Commander-in-Chief to attack with the main forces not on the Seeburg - Rastenburg front, but on the Osterode - Allenstein front. According to the new directive, the VI Russian corps was entrusted with the task, remaining at Bischofsburg, to ensure the right flank of the 2nd Russian army in the area between Allenstein and the main Masurian lakes . To the right was the 4th Cavalry Division with the aim of reconnaissance in the Seeburg-Rastenburg strip ^[3] . As a result of horse reconnaissance, corps commander General Blagoveshchensky received information about the presence of large enemy forces at Lautern - Seeburg. As part of the task assigned to the corps, Blagoveshchensky decides to move the 16th Infantry Division to Allenstein. On the morning of August 13/26, the division began moving towards Allenstein. Meanwhile, "the Lautern side began an offensive by the enemy." The 4th Infantry Division "got involved in the battle and quickly used up its reserves." Small Russian artillery refused to fight with the enemy’s batteries. The Russian regiments, heroically resisting, suffered huge losses from enemy artillery fire. At 1 pm, the commander of the VI Corps orders the 16th Infantry Division to return to Bischofsburg to assist the 4th Infantry Division. One regiment was sent to Bischofsburg, and with the rest of the forces was ordered to move west to inflict a flank strike. However, there was not enough time: the 4th Infantry Division, covered on three sides, began to withdraw to Ortelsburg . The erratic retreat of the 4th Infantry Division was covered by units of 16 Infantry and 4th Cavalry Divisions.

In a battle near Bischofsburg, the 4th Infantry Division, consisting of 12.5 battalions, 5 field and 2 mortar batteries, lost 73 officers, 5,283 lower ranks, 2 batteries and 18 machine guns ... losses reached 50% ^{[4 ]}

.

On the morning of August 14/27, the 16th Infantry Division began a retreat from Bischofsburg in the direction of Mensgut [1] . At about 4 pm, her rearguard got into a battle with the enemy vanguard north of Mensgut. Gradually, "the main forces of the 16th Infantry Division also turned around and entered the battle." The enemy was forced to stop the offensive. On the night of August 15/28, "the division passed by the burning Ortelsburg and was located east of it." The central corps of the army of General Samsonov were at Allenstein and to the west. Military historian Golovin N.N. in his research, he notes that “under such conditions there was only one way for the 16th Infantry Division: the road to Passenheim [2] so that, protecting the defile between the lakes there, to prevent the enemy corps from reaching the rear of the main forces of Samsonov’s army ". The 16th Infantry Division was obliged to occupy either Passenheim, Jedabno or Wallenberg [3] . However, this was not done either on the night of August 16/29, or on the afternoon of August 16/29. The division commander and his headquarters did not make an independent decision in accordance with the prevailing situation and, together with their division, "passively" retreated after the "4th Infantry Division and corps commanders who had gone south".

The southward passage of the fully combat-ready 16th infantry division cannot be considered the largest strategic mistake of the corps commander and division head , which led to disastrous consequences for the central corps of the 2nd Army ^[5]

.

Until August 17/30, the front headquarters did not take any measures "in order to take control of the flank corps" of the 2nd Russian army. At 11 a.m. on August 17/30, an order was received from the front headquarters on the need to concentrate the VIth Corps at Wilenberg, the 4th Cavalry Division to move to Passenheim in order to ensure the right flank and rear of the central corps of Samsonov’s army. By evening, the VIth building advanced 15 miles in the direction of Lipovets . The 4th Cavalry Division again approached Gramen [4] . On August 17/30, some parts of the XIII corps were captured. On the night of August 18/31, Zhilinsky orders the VIth Corps to retreat to Myshkovets and then to Ostroleka ^[6] . Golovin N.N. wrote that the continuation of the movement of the corps to Wallenberg would save parts of the 36th Infantry Division under the command of General Prezhentsov (almost 11,000). However, the will of the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Front, General Zhilinsky, “failed to show even a little perseverance to save the remnants of those heroes who were so foolishly driven into adventure” ^[7] .

To save the central corps of the 2nd Army, it was not at all necessary to force hundreds of versts into the strategic trap of the left-flank corps of the Rennenkampf Army, and only elementary strategic literacy of the tops of the VIth Corps was required ^[8]

.

Since October 12, 1914, the corps was part of the 1st Army under the command of the cavalry general P.K. Rennenkampf . He performed the task of covering the right flank and rear of the army operating west of the Vistula. November 4 participated in the attack on Ratsionzh , Serpets and Rypin .

On November 15, the corps launched an attack on the towns of Sobot and Belyava, crowded out parts of the German 1st Infantry Division, crossed the river. Mrogu and entrenched in new positions.

By December 6, after heavy fighting, the number of corps fell to 17 thousand people (40% of the staff and 58% of the number as of November 1).

In mid-December, the corps occupied a 15-km section of the front at the confluence of the Bzura and Ravka rivers. In battles in this area, his troops were attacked by the Germans using chemical weapons ^[9] .

On January 7, 1915, the corps was transferred to the 2nd Army (commander of the infantry general V.V. Smirnov ). In June 1915 he was transferred to the 11th Army (commander of the infantry general D. G. Shcherbachev ) of the South-Western Front. He was transferred to Galicia, where he took part in a strike on the flank of the advancing German units, Colonel General A. von Mackensen . In these battles, Russian troops defeated two enemy corps, taking 13 thousand prisoners, capturing 6 artillery pieces and over 40 machine guns. Since June 3, the corps switched to defense.

In the fall of 1915, the 6th Army Corps took part in the offensive operation of the southern armies of the South-Western Front on the river. Seret . By early November, together with the 17th Army Corps , more than 10 thousand prisoners were captured.

Commanders

02.19.1877-04.03.1877 - Lieutenant General Baron Rall, Vasily Fedorovich
03/04/1877-16.04.1878 - Lieutenant General Baron Meller-Zakomelsky, Nikolai Ivanovich
04.16.1878-21.10.1883 - Lieutenant General Roop, Christofor Khristoforovich
11/04/1883 - 04/09/1888 - Lieutenant General Pavlov, Platon Petrovich
05/28/1889 - 05/03/1900 - lieutenant general (since 30/30/1894 general from the cavalry ) Kulgachev, Alexei Petrovich
05/03/1900 - 12/07/1901 - lieutenant general (from 06/06/1900 general from infantry ) Grippenberg, Oscar-Ferdinand Kazimirovich
12/07/1901 - 06/22/1902 - Lieutenant General Faddeev, Semyon Andreevich
хх.хх.1902 — хх.хх.1904 - Lieutenant General Shepelev, Nikolai Alexandrovich
09/03/1904 - 04/25/1905 - Lieutenant General Skugarevsky, Arkady Platonovich
хх.хх.1906–05.12.1909 - lieutenant general (from 1908 - general from artillery ) Khitrovo, Nikolai Mikhailovich
12/05/1909 - 06/03/1910 - Infantry General Alekseev, Konstantin Mikhailovich
09/01/1912 - 08/26/1914 - lieutenant general (from 6/12/1912 - general from infantry) Blagoveshchensky, Alexander Alexandrovich
08/30/1914 - 11/09/1914 - Lieutenant General Baluev, Pyotr Semenovich
11/09/1914 - 12/06/1915 - Lieutenant General Gurko, Vasily Iosifovich
03/02/1916 - 04/15/1917 - Lieutenant General Gutor, Alexei Evgenievich
04/15/1917 - 04/25/1917 - I.D., Lieutenant General Dmitriev, August Alexandrovich
04/25/1917 - 09/09/1917 - Lieutenant General Notbek, Vladimir Vladimirovich
09.09.1917—? .12.1917 - ID, Lieutenant General Markodeev, Pavel Anisimovich

Notes

↑ Lodz operation
↑ N.N. Golovin, “From the History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front”, Prince. 1, t. 1. "Plan of war"; T. 2. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia ”/ N.N. Golovin - M .: AIRIS-press, 2014 - 688 p., (White Russia), p. 501, 529
↑ N.N. Golovin, “From the History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front”, Prince. 1, t. 1. "Plan of war"; T. 2. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia ”/ N.N. Golovin - M .: AIRIS-press, 2014 - 688 p., (White Russia), p. 525
↑ N.N. Golovin, “From the History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front”, Prince. 1, t. 1. "Plan of war"; T. 2. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia ”/ N.N. Golovin - M .: AIRIS-press, 2014 - 688 p., (White Russia), p. 527
↑ N.N. Golovin, “From the History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front”, Prince. 1, t. 1. "Plan of war"; T. 2. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia ”/ N.N. Golovin - M .: AIRIS-press, 2014 - 688 p., (White Russia), p. 528
↑ N.N. Golovin, “From the History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front”, Prince. 1, t. 1. "Plan of war"; T. 2. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia ”/ N.N. Golovin - M .: AIRIS-press, 2014-688 p., (White Russia), p. 585
↑ N.N. Golovin, “From the History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front”, Prince. 1, t. 1. "Plan of war"; T. 2. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia ”/ N.N. Golovin - M .: AIRIS-press, 2014 - 688 p., (White Russia), p. 586
↑ N.N. Golovin, “From the History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front”, Prince. 1, t. 1. "Plan of war"; T. 2. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia ”/ N.N. Golovin - M .: AIRIS-press, 2014 - 688 p., (White Russia), p. 546
↑ Gurko V. War and revolution in Russia. Memoirs of the commander of the Western Front. 1914-1917. - M .: Centerpolygraph, 2007 .-- 399 p. - (Witnesses of the era). - ISBN 978-5-9524-2972-7 . S. 117, 118.

Sources

The Russian Army in the Great War: File Card Formations
K.A. Zalessky. World War I. Rulers and military leaders. Biographical Encyclopedic Dictionary. 2000
Gurko V. War and revolution in Russia. Memoirs of the commander of the Western Front. 1914-1917. - M .: Centerpolygraph, 2007 .-- 399 p. - (Witnesses of the era). - ISBN 978-5-9524-2972-7 .

[1] Lodz operation

[2] N.N. Golovin, “From the History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front”, Prince. 1, t. 1. "Plan of war"; T. 2. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia ”/ N.N. Golovin - M .: AIRIS-press, 2014 - 688 p., (White Russia), p. 501, 529

[3] N.N. Golovin, “From the History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front”, Prince. 1, t. 1. "Plan of war"; T. 2. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia ”/ N.N. Golovin - M .: AIRIS-press, 2014 - 688 p., (White Russia), p. 525

[4] N.N. Golovin, “From the History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front”, Prince. 1, t. 1. "Plan of war"; T. 2. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia ”/ N.N. Golovin - M .: AIRIS-press, 2014 - 688 p., (White Russia), p. 527

[5] N.N. Golovin, “From the History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front”, Prince. 1, t. 1. "Plan of war"; T. 2. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia ”/ N.N. Golovin - M .: AIRIS-press, 2014 - 688 p., (White Russia), p. 528

[6] N.N. Golovin, “From the History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front”, Prince. 1, t. 1. "Plan of war"; T. 2. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia ”/ N.N. Golovin - M .: AIRIS-press, 2014-688 p., (White Russia), p. 585

[7] N.N. Golovin, “From the History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front”, Prince. 1, t. 1. "Plan of war"; T. 2. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia ”/ N.N. Golovin - M .: AIRIS-press, 2014 - 688 p., (White Russia), p. 586

[8] N.N. Golovin, “From the History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front”, Prince. 1, t. 1. "Plan of war"; T. 2. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia ”/ N.N. Golovin - M .: AIRIS-press, 2014 - 688 p., (White Russia), p. 546

[9] Gurko V. War and revolution in Russia. Memoirs of the commander of the Western Front. 1914-1917. - M .: Centerpolygraph, 2007 .-- 399 p. - (Witnesses of the era). - ISBN 978-5-9524-2972-7 . S. 117, 118.