Chronicle of the Great Patriotic War (June 1943)

Sovinformburo ^[1] . During June 1, fights continued in the Kuban, northeast of Novorossiysk. In other sectors of the front, no significant change has occurred.

On June 2, German aviation made one of the largest raids on the Kursk railway junction. The enemy attracted about 550 aircraft to strike, of which more than 420 bombers and about 120 cover fighters. Daytime raid was intensified by the actions of night bombers, which made up to 300 sorties on the night of June 3. Enemy aircraft approached the railway junction from different directions and at various heights. Fighters of the 16th and 2nd Air Armies, 101st Fighter Aviation Division of the country’s air defense and anti-aircraft artillery of the Kursk Air Defense Group, as well as artillery of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, and 145 enemy aircraft were destroyed, reflected the enemy’s daily raid. ^[2] (p. 398)

Sovinformburo . During June 2, fights continued in the Kuban, northeast of Novorossiysk.

Sovinformburo . During June 3, fights continued in the Kuban, northeast of Novorossiysk.

Sovinformburo . During June 4, there were no significant changes at the front.

The Soviet government issued the Second State War Loan.

Sovinformburo . During June 5, there were no significant changes at the front.

On June 6, analyzing the situation, the Operations Directorate of the General Staff drew attention to the strange behavior of the enemy. Doubts arose about the deployment of his tank divisions. On the same day, signed by Antonov, a telegram was sent to the headquarters of the fronts as follows: “Now it is extremely important for us to know whether the enemy’s tank grouping remains the same or has been changed. Therefore, set the task to all types of intelligence to locate enemy tank divisions. ” After five days, the headquarters reported that everything was still at the front, the enemy tank grouping had not changed. ^[3] (p. 132)

Sovinformburo . During June 6, there were no significant changes at the front.

North Caucasian Front . Until June 7, stubborn battles continued on the ground and in the air. But all attempts to break through the enemy’s defenses north-east of Novorossiysk were unsuccessful. Colonel General I.E. Petrov, who took command of the front, decided to stop these unsuccessful attacks, gain a foothold on the lines reached and prepare for decisive battles to break through the enemy’s Blue Line and destroy it on the Taman Peninsula. The Stavka affirmed this decision and ordered: “From now on, until special instructions by the Stavka, active offensive operations in sections 37, 56 and 18 of the armies should be abstained. On the whole front, switch to a solid defense at the occupied lines, replenish troops, put them in order and have reserves. It is allowed to conduct private active actions in certain areas, only to improve their defensive position. Pay special attention to the unconditional retention of the bridgehead in the Myskhako area. ” According to this directive, the troops of the front, gaining a foothold on the achieved frontiers, began to conduct private operations. ^[4] (p. 341)

Sovinformburo . During June 7, there were no significant changes at the front.

The second operation of the Soviet Air Force to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields was carried out by three air armies (1, 2 and 15th) and long-range aviation from June 8 to 10. This time, Soviet pilots hit 28 enemy airfields located in the central section of the front. The main efforts were directed to airfields in Seshche, Bryansk, Karachev, Orel and Borovsky, from which enemy aircraft made night raids on important industrial facilities of the Soviet country. The first massive blow was delivered not in the morning, as it was in the May operation, but in the evening. Nevertheless, it was not possible to achieve surprise. The greatest success was achieved by those air armies that attacked with large forces.

Two days later, Soviet aviation again struck at the airfields of Seshcha and Bryansk. This time, 160 took part in the raid on Seshcha, and 113 aircraft of the 1st Air Army took part in the Bryansk airfield. As a result, 76 German aircraft were burned and damaged on the ground 76 and shot down in the air. No less successfully operated units of other air armies. In total, during the second air operation, Soviet pilots destroyed 223 German aircraft. ^[2] (p. 396)

Sovinformburo . During June 8, there were no significant changes at the front.

Sovinformburo . During June 9, there were no significant changes at the front.

Sovinformburo . During June 10, there were no significant changes at the front.

In early June, the governments of England and the United States informed the Soviet Union of their decision not to create a second front in Europe in 1943. This report said that it was decided to limit the operations of the allied forces until mid-1944 by the Mediterranean theater of operations, primarily by landing in Sicily.

The head of the Soviet government emphasized in a letter dated June 11, 1943 that delaying the opening of a second front creates exceptional difficulties for the Soviet Union, which is fighting "almost in single combat with a still very strong and dangerous enemy."

Churchill sent a response message on June 19, in which he argued that all his aspirations were aimed at opening a second front, but the creation of this front was impossible due to a number of difficulties in 1943.

On June 24, JV Stalin sent a new message to the British Prime Minister, in which he noted that the difficulties of creating a second front were also known when the governments of the United States and England made their solemn commitments. Since then, thanks to the successes of the Red Army, the conditions for opening a second front have improved significantly. The message ended with the following words: “I must tell you that the matter here is not just about the disappointment of the Soviet Government, but about the preservation of its confidence in the Allies, which is undergoing difficult trials. We must not forget that we are talking about saving millions of lives in the occupied regions of Western Europe and Russia and reducing the colossal victims of the Soviet armies, in comparison with which the casualties of the Anglo-American troops are small. ” ^[2] (p. 498)

Sovinformburo . During June 11, no significant changes took place at the front.

Sovinformburo . During June 12, there were no significant changes at the front.

Sovinformburo . During June 13, there were no significant changes at the front.

Sovinformburo . During June 14, there were no significant changes at the front.

Steppe Military District . Until June 15, the so-called state line was prepared for defense by the forces of the local population. He walked along the left bank of the Don to Voeikovo, Lebedyan, Zadonsk, Voronezh, Liski, Pavlovsk, Boguchar. The steppe military district was studying this line and was preparing to occupy it as soon as necessary. We also carried out reconnaissance of our old defensive line - Efremov, Borki, Alekseevka, Belovodsk, Kamensk on the Seversky Donets. As a result, in the zone of the most likely enemy attack, the total depth of the engineering equipment of the area reached 300 kilometers. In this space, our strategic reserves were to destroy the enemy in the event of a breakthrough. At the same time, the Steppe District was instructed: “The troops, headquarters and commanders of the formations should be prepared mainly for offensive combat and operations, to break through the enemy’s defensive line, as well as to produce powerful counterattacks by our troops, and to counteract massive attacks by tanks and aircraft.” ^[3] (p. 126)

Sovinformburo . During June 15, there were no significant changes at the front.

Operation Citadel . Guderian : “On June 15, I again dealt with our wards “ panthers ” , whose lateral gears were out of order and showed flaws in optics. The next day I expressed to Hitler my doubts about the expediency of using the Panther tanks on the Eastern Front, since they were not yet fully ready for their use in battles. ” ^[5] (p. 428)

Sovinformburo . During June 16, there were no significant changes at the front.

Sovinformburo . During June 17, no significant changes took place at the front.

Sovinformburo . During June 18, there were no significant changes at the front.

Sovinformburo . During June 19, there were no significant changes at the front.

Sovinformburo . During June 20, there were no significant changes at the front.

North Caucasian Front . The Military Council of the North Caucasus Front, in its order of June 21, 1943, noted: “As a result of air battles, the victory undoubtedly remained on our side. The enemy did not achieve his goal. “Our aviation not only successfully counteracted the enemy, but at the same time forced the Germans to stop the air battles and remove their aircraft.” For the entire period of hostilities in the Kuban (from April 17 to June 7), front-line aviation and aviation of the Black Sea Fleet made about 35 thousand sorties. The enemy lost 1,100 combat aircraft. In the battles at the Kuban bridgehead, and especially during the battles for the Crimean village, Soviet pilots showed examples of heroism, courage and courage. 52 pilots were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. ^[4] (p. 345)

Sovinformburo . TWO YEARS OF THE PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION. Two years have passed since the day that Hitlerite Germany was mean and treacherous attacked our homeland. For two years, the peoples of the Soviet Union have been waging a tense struggle against the Nazi invaders. The Soviet people and their Red Army have passed the severe test in the fight against a strong and treacherous enemy ...

During the battles during the two years of the war, the Red Army inflicted enormous damage on manpower and equipment to the Nazi troops. How serious are the losses of the Germans on the Soviet-German front compared with the losses of the Red Army, it can be seen from the following factual data: Germany and its allies lost 6.400.000 soldiers and officers killed and captured in two years of the war, lost 56 500 guns of all calibers, 42.400 tanks , 43,000 aircraft. During the same time, the USSR lost 4,200,000 people, 35,000 guns of all calibers, 30,000 tanks, 23,000 aircraft, killed and missing ... Thus, as a result of two years of war, the military power of Nazi Germany was thoroughly undermined, and the Nazi army was undergoing serious the crisis…

While the situation of Nazi Germany sharply worsened, the military, political and international situation of the Soviet Union strengthened ... The Red Army grew stronger, and the Soviet rear was strong and unshakable ... The international situation of our Motherland is now stronger than ever, and during the war the military alliance was further strengthened. USSR, England and the USA ...

However, the Soviet people and the Red Army do not underestimate the forces of the enemy and the difficulties of further struggle ... The correlation of forces during the war has changed in our favor and in favor of our allies. But this is not enough to win. Now it all depends on how our allies use the favorable environment to create a second front on the continent of Europe, for without a second front victory over Nazi Germany is impossible ... To miss the favorable conditions created for the opening of a second front in Europe in 1943, to be late in this matter means cause serious damage to our common cause. The postponement of the second front in Europe against fascist Germany would lead to a prolongation of the war, and therefore to a colossal increase in casualties. And, on the contrary, the organization of a second front in Europe this year would lead to a quick end to the war - hence, a tremendous reduction in casualties on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition.

During June 21, no significant changes took place at the front.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command . The Soviet command is concerned about the lack of a German offensive. A. Vasilevsky : "The commander of the Voronezh Front, N. F. Vatutin, began to show particular impatience. Nikolai Fedorovich repeatedly raised the question of the need to launch an offensive on his own so as not to miss summer time. My arguments are that the enemy’s transition to an offensive against us is by the question of the coming days and that our attack would certainly be beneficial only to the enemy, they didn’t convince him ... From the daily negotiations with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I saw that he was restless, once he informed me that Vatutin called him and didn’t he insists that we start our offensive no later than the first days of July; further, Stalin said that he considered this proposal deserving the most serious attention; that he ordered Vatutin to prepare and report his thoughts on the Voronezh Front to Headquarters ...

I replied that the instructions would be followed, and I noticed that it would be much more profitable for us if the enemy warned us with their offensive, which, according to all reports, should be expected in the very near future ... With such thoughts, I left the Voronezh Front on June 22 . ^[6] (p. 312)

Moscow . An exhibition of captured weapons captured from the enemy in 1941–43 opened in Moscow.

On June 22, a Decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus (Bolsheviks) on measures to further deploy the partisan movement in the western regions of Belarus was issued.

Berlin June 22, Hitler issued an order in which he demanded not to stop at nothing to increase the combat effectiveness of the army. "I propose," the order said, "to the commanders-in-chief, corps and division commanders, if necessary, to act mercilessly and report to me about special cases of failure to complete the task so that I can immediately take the necessary measures." ^[2] (p. 243)

Sovinformburo . During June 22, no significant changes took place at the front.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command . By the decision of the General Headquarters of June 23, Colonel General I. S. Konev was appointed commander of the troops of the Steppe Military District, with his release from the post of commander of the North-Western Front.

Sovinformburo . During June 23, there were no significant changes at the front.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus (Bolsheviks) adopted a decree “On the destruction of enemy railroad communications by the rail war method”, which proposed a plan for the mass destruction of rails in the occupied territory, which went down in history under the name “ Rail War ”. It was supposed that a simultaneous mass strike would make hundreds of thousands of railroads unusable and thereby make it impossible for the enemy to quickly restore the railways. The Rail War was to be accompanied by train wrecks, bridge explosions, and destruction of station structures. In addition to the Belarusian partisans, the Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol and part of the Ukrainian partisans were involved in this operation by decision of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement.

Sovinformburo . During June 24, nothing significant happened at the front.

Sovinformburo . During June 25, nothing significant happened at the front.

Sovinformburo . During June 26, nothing significant happened at the front.

Sovinformburo . During June 27, no significant changes took place at the front.

North Caucasian Front . (see the “Blue Line” map - the defense system on the Taman Peninsula (145 KB) ) On June 28, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command set the task for the front commander: “With concentrated strikes of the main forces of the front, break open the enemy’s defenses on the Kievskoye, Moldavanskoye section and, conducting successive offensive operations, to have the ultimate goal of cleansing the area of ​​the Lower Kuban and the Taman Peninsula from the enemy. Clear the eastern bank of the river. Trigger the enemy, firmly secure him and prevent a possible breakthrough of the enemy at Anastasievskaya. Units of the 9th army continue active operations in the floodplains. At the same time, the forces of the 9th army should be ready to strike at Varenikovskaya with the development of the success of the 56th army ... To break through the enemy’s defense: deliver the main blow in the direction of Krasny and Gladkovskaya, bypassing Kievskoye from the south and Moldavanskaya from the north. The immediate task is to reach the border of Keslerovo, Novo-Mikhailovsky, collective farm named after Stalin, to continue to attack Gostagaevskaya and part of the forces on Varenikovskaya in order to assist the 9th army in capturing this area. " To ensure the most favorable starting position for the offensive, the Stavka ordered five days before the start of the main operation to conduct a private operation to capture the height of 114.1 (east of Moldavan).

However, this operation was not successful. Then the Headquarters ordered the front commander: “To suspend the actions you take, until further notice, with the aim of putting troops in order, replenishing units and formations, accumulating material resources, increasing the combat training of the troops, as well as continuously reconnaissance of the enemy, to clarify his location and intentions and to prepare troops front to continue the offensive. At the same time, it is firmly defending the current lines. ” From this period until September, the troops of the North Caucasian Front did not conduct active offensive operations, but prepared for decisive battles on the Taman Peninsula. During the offensive of the North Caucasus Front in the lower reaches of the Kuban, Soviet troops cleared a large territory of the North Caucasus and inflicted significant losses on the enemy. ^[4] (p. 342)

Sovinformburo . During June 28, there were no significant changes at the front.

Sovinformburo . During June 29, no changes occurred at the front.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command . On June 30, JV Stalin left G.K. Zhukov in the Oryol direction to coordinate the actions of the Central, Bryansk and Western fronts, and A.M. Vasilevsky was sent to the Voronezh Front.

G.K. Zhukov : “These days, being on the Central Front, I worked with K.K. Rokossovsky in the 13th Army, in the 2nd Tank Army and in reserve corps. An exceptionally high density of artillery fire was created on the site of the 13th Army, where the main blow of the enemy was expected. The 4th artillery corps of the reserve of the High Command was deployed in the Ponyrey area, which included 700 guns and mortars. All the main forces of the front artillery units and the reserve of the Supreme High Command were located here. The artillery density was increased to 92 guns and mortars per 1 kilometer of the front. ” ^[7] (p. 149)

Berlin The total irretrievable loss of Germans in manpower for the period from July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943, according to the General Staff of the German Army, amounted to 1135 thousand people. ^[8] (p. 11)

Sovinformburo . During June 30, there were no significant changes at the front.

1. The general course of hostilities in the second period of World War II. November 1942 - December 1943 421 KB
2. North Caucasus Offensive Operation (January 1 - February 4, 1943) 1.29 MB
3. The Blue Line is a defense system on the Taman Peninsula (145 KB)