The Sicilian operation, or Operation Husky, is the Second World War operation, during which the Allied forces defeated the Axis countries ( Italy and Germany ) located in Sicily and captured the island. The large-scale landings were followed by six weeks of land battles.
Sicilian Operation (Operation Husky) | |||
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Main Conflict: World War II | |||
British troops on the Sicilian coast. July 10, 1943 | |||
date | July 9 - August 17, 1943 | ||
A place | Sicily , Italy | ||
Total | Allied strategic victory | ||
Opponents | |||
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Commanders | |||
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Forces of the parties | |||
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Losses | |||
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The Sicilian operation marked the beginning of the Italian Allied campaign .
The operation began on the night of July 9-10 and ended on August 17, 1943 . At the time of the event, it was the largest naval landing operation.
The Allied Command used the experience of landing in Sicily for a larger landing in Normandy , which still remains the largest landing operation.
The operation achieved its goals: the ground, air force and naval forces of the Axis countries were knocked out of the island, the Mediterranean sea routes were opened, and the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini was removed from power. The landing of the Allied forces in Italy began .
Background
Members
The Allied forces consisted mainly of American , British and Canadian units and divisions.
Some other countries of the anti-fascist coalition also allocated air and naval forces for the operation.
American troops were represented by the 7th US Army. The 8th British Army was supported by the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, which was part of the 1st Canadian Army, based in England. The commander of the force was General Dwight Eisenhower . General Harold Alexander led the ground forces assembled in the 15th Army Group, which included the 8th British Army of General Bernard Montgomery and the 7th US Army under George Patton . The total number of Allied forces was 470,000 people [1] .
The island was defended by the 6th Italian Army of General Alfredo Guzzoni , consisting of the 12th and 16th Coast Guard Corps, four front divisions, the 14th German Panzer Corps and other army units. In total, there were 300,000 Italian and 40,000 German soldiers in Sicily, at least 147 tanks and about 220 artillery pieces. The Italians soon sent an additional 12,000 soldiers and 91 tanks.
Operation Planning
At the beginning of 1943, the leaders of the Allied countries came to the conclusion that this year the invasion of France should not take place. It was decided to land on the Italian island of Sicily, using troops participating in the North African campaign , approaching its victorious end.
The main objectives of the operation were the cleaning of Sicily from the Axis forces , the expulsion of their fleet from Sicilian waters and the free float of the Allied fleet in the Mediterranean Sea , as well as pressure on the Mussolini regime and, possibly, the withdrawal of Italy from the war. The capture of Sicily opened up the possibility of a landing in Italy itself, but at that moment the Allies did not discuss this issue: the Americans did not want to take part in any operation that could delay the landing in France .
Two possible plans for the operation were considered. According to the first, it was planned to land two armies in the west and east of Sicily, in order to then advance to the center of the island and surround the enemy troops. In this case, the Axis forces in Sicily would not only be surrounded, but also destroyed. This plan was very risky, since the two armies would not be able to support each other and could be destroyed individually. Although in North Africa the Italian troops showed themselves to be a rather weak enemy, they could pose a serious threat here, as they defended their country.
Another plan included the landing of two allied armies not far from each other, followed by further advance inland. In this case, the possibility of encircling enemy forces would be excluded.
In the end, the Allied command chose this plan as less risky.
The 7th Army was to land in the Gulf of Gela south of the center of Sicily: the 3rd Infantry Division and the 2nd Armored Division landed west of Licata, the 1st Infantry Division in the center of the bay, the 45th Infantry Division east of Skoglitti. The 82nd Airborne Division was to be thrown over the line of enemy fortifications at Jela and Scoglitti. The coastal strip, which was to occupy the 7th Army, was about 50 kilometers.
The 8th army was supposed to land in southeastern Sicily: the 30th corps landed on both sides of Cape Passero - in the most southeastern part of the island, while the 13th corps was supposed to land north in Noto Bay near Avoles . The length of the strip reserved for the landing of the 8th Army was also 50 kilometers. Thus, a gap of 40 kilometers was formed between the two armies.
After the landing, both armies were ordered to draw closer and secure most of the coastal territory. Then the 8th Army was to head north along the east coast all the way to Messina , and the 7th Army to cover the flank of the 8th Army and clear the rest of the island.
Distracting operations and their role
According to the prevailing version, in order to mislead the enemy, the British intelligence carried out two successful operations: Operation Minsmith (Minced Meat) - when a corpse in the form of an English officer carrying a briefcase was planted near the coast of Spain with "secret" documents, according to which the allies should not land in Sicily, but in Greece ; [2] and Operation Brimstone (Native Sulfur) - when the British counterintelligence captured and turned over the military intelligence agent Admiral Canaris , who was then sent with a fake document about the allegedly forthcoming capture by the Allies of Sardinia to Bulgaria , where he and his document were “Surrendered” to the Germans who did not suspect a dirty trick.
Later, a version appeared (disproving the previous one), according to which Canaris himself, in agreement with the Allies, submitted to Hitler allegedly genuine messages from his agents about the impending landing of the Allied forces in Greece and Sardinia. Hitler believed Canaris and withdrew ten divisions from Sicily. As a result, at the time of the Allied landings, only the German fifteenth motorized division and the German Goering division (there were only two battalions), four Italian battered divisions and six coastal defense divisions that did not have heavy weapons remained in Sicily.
Canadian Forces
The 1st Canadian Infantry Division was included in the allied forces at the insistence of the Canadian headquarters in England. The British replaced the Canadians with their veterans - the 3rd British Infantry Division. This replacement was approved on April 27 by General Andrew MacNaughton , commander of the 1st Canadian Army. The 1st Canadian Tank Brigade was also allocated to the reserve.
The commander of the Canadian forces at first was Major General Harry Salmon, but he died in a plane crash when the operation was still at the planning stage, and he was replaced by Major General Guy Symonds.
Despite the fact that the Canadian troops were in the UK for several years, they were mostly unshielded. Another difference between Canadians and the rest of the troops of the 15th Army Group: they never served in the Mediterranean and therefore were unaccustomed to a hot and arid climate. This fact, combined with poor supply caused by the sea losses of the Allies, led to the fact that after the landing the Canadian forces were suspended for several days so that the soldiers received the necessary rest.
Fighting
Landing and fighting on the coast
A strong wind blew on the day of landing. This interfered with the operation, but contributed to the surprise. A landing force landed on the southern and eastern coast of Sicily: British troops in the east, and American troops in the center of the island. Canadian troops in the face of stubborn resistance of the enemy landed near the village of Pacino.
On the night of July 9-10, the Allies fired four airborne assaults.
The American landing force consisted mainly of the 505th Parachute Regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division; this was his first throw.
A strong wind turned out to be a serious obstacle: many Allied aircraft deviated from the course. Half of the American paratroopers could not reach their destinations. The actions of the British landing, dropped from the gliders , also left much to be desired. In addition, only twelve gliders reached the target, many gliders fell into the sea and the paratroopers inside them drowned.
Despite the setbacks, the dispersed units of the paratroopers, taking advantage of the surprise, attacked the enemy patrols and confused the enemy.
Due to bad weather, a significant part of the troops landed not where it was planned, in violation of these military formations, and besides, six hours later. Nevertheless, on the way to Syracuse, the British almost met no resistance.
Canadians are faced with the ever-increasing resistance of Italians, who have sat on the hills. They were even thrown back to the coastline, but the massive allied replenishment stopped the Italian counterattack, and the Canadians were able to move forward.
In the central part of the coast, at the place of the Americans landing, the Italians, moving along the 115th and 117th highways, were able to organize a serious counterattack by the forces of the division right in the place where the paratroopers were supposed to land.
Near the landing of the Americans, only one German Goering division was in readiness for defense, which included very few infantry. Having hardly walked from Caltagirone with her Tigers , PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV through the narrow streets of several villages, she, together with the Italian division Livorno , attacked the Americans who landed in the Dzhela area on the morning of July 11 and even forced them to return to the ships at some points. Then she turned east to strike at an enemy advancing towards the Comiso airfield, but she was not successful here. Nevertheless, she achieved a lot. It was, of course, beyond her power to dump into the sea an enemy who had landed at the front over 150 km. But the rapid emergence of German units served as a warning to the enemy, forcing him to cautious actions, and in this sense the goal was fully achieved [3] . The guns of the ships USS Shubrick (DD-639) and USS Boise (CL-47) destroyed several tanks, in total, according to Patton, the Germans lost 11 [4] .
On July 11, Patton ordered the regiments of paratroopers in reserve to eject and strengthen the center of the coast captured by then. However, not all Allied forces were informed of this decision, and the British Royal Navy opened fire on S-47 aircraft carrying assault forces. As a result, 23 aircraft were shot down, 318 people were injured by fire on their own , 83 of them died [5] .
Island Fights
Initially, plans to continue the battle immediately after the landing were not developed: the commander of the army group Harold Alexander did not draw up a plan for the further offensive. As a result, the Allies had to advance almost without interaction. Only the required gap between the armies was established in advance. However, in the first two days of the offensive, the troops advanced rapidly and captured Vidzini in the west and Augusta in the east.
Soon, enemy resistance in the British sector began to increase. Montgomery persuaded Alexander to change the distance between the Allied armies so that the British could bypass the centers of resistance and play a decisive role in the capture of Messina , while American troops would cover the British flank. The historian Carlo D'Este called this step the grossest strategic mistake in the entire campaign. As a result, the 45th US Infantry Division had to go back to the coast near Jela and then head northwest. Thus, the 14th German tank corps managed to retreat, escaping encirclement. This decision served as the main cause of serious conflict between Montgomery and the commander of the 2nd American Corps, Omar Bradley . Patton, however, did not dispute this decision.
On July 13, a meeting was held at the headquarters of the Fuhrer. Hitler said that the situation in Sicily, where the Western powers landed on July 10, became serious. The Italians did not fight at all. The island is likely to be lost. The next step of the enemy could be a landing in the Balkans or in southern Italy, so it is necessary to form new armies there. The eastern front must give up some of the strength, and therefore the operation "Citadel" can not continue longer [6] .
On July 14, Mussolini, worried about the situation in Sicily, the capture of Augusta and Syracuse, sent a note to the Chief of General Staff Ambrosio , noting that the situation is critical. The reports of the British and Americans about the victories on the island were causing depression. The enemy possessed absolute superiority at sea and in the air, quickly moving deep into the Sicilian defensive line. The Italian forces intensified chaos and confusion. Duce did not know about the movements and condition of the divisions German Goering, Livorno, Naples, Assieta and Aosta. As an action plan, it was prescribed "to resist on land at all costs and to prevent the receipt of enemy supplies by intensive use of our naval and air forces" [7] . The latter was unrealistic. An advocacy campaign to strengthen the morale of civilians and soldiers crashed.
On the west coast of Sicily, Italians managed to restrain the American offensive in the area of Catastrophilippo - Naro ; The 35th battalion battalion showed great courage and stubbornness in defense, although it was soon defeated by the superior forces of the Americans and the power of their fire. On the Naro River, the 73rd battalion battalion and the remnants of the 35th and 160th coastal artillery battalions also defended themselves courageously. It was evident that not all troops standing on the defensive lost their desire to fight.
After a week of fighting, Patton began to look for a more serious goal for his army. He decided to take the capital of Sicily, Palermo . After sending a reconnaissance detachment to the Agrigento area that successfully captured the city, Patton formed a temporary corps and persuaded Alexander to let him continue the offensive. At first, Alexander agreed and gave the order to continue the offensive, but soon changed his mind and canceled his order. Patton ignored the cancellation of the order, saying that "the order to cancel the order was distorted during transmission by radio." Therefore, by the time the “misunderstanding” situation had cleared up, Patton’s troops were already at the gates of Palermo. Захват города не имел большого значения, но быстрое продвижение американцев продемонстрировало их мобильность.
Падение Палермо показало итальянцам и немцам, что Сицилия для них потеряна. Войска стран Оси отступили в Мессину, чтобы эвакуироваться в континентальную Италию. Однако это не убедило итальянцев в том, что они проиграли войну. Для многих командиров союзных войск это было большой неожиданностью, поскольку они полагали, что потеря Сицилии и колоний приведёт к выходу Италии из войны.
После захвата Палермо Паттоном и в связи с тем, что английские войска завязли в боях южнее Мессины, Александер отдал приказ о совместном англо-американском наступлении на город. Однако 24 июля Монтгомери предложил Паттону взять город силами 7-й армии США, так как она находилась в стратегически более выгодном положении, чем английские войска под Мессиной. Тем временем войска «Оси» приготовили сильную линию обороны вокруг Мессины, так называемую «линию Этны», целью которой было обеспечение организованного отступления итальянских и немецких войск на материковую Италию.
Паттон начал наступление на Троину . Она являлась важным опорным пунктом в немецко-итальянской обороне, и войска противника удерживали её с большим упорством. Несмотря на удачные военные действия союзников, немцам и итальянцам удалось спасти костяк своих войск и осуществить планы по организованной эвакуации с острова. После того, как эвакуировались все войска, не занятые в обороне Троины, остатки итало-немецких войск под покровом ночи также начали переправляться в материковую Италию. Союзники не следили за перемещениями противника, поэтому эвакуация прошла успешно. Части 3-й пехотной дивизии США вступили в Мессину всего лишь через несколько часов после того, как её покинул последний солдат противника. Так части генерала Паттона закончили бросок на Мессину.
Results
Потери немцев и итальянцев составили 29 000 человек убитыми, 140 000 (в основном итальянцы) были взяты в плен. Американские войска потеряли 2237 человек убитыми, 6544 человек были ранены и взяты в плен; 2721 британских солдат погибли, 10 122 солдата были ранены и взяты в плен; потери канадских войск составили 562 погибших и 1848 раненых и взятых в плен.
Для многих американских подразделений, а также для всего канадского контингента это было первое сражение, в котором они участвовали.
Джон Фуллер указал, что немецкие части сумели отойти почти беспрепятственно, и это в условиях, когда их противник абсолютного господствовал в воздухе [8] . Лиддел Гарт также написал, что резко пересечённая горная местность на северо-востоке Сицилии благоприятствовала ведению сдерживающих действий. Отходя, немецкие войска сокращали фронт обороны, облегчая себе ведение боя, в то время как наступавшим союзным войскам всё труднее становилось использовать свое численное превосходство. Отвод немецко-итальянских войск в Италию был осуществлён за 6 суток, причём без серьёзных помех со стороны авиации и флота союзников. К счастью для Кессельринга, союзное верховное командование не попыталось осуществить высадку десанта в Калабрии на южной оконечности Италии, то есть в тылу немецких войск, находившихся в Сицилии, с целью не допустить их отвод через Мессинский пролив [9] .
Союзники учли ошибки при высадке десанта и случай ведения огня по своим. Было улучшено взаимодействие между частями и подразделениями, усилена подготовка десантников, сделаны корректировки в применении этого вида войск.
Улучшенные возможности воздушного десанта пригодились союзникам при проведении операции «Оверлорд» , а также в десантных операциях в Италии и Южной Франции.
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See also
- Battle of Kursk
Notes
- ↑ 1 2 3 Нимиц Ч. У. , Поттер Э. Б. Война на море (1939-1945). — Смоленск : Русич , 1999. — С. 219. — ISBN 5-88590-970-9
- ↑ Смолян Г. Рефлексивное управление — технология принятия манипулятивных решений. (рус.) // Труды Института системного анализа РАН : журнал. — 2013. — Т. 63 , № 2 . — С. 54—61 . — ISSN 2079-0279 .
- ↑ Курт фон Типпельскирх. История Второй мировой войны
- ↑ Паттон Дж. Война, какой я её знал. Операция «Хаски». Вторжение на Сицилию
- ↑ James Jay Carafano. A Serious Second Front // GI ingenuity: improvisation, technology, and winning World War II . — Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006. — P. 100. — 262 p. — ISBN 0275986985 .
- ↑ Эрих фон Манштейн. Утерянные победы
- ↑ Муссолини Б. Мемуары 1942—1943. — М., 2004. — С. 82—84
- ↑ Вторая мировая война 1939—1945 гг. Стратегический и тактический обзор
- ↑ Вторая мировая война. Глава 26. Вторжение на европейский континент через Сицилию
- ↑ Люфтваффе: триумф и поражение. Воспоминания фельдмаршала Третьего рейха. 1933—1947 . Дата обращения 23 августа 2019.
- ↑ Ни страха, ни надежды. Хроника Второй мировой войны глазами немецкого генерала. 1940—1945 . Дата обращения 30 августа 2019.
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