Small October

The Kazakhs were indifferent to both the overthrow of the monarchy in Russia and the establishment of Soviet power. Bolsheviks had no leverage over the nomadic population, which, unlike the working central regions of the country, was not dependent on a centralized distribution system of goods. The main support of the Bolsheviks in the region was the small Kazakh intelligentsia, which supported them only on the basis of broad autonomy and non-interference in the traditional life of the republic.

All this gave reason to the central authorities to consider Kazakhstan a potentially low-loyal territory, and its leadership - unreliable. The central authorities also had certain types of livestock, which was in the hands of Kazakh clans and tribes . A significant part of the Kazakhs led a nomadic lifestyle. According to the 1926 census, only 23% of aul farms were completely settled ^[1] .

The editor- in -chief of the literary magazine Prostor Valery Mikhailov:

... Another point. For some reason, when we talk about hunger in the steppe, the famine of the 30s is immediately implied. But in Kazakhstan it was the second famine. The first was in 1919-1922. Therefore, when researchers will deal with this problem, they should divide it into the first and second periods. The first famine was also terrible. He touched more on the southern region, although all residents of Kazakhstan were affected to one degree or another. If in the 30s, according to various estimates, from 1.5 to 2 million people died, then in the first famine - about one million people. So the Kazakhs, indeed, for some 10-15 years lost about half of the population. World history does not know a tragedy of this magnitude. And every Kazakh is simply obliged to know, remember about this tragedy ... ^[2]

In the fall of 1925, Philip Isaevich Goloshchekin became the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Goloshchekin immediately after arriving in Kyzyl-Orda in December 1925, speaking at a party conference in Kyzyl-Orda, said that before his arrival in Kazakhstan there was no Soviet power. In his statement, he emphasized that he would have to start from scratch, crossing out the work done by his predecessors. By the 10th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1927, Goloshchekin was the author of two works - “ Kazakhstan at the October Review ” and “ 10 Years of Soviet Power ”, where he justifies the need for escalation of emergency, literally calling for the idea of ​​a civil war in the aul. Goloshchekin sent a letter addressed to Stalin , where he substantiated the need for holding the “Small October” in Kazakhstan and asked for "good" for this event. ^[3] . The next step was to become a mass transition of Kazakhs to settled.

Knowing full well that these events would provoke a protest from the side of local communists, Goloshchekin began a struggle with those party leaders who did not share his views. Already in 1926, S. Sadvakasov and S. Khodzhanov were accused of "national deviation". S.Seifullin , M. Murzagaliev, N. Nurmakov , S. Mendeshev and others were persecuted. Many of them were removed from the republic. Zh. Sultanov, S. Sadvakasov, Zh. Mynbaev removed from their posts. At the end of 1928, the first arrests of political opponents of Goloshchekin began, including A. Baitursynov , M. Dulatov , J. Aymauytov , M. Zhumabaev . Two years later, M. Tynyshpayev , Zh. Dosmukhamedov , X. Dosmukhamedov and many other representatives of the national intelligentsia were arrested.

Goloshchekin began to implement his idea of ​​“Small October”. In 1926-1927, a redistribution of arable and pasture lands was carried out. About 1 360 thousand acres of hayfields and 1,250 thousand acres of arable land were taken from wealthy farms and transferred to the poor and middle peasants. The next step was the confiscation of the property of large bais and sultans, cattle owners with their eviction together with their families outside the areas of residence. On May 3, 1928, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution on the need to confiscate property and evict large herders ^[4] .

On August 28, 1928, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic issued a Decree "On Confiscation of Bai Farms", which provided for "the eviction of those largest cattle breeders from the indigenous population, who, while maintaining semi-feudal, patriarchal and clan relations, impede the sovietization of the aul with their property and social influence" ^{[ 5]} . The decree applied to the whole of Soviet Kazakhstan, except for the Adaevsky District , the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Region and the cotton-growing areas of the former Dzhetysuy and Syrdarya provinces ^[5] . Also issued was the Decree of the CEC and the Council of People's Commissars of the KASSR of September 13, 1928 "On criminal liability for counteracting confiscation and eviction of the largest and semi-feudal riot" ^[6] .

To confiscate the property of large herders, it was established ^[7] :

• Evict with confiscation of livestock 600 families. These include Tore sultan and khan descendants, former volost rulers who received awards from the tsarist government and large “buy-semi-feudal lords” who owned a huge number of cattle. Large farms in nomadic areas included families with more than 400 head of cattle (in terms of large), in semi-nomadic - more than 300, in the rest - more than 150 heads;
• Special district confiscation commissions were created, to which the police were subordinate.

In his message, the head of "Kaznarhozchet" Mukhtar Samatov reported that the population of Kazakhstan decreased by 971 thousand people. As it turned out, Soviet leaders deliberately underestimated the loss of population from starvation. At the end of the 1937 census, Stalin, instead of population growth, discovered his decline. Stalin expressed indignation and distrust of the outcome of the work of the census takers and everyone who took part in it, ordered them to be declared "enemies of the people." Among the first was Mukhtar Samatov and his immediate superior, the head of the All-Union Economic Accounting - Caraval. In addition, in Kazakhstan, without exception, all regional and district leaders of economic accounting were shot - supposedly they intentionally reduced the number of population and thereby played into the hands of the enemies of the USSR ^[8] .

During the collectivization , animal husbandry suffered enormous losses: from 1928 to 1932 the number of cattle decreased from 6 million 509 thousand to 965 thousand heads, sheep - from 18 million 566 thousand to 1 million 386 thousand heads, horses - from 3 million 616 thousand to 416 thousand heads, camels - from 1 million 42 thousand to 63 thousand heads. ^[9] .

For "arbitrariness", F. Goloshchekin in October 1939 was arrested on charges of anti-Soviet activity and excesses in collectivization. He spent two years in a pre-trial detention center. In October 1941, he was transferred to Kuibyshev and executed there. The indictment states that he ^[10]

"Exposed in the fact that he was a member of an anti-Soviet organization, fought against the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and was engaged in pederasty ..."

• Famine in the USSR (1932-1933)
• Famine in Kazakhstan (1919-1922)
• Famine in Kazakhstan (1932-1933)
• Hunger in Ukraine (1932-1933)

• "Small October" and collectivization in Kazakhstan
• Untimely notes. About the Holodomor, about grief, about the tragedies of the era.